WASHINGTON v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Following a jury trial, Eddie Washington (“Washington”) was convicted of Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement.¹ Washington appeals, claiming there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In April 2023, the State filed a five-count information against Washington. Two counts were dismissed, which left only (1) Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement, (2) Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, and (3) Class A misdemeanor intimidation. A jury trial was held in November 2013.

[3] At trial, the State presented evidence about a disturbance at an apartment in Indianapolis on April 24, 2023. Multiple officers from the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (“IMPD”) were dispatched to the apartment, with three of the officers testifying at trial: Officer Lacey Nelson (“Officer Nelson”), Officer Bradley Hunt (“Officer Hunt”), and Officer Nathaniel Sell (“Officer Sell”). When IMPD officers arrived at the apartment complex around 10:00 p.m., they found Washington standing outside an apartment on the third floor. Officer Sell went inside the apartment to speak with its occupant while Officer Nelson and Officer Hunt remained outside with Washington. According to Officer Nelson, Washington was agitated and breathing heavily, talking about how people had been “bothering him all day.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 157. Officer Nelson tried to calm Washington down, asking if he was okay and attempting to de-escalate the situation. Officer Nelson told Washington he did not have to speak with her, but that he could not go inside the apartment because the officers were “keeping the parties involved in the disturbance separated” to “ensure safety” and “see what was going on[.]” Id. at 158. At that point, Washington moved closer to the door. Officer Nelson “put [her] hand up” between herself and Washington and “explain[ed] again” that he could not go inside. Id. Despite being told “multiple times not to go inside,” Washington “attempted to push past officers to go inside[.]” Id. at 173.

[4] When Washington attempted to push past the officers, Officer Hunt “thought it was necessary to try [to] detain [Washington] in handcuffs.” Id. As Officer Hunt attempted to place Washington's hands behind his back, Washington “forcefully ripped his hands towards the front of his body, lowered his body[ ]weight[,] and tried to make his way into the apartment.” Id. Washington evaded Officer Hunt's attempt to handcuff him and “kept going f[a]rther and f[a]rther into the apartment where the other party was.” Id. at 160. At that point, four responding officers attempted to subdue Washington by taking him to the ground, with the goal of placing Washington in handcuffs. Once on the ground, Washington “tugg[ed] [the] hands” of the officers, trying to prevent them from putting his hands behind his back. Id. at 162. Officers gave Washington “multiple loud and clear verbal commands,” instructing him to stop resisting and put his hands behind his back. Id. at 175. Washington kept his hands “under his body,” refusing to comply. Id. Around this time, an officer made approximately seven attempts to deploy his taser, but only one of the probes successfully entered Washington's body. Because the officer was unable to obtain a closed circuit with the taser probes—which would result in “neuromuscular incapacitation” such that Washington could not move “for the five ․ seconds that [the circuit is] activated”—it was necessary to “use the taser itself as a second point of contact” to complete the circuit. Id. at 179. Washington was “violently flailing” in a such a manner that the “circuit ․ continued to be broken by way of the taser moving off of his body,” id., and “it was still a struggle” to subdue him, id. at 176. In the end, the officers were able to handcuff Washington and place leg shackles on him. During the encounter, Officer Nelson sustained scratch marks, pain, and swelling to her hand.

[5] The jury found Washington not guilty of Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement and Class A misdemeanor intimidation, but guilty of Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. The trial court entered its judgment of conviction and, on November 16, 2023, ultimately sentenced Washington to 116 days executed in the Marion County Jail. Washington now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Washington challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting his conviction. For there to be sufficient evidence supporting a criminal conviction, the record must disclose “substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)). In reviewing for sufficient evidence, we do not reweigh evidence or reassess witness credibility. See id. Rather, we consider only the evidence supporting the judgment, “not evidence that might undermine it.” Id.

[7] A person commits Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement if the person knowingly or intentionally “forcibly resists, obstructs, or interferes with a law enforcement officer” while the officer was “lawfully engaged in the execution of the officer's duties[.]” Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1). The term “forcibly” modifies all three verbs—resists, obstructs, and interferes—requiring proof of “strong, powerful, violent means” to evade an officer's rightful exercise of duties. Jordan v. State, 37 N.E.3d 525, 534 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Spangler v. State, 607 N.E.2d 720, 723 (Ind. 1993)). The State need not prove that the defendant's force overwhelmed law enforcement; rather, “even a modest exertion of strength, power, or violence” is sufficient. Walker v. State, 998 N.E.2d 724, 727 (Ind. 2013). As to the requirement that the officer be lawfully engaged in his duties, caselaw establishes that “[a]n officer is not lawfully engaged in the execution of his duties when he uses unconstitutionally excessive force.” Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 697 (Ind. 2017). To evaluate the constitutionality of the force used, courts must apply the “reasonableness” standard under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. “[T]he question is whether the officers’ actions [were] ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Id. (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). Furthermore, to the extent a sufficiency challenge involves the consideration of video evidence, we will not disturb the judgment unless the video “indisputably contradicts” the judgment, i.e., “when no reasonable person can view the video and come to a different conclusion.” Id. at 700.

[8] Here, Washington focuses on whether there was sufficient evidence that he knowingly and intentionally resisted law enforcement and that the officers used constitutionally permissible force. Regarding his knowing and intentional resistance, Washington argues there was a “chaotic environment” at the scene. Appellant's Br. p. 8. Washington directs us to evidence that he appeared anxious when law enforcement arrived, claiming the evidence suggests he “didn't want to interact with the police” but instead “wanted to work and to get his stuff.” Id. at 11. Washington also focuses on the use of the taser, seemingly suggesting that the taser caused him to involuntarily move his body. See id. at 12 (“The officer did not testify about the effects of the shockwave, the pain, and the trauma on the brain. It's a reasonable inference that the [taser] affected more than [Washington's] spine.”). As to the force used by law enforcement in this case, Washington asserts that “[t]he situation called for de-escalation, not escalation,” id. at 11, and Officer Hunt “escalated the situation when he forcibly grabbed ․ Washington's arm[,] which ultimately resulted in the tasing,” id. at 12. Washington directs us to bodycam footage admitted into evidence, which Washington claims “clearly shows that the force the officers used on [him] was unreasonable and excessive in light of the facts and circumstances confronting [the officers] at the apartment.” Id. at 12–13. Washington ultimately contends that law enforcement used excessive, unconstitutional force by “manhandl[ing] him,” “screaming threats and commands” with use of profanity, and engaging in “violence” that “includ[ed] cruelly tasing him seven times.” Id. at 13.

[9] Washington's arguments amount to requests to reweigh the evidence, which we must decline. The evidence favorable to the judgment reflects that Officer Nelson initially tried to calm Washington down and instructed him that he could not enter the apartment while officers were investigating the disturbance. The officers wanted Washington to remain outside the apartment to “ensure safety,” keeping “the parties involved in the disturbance separated” as they investigated “what was going on[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 158. Despite receiving multiple instructions to remain outside the apartment, Washington tried to push past the officers. At that point, Officer Hunt “thought it was necessary to try [to] detain [Washington] in handcuffs.” Id. at 173. Officer Hunt tried to place Washington in handcuffs, but Washington forcibly pulled away and pushed farther and farther into the apartment. After Washington evaded Officer Hunt's attempt to handcuff him, law enforcement attempted to subdue Washington by guiding him to the ground. Even after Washington was brought to the ground, he tugged at the officers and put his hands under his body. Law enforcement ultimately tried to use a taser to subdue Washington, who continued to flail.

[10] On appeal, Washington focuses on the number of taser deployments, suggesting use of the taser amounted to “violence” under the circumstances. Appellant's Br. p. 13. Yet, Washington omits that the taser was deployed only after he had forcibly pushed past multiple officers. Washington also does not address evidence that his continuing physical movements prevented effective use of the taser, resulting in an ongoing struggle. Further, to the extent Washington speculates that the taser caused him to make involuntary movements while on the ground, the evidence favorable to the judgment indicates that a taser has the opposite effect, resulting in “neuromuscular incapacitation” that “locks ․ up” an individual such that they are unable “to move for the five ․ seconds that it's activated.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 179. Finally, to the extent Washington claims the body footage established the use of unlawful force, we cannot say the video evidence in this case indisputably contradicts the jury's determination of guilt.

[11] We conclude the record discloses substantial evidence of probative value such that a reasonable jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Washington committed Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1).

Foley, Judge.

Bailey, J. and Bradford, J., concur.