GONZALEZ CHAVEZ v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Gelacio Gonzalez-Chavez was charged with five counts of child molesting and waived his right to a jury trial in writing and orally on these charges; he was found guilty as charged. Gonzalez-Chavez now appeals and presents one issue for our review: Whether his jury trial waiver was valid.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In December 2022, the State charged Gonzalez-Chavez with three counts of child molesting as Level 1 felonies and two counts of child molesting as Level 4 felonies. On March 27, 2024, Gonzalez-Chavez signed and filed both an English and a Spanish version of a Waiver of Trial by Jury and Motion to Set for Bench Trial. That waiver provided in relevant part as follows:

1. The Defendant cannot read, write and understand English. His primary language is Spanish.

2. The Defendant has been fully advised by the Court and by counsel of his constitutional right to a trial by jury.

3. The Defendant hereby waives his constitutional right to a trial by jury ․ and asks that this cause be submitted to the Court without intervention by jury.

4. No person has made any promise or suggestion of any kind to the defendant, or within his knowledge to anyone else, that the Defendant would receive any favors, special treatment or any other form of leniency if the Defendant would decide to waive his right to a jury trial in this case.

5. No person has made any threat of any kind to him, or within his knowledge to anyone else, to coerce him into waiving his right to a jury trial in this case.

6. The Defendant freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made an [sic] executed the waiver of this right to a jury trial.

Appellant's App. Vol. II at 41–42; see also id. at 43–44.

[4] Before Gonzalez-Chavez's bench trial began and with two interpreters present, the trial court questioned Gonzalez-Chavez about this waiver in relevant part as follows:

THE COURT: Alright. So, you understand that by reading this your [sic] asked for a trial in front of me, the Judge?

DEFENDANT BY INTERPRETER: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you understand that under the Indiana and US Constitutions you have a right to a trial by jury?

DEFENDANT BY INTERPRETER: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you know what a jury is?

DEFENDANT BY INTERPRETER: That eleven people come and judge you.

THE COURT: So, it would be a jury of twelve people. They would decide if the State has met its burden of proof to prove beyond a reasonable doubt whether you are guilty of these charges. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

* * *

THE COURT: I'm just confirming, confirming that since you signed this document is it still your wish to proceed without a jury?

DEFENDANT BY INTERPRETER: Yes.

THE COURT: Alright. And this is a decision you've made voluntarily?

DEFENDANT BY INTERPRETER: Yes.

THE COURT: You've discussed it with your attorney, and you've come to this decision on your own?

DEFENDANT BY INTERPRETER: Yes.

THE COURT: Has anyone forced you into this decision?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: Has anyone made any promises to you or given you any benefit to make this decision to proceed just with the Judge?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

Tr. Vol. II at 8–11. Gonzalez-Chavez then asked if the trial court's questions meant he “still ha[d] a chance to have a jury, a jury trial,” so the trial court gave him time to consult with his counsel. Tr. Vol. II at 10. After that consultation, the following colloquy occurred:

THE COURT: ․ Mr. Gonzalez, how do you wish to proceed here today?

DEFENDANT BY INTERPRETER: Bench trial.

THE COURT: Bench trial. ․ [W]e'll proceed with a bench trial, and you understand you're waiving your right to a jury trial?

DEFENDANT BY INTERPRETER: Yes.

THE COURT: Alright. And that decision again has been made freely and voluntarily?

DEFENDANT BY INTERPRETER: Yes.

Tr. Vol. II at 10–11.

[5] The case proceeded to a bench trial, and Gonzalez-Chavez was found guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Gonzalez-Chavez to 70 years of incarceration, with 5 of those years suspended to probation. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Gonzalez-Chavez's Jury Trial Waiver Was Valid

[6] On appeal, Gonzalez-Chavez challenges the validity of his jury trial waiver. Whether a defendant validly waived the right to a jury trial is question of law we review de novo. Horton v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1157 (Ind. 2016) (citing Hall v. State, 36 N.E.3d 459, 466 (Ind. 2015), reh'g denied). Our Supreme Court has explained the right to a jury trial as follows:

In broad view, federal and Indiana constitutional jury trial rights guarantee the same general protection—a criminal defendant must receive a jury trial, unless he waives it. Waiver of the Sixth Amendment jury trial right must be “express and intelligent,” Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312, 50 S.Ct. 253, 74 L.Ed. 854 (1930), and waiver of the Indiana constitutional jury trial right must be “knowing, voluntary[,] and intelligent,” Perkins v. State, 541 N.E.2d 927, 928 (Ind. 1989).

Horton, 51 N.E.3d at 1158. Generally, the defendant bears the burden of establishing that his waiver was invalid. Nunez v. State, 43 N.E.3d 680, 683 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.

[7] Gonzalez-Chavez claims “he was not adequately informed of the consequences of a waiver of his jury trial right.” Appellant's Br. at 8. In other words, Gonzalez-Chavez contends he did not make his jury trial waiver knowingly. “For waiver to be knowing, a defendant must be advised of their rights either on the record or in writing.” Carmouche v. State, 188 N.E.3d 482, 485 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing Duncan v. State, 975 N.E.2d 838, 844 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)). Further, this court has held in Nunez v. State that “defendants should be informed that (1) twelve members of the community compose a jury, (2) the defendant may take part in jury selection, (3) a jury verdict must be unanimous, and (4) the court alone decides guilt or innocence if the defendant waives a jury trial.” 43 N.E.3d at 683 (emphasis added). However, a defendant need not have explained to them “each and every possible detail concerning a jury trial in order for the defendant to be sufficiently informed about the nature of a jury trial and the consequences of waving his right to a jury trial.” Reynolds v. State, 703 N.E.2d 701, 704 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).

[8] Relying on Nunez, Gonzalez-Chavez contends his jury trial waiver was invalid because neither the trial court nor the written waivers advised him that he could take part in jury selection and the jury's verdict must be unanimous. While it is true that the written waivers and Gonzalez-Chavez's colloquy with the trial court did not address jury selection and jury unanimity, the extensive dialogue between Gonzalez-Chavez and the trial court constituted a sufficient advisement concerning his right to a jury trial. See Reynolds, 703 N.E.2d at 704. Gonzalez-Chavez affirmatively indicated that he knew both that he had a constitutional right to a jury trial and that he was giving up that right in favor of a bench trial. The same is true of Gonzalez-Chavez's written waivers. On this record, we cannot say that Gonzalez-Chavez did not knowingly waive his right to a jury trial. We therefore affirm his conviction and sentence.

[9] Affirmed.

Felix, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Foley, J., concur.