IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of Z.C.A.S. and Z.T.K.S. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] In this termination of parental rights case, H.M. (Mother) and V.S. (Father) (collectively, Parents) failed to meaningfully pursue substance abuse treatment for thirteen months. During that time, Parents either tested positive for fentanyl or were non-compliant with drug screens. They also had minimal contact with their two young children, Z.C.A.S and Z.T.K.S. (collectively, Children). But on the morning of the termination hearing, Parents checked themselves into a drug rehabilitation facility while their attorneys appeared in court and requested a continuance. The trial court denied the request, conducted the hearing without Parents—but with their attorneys—and ultimately terminated Parents’ parental rights as to Children. On appeal, Parents claim the trial court both abused its discretion by denying the continuance and violated their due process rights by holding the termination hearing without them. We find no error and affirm.

Facts

[2] The Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) became involved with Parents and Children in June 2023, after Z.T.K.S. was born with fentanyl and methamphetamine in his system. Mother admitted to using illicit substances the night before Z.T.K.S.’s birth, and Father advised that he and Mother had been using illegally purchased pain medication. Father also reported that he and Mother were trying to regain admission to a methadone clinic.

[3] As a result of Parents’ substance abuse issues, DCS petitioned to have Children adjudged to be children in need of services (CHINS). The trial court initially authorized Children to remain with Parents, who were residing with a sober relative. However, the court conditioned the in-home placement on Parents being sober and participating in substance abuse treatment. Parents soon completed substance abuse assessments, which recommended they pursue inpatient drug rehabilitation. But Parents did not pursue any such treatment, and they continued to use fentanyl.

[4] In July 2023, the trial court removed Children from Parents’ care and placed them in foster care. Children were adjudged to be CHINS the following month, and that September, the court entered its dispositional order. Among other things, the order approved a permanency plan of reunification, prohibited Parents from using illicit substances, and required them to submit to random drug screens. It also required Parents to complete all treatment recommended by their substance abuse assessments.

[5] Parents were admitted to an inpatient drug rehabilitation facility in November 2023, but they left after only one week. Thereafter, Parents did not participate in any substance abuse treatment, despite DCS offering them further assistance. Parents also regularly failed to submit to drug screens. And the few times they did screen, Parents tested positive for fentanyl.

[6] After multiple review hearings at which Parents failed to show meaningful progress toward reunifying with Children, the trial court approved a concurrent permanency plan of adoption. Then, in May 2024, DCS petitioned to terminate Parents’ parental rights. A month later, Parents appeared in person at an initial hearing on DCS's petition. The trial court appointed each of them pauper counsel and set the matter for a termination hearing that August. As required by Indiana Code § 31-35-2-6.5, DCS later sent both Parents and their attorneys notice of the hearing at least ten days prior.

[7] Despite having nearly two months prior notice of the August termination hearing, Parents failed to appear in person. They appeared only by counsel, who at the outset of the hearing, advised the trial court that Parents had been admitted to an inpatient drug rehabilitation facility that morning. Parents’ attorneys therefore jointly moved to continue the termination hearing, which DCS opposed. The trial court denied the motion, emphasizing that Parents had been offered inpatient drug rehabilitation for the last thirteen months. In the court's view, “[Parents’] timing [was] such to try to delay these processes.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 4.

[8] The trial court proceeded with the termination hearing, during which Parents were represented by counsel. Among other evidence, DCS presented the testimony of the family case manager (FCM) assigned to Children's CHINS cases. The FCM relayed that Parents’ visitation with Children was conditioned on Parents providing negative drug screens. Because Parents were unable to do so, they had not visited with Children for the better part of a year. Meanwhile, Children were thriving in foster care and well-bonded to their pre-adoptive placement.

[9] DCS also presented the testimony of Children's court appointed special advocate, who opined that termination of Parents’ parental rights was in Children's best interests. The trial court ultimately agreed and terminated Parents’ parental rights.

Discussion and Decision

[10] On appeal, Parents do not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's termination of their parental rights. Rather, Parents argue that the court both abused its discretion by denying their motion to continue the termination hearing and violated their due process rights by conducting the hearing without them. Neither claim prevails.

I. No Abuse of Discretion

[11] “Generally speaking, a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to continue is subject to abuse of discretion review.” In re K.W., 12 N.E.3d 241, 243-44 (Ind. 2014). “An abuse of discretion may be found in the denial of a motion for a continuance when the moving party has shown good cause for granting the motion.” Id. at 244. However, “[t]here are no ‘mechanical tests’ for determining whether a request for a continuance was made for good cause.” Matter of M.S., 140 N.E.3d 279, 285 (Ind. 2020). The decision “turns on the circumstances present in a particular case.” Id. And there is “a strong presumption that the trial court properly exercised its discretion.” In re B.H., 44 N.E.3d 745, 748 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

[12] Parents argue that their admission to an inpatient drug rehabilitation facility was good cause for continuing the termination hearing because the trial court's dispositional order required Parents to complete such treatment. But as the trial court noted when denying the continuance, Parents had been offered inpatient drug rehabilitation for the last thirteen months. The only time they pursued it—nine months earlier—Parents left after one week and then seemingly waited until the date of the termination hearing to try again. Had their re-admission to drug rehabilitation been pending for any notable amount of time, Parents should have been able to request a continuance of the hearing before the morning thereof.

[13] While seeking substance abuse treatment is generally laudable, the timing and context of Parents’ motion to continue the termination hearing undermines their claim of good cause. We therefore find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion.

II. No Due Process Violation

[14] “Whether a party is denied due process is a question of law, which we review de novo.” Matter of Paternity of E.B.K., 242 N.E.3d 500, 510 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). Due process generally requires “the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 917 (Ind. 2011) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)). But the nature of that opportunity “turns on the balancing of three factors: (1) the private interests affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of error created by the State's chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure.” Id.; accord Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.

[15] The Indiana Supreme Court has recognized that, in termination of parental rights cases, the private interests of the parent and the countervailing interest of the State are both “substantial.” In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d at 917 (comparing “a parent's interest in the care, custody, and control of her child” with “the State's parens patriae interest in protecting the welfare of a child”). This Court has also held that, when a parent is represented by counsel at a termination hearing, the risk of error posed by the parent's absence is “vastly reduced.” Matter of C.C., 170 N.E.3d 669, 677 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021).

[16] Here, both Parents were represented by counsel at the termination hearing, and their attorneys each had the opportunity to object to evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and otherwise defend Parents’ interests. Though Parents argue that their absence created a “substantial” risk that their parental rights would be erroneously terminated, they do not explain how. Mother's Br., p. 12; Father's Br., p. 11. And the record suggests that any risk was minimal.

[17] Because Parents were represented by counsel at the termination hearing, the trial court did not violate their due process rights by holding the hearing without them.

[18] Affirmed.

Weissmann, Judge.

May, J., and Scheele, J., concur.