NELSON v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] After conducting an independent investigation to corroborate an anonymous tip that Donald Nelson was dealing methamphetamine and heroin, law enforcement officers obtained a search warrant for Nelson, his residence, and his vehicle. Officers executed the search warrant and discovered methamphetamine in Nelson's shoe. The trial court denied Nelson's pretrial motion to suppress the evidence collected pursuant to the search warrant. A jury found Nelson guilty of possessing methamphetamine as a Level 4 Felony, and the trial court sentenced him to 11 years of incarceration. Nelson now appeals, raising three issues ¹ for our review:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain evidence at trial;

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by not identifying certain mitigating factors at sentencing; and

3. Whether Nelson's sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In January 2024, Wabash County Sheriff's Department Detective Devin Bechtold received an anonymous tip that Nelson regularly travelled from Wabash County, Indiana, to South Bend, Indiana, to purchase methamphetamine and heroin that he would bring back to Wabash County. According to the tip, Nelson would sometimes use his blue Volkswagen Jetta to travel to and from South Bend.

[4] Based on this information, Detective Bechtold began observing Nelson's residence and movements. On January 24, Detective Bechtold collected the contents of a trash can outside of residence Nelson frequented, which contained multiple plastic baggies with residue, a broken glass smoking device that field tested positive for methamphetamine, a used syringe, several syringe caps, and a used plastic bag for a Naloxone Nasel Kit. Detective Bechtold also had a K9 conduct a free air sniff of Nelson's vehicle while it was parked in front of Nelson's residence; the K9 alerted to illegal narcotics. Consequently, Detective Bechtold requested a search warrant for Nelson, two other people, Nelson's residence, and Nelson's Jetta.

[5] On January 29, the trial court issued the search warrant. The next day, Detective Bechtold observed Nelson driving his Jetta and had Wabash County Sheriff's Deputy Corey Phillipy initiate a traffic stop. Although Deputy Phillipy was in a marked car and activated his lights and sirens, Nelson did not stop until Detective Bechtold “positioned his vehicle in front [of Nelson's] that way he would either have to come up to [Detective Bechtold] or go over the curb,” Tr. Vol. II at 225. Detective Bechtold and Deputy Phillipy then approached the Jetta, removed Nelson from it, handcuffed and Mirandized him, and provided him a copy of the search warrant. While speaking with Nelson, Detective Bechtold noticed a “plastic baggy sticking out of” Nelson's right shoe. Id. at 231. When Detective Bechtold removed the bag from Nelson's shoe, it had what appeared to be methamphetamine in it. Nelson told Detective Bechtold that the bag was his; he told Detective Bechtold the bag contained “roughly a ball or a little over a ball of methamphetamine,” id. at 232–33; and he told Detective Bechtold that he had moved the bag from his pocket to his shoe when Deputy Phillipy initiated the traffic stop. Later testing revealed the bag contained 7.62 grams of methamphetamine. Law enforcement officers also found a glass smoking device in the driver's-side door of the Jetta.

[6] The State charged Nelson with possession of methamphetamine as a Level 4 felony, possession of methamphetamine as a Level 5 felony, resisting law enforcement as a Level 6 felony, and obstruction of justice as a Level 6 felony. Before trial, Nelson filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the search warrant, arguing the search was unconstitutional for lack of probable cause. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Nelson's motion.

[7] Nelson chose not to attend his jury trial, at which the jury found him guilty of both possession charges.² The trial court entered judgment on only the conviction for possession of methamphetamine as a Level 4 felony due to double jeopardy concerns, and it sentenced Nelson to 11 years of incarceration. This appeal ensued.³

Discussion and Decision

1. Nelson Has Waived His Evidentiary Claim for Failure to Significantly Comply with the Indiana Appellate Rules

[8] Nelson contends the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence at trial. Specifically, Nelson argues that “the evidence seized during the [search] was inadmissible,” Appellant's Br. at 18, because the search violated his federal and state constitutional rights. However, Nelson does not in any manner identify the evidence he claims was erroneously admitted. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(d) (requiring citations to pages of the Transcript where the challenged evidence was identified, offered, and received or rejected). The State posits that Nelson is likely challenging the evidence relating to the methamphetamine officers found in his shoe during the search. However, we will not search the record to find a basis for a party's argument. Carter ex rel. CNO Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Hilliard, 970 N.E.2d 735, 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Nealy v. Am. Family Mut. Ins., 910 N.E.2d 842, 845 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied). Nelson's failure to direct our attention to any piece of evidence—either by name, description, or required citation—substantially impedes our review of his evidentiary claim, so we cannot address its merits. See Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Guardiola v. State, 375 N.E.2d 1105, 1107 (Ind. 1978)).

[9] Waiver notwithstanding, even if Nelson had identified the specific evidence he now challenges and assuming he properly objected to admission of that evidence at trial,⁴ he has not demonstrated that the trial court erred in admitting any search-related evidence. We review rulings on admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 858 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864 (Ind. 2012)), cert. denied. “[W]e may affirm the trial court's decision on any basis supported by the record,” Means v. State, 201 N.E.3d 1158, 1163 (Ind. 2023) (citing Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 190 n.2 (Ind. 2021)), and we will reverse “only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances,” Russell, 234 N.E.3d at 858 (quoting Smith v. State, 754 N.E.2d 502, 504 (Ind. 2001)). “However, when a challenge to an evidentiary ruling is based on the constitutionality of the search or seizure of evidence, it raises a question of law that we review de novo.” Combs v. State, 168 N.E.3d 985, 990–91 (Ind. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Johnson v. State, 157 N.E.3d 1199, 1203 (Ind. 2020), cert. denied), cert. denied.

[10] Nelson argues that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause and thus violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution; he also contends the search was unreasonable under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. We first address Nelson's Fourth Amendment argument before turning to his Article 1, Section 11 arguments.

a. Fourth Amendment

[11] The Fourth Amendment states that warrants may only be issued “upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. When faced with a challenge to the probable cause supporting an affidavit, we must review two judicial rulings: (1) the warrant-issuing judge's “decision that probable cause existed to support issuing the warrant,” and (2) “the trial court's decision to uphold that determination.” Houser v. State, 678 N.E.2d 95, 98 (Ind. 1997). In reviewing the warrant-issuing judge's decision, we “focus on whether a ‘substantial basis’ existed for a warrant authorizing the search or seizure,” and resolve “doubtful cases ․ in favor of upholding the warrant.” Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236–39 (1983)). Because the trial court engages in the same review of the warrant-issuing judge's decision when ruling on a motion to suppress or an objection to the admission of evidence at trial, we review the trial court's decision de novo. Id.

[12] “Probable cause exists when ‘there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’ ” United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 (2006) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). “An affidavit must provide the [warrant-issuing judge] with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause ․” Gates, 462 U.S. at 239. A “substantial basis” exists if “reasonable inferences drawn from the totality of the evidence” support the warrant-issuing judge's probable cause determination. Houser, 678 N.E.2d at 99. Thus, the affidavit must contain more than conclusory statements and uncorroborated hearsay. Id. at 239–41. However, if the affidavit presents “a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay” contained therein, then the affidavit “is not to be deemed insufficient on that score.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 241–42.

[13] For example, in Illinois v. Gates, law enforcement received an anonymous letter that Sue and Lance Gates were dealing illegal drugs and that detailed how the Gateses moved the drugs from Florida to Illinois. 462 U.S. at 225. Before applying for a search warrant, law enforcement investigated the claims in the letter, including surveilling the Gateses. Id. at 225–27. This investigation corroborated many of the details in the letter, namely the details of the Gateses’ travel to and from Florida. Id. at 226–27. In the search warrant affidavit, law enforcement included both the information gained from the anonymous letter and from the ensuing investigation. Id. at 226. The judge determined probable cause existed to search the Gates’ residence and vehicle. Id. The United States Supreme Court held the judge had a substantial basis for concluding probable cause existed because law enforcement had corroborated “major portions of the letter's predictions,” which provided a “fair probability that the writer of the anonymous letter had obtained his entire story either from the Gates[es] or someone they trusted.” Id. at 246.

[14] Here, like the law enforcement officers in Gates, Detective Bechtold investigated the anonymous tip he received about Nelson and corroborated many of its details. The anonymous tip stated that Nelson was transporting controlled substances in a blue Jetta. Detective Bechtold observed Nelson driving a blue Jetta, which a K9 indicated had controlled substances inside. Detective Bechtold also discovered evidence of illegal drug use outside of a residence Nelson frequented.

[15] Based on the foregoing, the anonymous tip was sufficiently corroborated by Detective Bechtold's investigation, and the totality of the circumstances established a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found on Nelson's person, in the Jetta, or in the residence Nelson was frequenting. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 241–46. Consequently, we cannot say the search warrant was unsupported by probable cause, so Nelson's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting at trial any evidence obtained pursuant to that search warrant.

b. Article 1, Section 11

[16] Nelson challenges both the search warrant and the search under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. We first address his argument regarding the search warrant and then address his argument regarding the search itself.

i. Probable Cause

[17] First, Nelson argues the search warrant lacked probable cause, which violated his rights under Article 1, Section 11. Like the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution provides that search warrants can only be issued when supported by probable cause, Ind. Const. art. 1, § 11. To this end, Indiana Code section 35-33-5-2 requires a search warrant affidavit to set forth facts known to the affiant through personal knowledge or based on hearsay. Ind. Code § 35-33-5-2(a)(3). To amount to probable cause, hearsay must be supported by some “reliable information establishing the credibility of the source” and “a factual basis for the information furnished” in the affidavit, id. § 35-33-5-2(b)(1), or it must be corroborated under the totality of the circumstances by other information in the affidavit, id. § 35-33-5-2(b)(2).

[18] The Indiana Supreme Court has explained our standard of review for a probable cause determination as follows:

We apply a deferential standard of review to a warrant-issuing judge's probable-cause finding, affirming if the judge has a “substantial basis” for determining that probable cause existed. Heuring v. State, 140 N.E.3d 270, 273 (Ind. 2020). Our focus is “whether reasonable inferences drawn from the totality of the evidence support” the finding of probable cause. Id. (quoting Query v. State, 745 N.E.2d 769, 771 (Ind. 2001)).

Bunnell v. State, 172 N.E.3d 1231, 1234 (Ind. 2021).

[19] Notably, if a search warrant affidavit consists only of uncorroborated hearsay, then probable cause does not exist. Bailey v. State, 131 N.E.3d 665, 679 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Newby v. State, 701 N.E.2d 593, 598 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)), trans. denied. Consequently, an anonymous tip, without more, cannot support a finding of probable cause. See McGrath v. State, 95 N.E.3d 522, 527 (Ind. 2018). “However, an officer can bolster the trustworthiness of a source of unknown credibility by including in the search warrant affidavit the basis of the informant's knowledge or facts obtained through independent police investigation that corroborate the source.” Bailey, 131 N.E.3d at 679 (citing McGrath, 95 N.E.3d at 527).

[20] An officer can demonstrate the trustworthiness of information included in a search warrant affidavit in numerous ways.

For example, hallmarks of trustworthiness include whether “(1) the informant has given correct information in the past; (2) independent police investigation corroborates the informant's statements; (3) some basis for the informant's knowledge is shown; or (4) the informant predicts conduct or activities by the suspect that are not ordinarily easily predicted.” Jaggers v. State, 687 N.E.2d 180, 182 (Ind. 1997). The magistrate is to make a practical, commonsense determination whether there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime or contraband will be found if the search warrant is issued. Id. at 181.

Bailey v. State, 131 N.E.3d at 679.

[21] For the same reasons probable cause existed under the Fourth Amendment, probable cause existed under Article 1, Section 11—independent investigation corroborated the anonymous tip. According to that tip, Nelson was transporting controlled substances in a blue Jetta. Detective Bechtold observed Nelson driving a blue Jetta, which a K9 indicated had controlled substances inside. Detective Bechtold also discovered evidence of illegal drug use outside of the residence Nelson frequented. Based on the foregoing, reasonable inferences drawn from the totality of the evidence support the finding of probable cause, so Nelson's rights under Article 1, Section 11 were not violated and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting at trial any evidence obtained pursuant to that search warrant.

ii. Reasonableness of Search

[22] Second, Nelson contends the search was unreasonable under Article 1, Section 11, which prohibits “unreasonable search or seizure.” Ind. Const. art. 1, § 11. When reviewing an unreasonable search claim, we “ask whether the State has shown that a particular search or seizure was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances.” Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 191 (Ind. 2021) (citing Hardin v. State, 148 N.E.3d 932, 942 (Ind. 2020)). In conducting this analysis, we employ the framework set forth by our Supreme Court in Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356 (Ind. 2005), which requires us to balance three factors: (1) “the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred,” (2) “the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities,” and (3) “the extent of law enforcement needs.” Ramirez, 174 N.E.3d at 191 (quoting Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 361). We address each factor in turn.

[23] Degree of Suspicion. Nelson argues that there was no “reasonable concern, suspicion or belief that illegal activities had been undertaken” by him because “Detective Bechtold lacked any personal knowledge that Nelson was participating in illegal activities and had not personally seen Nelson participate in the same.” Appellant's Br. at 29. When evaluating the degree of suspicion that a violation has occurred, “we consider all the information available to the officer at the time of the search or seizure.” Ramirez, 174 N.E.3d at 191 (citing Hardin, 148 N.E.3d at 943). Here, Detective Bechtold received an anonymous tip that Nelson was transporting controlled substances in a blue Jetta; observed Nelson driving a blue Jetta; conducted a K9 free air sniff of that blue Jetta, which resulted in an alert for the presence of controlled substances therein; and discovered evidence of illegal drug use outside of a residence he observed Nelson frequenting. These facts gave rise not only to probable cause for the search warrant but also a high degree of suspicion that Nelson possessed illegal substances.

[24] Degree of Intrusion. Nelson argues, without citation to authority, that “the search of a person's body is of the highest degree of intrusion into a citizen's ordinary activities and far surpasses the search of a person's home, vehicle or personal belongings.” Appellant's Br. at 29. When evaluating the degree of intrusion that the method of the search imposed on the person's ordinary activities, we proceed from the defendant's perspective and “consider the intrusion into both a defendant's physical movements and privacy, focusing on how officers conducted the search.” Ramirez, 174 N.E.3d at 191 (citing Hardin, 148 N.E.3d at 944–45). Here, Deputy Phillipy and Detective Bechtold conducted a traffic stop of Nelson and his Jetta, and Nelson does not claim that traffic stop was in any way improper or unlawful. We also observe that the search of Nelson's person was lawful because it was done pursuant to a valid warrant, see Perez v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1144, 1154 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied, and it appears to have been minimally intrusive as the bag of methamphetamine was in plain sight.

[25] Law Enforcement Needs. Finally, Nelson argues that “the search of his person was unnecessary as the State could have simply caught Nelson on one of his alleged trips to South Bend with drugs in his possession, or the State could have recruited [the anonymous tipster] to work as a CI and conducted formal controlled buys to capture Nelson in the act.” Appellant's Br. at 29. When evaluating the extent of law enforcement needs, we “examine not only the needs of officers ‘to act in a general way,’ but also officers’ needs ‘to act in the particular way and at the particular time they did.’ ” Ramirez, 174 N.E.3d at 191 (citing Hardin, 148 N.E.3d at 946–47). The needs of law enforcement here were high because they had corroborated information that Nelson possessed illegal drugs. See Hardin, 148 N.E.3d at 947 (observing that law enforcement's need to fight drug trafficking is significant). Nelson's argument that law enforcement's need was low because they had not tried to catch him committing a crime is unpersuasive.

[26] Based on the foregoing, the State has shown that the search of Nelson was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances. Therefore, that search did not violate Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution and we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by admitting at trial any evidence obtained pursuant to that search.

2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Not Identifying Certain Mitigating Factors at Sentencing

[27] Nelson asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by not identifying certain mitigating factors at sentencing. The trial court determined there were no mitigating factors in this case and three aggravating factors—Nelson's refusal to attend his jury trial, Nelson's “significant” criminal history, and Nelson's history of unsuccessful probation. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 39; Tr. Vol. III at 94.

[28] Our Supreme Court has explained the standard of review for a trial court's identification of mitigating circumstances as follows:

We review a sentencing court's decision about whether to find a mitigating factor for an abuse of discretion. Carter v. State, 711 N.E.2d 835, 838–39 (Ind. 1999). “An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Id. at 838. Sentencing courts are “under no duty to deem mitigating every factor” advanced “simply because it [was] supported by some evidence in the record.” Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 952 (Ind. 1994). And “the sentencing judge is not obligated to explain why [they have] chosen not to make a finding of mitigation ․ Moreover, the [sentencing] court is not obligated to credit or weigh the defendant's evidence of mitigating circumstances the same way the defendant does.” Id. (quotations omitted).

Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 847–48 (Ind. 2024) (alterations in original).

[29] Nelson asserts that he presented evidence of circumstances he believes to be mitigators, namely that he has struggled with substance abuse for more than ten years. A history of substance abuse may be a mitigating factor, Hape v. State, 903 N.E.2d 977, 1002 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Field v. State, 843 N.E.2d 1008, 1012 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied), but “when a defendant is aware of a substance abuse problem but has not taken appropriate steps to treat it, the trial court does not abuse its discretion by rejecting the addiction as a mitigating circumstance,” id. (citing Bryant v. State, 802 N.E.2d 486, 501 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied).

[30] During argument at sentencing, Nelson conceded that he has

never really addressed ․ substance abuse throughout his life. The only time he ever really did that was taking some minor classes while incarcerated in jail, and obviously that was not enough. He was even on electronic monitoring with alcohol testing and he wasn't able to do that.

Tr. Vol. III at 91. Based on this concession, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting Nelson's substance abuse as a mitigating factor. See Hape, 903 N.E.2d at 1002 (citing Bryant, 802 N.E.2d at 501).

3. Nelson's Sentence Is Not Inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B)

[31] Finally, Nelson argues his sentence is inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B) and should be revised. The Indiana Constitution authorizes us to independently review and revise a trial court's sentencing decision. Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 855–56 (Ind. 2024) (citing Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6; Jackson v. State, 145 N.E.3d 783, 784 (Ind. 2020)). That authority is implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), which permits us to revise a sentence if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, we find that the sentence is “inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Id. (quoting Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 159 (Ind. 2019)). Our role under this rule “is primarily to ‘leaven the outliers’ and identify ‘guiding principles’ for sentencers, rather than to achieve the ‘perceived “correct” result’ in each case.” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008)).

[32] Because we give “considerable deference” to a trial court's sentencing decision, Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 122 (quoting Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222), a defendant requesting revision under Appellate Rule 7(B) must present “compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense and the defendant's character,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261, 1267 (Ind. 2023)). In reviewing the defendant's sentence, “we are not limited to the mitigators and aggravators found by the trial court.” Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 4 (Ind. 2014).

[33] When considering the nature of the offense, we start with the advisory sentence. Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 4 (citing Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007), as amended (July 10, 2007), decision clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)). Here, Nelson was convicted of and sentenced on one count of possession of methamphetamine as a Level 4 felony. “A person who commits a Level 4 felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between two (2) and twelve (12) years, with the advisory sentence being six (6) years.” I.C. § 35-50-2-5.5 (emphasis added). The trial court sentenced Nelson to 11 years executed at the DOC.

[34] Where, as here, the trial court deviated from the advisory sentence, one factor we consider is “whether there is anything more or less egregious about the offense committed by the defendant that makes it different from the ‘typical’ offense accounted for by the legislature when it set the advisory sentence.” T.A.D.W. v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1205, 1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Holloway v. State, 950 N.E.2d 803, 806–07 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)), as amended (May 26, 2023). We also consider whether the offense was “accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality.” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). Here, Nelson possessed more than seven grams of methamphetamine. Because this is a mid-range amount of methamphetamine for this level of an offense, it does not compel this court to believe it is either more or less egregious than another Level 4 offense.

[35] In considering the character of the offender, “we engage in a broad consideration of a defendant's qualities,” T.A.D.W., 51 N.E.3d at 1211 (citing Aslinger v. State, 2 N.E.3d 84, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), clarified on other grounds on reh'g), including whether the defendant has “substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character,” Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

[36] Nelson's criminal history consists of eight felony convictions, including convictions for dealing in methamphetamine, robbery, auto theft, and unlawful imprisonment; four misdemeanor convictions; and two petitions to revoke probation that were pending at the time of sentencing. Nelson committed the instant offense while on probation for possession of methamphetamine, a syringe, and paraphernalia. Furthermore, while on pretrial release in this case, Nelson violated the terms of his bond by testing positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine. Nelson has failed to appear for hearings at least seven times throughout his criminal history. (Nelson also refused to attend his jury trial in this case, which, as the trial court observed, “shows a lack of respect for authority,” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 39. Moreover, Nelson did not immediately stop when Deputy Phillipy initiated the traffic stop, and he tried to conceal the methamphetamine he was carrying.

[37] Based on the nature of Nelson's offense and his history of criminal conduct, we cannot say that Nelson has produced compelling evidence demonstrating that the nature of his offense or his character renders his sentence inappropriate. See Lane, 232 N.E.3d 119. Consequently, Nelson has not shown that his sentence is inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B).

Conclusion

[38] In sum, Nelson waived his evidentiary claim, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not identifying certain factors as mitigating circumstances, and Nelson's sentence is not inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B). We therefore affirm the trial court on all issues raised.

[39] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We remind Nelson's counsel that each issue presented for review must be concisely and particularly described in the Statement of Issues, as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(4), and that each argument must have its own heading in the Argument, as required by Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(c).

2.   Pursuant to the State's motion, the trial court dismissed the obstruction of justice charge before trial. The jury found Nelson not guilty of resisting law enforcement.

3.   Nelson fails to include all relevant facts in his Statement of Facts, as required by Appellate Rule 46(A)(5). For example, Nelson does not provide details about the search warrant and search in his Statement of Facts; he instead includes that information in only his Argument. Nelson also fails to support with citations to the record several statements of fact in his Argument, as required by Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). Because this noncompliance with Appellate Rule 46 does not substantially impede our review of Nelson's claims, we choose to address their merits. See Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015).

4.   The State contends that Nelson did not object at trial and therefore further waived his evidentiary claim. See Appellee's Brief at 15. Because Nelson fails to identify the evidence he now challenges, including the pages of the Transcript where he objected to the admission of such evidence, we would have to review the entire transcript of the trial to determine whether Nelson objected to search-related evidence based on his motion to suppress. We remind counsel that the purpose of our appellate rules—especially Appellate Rule 46 governing the content of briefs—“is to aid and expedite review and to relieve the appellate court of the burden of searching the record and briefing the case.” Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (emphasis added) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)). Based on Nelson's failure to properly cite the pages of the Transcript where the challenged evidence was identified, offered, and received or rejected, we assume arguendo that proper objections were made.

Felix, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Foley, J., concur.