J.W., Appellant-Respondent v. A.R., Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] J.W. (“Putative Father”) appeals the trial court's order that his consent is not required for A.R.’s (“Adoptive Father”) adoption of Ja.W. (“Child”), and the subsequent decree of adoption. The restated issue on appeal is whether the trial court clearly erred when it determined Putative Father was not entitled to receive notice of the adoption action nor entitled to contest the same. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child was born to C.R. (“Mother”) on January 27, 2011, at which time Mother and Putative Father lived together. No paternity affidavit regarding Child was ever filed with a county health department, nor did Putative Father ever register with the Putative Father Registry of the Indiana Department of Health. Mother and Putative Father ended their relationship and ceased living together approximately one and one-half years after Child's birth.

[3] On March 21, 2024, Adoptive Father, who is Mother's current spouse, filed a petition to adopt Child and provided notice of the same to Putative Father. On April 3, Putative Father filed a pro se document in which he asserted that he was “contesting/putting a hold on the adoption of [Child].” App. at 18. On May 13, Adoptive Father filed a Putative Father Registry Affidavit from the Indiana Department of Health dated April 16, 2024, which stated that “[n]o putative father is registered[,]” and “[n]o paternity determination is on file with the department.” Id. at 27.

[4] The court appointed counsel for Putative Father. On July 10, the court held a hearing on Putative Father's objection to Child's adoption at which Putative Father appeared with counsel and presented testimony. In an order dated July 25, the court found that, because Putative Father failed to register with the Putative Father Registry per Indiana Code Section 31-19-5-12, he was not entitled to notice of Child's adoption nor entitled to object to the same. On August 19, following a hearing, the trial court granted the adoption petition. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Putative Father contends that the trial court erred when it concluded that he was not entitled to receive notice of the instant adoption action nor entitled to contest the same. Our standard of review in adoption cases is well-settled:

In family law matters, we generally give considerable deference to the trial court's decision because we recognize that the trial judge is in the best position to judge the facts, determine witness credibility, “get a feel for the family dynamics,” and “get a sense of the parents and their relationship with their children.” MacLafferty v. MacLafferty, 829 N.E.2d 938, 940 (Ind. 2005). Accordingly, when reviewing an adoption case, we presume that the trial court's decision is correct, and the appellant bears the burden of rebutting this presumption. In re Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965, 972–73 (Ind. 2014).

The trial court's findings and judgment will be set aside only if they are clearly erroneous. In re Paternity of K.I., 903 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ind. 2009). “A judgment is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence supporting the findings or the findings fail to support the judgment.” Id. We will not reweigh evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. In re Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d at 973. Rather, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision. Id.

E.B.F. v. D.F., 93 N.E.3d 759, 762 (Ind. 2018).

[6] We note that Adoptive Father failed to file an appellee's brief. Under such circumstances, we do not undertake the burden of developing arguments for the appellee, and we may reverse if the appellant establishes prima facie error. E.g., In re Baby Girl, 231 N.E.3d 844, 848 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). “Prima facie error in this context means ‘at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.’ ” Salyer v. Wash. Regular Baptist Church Cemetery, 141 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2020) (citation omitted). Of course, we are still “obligated to correctly apply the law to the facts in the record in order to determine whether reversal is required.” Baby Girl, 231 N.E.3d at 848 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

[7] This case is governed by Indiana Code Section 31-19-5-12(a) which provides:

To be entitled to notice of an adoption under IC 31-19-3 or IC 31-19-4, a putative father must register with the state department under section 5 of this chapter not later than:

(1) thirty (30) days after the child's birth; or

(2) the earlier of the date of the filing of a petition for the:

(A) child's adoption; or

(B) termination of the parent-child relationship between the child and the child's mother;

whichever occurs later.

[8] It is well-settled that a putative father's failure to register with the Putative Father Registry within the statutorily prescribed time limit results in waiver of the ability to challenge an adoption. In re I.J., 39 N.E.3d 1184, 1186-87 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). That is, when a putative father fails to timely register as required by statute, he waives the right to receive notice of the adoption proceedings and irrevocably implies his consent to the same. See, e.g., In re Adoption of K.G.B., 18 N.E.3d 292, 298 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

[9] Here, it is undisputed that Putative Father failed to register with the Putative Father Registry at any time. Therefore, he was not entitled to notice of the adoption proceedings nor entitled to contest the same.¹ See I.C. § 31-19-5-12(a). Putative Father has failed to establish prima facie error.

[10] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Since the trial court correctly determined on July 25, 2024, that Putative Father was not entitled to contest the adoption, Putative Father was also not entitled to present evidence at the subsequent adoption hearing, as he claims.

Bailey, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.