Dentrell M. Brown, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In the early morning hours of April 17, 2022, Dentrell Brown shot Lamondra Townsend (“JR”) and Saadallah Altameemi (“Dallah”). JR suffered injuries to his leg, and Dallah suffered serious injuries that required emergency care and surgery. The State subsequently charged Brown with Level 1 felony attempted murder, Level 3 felony aggravated battery, and Level 6 felony criminal recklessness. The State also filed a firearm enhancement, alleging that Brown had used a firearm in commission of both the attempted murder and the aggravated battery. Brown pled guilty to the firearm enhancement, and the jury found him guilty of attempted murder and criminal recklessness. The trial court sentenced Brown to an aggregate fifty-four-year sentence. Brown contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence and in sentencing him. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On the night of April 16, 2022, a spring-break-themed event was held at the Eagles event center in Elkhart. The event continued into the early morning hours of April 17th. Dallah and JR went to the party together, as did Brown and his friend Christopher Allen. Neither Dallah nor JR was in possession of a weapon, and both were patted down by security before entering the venue. At some point, several fights broke out.¹ Event security was eventually able to stop the fights and de-escalate the situation, after which event coordinators decided to shut down the event.

[3] As the crowd was leaving the venue, Brown shot JR in the leg multiple times. After shooting JR, Brown chased Dallah and shot him in the chest, abdomen, arm, and foot. Brown and Allen left in Allen's vehicle. Neither Dallah nor JR had known Brown prior to the shooting. Surveillance video showed Brown to be the individual who had fired shots toward Dallah.

[4] As a result of being shot, JR suffered a “shattered” tibia. Tr. Vol. III p. 154. Dallah was “critically wounded” with life-threatening injuries. Tr. Vol. IV p. 12. Dallah required emergency surgery, had to be intubated and placed on a ventilator because he was unable to breathe on his own, had very low blood pressure due to significant blood loss, and had to have a chest tube inserted to drain blood from his chest cavity. Dallah, who was in intensive care for several days, suffered injuries to his lungs, diaphragm, and stomach, in addition to an “essentially shattered” radial tuberosity ² in his right arm. Tr. Vol. IV p. 46.

[5] Brown fled to Chicago, where he sold the gun used in the shooting. He was eventually located in Mississippi by United States Marshalls. The State charged Brown with Level 1 felony attempted murder (of Dallah), Level 3 felony aggravated battery (of JR), and Level 6 felony criminal recklessness. The State also filed firearm enhancements, alleging that Brown had used a firearm during the commission of the attempted-murder and aggravated-battery charges.

[6] Allen testified at trial that Brown had been beside him when they heard gunshots, testimony that was inconsistent with his prior statement to police that Brown had reentered the venue before the gunshots. Over Brown's objection, Allen's prior statement to police was admitted as impeachment evidence pursuant to Evidence Rule 613.

[7] Brown also testified at trial, admitting that he had (1) fired multiple shots at JR, hitting him in the leg; (2) fired multiple shots at Dallah; and (3) fled the state. Brown claimed that he had been acting in self-defense, alleging that JR and Dallah had attacked him earlier in the evening. Brown also admitted that he had fled to Chicago, where he had sold the gun used in the shooting, and then to Mississippi. Brown further admitted that although he claimed to have been “beat down pretty bad” on the night in question, he had not obtained any medical treatment or taken any pictures of his alleged injuries. Tr. Vol. VI p. 174. Brown subsequently pled guilty to the firearm enhancement and the jury found him guilty of Level 1 felony attempted murder and Level 6 felony criminal recklessness.

[8] At sentencing, the parties discussed Brown's criminal history, which includes a 2009 murder conviction. With regard to this conviction, the record reveals that after the murder conviction had been affirmed by state courts and Brown's petition for a writ of habeas corpus had been denied by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had reversed the District Court, concluding that Brown had received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. On remand, the District Court ordered that Brown be released from custody after finding that he had been prejudiced by his counsel's deficient performance. Thereafter, the parties reached an agreement, under the terms of which Brown would be released from custody pursuant to the federal writ, but his murder conviction would not be vacated. Brown further agreed that he would “not further attack the State conviction of murder directly or indirectly.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 77–78 (internal quotation marks omitted).

[9] The presentence investigation report (“PSI”) referenced the information relating to the 2009 murder conviction. The Indiana Risk Assessment System (“IRAS”) score contained in the PSI indicated that Brown was “in the VERY HIGH risk category to reoffend.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 153. One of the seven criteria considered in calculating this score was Brown's criminal history. At sentencing, Brown objected to mention of the prior murder conviction in the PSI, arguing that he was “not sure if that was used within when they were determining -- when probation was determining the -- the [IRAS score].” Tr. Vol. VII p. 64. When the trial court asked if Brown was seeking to continue sentencing in order to make an amendment to the PSI, Brown indicated that he was not, stating “it doesn't have to change; not asking for the PSI to be redone or anything. I just wanted to continue that objection, again, just for the record.” Tr. Vol. VII p. 64. The trial court overruled Brown's objection, stating the following:

I'm gonna overrule your objection ․ only because I believe that, as long as the [PSI] contains the whole record procedurally of what happened, which I believe it does, then the [PSI] is accurate. And, by overruling your objection, that doesn't limit the Court from utilizing it as I deem appropriate.

Tr. Vol. VII p. 65.

[10] The trial court, however, made it clear that it was not going to find the prior murder conviction to be an aggravating factor, stating “I'm gonna state on the record I'm not gonna consider the vacated murder conviction as to sentencing because I don't think it's appropriate to do so[ ]” and “I'm not gonna use it. That's the bottom line.” Tr. Vol. VII p. 63. The trial court reiterated “I'm not gonna consider it.․ I don't think it would be proper if I did because the -- the Seventh Circuit ruled on your writ of habeas corpus. You prevailed on that.” Tr. Vol. VII p. 65. The trial court further reiterated this point in its written order, stating “[t]he Court does not consider the vacated murder conviction as to sentencing in this case.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 182.

[11] In a sentencing memorandum filed with the trial court, Brown argued that he had been incarcerated in the Department of Correction (“DOC”) from the age of fourteen to twenty-seven and that while incarcerated, he had participated in several programs, which he claimed had rehabilitated him. Specifically, Brown asserted that

[w]hile incarcerated, [he] ․ participated in the TASK program and earned his high school equivalency. [He] also participated in the Moral Recognition Therapy (MRT) program. The MRT program helped him learn positive social behaviors and beliefs, as well as positive self-image and identity. [He] also participated in the PLUS program. [He] also participated in Dialectical Behavioral Therapy, which focuses on balancing emotions, focusing specifically on stress. Additionally, [he] was involved in a faith-based program which focuses on helping [him] think differently, while grounded in religion. [He] excelled in the programs to the point that he obtained a leadership role and was able to help others going through the program. [He] also worked while at DOC; specifically, he worked in the kitchen.

[His] experience in the [DOC] was unique due to how young he was when he was sentenced and so it forced him to mature quickly but also taught him a lot along the way. [He] took advantage of many of the opportunities and resources that were offered to him while incarcerated. [He] credits his time in DOC as a learning experience and a wakeup call. Even though it was rough, he was able to take advantage of the programs and learn from the experience.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 169–70.

[12] After considering the parties’ written submissions and arguments, the trial court reiterated that it did not find Brown's prior murder conviction to be aggravating but noted that it was related to a factor that the trial court did find to be aggravating. Specifically, the trial court explained

Now, here's where I find your prior history and that prior murder sentence that was vacated to result in something that's aggravating. I'm gonna give you the history. You know it very well. You lived it, Mr. Brown. You were convicted of murder and sentenced to the [DOC]. I'm not gonna consider that part to be aggravating. You served 12 -- approximately 12 years in custody. I'm not considering that part to be aggravating. Your --your conviction, your murder conviction, was set aside after you were granted a writ of habeas corpus. That certainly would not be aggravating.

Here's the part that's aggravating. You told the Court -- you told me, Mr. Brown, that you thought it was best if you got out of Elkhart County, and you intend -- intended to move away. And I told you I thought that would be a smart move on your part, get a fresh start, go someplace else and get a fresh start. And, instead, you wasted that opportunity for a new start by committing these offenses. I certainly understand that you claim this was all done in self-defense. The jury disagreed with you.

Tr. Vol. VII p. 89.

[13] The trial court also found Brown's prior juvenile adjudication for burglary to be aggravating and noted that Brown had

six writeups while you were incarcerated; that's aggravating. Contrary to what you believe, the fact that you used alcohol illegally from age 12 until you turned 21 is an aggravator. Your use of marijuana from age 11 or 12 until sometime when you're unable to recall, that's aggravating. Both of those are aggravating, Mr. Brown, because each use was a separate crime against the state of Indiana, showing that you have a disregard for the law and society. That's why it's aggravating.

Tr. Vol. VII p. 88. The trial court further noted that “other forms of sanctions have proved to be unsuccessful in keeping you from engaging in criminal activity and that you have not taken advantage of programming and alternative sanctions offered to you in the past.” Tr. Vol. VII p. 88. The trial court also found the facts and circumstances of the case, including shooting the unarmed victims multiple times, chasing one victim who was trying to get away, failing to seek medical aid for the victims, fleeing the jurisdiction, and acting out of revenge for an alleged prior assault instead of dealing with that situation in a law-abiding manner, to be an aggravating factor.

[14] After finding that the aggravating factors warranted imposition of an enhanced sentence, the trial court sentenced Brown to a thirty-seven-year term on the attempted-murder conviction, which was enhanced by an additional fifteen years by virtue of the firearm enhancement. The trial court also sentenced Brown to a two-year term on the criminal-recklessness conviction, and ordered that it run consecutively for an aggregate fifty-four-year sentence.

Discussion and Decision

[15] Brown contends that the trial court abused its discretion both in admitting certain evidence during trial and in sentencing him.

I. Admission of Evidence

[16] The “admission of evidence at trial is a matter we leave to the discretion of the trial court.” Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259–60 (Ind. 2013) (internal citation omitted). “We review these determinations for abuse of that discretion and reverse only when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights.” Id. at 260 (internal citation omitted). “We may affirm a trial court's judgment if it is sustainable on any basis in the record.” Estrada v. State, 969 N.E.2d 1032, 1038 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (internal citation omitted), trans. denied. Further, “[e]ven when a decision on the admissibility of evidence is an abuse of discretion, we will not reverse a judgment where that error is harmless, that is, where the error did not affect the substantial rights of a party.” Dixon v. State, 967 N.E.2d 1090, 1092 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

[17] “The Indiana Rules of Evidence govern the use of extrinsic evidence for impeachment of a witness.” Id. “Any party, including the party that called the witness, may attack the witness's credibility.” Ind. Evidence Rule 607. “Where a party seeks to examine a witness concerning a prior statement, the party need not show the statement to the party or disclose the statement's contents to the witness, though it must be disclosed to opposing counsel upon request.” Dixon, 967 N.E.2d at 1092 (citing Evid. R. 613(a)). Indiana Evidence Rule 613(b) provides that “[e]xtrinsic evidence of a witness's prior inconsistent statement is admissible only if the witness is given an opportunity to explain or deny the statement and an adverse party is given an opportunity to examine the witness about it, or if justice so requires.” “Extrinsic evidence of impeachment is not, however, admissible where impeachment is complete because the witness ‘admitted himself a liar,’ that is, where the witness acknowledges having made the prior inconsistent statement.” Dixon, 967 N.E.2d at 1092 (quoting Appleton v. State, 740 N.E.2d 122, 126 (Ind. 2001)).

[18] Brown contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Allen's prior statement to law enforcement because Allen had indicated at trial that he had not remembered anything about his statement, beyond the fact that he had given one. Thus, Brown argues that “Allen was not confronted with misrepresentations or inconsistencies in his testimony.․ This is a memory problem, it is not a prior inconsistent statement.” Appellant's Br. p. 12. Lack of memory, Brown asserts, “is not an inconsistency.” Appellant's Br. p. 12. In support, Brown cites the Indiana Supreme Court's opinion in Dunlap v. State, 761 N.E.2d 837 (Ind. 2002).

[19] The Indiana Supreme Court has noted that “[c]omparing two statements by a witness to test for inconsistency is not an exact science. Given the varying nuances that arise in a person's account of historical events, the trial judge must be given wide discretion in determining whether two statements are sufficiently inconsistent.” Dunlap, 761 N.E.2d at 843 n.6. In Dunlap, the witness claimed that she had not remembered certain facts, about which she had made prior statements to police, during trial. Concluding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in sustaining the State's objection to admission of the witness's prior statements on the grounds that they were not inconsistent, the Indiana Supreme Court stated

[f]or the purposes of Rule 613(b), a statement at trial of “I am not sure” or “I don't remember” is not necessarily inconsistent with an earlier statement that provides the answer to the question being asked. We consider the differences between [the witness's] trial testimony and her statements in the transcribed police interview to be within the ambit of the trial court's discretion to determine inconsistency.

Dunlap, 761 N.E.2d at 845.

[20] We agree with the State that Brown's reliance on the Indiana Supreme Court's opinion in Dunlap is misplaced, as Dunlap is inapposite to the instant matter. While Allen did claim a lack of memory on certain points during his trial testimony, stating that his memory had not been refreshed by reviewing his prior statements to law enforcement, he also provided testimony that was in direct conflict with his prior statements. Allen testified at trial that he and Brown had been outside in the parking lot and Brown had been “[r]ight next to” him when the shooting occurred. Tr. Vol. IV p. 71. This testimony was inconsistent with his prior statement to law enforcement in which Allen had claimed that, while he had been outside in the parking lot when the shooting occurred, Brown had gone back into the venue and was inside when the shooting occurred. These two statements were in direct conflict. As such, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Allen's prior statements as extrinsic evidence of impeachment.³

[21] Additionally, while we acknowledge that “a party is forbidden from placing a witness on the stand when the party's sole purpose in doing so is to present otherwise inadmissible evidence cloaked as impeachment[,]” Appleton, 740 N.E.2d at 125, we disagree with Brown's suggestion that the State's sole purpose of calling Allen to testify was to impeach him with an otherwise inadmissible statement. As the State points out, there is no suggestion in the record that the State “knew that Allen was going to testify in a manner inconsistent with his prior statement.” Appellee's Br. p. 27. Allen's testimony established that Brown had been present at the venue on the night in question and that he had driven Brown away from the venue following the shooting. Allen's testimony also contradicted Brown's assertion that he had acted in self-defense, contradicting Brown's claim that Dallah and JR had attacked him prior to the shooting.

[22] We also disagree that the State's method of using the impeachment evidence was problematic. While the Indiana Supreme Court has disapproved of using impeachment evidence in a manner that results in a line-by-line recitation of an otherwise inadmissible statement, see Appleton, 740 N.E.2d at 126, the State's method of questioning Allen did not result in a line-by-line recitation of his full prior statement but rather focused on the parts of his statement that were in conflict with his trial testimony. We have previously noted that this method of using impeachment evidence has been recognized as the proper way to use such evidence. See Martin v. State, 779 N.E.2d 1235, 1245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied.

[23] Furthermore, even if the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence, any error would be harmless, given the other unchallenged evidence of Brown's guilt.

No error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the trial court or by any of the parties is ground for granting relief or reversal on appeal where its probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.

Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A). Brown admitted to shooting both JR and Dallah. Although Brown claimed to have acted in self-defense, the jury concluded otherwise. Given Brown's admission, coupled with other unchallenged evidence of his guilt, we cannot say that the probable impact of Allen's testimony affected Brown's substantial rights. As such, even if the trial court could be said to have erred in admitting the challenged evidence, any potential error could only be considered harmless.

II. Sentencing

[24] Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), modified on other grounds on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id. (quotation omitted).

We review for an abuse of discretion the court's finding of aggravators and mitigators to justify a sentence, but we cannot review the relative weight assigned to those factors. When reviewing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances identified by the trial court in its sentencing statement, we will remand only if the record does not support the reasons, or the sentencing statement omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record, and advanced for consideration, or the reasons given are improper as a matter of law.

Baumholser v. State, 62 N.E.3d 411, 416 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citation and quotation omitted), trans. denied. Moreover,

[a] single aggravating circumstance may be sufficient to enhance a sentence. When a trial court improperly applies an aggravator but other valid aggravating circumstances exist, a sentence enhancement may still be upheld. The question we must decide is whether we are confident the trial court would have imposed the same sentence even if it had not found the improper aggravator.

Id. at 417 (internal quotation and citation omitted).

[25] Brown argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him because it is unclear whether the probation department considered his prior murder conviction when calculating his IRAS score, which indicated that he was a very high risk to reoffend. In making this argument, Brown acknowledges that risk assessments, such as the IRAS score, are supplemental tools that can be considered by a trial court when considering the available alternative placement options. Brown asserts that his criminal history was one factor that was considered in calculating his IRAS score and reiterates his concern that the probation department may have considered his prior murder conviction as part of his criminal history. We have no way to know whether the probation department considered this prior conviction as it is unclear from the record what information the probation department relied on in calculating the IRAS score. Brown's criminal history included a juvenile adjudication for battery, which also may have been what the probation department considered. Brown's argument in this regard is merely speculative and falls short of convincing us that the trial court somehow abused its discretion in sentencing him.

[26] Further, to the extent that Brown is arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to strike any mention of his prior murder conviction from the PSI, Brown has waived appellate review of this argument. Again, when Brown objected to the inclusion of reference to his prior murder conviction at trial, the trial court asked if Brown was seeking to continue sentencing in order to make an amendment to the PSI. Brown indicated that he was not, stating “it doesn't have to change; not asking for the PSI to be redone or anything. I just wanted to continue that objection, again, just for the record.” Tr. Vol. VII p. 64. Brown's explicit statement that he was not asking for the PSI to be redone or changed forecloses any argument that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to order that the PSI be redone to omit any reference to Brown's prior murder conviction. See Veerkamp v. State, 7 N.E.3d 390, 395 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (providing that appellate review of an issue or argument is waived if the party fails to raise it before the trial court), trans. denied.

[27] Brown also seems to argue that the trial court abused its discretion in considering the fact that he had failed to respond positively to prior rehabilitative efforts. We are somewhat perplexed by this argument because Brown introduced statements outlining the rehabilitative programs that he had participated in while previously incarcerated in the DOC in support of his suggestion that he would respond well to future rehabilitative efforts. We cannot say that the trial court somehow abused its discretion in considering the information provided by Brown. Brown had also indicated to the trial court that he was looking forward to a fresh start following his release from the DOC. In sentencing Brown, the trial court noted that despite Brown's prior statements regarding a fresh start and prior participation in rehabilitative programming, he committed the underlying violent crimes less than a year after being released from the DOC, suggesting that he had neither intended to change his behavior nor responded positively to the prior rehabilitative programming. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in considering this fact when sentencing Brown.

[28] A person who commits a Level 1 felony “shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between twenty (20) and forty (40) years, with the advisory sentence being thirty (30) years.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4(b). In sentencing Brown for Level 1 felony attempted murder, the trial court imposed a less-than-maximum thirty-seven-year sentence. Additionally, the firearm-use enhancement allowed for “an additional fixed term of imprisonment of between five (5) and twenty (20) years.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-11(g). After Brown pled guilty to this enhancement, the trial court imposed “a fifteen (15) year enhancement” on Brown's thirty-seven-year sentence. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 185. The trial court considered numerous unchallenged aggravating factors, finding that the unchallenged aggravating factors outweighed the proffered mitigating factors. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Brown.

[29] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Dallah and JR testified that they had not been involved in any of the fights. Allen testified that neither he nor Brown had been involved in any of the fights. Brown, however, who claimed to have been acting in self-defense when he shot JR and Dallah, testified that JR had accosted him, Dallah had punched him, and a group of guys had jumped him and kicked him after he fell to the floor.

2.   The radial tuberosity is “where your biceps tendon inserts.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 46.

3.   To the extent that Brown briefly asserts that the State had failed to lay a proper foundation to allow for admission of Allen's prior statement, Brown has not developed this argument on appeal or supported it with citations to the record and relevant authority and has therefore waived appellate review of this assertion. See Smith v. State, 822 N.E.2d 193, 202–03 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“Generally, a party waives any issue raised on appeal where the party fails to develop a cogent argument or provide adequate citation to authority and portions of the record.”), trans. denied.

Bradford, Judge.

Chief Judge Altice and Judge Kenworthy concur. Altice, C.J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.