Laud Williams, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Laud Williams appeals his conviction and corresponding sentence for one count of rape, as a Level 3 felony.¹ We affirm.

Issues

[2] Williams raises two issues for our review, which we revise and restate as the following three issues:

1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his convictions.

2. Whether the court abused its discretion when it sentenced him.

3. Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] J.B. was born in 2008, and, in approximately 2020, he became a ward of the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”). J.B. had a “history of running away,” and he would be “disobedient[,]” so he was placed in “a lot of different foster homes and facilities” over the next few years. Tr. Vol. 2 at 9.

[4] In May 2022, DCS placed J.B. with Williams. Five days later, J.B. reported that Williams had “put his mouth ․ on [J.B.’s] penis.” Id. at 10. J.B. was removed from Williams’ care and placed in an emergency shelter. Thereafter, he went to a mental health facility. He was there for approximately thirty days, but he felt like the people there were “treating [him] like ․ [he] was insane.” Id. at 12. J.B. wanted to leave, so he “changed his story” and told someone that he had “lied about the sexual contact and that it had never happened[.]” Id. at 11-12. J.B. left the facility and went to a long-term foster home.

[5] After a few months at the long-term home, J.B. had his phone taken away after receiving bad grades. He “didn't like the discipline that was being given to” him, so he ran away. Id. at 13. J.B. slept in a tent in a “homeless camp,” until he was ultimately found by law enforcement and DCS. Id. DCS then placed J.B. back with Williams on April 1, 2023. At that time, J.B. was fourteen years old.

[6] At approximately 4:00 a.m. on a Monday “shortly after being placed” in Williams’ care, J.B. was in the living room watching TV and trying to sleep. Id. at 15. Williams was “keeping [J.B.] up” and “engaging in horseplay” with him, but it was “nothing sexual.” Id. at 16. J.B. went to lie down on the couch, but Williams asked J.B. if he wanted “to lay [sic] down in ․ [Williams’] room.” Id. at 18. Williams then “guided” J.B. to his room. Id. at 19. J.B. got on the bed and got “comfortable.” Id. With “no explanation at all,” Williams “pounced” on J.B. Id. J.B. was “moving around a lot” and “trying to get out of the situation,” but Williams “got on top of” J.B. and “push[ed] his weight” on J.B.’s body. Id. at 19-20. J.B. “struggle[d]” and tried to get out from underneath Williams, but he was not able to. Id. at 20.

[7] Williams then “began to pull” J.B.’s pants down. Id. J.B. “tr[ied] to prevent” that from happening, but Williams removed J.B.’s pants and underwear. Id. J.B. knew that Williams had “a gun in his room,” and he was “afraid” that Williams “might hurt [him] in some way.” Id. at 21. After Williams removed J.B.’s shorts and underwear, Williams “put his dick in [J.B.’s] butthole” and moved it “in and out.” Id. at 22-23. J.B. “struggle[ ]d with [Williams] in those moments,” and he “was crying and just yelling.” Id. at 23. Williams then put J.B.’s “penis in his mouth.” Id. at 22. And Williams “pushed [J.B.] over” and “forced” J.B. to “put ․ [his] penis in [Williams’] butt.” Id. at 24-25. The “whole thing” lasted for about ten minutes. Id. at 26. Afterward, J.B. went to the bathroom, “wiped [himself] off,” and went to sleep in his room. Id.

[8] The next morning, Williams and J.B. went to pick up J.B.’s foster brother, who had spent the previous evening away from the house. Later that day, J.B. told his foster brother about what had occurred the prior night. J.B. and his foster brother then left Williams’ house and walked down the street to the home of a school counselor. J.B. reported the incident, and the counselor's husband called the police.

[9] An officer from the local sheriff's department picked J.B. up and took him to a hospital. Detective Brock Russell with the Indiana State Police went to the hospital and interviewed J.B. J.B. was “unsatisfied with the result” of his first report in 2022, and he “didn't trust the system to investigate” his claims. Id. at 47. So he “made up stuff” and additionally told Detective Russell that Williams had kissed him “all over” and placed handcuffs on him. Id. at 45.

[10] After his interview with Detective Russell, J.B. submitted to an examination by a sexual assault nurse examiner (“SANE”). The SANE noted that J.B. was “very withdrawn” and “fidgeting with his hands[.]” Id. at 60. She then observed that J.B. had “some redness” in his mouth and “some purple and red bruising to the anal folds.” Id. at 62-63. The SANE then directed J.B. to swab areas to collect DNA, and the swabs taken from J.B.’s scrotum and underwear had DNA from both J.B. and Williams.

[11] The State charged Williams with rape, as a Level 3 felony; sexual misconduct with a minor, as a Level 4 felony;² and sexual battery, as a Level 6 felony.³ Following a bench trial, the court found Williams guilty on all three counts but, due to double jeopardy concerns, only entered judgment of conviction against Williams for rape. The court then held a sentencing hearing and found the following aggravating factors: that Williams was in a position of care, custody, or control over J.B.; that J.B. was fourteen years old; that J.B. was “particularly vulnerable after having been placed in numerous foster case placements while under the care and control” of DCS; that Williams “forced [J.B.] to perform or submit to multiple acts”; and that Williams is a “Very High Risk to reoffend[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 68. The court then found as a mitigating factor that Williams has no history of delinquency or criminal activity. Accordingly, the court sentenced Williams to fifteen years, with fourteen years executed in the Department of Correction and one year suspended to probation. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Sufficiency of the Evidence

[12] Williams first contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction for rape. Our standard of review on a claim of insufficient evidence is well settled:

For a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we look only at the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We do not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence. Id. We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017).

[13] To demonstrate that Williams committed rape, as a Level 3 felony, the State was required to show that he had knowingly or intentionally had sexual intercourse with J.B. or caused J.B. to perform or submit to other sexual conduct when J.B. was “compelled by force or imminent threat of force.” Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1(a)(1). On appeal, we first address Williams’ brief contention that the lack of “definitive forensic evidence combined with J.B.’s inconsistent testimony leaves significant doubt as to whether” the sexual conduct occurred. Appellant's Br. at 14.

[14] In particular, Williams alleges that J.B.’s testimony at trial differed in part from what he told the officer at the hospital, which “cast[s] doubt on the credibility of his account.” Id. at 14. And he asserts that the “DNA evidence presented at trial was inconclusive” because there was evidence that it “could have resulted from transference rather than direct sexual contact.” Id. However, both of those arguments are merely requests for this court to judge the credibility of witnesses and reweigh evidence, which we cannot do. J.B. acknowledged that he had lied to officers about certain details because he was concerned that the officers would not investigate his claims, and the court nonetheless determined that he was a credible witness. Similarly, while the court heard evidence that DNA can be transferred by picking up something that someone else had touched, the court clearly determined that that was not what happened here. We cannot now reassess the court's determinations. Rather, the evidence most favorable to the judgment demonstrates that Williams engaged in multiple acts of sexual conduct with J.B.

[15] We next turn to Williams’ argument that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to show that J.B. was compelled by force to submit to sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct. As this Court has recently stated:

The “force necessary to sustain a rape conviction need not be physical, but ․ it may be inferred from the circumstances.” Bryant v. State, 644 N.E.2d 859, 860 (Ind. 1994). The presence or absence of force is determined from the victim's perspective, not the defendant's. Tobias v. State, 666 N.E.2d 68, 72 (Ind. 1996). “This test is subjective and looks to the victim's perception of the circumstances surrounding the incident in question.” E.S. v. State, 198 N.E.3d 701, 703 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citation omitted).

Morales v. State, 227 N.E.3d 183, 189 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied.

[16] Williams maintains that “J.B.’s subjective perception of the situation fails to meet the statutory requirement” for forceful compulsion because his “own testimony reveals that he entered Williams’ bedroom willingly, was not physically restrained, and did not attempt to leave.” Appellant's Br. at 11. And he contends that “J.B. explicitly stated that Williams did not make any threats or display any force during the encounter.” Id.

[17] However, the evidence most favorable to the judgment shows that, after Williams “guided” J.B. into Williams’ room, Williams “pounced” on J.B. and “push[ed] his weight upon [J.B.’s] body.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 19-20. J.B. “struggle[d] against [Williams], trying to get out,” but he was not able to. Id. at 20. Williams then began to pull down J.B.’s pants and underwear. J.B. “tr[ied] to prevent him” from doing so but was unsuccessful. Id. Then, when Williams inserted his penis into J.B.’s anus, J.B. “struggle[ ]d with [Williams] in those moments” and “was crying and just yelling.” Id. at 23. And Williams “pushed [J.B.] over” and “forced” J.B. to “put ․ [his] penis in [Williams’] butt.” Id. at 24-25. J.B. was “afraid” that Williams “might hurt [him] in some way,” and he knew that Williams “had a gun in his room.” Id. at 21.

[18] Stated differently, J.B. struggled to get away from Williams both before and during the offenses, and he was afraid that Williams would harm him. While there may not have been any explicit threats of force, there was a physical struggle, and Williams forced J.B. to submit to the sexual acts. As outlined above, the force “may be inferred from the circumstances.” Morales, 227 N.E.3d at 189. And the test is a subjective one that “looks to the victim's perception of the circumstances[.]” Id. We hold that a reasonable fact-finder could readily infer from that evidence that J.B. subjectively believed that Williams had used force to compel him to submit to sexual intercourse and other sexual conduct. We therefore affirm Williams’ conviction.

Issue Two: Abuse of Discretion in Sentencing

[19] Williams next asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him.⁴ Sentencing decisions lie within the sound discretion of the trial court. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Gross v. State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citation omitted), trans. denied. A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing if it does any of the following:

(1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all;” (2) enters “a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence—including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any—but the record does not support the reasons;” (3) enters a sentencing statement that “omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration;” or (4) considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.”

Id. (quoting Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-491 (Ind.), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)).

[20] The sentencing range for a Level 3 felony is three years to sixteen years, with an advisory sentence of nine years. I.C. § 35-50-2-5(b). Here, the court identified as aggravating factors that Williams was in a position of having care, custody, or control over J.B.; that J.B. was fourteen years old; that J.B. was “particularly vulnerable” after having been placed in numerous foster care placements; that he had forced J.B. to submit to “multiple sexual acts”; and that Williams was a very high risk to reoffend. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 68. As a mitigating factor, the court identified Williams’ lack of criminal history. Accordingly, the court imposed a near-maximum sentence of fifteen years, with fourteen years executed and one year suspended to probation.

[21] On appeal, Williams challenges the court's identification of J.B.’s vulnerability and his high likelihood to reoffend as aggravating factors. However, both factors are clearly supported by the record. Indeed, J.B. had been through numerous foster homes by the time he arrived at Williams’ house, and it goes without saying that foster children are some of the most vulnerable people in our society. Contrary to Williams’ assertion, the fact that DCS returned J.B. to Williams’ house a second time following an unsubstantiated report of abuse does not change the fact that J.B. was vulnerable because of his status as a foster child. And Williams’ Indiana Risk Assessment System score showed that he is a very high risk to reoffend. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 65.

[22] In any event, even if the court erred when it identified those aggravators, “one valid aggravating factor is enough to enhance a sentence.” Harris v. State, 163 N.E.3d 938, 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. Further, it is well settled that, where the trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing a defendant, we need not remand for resentencing if we can “say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it properly considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. Here, in addition to the challenged aggravators, the court also identified as aggravating Williams’ position of care, custody, and control over J.B.; that J.B. was only fourteen years old at the time of the offense; and that Williams forced J.B. to submit to multiple acts. Based on those aggravators, we can say with confidence that, even if the court had considered only those aggravators, it would have imposed the same sentence.

[23] Still, much of Williams’ argument on this issue is that the trial court did not give enough weight to his lack of criminal history and that the court gave too much weight to the other factors despite his lack of criminal history. But a “trial court no longer has any obligation to ‘weigh’ aggravating and mitigating factors against each other when imposing a sentence.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. As such, “a trial court can not now be said to have abused its discretion in failing to ‘properly weigh’ such factors.” Id. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Williams.

Issue Three: Appropriateness of Sentence

[24] Finally, Williams contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that “[t]he Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” This Court has recently held that “[t]he advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Sanders v. State, 71 N.E.3d 839, 844 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). And the Indiana Supreme Court has recently explained that:

The principal role of appellate review should be to attempt to leaven the outliers ․ but not achieve a perceived “correct” result in each case. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). Defendant has the burden to persuade us that the sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate. Anglemyer [868 N.E.2d at 494].

Shoun v. State, 67 N.E.3d 635, 642 (Ind. 2017) (omission in original).

[25] Indiana's flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate sentence to the circumstances presented, and the trial court's judgment “should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222. Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate at the end of the day turns on “our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other facts that come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224. The question is not whether another sentence is more appropriate, but rather whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Deference to the trial court “prevail[s] unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[26] Here, again, the court imposed a near-maximum sentence of fifteen years, with fourteen years executed and one year suspended to probation. On appeal, Williams contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense because the “allegations against [him] are not supported by strong evidence for force or threats” such that the “gravity of the offenses is overstated.” Appellant's Br. at 17. And he maintains that his sentence is inappropriate in light of his character because he has a “clean record.” Id.

[27] However, Williams has not met his burden on appeal to demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate. With respect to the nature of the offense, Williams forced J.B. to engage in several acts of sexual conduct. Further, J.B. was only fourteen years old. And, most notably, J.B. was Williams’ foster son, and J.B. had only recently been placed with Williams when the offense occurred. Williams has not presented compelling evidence portraying the nature of the offense in a positive light. See Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

[28] As for his character, we acknowledge that Williams does not have a criminal history. However, we agree with the State that Williams’ “character is that of a predator.” Appellee's Br. at 22. Again, Williams took in a young foster child and forced him to submit to several sexual acts. Williams has not presented compelling evidence of substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character. See Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122. We cannot say that Williams’ sentence is inappropriate in light of his character.

Conclusion

[29] The State presented sufficient evidence to support Williams’ conviction. In addition, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Williams and Williams’ sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. We therefore affirm his conviction and sentence.

[30] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1(a)(1).

2.   I.C. § 35-42-4-9(a).

3.   I.C. § 35-42-4-8(a)(1)(A).

4.   Williams does not make a separate argument on this issue but, rather, includes it with his argument that his sentence is inappropriate.

Bailey, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and DeBoer concur. Vaidik, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.