WALKER v. BLAKE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] H.B. Walker (“Walker”) appeals the trial court's decision to deny his motion to correct error as untimely under Trial Rule 59(C). Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion as untimely, we affirm. To the extent Walker invites us to reach the merits of the underlying judgment, for which there is no timely Notice of Appeal, we decline to reach the merits.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On December 16, 2015, Walker entered into a land sale contract (“the Contract”) with Brian Blake and Diane Palermo Blake (collectively, “the Blakes”) for the purchase of real estate in Fort Wayne. Under the Contract, Walker was to make an initial down payment, then pay monthly installments over the next five years with a final balloon payment due on or before March 5, 2017. The Contract contemplated the possibility of additional time for Walker to pay the balance, specifying that, if Walker could not secure financing to make the final payment, but was otherwise in good standing, the Contract would “renew for [an] additional 5 years at 8% interest.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 29. It is undisputed that the Contract renewed for an additional five years.

[3] On March 27, 2023, the Blakes filed a complaint alleging Walker was in default because he failed to make the final payment. As a remedy, the Blakes sought foreclosure. Walker initially represented himself and filed his Answer on April 17, 2023. On November 20, 2023, the Blakes moved for summary judgment. In support, they designated evidence that the final payment was due on or before March 5, 2022; Walker failed to make that payment; and this was an event of default authorizing the remedy of foreclosure. Walker soon obtained counsel and filed a response. In March 2024, the trial court held a hearing.

[4] On April 1, 2024, the trial court granted summary judgment to the Blakes. Thirty-one days later—on May 2, 2024—Walker filed a motion to correct error. Therein, Walker focused on the merits of the summary judgment ruling, without addressing the timing of the motion to correct error. On May 8, 2024, the trial court denied Walker's motion to correct error “as untimely” for failure to comply with the deadline set forth in Trial Rule 59(C). Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 11. On May 20, 2024, Walker filed a motion to reconsider. Therein, Walker acknowledged that Trial Rule 59(C) establishes a thirty-day period for filing a timely motion to correct error. Walker claimed the thirty-day timeline should commence when counsel learns of the judgment, rather than when the judgment is entered in the CCS. Walker attached a document indicating that his counsel received notice of the judgment at 3:38 a.m. on April 2, which he argued made the May 2 motion timely. The trial court denied the motion to reconsider on May 21, 2024. The trial court referred to Trial Rule 59(C) and stated that a motion to correct error must be filed “not later than 30 days after the entry of the judgment noted in the CCS,” which, in this case, meant that the thirty-day period “expired on May 1, 2024.” Id. at 13. The court added that “[n]owhere in the rule does it contemplate the date counsel received the notice and, therefore, the fact that the notice was sent in the early morning hours of April 2, 2024, does not change the date the [o]rder was entered on the [CCS].” Id. Walker now appeals, having filed his Notice of Appeal on June 7, 2024.

Discussion and Decision

[5] We review a ruling on a motion to correct error for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Coronado v. Coronado, 243 N.E.3d 1121, 1124 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). To the extent the trial court's ruling turns on a question of law, our review is de novo. Id. Furthermore, “[w]e review de novo questions involving the interpretation of the Indiana Trial Rules.” Lutheran Health Network of Ind., LLC v. Bauer, 139 N.E.3d 269, 281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), reh'g denied. “The rules of statutory construction are applicable to the interpretation of trial rules.” Coronado, 243 N.E.3d at 1124. Our objective is “to ascertain and give effect to the intent underlying the rule.” Id. (quoting Carter-McMahon v. McMahon, 815 N.E.2d 170, 175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)). To the extent a rule “has not previously been construed,” the “express language of the rule controls the interpretation.” Id. at 1125 (quoting Carter-McMahon, 815 N.E.2d at 175). Furthermore, so long as the language of the rule is “clear and unambiguous,” the rule “is not subject to judicial interpretation.” Id. (quoting Carter-McMahon, 815 N.E.2d at 175).

[6] This case involves the interpretation and application of Trial Rule 59(C), which provides in pertinent part as follows: “The motion to correct error, if any, must be filed not later than thirty (30) days after the entry of a final judgment is noted in the Chronological Case Summary.” Here, the CCS reflected that the trial court granted summary judgment to the Blakes on April 1, 2024, and this was a final judgment. Based on the timing of that CCS entry, for Walker to file a timely motion to correct error under Trial Rule 59(C), Walker needed to file the motion “not later than thirty ․ days after” April 1, 2024. Walker failed to do so, instead moving to correct error on May 2, 2024, which was one day late. The trial court denied Walker's belated motion, citing his “failure to comply with the deadline set forth in Trial Rule 59(C).” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 11.

[7] On appeal, Walker essentially asks us to disregard the plain language of Trial Rule 59(C)—which specifically directs that the thirty-day time period commences upon the entry of the order on the CCS—and instead calculate this period based on when “[c]ounsel received notice of the court's order[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 9. In his argument section, Walker does not cite Trial Rule 59(C) or any case applying this rule.¹ Walker instead refers to general principles of due process. Without explaining how these principles affect the interpretation of Trial Rule 59(C), Walker baldly asserts that his proffered timeline is proper because “courts on appeal continue to feel a noticed[-]base approach is the way to go.” Appellant's Br. p. 9.

[8] In his limited briefing, Walker has not established that the timeline set forth in Trial Rule 59(C) offends principles of due process. Thus, based on the record—which disclosed that Walker did not timely move to correct error—we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to correct error as untimely. Next, to the extent Walker invites us to reach the merits, we note that Walker timely appealed the denial of his motion to correct error, but he did not timely appeal the order granting summary judgment to the Blakes. Indiana Appellate Rule 9(A) provides that “[a] party initiates an appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal ․ within thirty (30) days after the entry of a Final Judgment is noted in the Chronological Case Summary,” specifying that the deadline for pursuing an appeal is extended only “if any party file[d] a timely motion to correct error[.]” (emphasis added). As earlier discussed, Walker did not file a timely motion to correct error. Moreover, although the trial court entered its final judgment on April 1, 2024, Walker did not file his Notice of Appeal until June 7, 2024, which was outside the deadline established in Appellate Rule 9(A).

[9] Under Appellate Rule 9(A)(5), “[u]nless the Notice of Appeal is timely filed, the right to appeal shall be forfeited” except in certain Post-Conviction cases. We are not deprived of jurisdiction to address the merits of untimely appeals. See Cooper's Hawk Indianapolis, LLC v. Ray, 162 N.E.3d 1097, 1098 (Ind. 2021). However, to avoid this type of forfeiture, “an appellant must show that there are ‘extraordinarily compelling reasons why this forfeited right should be restored.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965, 971 (Ind. 2014)). On appeal, Walker did not address the fact that he failed to file a Notice of Appeal within thirty days of the summary judgment ruling, nor did he identify extraordinarily compelling reasons to support reaching the merits of the ruling. Thus, we decline Walker's invitation to reach the merits of summary judgment.

[10] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Neither does the Table of Authorities refer to Trial Rule 59(C) or otherwise correspond to the instant brief.

Foley, Judge.

Bailey, J. and Bradford, J., concur.