K.S., Appellant-Respondent, v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] K.S. appeals the juvenile court's order granting wardship over him to the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC) for an indeterminate period. K.S. argues that his delinquency adjudication only justified a three-month commitment to the DOC, followed by a release to his grandparents’ custody.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On April 12, 2024, fifteen-year-old K.S., who was living with his grandparents,¹ took his grandfather's Chevy Volt automobile without permission. K.S.’s grandfather reported the Volt stolen and at some point, K.S. crashed the car. Two days later, the Volt was recovered and K.S. was arrested. K.S. was in possession of marijuana at the time of his arrest. The State charged K.S. with the following offenses had they been committed by an adult: auto theft, a Level 6 felony, possession of marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor, and operating a vehicle without ever receiving a license, a Class C misdemeanor.

[4] At a fact-finding hearing on May 6, 2024, K.S. admitted to the allegations of possession of marijuana and operating a vehicle without a license. The juvenile court also determined that K.S. was delinquent for committing theft.

[5] The evidence established K.S.’s juvenile delinquency history as follows:

December, 2019—referred for criminal mischief and battery.

January, 2022—delinquent for Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury.

May, 2022—referred for criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor.

August, 2022—delinquent for committing battery, a Class B misdemeanor.

November, 2022—delinquent for theft, a Class A misdemeanor and leaving home without the permission of a parent or custodian.

January, 2023—referred for leaving home without the permission of a parent or custodian five times and twice for resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor.

February, 2024—delinquent for battery, a Class B misdemeanor, and disorderly conduct, a Class B misdemeanor.

Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 18. As a result of his past adjudications, K.S. has served numerous days in detention, been placed in residential facilities, and has been ordered to informal or formal probation. K.S. was also directed to participate in counseling and homebased services on numerous occasions.

[6] While detained awaiting the dispositional hearing in this case, K.S. refused to return to his cell during lockdown several times. There were at least two instances where K.S. argued with other juveniles, and K.S. was placed in lockdown on multiple occasions for disruptive behavior.

[7] At the dispositional hearing on June 3, 2024, the probation department recommended that wardship of K.S. be granted to the DOC because “they ha[d] run out of options,” and there were no other placement facilities available for K.S. Transcript Vol. II at 16. The State agreed with that recommendation, and K.S.’s counsel commented: “Judge ․ if we were going to send [K.S.] to DOC ․ could we bring him back in three months, and could we then review it? Maybe send him back home with his grandparents if he's not ․ having any more problems?” Transcript Vol. II at 19.

[8] The juvenile court ordered K.S. to the DOC for an indeterminate period, stating to K.S. that “the amount of time that you are there is dependent upon your actions while you're there.” Transcript Vol. II at 19. In its dispositional order, the juvenile court pointed out that K.S. had received counseling, supervised probation, case management and homebased services, detention, and residential placements over the two and one-half-year period of his delinquency history. The order also noted that K.S. committed the instant offenses only two months after being released from detention on other offenses, and that no residential care facility was available or willing to accept K.S. The juvenile court concluded that “[K.S.] is a threat to the community and to himself due to his refusal to follow the rules of the home and inability to control his impulses. [He] has harmed other individuals, [and] the court has no options left given the child's unwillingness and/or inability to control himself.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 52.

[9] K.S. now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[10] The disposition of a juvenile delinquent is committed to the juvenile court's sound discretion, subject to the “statutory considerations of the welfare of the child, the community's safety, and the Indiana Code's policy of favoring the least harsh disposition.” E.H. v. State, 764 N.E.2d 681, 684 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. A juvenile court's disposition will not be reversed absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. J.T. v. State, 111 N.E.3d 1019, 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. A court abuses its discretion only if its action is “clearly erroneous and against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” M.C. v. State, 134 N.E.3d 453, 458 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.

[11] While Ind. Code § 31-37-18-6 requires the juvenile court to select the least restrictive placement in most situations, the statute recognizes that in certain situations the best interests of the child are better served by a more restrictive placement. See, e.g., K.A. v. State, 775 N.E.2d 382, 386-87 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (recognizing that the statute requires placement in the least restrictive setting only “[i]f consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child”), trans. denied. Juveniles adjudicated delinquent may be placed at the DOC for either determinate or indeterminate commitments, and the juvenile court has discretion to choose between the two provisions. D.C. v. State, 958 N.E.2d 757, 759-60 (Ind. 2011); I.C. § 31-37-19-6.

[12] Notwithstanding K.S.’s claim that the juvenile court abused its discretion by making him a ward of the DOC for an indeterminate period, the evidence established that K.S. has failed to conform his behavior to an acceptable standard despite being afforded multiple opportunities to do so. The juvenile court observed that K.S. has a lengthy history of detentions, homebased services, counseling, residential placement, and probation over a two- and one-half-year period, and he has continued to engage in delinquent behavior.

[13] In this case, K.S. stole his grandfather's car without ever having received a license, which resulted in him crashing the car and placing him and the public in danger. In light of K.S.’s delinquent history, his unwillingness to follow the rules at home, and the failed services that were offered, ordering K.S. to the DOC for a short determinate period and then returning him to his grandparents’ custody was not necessarily in his best interests.

[14] Further, the parties acknowledged that there were no alternative placements for K.S., as no residential facility was willing to accept him. The evidence demonstrated that K.S. required a structured setting to ensure that he receives the necessary services for his rehabilitation, and the DOC was the only available placement that could provide such an environment. Accordingly, the DOC was the least restrictive disposition available, given K.S.’s needs. See, e.g., M.C., 134 N.E.3d at 459 (placement at DOC was not an abuse of discretion where the juvenile continued to commit delinquent acts and less restrictive methods had failed); see also D.S. v. State, 829 N.E.2d 1081, 1085 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (requiring the least restrictive disposition that is consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child).

[15] In sum, the evidence supports the juvenile court's conclusion that repeating less restrictive services and committing him to a determinate term at the DOC was not in K.S.’s best interests. See, e.g., L.L. v. State, 774 N.E.2d 554, 559 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (finding no abuse of discretion where the juvenile was committed to the DOC after previous opportunities, including probation, were unsuccessful), trans. denied. Thus, K.S. has failed to show that the juvenile court abused its discretion.

[16] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Both of K.S.’s parents were deceased.

Altice, Chief Judge.

Brown, J. and Tavitas, J., concur.