Jared P. Upchurch, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Jared P. Upchurch (“Upchurch”) appeals the sanction imposed following the revocation of his probation. Upchurch argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to serve all of his previously suspended sentence. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Upchurch to serve all of his previously suspended sentence.

Facts

[3] In November 2021, the State charged Upchurch with Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine in this cause on appeal. In July 2022, the State charged Upchurch with Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia in cause number 18C02-2207-F6-000377 (“Cause F6-377”).

[4] In December 2022, Upchurch entered into a plea agreement with the State. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Upchurch pleaded guilty to Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine in this cause. In exchange, the State dismissed all of the charges in Cause F6-377. The trial court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Upchurch to twenty-four (24) months at the county jail, all of which was suspended to supervised probation. The trial court ordered Upchurch to comply with the standard terms and conditions of probation, which included: (1) reporting to a probation officer as directed; (2) refraining from using or possessing any medication, illegal drug, or controlled substance unless prescribed by a physician; (3) submitting to drug screens; (4) submitting to evaluations; and (5) enrolling and completing all educational, counseling, and treatment recommendations. The trial court also ordered that Upchurch: (1) complete a four-hour substance abuse education class through community corrections; (2) submit to random urinalysis screenings through community corrections; and (3) complete a substance abuse evaluation through community corrections.

[5] In January 2024, the probation department filed a petition to revoke Upchurch's probation. In its petition, the probation department alleged that Upchurch had: (1) failed to report to the probation department; (2) failed to comply with substance abuse treatment; and (3) admitted to the continued use of illegal substances.

[6] In September 2024, the trial court held a factfinding hearing on the probation department's petition to revoke Upchurch's probation. At the hearing, Delaware County Probation Officer Curtis Mardis (“PO Mardis”) testified that Upchurch had failed to report on February 23, 2023, March 16, 2023, April 6, 2023, July 6, 2023, August 22, 2023, November 21, 2023, February 8, 2024, February 22, 2024, May 6, 2024, August 8, 2024, and August 28, 2024. PO Mardis also testified that Upchurch had failed a drug screen in June 2024. PO Mardis further testified that he had been unable to give Upchurch drug screens when he did not report to probation appointments. PO Mardis testified that Upchurch had admitted to him that he had begun using methamphetamine. PO Mardis testified that he had, in response to Upchurch's admission of using methamphetamine, given Upchurch options for substance abuse programs to attend. However, PO Mardis never received any confirmation that Upchurch had attended any of the programs.

[7] Upchurch testified that he had not attended his meetings with PO Mardis because he had “a lot going on” and had “just kind of spaced it.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 21). In addition, he stated that he had been going to “NA and Road to Redemption” meetings and that he had traveled to those meetings using a bicycle. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 22). When the State asked Upchurch if he could produce a clean drug screen today, he replied, “[p]robably not, probably from marijuana and some other stuff.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 23).

[8] At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that Upchurch had violated the terms of his probation. The trial court revoked Upchurch's probation and ordered him to serve the entirety of his previously suspended sentence in the county jail. The trial court explained that “there [were] programs in the jail that can actually benefit [Upchurch].” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 25). The trial court further explained that it believed that if Upchurch was at the county jail “for that length of time” and was “able to work those programs that might be the best thing for [Upchurch].” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 25).

[9] Upchurch now appeals.

Decision

[10] Upchurch argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to serve all of his previously suspended sentence. “[A] trial court's sentencing decisions for probation violations are reviewable using the abuse of discretion standard.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007) (citing Sanders v. State, 825 N.E.2d 952, 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied). An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id.

[11] Indiana Code § 35-38-2-3(h)(3) provides:

(h) If the court finds that the person has violated a condition [of probation] at any time before termination of the period, and the petition to revoke is filed within the probationary period, the court may impose one (1) or more of the following sanctions:

* * * * *

(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

“Once a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed.” Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188. “If this discretion were not [given] to trial courts and sentences were scrutinized too severely on appeal, trial judges might be less inclined to order probation to future defendants.” Id. Further, it is well settled that a single “violation of a condition of probation is enough to support a probation revocation.” Pierce v. State, 44 N.E.3d 752, 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

[12] Our review of the record reveals that the trial court had a sufficient basis for its decision to order Upchurch to serve his previously suspended sentence. Upchurch failed to report to nearly a dozen scheduled probation meetings. When Upchurch reported to probation in June 2024, he failed a drug screen. Further, Upchurch admitted to PO Mardis that he had been using methamphetamine. In response, PO Mardis recommended treatment programs to Upchurch. However, there was no evidence that Upchurch had attended any of the recommended treatment programs. Considering the record before us, the sanction imposed was well within the trial court's discretion. See I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h)(3). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order.

[13] Affirmed.¹

FOOTNOTES

1.   Upchurch argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it had ordered him to serve the entirety of his suspended sentence because he had difficulty completing treatment programs. Upchurch notes that he was unable to attend any treatment programs “[d]ue to continued transportation issues[.]” (Upchurch's Br. 8). Thus, he argues that he had not “willfully avoided participation” in treatment programs and should be given the opportunity to attend treatment programs. (Upchurch's Br. 8). However, a trial court has the discretion to revoke all of a previously suspended sentence as a sanction for a probation violation, and here, that is precisely what the trial court did. See I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h)(3).

Pyle, Judge.

Judges Bradford and Kenworthy concur. Bradford, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.