IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of S.B. (Child) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] A.B. (“Father”) and J.B. (“Mother”) (collectively, “Parents”) appeal the trial court's involuntary termination of their parental rights to their child, S.B. (“Child”). They argue the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that the conditions under which Child was removed from their care would not be remedied or its conclusion that the continuation of the Parents-Child relationship poses a threat to Child's well-being. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Parents are the biological parents of Child, who was born December 3, 2020. On July 24, 2022, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report that Parents and Child were living in a motel and “[Child] was left alone for extended periods of time.” (Tr. Vol. II at 8.) DCS family case manager Hilliary Vires (“FCM Vires”) and two police officers went to the family's motel room and knocked on the door. No one answered the door. FCM Vires then went to the hotel manager and asked him to open the room so she could investigate whether a child was in the room. The hotel manager unlocked the door, and FCM Vires discovered Child, who was approximately one and a half years old, in a “car seat in the middle of the floor ․ strapped very tightly in that car seat[.]” (Id. at 9.) FCM Vires observed that Child “was dirty ․ [and] smelled very strongly of urine[.]” (Id.) When FCM Vires tried to talk to Child, Child seemed frightened and she started crying. Parents were not in the motel room.

[3] FCM Vires took Child back to the DCS office, where she removed Child from her car seat. She noticed Child “was completely saturated with urine, through her pull up, her clothes, and well into her car seat.” (Id.) She took the pull up off Child and weighed it. It weighed “approximately one pound[.]” (Id. at 10.) FCM Vires also saw Child “had a scrape on her lower back, just above her buttocks, um, and a swollen area above that area as well.” (Id.) Child's hair “was completed matted to the back of her head” (id.), and she “was not able to stand up on her own.” (Id.) DCS transported Child to the hospital and a doctor there determined Child was developmentally delayed based on her inability to stand on her own. DCS later discovered Parents had not been taking Child for medical care, and thus there were no medical records to determine the level of her delay. Child was placed in foster care, where she has remained throughout the proceedings.

[4] FCM Vires spoke with Parents shortly thereafter and asked why Child had been left in the motel room by herself. Mother indicated she had only been gone for a short time because she “was going around to neighbors to see if anyone else wanted [a piece of the] cake” she received earlier in the day. (Id.) FCM Vires and the police did not believe her story based on the condition of Child at the time they found her in the motel room. Police arrested Parents and the State subsequently charged them with Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent.¹

[5] On July 26, 2022, DCS filed a petition alleging Child was a CHINS based on Parents’ neglect and incarceration. On September 20, 2022, the trial court held a fact-finding hearing on the CHINS petition. Parents admitted Child was a CHINS. On October 18, 2022, the trial court held a dispositional hearing. On October 20, 2022, Mother and Father each pled guilty to Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent and was sentenced to 547 days with 365 days suspended and credit for 85 actual days incarcerated pending trial. On October 24, 2022, the trial court entered its order adjudicating Child as a CHINS based on Parents’ admissions. On December 19, 2022, the trial court entered its disposition order requiring Parents to, among other things: maintain contact with the FCM and follow all referrals; obtain and maintain safe, stable housing and employment; refrain from using illegal substances; obey the law; “actively participate” in home-based counseling individually and with Child and “demonstrate positive changes in their life as a result of the counseling[;]” complete parenting and substance abuse assessments and follow all recommendations; submit to random drug screens; complete a psychological evaluation and follow all recommendations; meet with medical and psychiatric personnel and follow all recommendations; and attend supervised visitation with Child. (Ex. Vol. I at 40.)

[6] Initially, Parents participated in some services, and the permanency plan was reunification. Mother and Father were referred to individual therapy in February 2023. The trial court held a permanency hearing on April 11, 2023, and entered an order on April 14, 2023. The trial court found Parents had been “participating in services, but have not been making the desired progress.” (Id. at 50.) The trial court noted “Father has still not addressed the issue of consistent employment and unstable housing,” (id.), and was not returning calls to engage in a psychological evaluation. The trial court also found Father had been resistant to engaging in individual therapy. Similarly, the trial court found Mother had failed to address the issue of unstable housing. However, it noted she had scheduled a psychological evaluation for the end of April. The trial court indicated Parents were “unwilling to look outside of the county for housing at this time.” (Id.) The trial court found Parents tested negative on drug screens and attended supervised visitation with Child.

[7] Mother completed her psychological assessment as scheduled in April 2023. Father did not complete his psychological assessment until June 2023. In therapy, Father was working on “reducing some of his social anxiety, developing coping skills, and addressing his emotions[.]” (Tr. Vol. II at 27.) Mother was “working on processing some of her trauma, um, and working through some of her historical concerns.” (Id.)

[8] On October 31, 2023, the trial court held a permanency hearing. On November 3, 2023, the trial court entered an order changing Child's permanency plan to reunification or adoption. In that order, the trial court found:

[Parents] have partially complied with [Child's] case plan. [Parents] have been participating in services, but have not been making the desired progress. Father is visiting with [Child] but his referral for individual therapy was closed out due to non-compliance, even though the therapy was held virtually. Father has not completed his parenting education classes, but has completed his psychological evaluation. Father is lacking comprehension on parenting a toddler. Father believes that [Child] will voice any wants or needs that she may have to [Father], although [Child] is a toddler. Father needs to complete his parenting education classes to better understand how to care for a child of [Child's] age. Mother was put on a call ahead schedule for her parenting education classes due to lack of compliance. Mother is not acknowledging the issues that led to [Child's] removal. [Parents] have made concerning statements that they will continue to sleep throughout the day and [Child], who is two[ ](2) will come wake them up if she needs anything if [Child] were to return home. This is especially concerning considering it highlights the fact that [Parents] are not making progress in services to remedy the reasons for removal. Visitation with [Parents] was moved from in [Parents’] home to community visits due to cockroaches and the smell of smoke in the home which were leading to health issues for [Child].

(Ex. Vol. I at 53.) In a subsequent attempt at supervised in-home visitation with Parents, DCS discovered black mold and visitation was thereafter held elsewhere.

[9] On February 27, 2024, the trial court held a permanency hearing. In its February 28, 2024, permanency plan order, the trial court noted Parents had improved their compliance with services, though there continued to be a “concern that [Parents] do not have the understanding to properly care for [Child's] needs.” (Id. at 56.) Additionally, the trial court found that Parents were made aware of Child's speech therapy appointments “and have yet to attend any appointments.” (Id.) The trial court indicated it was concerned about this lack of participation in Child's care because Child “will need this service long term and [Parents] are not demonstrating a commitment to continuing this essential medical care at this time.” (Id.) The trial court continued a permanency plan of reunification or adoption.

[10] On April 19, 2024, DCS filed a petition to terminate Parents’ parental rights to Child based on Parents’ noncompliance with services. On June 20, 2024, the trial court changed Child's permanency plan in the CHINS case to adoption based on Parents’ “inability to achieve progress and parenting abilities and inability to maintain stability.” (App. Vol. II at 66.)

[11] On September 24, 2024, the trial court held a fact-finding hearing on DCS's termination petition. At the time of the hearing, Mother was pregnant with another child, for whom she did not start receiving prenatal care until she was thirty-one weeks pregnant. Father was employed at the time, but Mother was not. Mother had not yet obtained her driver's license, which was a goal of home-based casework. Parents were separated and living with their respective mothers. Parents acknowledged neither home was an appropriate long-term living situation because of safety concerns. Parents had not completed “resource packets that gave them information on low-income housing” given to them by their homebased caseworker in an effort to assist Parents in obtaining housing. (Tr. Vol. II at 46.) Father indicated Parents were unable to find housing because “it is difficult to find a place for rent or rent to own that has any openings” in either Scott County or Jackson County. (Id. at 79.)

[12] Parents had not progressed from supervised visitations with Child. Twice DCS attempted to hold Parents’ supervised visits with Child in Parents’ home; however, both times the home was found to be unhealthy for Child. Additionally, Parents failed to consistently attend Child's medical and therapeutic appointments. FCM Natashia Thompson indicated Parents had not shown the ability to parent Child despite two years of services. The foster mother testified that Mother indicated to her that Mother had not pursued prenatal care until shortly before the termination fact finding hearing because she was “just going to wing it[.]” (Id. at 69.) Based the evidence and testimony presented, the trial court entered an order terminating Parents’ parental rights to Child on October 4, 2024.

Discussion and Decision

[13] “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” In re A.L., 223 N.E.3d 1126, 1137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). However, a juvenile court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. Id. The termination of parental rights is appropriate when parents are “unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities[.]” Id. (quoting Bester v. Lake Cnty. Ofc. of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005)). The termination of the parent-child relationship is “an ‘extreme measure’ and should only be utilized as a ‘last resort when all other reasonable efforts to protect the integrity of the natural relationship between parent and child have failed.’ ” K.E. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Rowlett v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Ofc. of Family & Children, 841 N.E.2d 615, 623 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)).

[14] To terminate a parent-child relationship in Indiana, DCS must allege and prove “one (1) or more” of the circumstances listed in Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d). As relevant herein, the statute lists the following circumstances:

(2) That:

(A) the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of services or a delinquent child; and

(B) despite the department's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

* * * * *

(7) That the parent:

(A) failed to substantially comply with the child's dispositional decree for a period of at least twelve (12) months following the child's:

(i) removal from the parent's home under IC 31-34-2; or

(ii) adjudication as a child in need of services;

whichever occurred earlier, unless the parent's failure to substantially comply with the child's dispositional decree was due to the failure of the department to make reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5; or

(B) is unlikely or unable to substantially comply with the child's dispositional decree.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d) (2024). In addition, DCS must prove that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child and that termination is in the child's best interests. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2) & (3) (2024). DCS must provide clear and convincing proof of these allegations at the termination hearing. In re T.W., 135 N.E.3d 607, 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. “[I]f the State fails to prove any one of these statutory elements, then it is not entitled to a judgment terminating parental rights.” Id. at 1261. Because parents have a constitutionally protected right to establish a home and raise their children, the State “must strictly comply” with the statutory requirements for terminating parental rights. In re Q.M., 974 N.E.2d 1021, 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Platz v. Elkhart Cnty. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 631 N.E.2d 16, 18 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)).

[15] When reviewing a trial court's termination of parental rights,

we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment and give due regard to the trial court's unique opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. We will set aside the trial court's judgment only if it is clearly erroneous.

In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016) (internal quotations and citations omitted). When, as here, a judgment contains specific findings of fact and conclusions thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. In re Adoption of T.L., 4 N.E.3d 658, 662 (Ind. 2014). First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings and then whether the findings support the trial court's judgment. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when the record lacks evidence or reasonable inferences from the evidence to support it. Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 125 (Ind. 2016). Parents do not challenge any of the trial court's findings, and “[w]e accept unchallenged findings as true.” Henderson v. Henderson, 139 N.E.3d 227, 232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[16] Parents argue the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that the conditions under which Child was removed from their care would not be remedied. When considering whether the conditions under which a child is removed from a parent's care would be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-3 (Ind. 2014). We first identify the reasons for the child's removal and we then determine whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will be remedied. Id. at 643. As we recently stated in In re A.L.:

It is well-established that “[a] trial court must judge a parent's fitness as of the time of the termination hearing and take into consideration evidence of changed conditions.” In judging fitness, a trial court may properly consider, among other things, a parent's substance abuse and lack of adequate housing and employment. The trial court may also consider a parent's failure to respond to services. “[H]abitual patterns of conduct must be evaluated to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.” A trial court “need not wait until the child[ ] [is] irreversibly influenced by [its] deficient lifestyle such that [its] physical, mental and social growth is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.”

223 N.E.3d 1126, 1138-9 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (internal citations omitted) (brackets in original).

[17] In terminating Parents’ parental rights to Child, the trial court found:

10. Child was removed from [Parents] on an emergency basis on July 24, 2022 due to allegations of abuse and/or neglect.

11. Specifically, [Child] was left alone in a hotel room and was found with matted hair, cradle cap, an[ ] abrasion on her lower back and a diaper weighing over one (1) pound due to the extreme saturation of urine.

* * * * *

19. [Parents] have been referred for substantially the same services throughout the past two (2) years of the underlying CHINS case.

20. These referrals include, but are not limited to, home-based casework, therapy and visitation referrals.

21. [Parents] have not benefitted from the services offered to them. [Parents] have not been successful in remedying the reasons for removal.

22. [Parents] were convicted of Neglect of a Dependent as a result of the circumstances that lead [sic] to Child's removal.

23. Although [Parents] were incarcerated for a portion of the CHINS case, they were not incarcerated for the entire CHINS case, having been released in October 2022. [Parents] have had ample time to engage in services and make efforts to obtain and maintain a safe and stable environment for Child. However, they have been unable to do so.

24. Throughout the underlying CHINS case, neither Mother nor Father made any progress in services to demonstrate that they enhanced their ability to provide care, safety and stability for [Child].

25. Through[out] the two (2) years of their home-based casework, [Parents] have had goals to obtain stable housing and stable employment. Mother has also had the goal of obtaining her driver's license.

26. Despite two (2) years of DCS intervention, Mother and Father have not made any significant progress in achieving these goals.

27. Mother has not acquired and has not made significant efforts to acquire her driver's license.

28. The Court finds this concerning as both Mother and Father identified Mother to be the primary caregiver of [Child].

29. Mother and Father have not identified stable housing.

30. Mother and Father's current living arrangements are not [ ] appropriate place[s] for [Child] due to the persons living in both homes.

31. Additionally, both Mother and Father are currently living with their parents but stated to the Court they did not intend to remain living there long-term.

32. [Parents] have not obtained or made significant efforts to obtain housing despite two (2) years of services.

33. Father testified that he and Mother had improved their ability and knowledge of how to properly care for [Child] through Court ordered services.

34. The Court does not find Father's testimony to be compelling or persuasive.

35. [Parents] have only ever had supervised visitation with [Child]. The level of supervision has never been decreased throughout the entirety of the underlying CHINS case.

36. DCS attempted on at least two (2) occasions to move visitation with [Child] in[to] their previous home. Both times, visits had to be moved back to an office-like setting.

37. On the first occasion, [Parents] allowed the conditions in the home to deteriorate to the point where cockroaches were observed. Additionally, [Parents] continued to smoke in the home, causing [Child] to become ill. Because of this, the visitation provider did not feel it was safe for [Child] to continue to visit with [Parents] in their home.

38. DCS again attempted to move visitation in[to] the home on a second occasion. However, visitation in the home with [Parents] was determined to be unsafe after it was determined [Parents’] home had an extensive amount of black mold.

39. [Parents] did not immediately respond to address these issues in a timely manner.

40. The Court finds it concerning as [Parents] continue to be unable to maintain a safe and appropriate home for [Child].

41. The Court finds [Parents] would not meet the basic and medical needs of [Child].

42. [Child] has medical needs which require ongoing speech and occupational therapy.

43. [Child's] speech therapist testified [Child] has four (4) goals, all of which she continues to need to work on. Speech therapy will be ongoing until she meets all goals.

44. [Parents] have failed to consistently attend [Child's] medical appointments despite assistance and gas cards being offered through DCS.

45. In the month just prior to the termination hearing, [Parents] did not attend at least three (3) of [Child's] weekly appointments.

46. The Court finds this concerning as it highlights [Parents’] inability to provide for the ongoing medical needs of [Child].

47. Mother is currently pregnant with another child.

48. Mother failed to seek medical care for herself and her unborn child until approximately 31 weeks into the pregnancy despite knowing of the pregnancy for a significant period of time prior to that point.

49. The Court finds Mother's failure to seek medical care particularly concerning as it demonstrates Mother's continued failure to make safe and appropriate decisions in ensuring the safety and care of a child.

50. Mother continues to demonstrate she is unable to understand the importance of [Child] being provided the appropriate care.

51. At the time of the final termination hearing, [Parents] were not in full compliance with the Dispositional Order in the underlying CHINS.

52. After two (2) years in services, there is no indication [parents] have or will enhance their ability to provide for the safety, care and protection of [Child].

(App. Vol. II at 64-9.) Based thereon, the trial court concluded the conditions under which Child was removed from Parents’ care would not be remedied.

[18] Parents admit they had not completed “services or all the goals of their service providers” but they argue “they were actively participating and working on rectifying the reasons for removal.” (Parents’ Br. at 16.) They contend Father's income was sufficient to support the family and allow Mother to stay home with Child and her subsequently born child. They assert “their conduct demonstrated a clear and concerted effort to reach the stability required by the case plan.” (Id.) However, Parents’ argument ignores the trial court's findings about their failure to progress in services to the extent that they properly understood how to care for Child and maintain stable employment and housing. The argument also ignores that Parents had been given two years to comply with services and improve their ability to care for Child and had not done so. Child needs stability and cannot languish, waiting for Parents to engage in court-ordered services such that they are able to properly care for Child. See Baker v. Marion Cnty. OFC, 810 N.E.2d 1035, 1040 n.4 (Ind. 2004) (limitations on trial court's ability to approve long-term foster care are designed to ensure a child does not “languish, forgotten, in custodial limbo for long periods of time without permanency”) (quoting In re Priser, No. 19861, 2004 WL 541124 at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. March 19, 2004)). We conclude the trial court's findings support its conclusion that the conditions under which Child was removed from Parents’ care would not be remedied.² See, e.g., In re C.S., 190 N.E.3d 434, 439 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (mother's continued drug use, pending criminal charges, and inability to demonstrate she could care for her child supported the trial court's conclusion that conditions under which child was removed from her care would not be remedied), trans. denied.

Conclusion

[19] The trial court's findings support its conclusion that the conditions under which Child was removed from Parents’ care would not be remedied. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's termination of Parents’ parental rights to Child.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-46-1-4(a).

2.   Parents also argue the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that the continuation of the Parent-Child relationship poses a threat to Child's well-being. Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d) requires DCS to prove one of the circumstances set forth in that section. Because we have determined the trial court's findings support its conclusion that the conditions under which Child was removed from their care would not be remedied, we need not consider Parents’ argument regarding another circumstance listed in Section 4(d).

May, Judge.

Judges Weissmann and Scheele concur. Weissmann, J., and Scheele, J., concur.