State of Indiana, Appellant-Respondent v. Wesley Eugene Baker, Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] The State of Indiana appeals the trial court's order granting Wesley Eugene Baker's petition for relief from his obligation to register as a sex offender. We reverse.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On October 11, 2010, the trial court entered judgment of conviction against Baker for child solicitation as a class D felony, sentenced him to one year suspended to probation, and ordered him to register as a sex offender. Baker moved to Tennessee in 2017 and registered as a sex offender in that state. Baker moved back to Indiana in 2018 for a short time and then moved to Kentucky and registered as a sex offender in that state. At some point, Baker relocated back to Indiana. Baker signed a “State of Indiana Sex or Violent Offender Registration Form” on May 3, 2023, which stated: “End Registration Date: None.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 31.

[3] On February 6, 2024, Baker filed a “Verified Petition for Relief from Lifetime Registration Requirement” arguing that, “[a]t the time [he] was sentenced[,] Child Solicitation, a Class D Felony, required a ten (10) year registration requirement under” the Indiana Sex Offender Registration Act (“SORA”) and that he was not required to register as a sex offender. Id. at 70.

[4] On March 14, 2024, the court held a hearing. Baker's counsel argued that Baker “was required under the statute to register as a sex offender for a ten-year period which he did and that began in 2010,” “[h]e comp[l]eted that ten-year period and then last March he got notice from DOC that he was now due to register as a lifetime offender and there was a three year lapse,” and “[w]e believe ․ that order made by the DOC was erroneous since he already completed that ten year sentence so we're asking that that be vacated.” Transcript Volume II at 4. Counsel for the State argued that “everything my colleague just said ․ would be accurate only to the extent [Baker] had remained a resident of Indiana,” “however he moved to two difference states, both Tennessee and Kentucky,” “Tennessee required him to register as essentially indefinite registration until he applies for removal from the Tennessee registry,” Kentucky required him to register for twenty years, “so at minimum he's to register for twenty years pursuant to the Kentucky decision,” and “furthermore under the federal statute [Baker] is classified as a 202 [sic] offender by virtue of crossing the state lines in which case the federal statute made (inaudible) registry[.]” Id. at 5.

[5] On April 23, 2024, the court entered an “Order on Sex Offender Registration Requirements” granting Baker's petition. Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 34. The court found that Baker “served the ten (10) year registration as required by” SORA, that “said registration requirement expired in 2020,” and that he “is not required under Indiana law to register as a offender for life based on his conviction in this case.” Id.

[6] The State filed a motion to correct error. It argued that Baker was sentenced on October 11, 2010, he was a “sex or violent offender” under Ind. Code § 11-8-8- 5(a)(6),¹ he “was therefore required to register as a sex offender for a period of ten years, pursuant to Indiana Code § 11-8-8-19(a), at the time when he was placed on probation,” and “[his] duty to register would have terminated on, or about, October 11, 2020.”² Id. at 13-14. The State argued:

5. However, [Baker] was subject to two other states’ sex offender registries. First, in 2017, [Baker] registered in Tennessee and such registration was required for a minimum of ten years and then, once the ten years had passed, [Baker] would be required to apply for termination of his obligation. (Decl. Chelsea Foster ¶ 4). Second, [Baker] returned to Indiana for a short period of time before moving to Kentucky and becoming subject to Kentucky's Sex Offender Registry in 2018. (Decl. Chelsea Foster ¶¶ 5-6). Kentucky classified [Baker] as a 20-year registrant. (Decl. Chelsea Foster ¶ 6).[3]

6. Pursuant to Indiana Code § 11-8-8-19(f), “[a] person who is required to register as a sex or violent offender in any jurisdiction shall register for the period required by the other jurisdiction or the period described in this section, whichever is longer.”

* * * * *

10. Thus, since [Baker] has a continuing duty to register in Tennessee until such a time as he applies for termination of his obligation, [his] duty to register in the State of Indiana continues until the Tennessee registration obligation is terminated. This is true regardless of [his] registration status in Kentucky.

Id. at 14-15 (footnote omitted). The State's motion to correct error was deemed denied, and the State now appeals.

Discussion

[7] We review the trial court's rulings on Baker's petition and the State's motion to correct error for an abuse of discretion. See Perkinson v. Perkinson, 989 N.E.2d 758, 761 (Ind. 2013) (motion to correct error); Lucas v. McDonald, 954 N.E.2d 996, 998 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (petition for relief).

[8] We note that Baker did not file an appellee's brief. When an appellee fails to submit a brief, we do not undertake the burden of developing arguments, and we apply a less stringent standard of review, that is, we may reverse if the appellant establishes prima facie error. Bixler v. Delano, 185 N.E.3d 875, 877 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). Prima facie is defined as “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Id. (citation omitted). This rule was established so that we might be relieved of the burden of controverting the arguments advanced in favor of reversal where that burden properly rests with the appellee. Id. at 878.

[9] The State argues that the trial court erred because Baker is required to register as a sex offender in Indiana “until he has completed all registration obligations from any jurisdiction under Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-19(f).” Appellant's Brief at 9. The State argues that Baker is required to register in Indiana based on his registration obligations under federal law,⁴ Kentucky law,⁵ and Tennessee law.⁶

[10] Ind. Code § 11-8-8-19(f) provides: “A person who is required to register as a sex or violent offender in any jurisdiction shall register for the period required by the other jurisdiction or the period described in this section, whichever is longer.”⁷ (Emphasis added).

[11] In Peters v. Quakenbush, 243 N.E.3d 1145 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), transfer pending, this Court discussed Ind. Code § 11-8-8-19(f).⁸ We held:

Eight years after being convicted of a sex offense in Illinois, where he was required to register as a sex offender for ten years, Gage Peters visited Florida for a week. While there, he registered as a sex offender as required by Florida law, which imposes a lifetime registration requirement on sex offenders. Peters later moved to Indiana, where he was informed that, due to his Florida obligation, he was subject to a lifetime registration requirement pursuant to Ind. Code § 11-8-8-19(f), often called the other-jurisdiction provision.

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On August 21, 2023, Peters filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against the Sheriff and the DOC, seeking relief from the change in his registration period․ [T]he trial court issued an order ․ finding that ․ “[Peters] is required to register for life in the state of Indiana because he is required to do so in the state of Florida.” The court dismissed Peters's complaint for declaratory judgment and entered judgment as a matter of law in favor of the DOC and the Sheriff. Peters now appeals.

* * * * *

As is relevant to this appeal, the Indiana legislature amended SORA in 2006 to add the following category of registrants: “a person who is required to register as a sex or violent offender in any jurisdiction.” Ind. Code §§ 11-8-8-4.5(b)(1) (defining a sex offender as “a person who is required to register as a sex offender in any jurisdiction”) and -5(b)(1) (similarly defining a sex and violent offender). In 2007, SORA was amended to address the length of registration for this category of registrants, adding the “other-jurisdiction” provision: “A person who is required to register as a sex offender in any jurisdiction shall register for the period required by the other jurisdiction or the period described in this section, whichever is longer.” I.C. § 11-8-8-19(f) (emphasis added).

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[W]e are guided by Ammons v. State, 50 N.E.3d 143 (Ind. 2016). There, our Supreme Court upheld the Indiana registration requirement of an offender who was required to register in Iowa as a sex offender based on a prior Indiana conviction, and, upon moving back to Indiana, was notified that he was required to register as a serious violent felon. On appeal, Ammons sought relief from the registration requirement claiming it violated Indiana's ex post facto clause because, at the time he committed the offense, Indiana had no registration requirement.

The Ammons Court upheld the requirement to register, explaining that, when Ammons moved back to Indiana, “Indiana law required ․ that offenders who are under a registration obligation in another state must register when they move to Indiana.” 50 N.E.3d at 144 (citing I.C. § 11-8-8-19(f) and -5(b)(1)). Although decided in the context of an ex post facto claim, the result reached in Ammons was based on the fact that Ammons had moved back to Indiana from Iowa, where he had a registration requirement due to his Indiana conviction. In other words, despite the lack of an independent requirement in Iowa for Ammons to register, the Supreme Court applied the other-jurisdiction statute and required him to register here upon moving back from Iowa.

Our decision today is also consistent with this court's recent holding in Shibli v. State, 231 N.E.3d 280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), transfer pending, where Shibli was convicted of Class C felony child molesting in 1998 and, after serving a period of incarceration, was released to parole. At the time of his conviction, SORA required that he register as a sex offender for a period of ten years. In January 2003, he transferred his parole to Florida, which required him to register as a sex offender for life. When he moved back to Indiana in 2021, he did not register as a sex offender, and the State later charged him with two counts of failure to register. The trial court denied his motion to dismiss the charges, and on appeal, he asserted that application of the other-jurisdiction provision – enacted in 2007 – violated Indiana's ex post facto clause.

Among other reasons, Shibli challenged his registration requirement because it was “based solely on Florida law, and not on any additional registerable offense,” which we find to be akin to Peters's claim that the other-jurisdiction provision is inapplicable to him because Florida lacked any “independent requirement” for imposing the lifetime registration obligation. The Shibli court expressly rejected the “lack of any additional registerable offense” argument, stating,

[I]t “is immaterial to the analysis whether Indiana law is maintaining, extending, or modifying its own duties or those of another state. Likewise, it is irrelevant where or when the conviction occurred, as long as another state imposed a lawful registration obligation on the offender[.]”

Id. at 284 (quoting Hope v. Comm'r of Ind. Dep't of Corr., 9 F.4th 513, 523 (7th Cir. 2021)). Here, Florida imposed a lawful lifetime registration requirement, and Peters was subject to it, pursuant to the other-jurisdiction provision, when he moved to Indiana.

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We find that the plain language of the other-jurisdiction provision compels registration for individuals with out-of-state registration obligations regardless of the source of those obligations. Because Peters is subject to a lifetime registration obligation in Florida, he is required, pursuant to Indiana's other-jurisdiction provision, to register as a sex offender for life in Indiana. Accordingly, the trial court properly entered judgment in favor of the Sheriff and the DOC on Peters's declaratory judgment complaint.

Peters, 243 N.E.3d at 1146-1151 (footnotes and citations to record omitted).

[12] As we held in Peters, the plain language of Ind. Code § 11-8-8-19(f) compels registration for individuals with out-of-state registration obligations.⁹ The State has established prima facie error and that Baker is required to register pursuant to Ind. Code § 11-8-8-19(f) as a sex offender in the State of Indiana. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order granting Baker's petition for relief.

[13] Reversed.

[14] I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. The majority's interpretation of Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-19(f) produces an absurd result that cannot reflect our General Assembly's intent in drafting the provision. I would interpret the statute to produce a logical result that better reflects our General Assembly's intentions.

[15] Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-19(f) provides: “A person who is required to register[¹⁰ ] as a sex or violent offender in any jurisdiction shall register for the period required by the other jurisdiction or the period described in this section, whichever is longer.” (emphasis added). The most sensible interpretation of this provision is that it only applies when: (1) a person has been convicted of an offense in a jurisdiction other than Indiana; (2) that jurisdiction requires the conviction to be registered in that jurisdiction; and (3) the person now resides in Indiana. In other words, the phrase “is required to register ․ in any jurisdiction” refers to the jurisdiction that imposed the original registration requirement due to a conviction in that jurisdiction. A person with such a conviction is required to register in Indiana for the time required by the other jurisdiction or according to Indiana registration requirements, whichever is longer.

[16] Here, because Baker was convicted in Indiana, and his registration requirement has concluded in this state, Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-19(f) does not apply, and Baker is no longer required to register in Indiana. The fact that Baker briefly lived in other states that imposed longer registration requirements does not place him within the ambit of the statute.

[17] I recognize that our Court is split on the interpretation of Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-19(f). I agree with the holding reached in Marroquin v. Reagle, 228 N.E.3d 1149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. pending. In that case, the Court reasoned that Section 11-8-8-19(f) “simply establishes how long such out-of-state offenders must register in Indiana.” Id. at 1151 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court held that Section 11-8-8-19(f) did not apply to an offender who committed an offense in Indiana that did not require him to register in Indiana. Though the offender moved to another state that required him to register in that state based on the Indiana offense, and the offender later returned to Indiana, this did not require the offender to register in Indiana.

[18] The majority interprets Section 11-8-8-19(f) broadly to mean that Baker, who complied with the requirement that he register in Indiana for ten years for his Indiana conviction, must now register in Indiana for much longer than ten years simply because he lived in other states with longer registration requirements before he moved back to Indiana. In other words, states that have no connection to the conviction can tack on registration requirements in Indiana even after the offender leaves those states.

[19] This is an absurd result that our General Assembly could not have intended in drafting Section 11-8-8-19(f). See Temme v. State, 169 N.E.3d 857, 863 (Ind. 2021) (“We do not presume that the Legislature intended language used in a statute to be applied illogically or to bring about an unjust or absurd result.”) (quotation omitted); Peters v. Quakenbush, 243 N.E.3d 1145, 1152-53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (Mathias, J., dissenting) (adopting the reasoning of Marroquin and noting that “[o]ur legislature cannot have intended to impose a lifetime registry requirement based on a one-week vacation” to a state that requires lifetime registration”), trans. pending. Rather, our General Assembly merely intended that Indiana “avoid[ ] becoming a safe haven for offenders attempting to evade their obligation” to register based on a conviction in another jurisdiction. Tyson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 88, 96 (Ind. 2016).

[20] And contrary to the majority's suggestion, Ammons v. State, 50 N.E.3d 143 (Ind. 2016), does not compel the majority's holding. The Court in Ammons was only presented with a challenge to Section 11-8-8-19(f) under the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Indiana Constitution; the Court was not presented with and did not decide the proper interpretation of Section 11-8-8-19(f) as a matter of the statutory text. See Marroquin, 228 N.E.3d at 1151 (holding that Ammons was not controlling because our Supreme Court only “addressed and rejected” the Ex Post Facto argument but “didn't address the statutory argument Marroquin makes here”).¹¹

[21] Section 11-8-8-19(f) does not apply to Baker. I would, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 11-8-8-5 provides that “sex or violent offender” means “a person convicted of any of the following offenses: ․ (6) Child solicitation (IC 35-42-4-6).”

2.   Ind. Code § 11-8-8-19(a) provides, “[e]xcept as provided in subsections (b) through (f), a sex or violent offender is required to register under this chapter until the expiration of ten (10) years after the date the sex or violent offender: ․ (5) is placed on probation[.]”

3.   The “Declaration of Chelsea Foster” attached to the State's motion to correct error stated:4. Mr. Baker became subject to Tennessee's Sex Offender Registry sometime in 2017, which was a 10-year registration requirement, but he would then have to apply for termination of his obligation once the time period had expired. Documentation is attached as Exhibit A.5. Mr. Baker moved back to Indiana in April 2018 but then moved to Kentucky soon after.6. Mr. Baker began registering in Kentucky in 2018, where he had a 20-year registration requirement. Documentation from Kentucky is attached as Exhibit B.7. Mr. Baker is currently registered in Vanderburgh County, and his most recent registration forms from May 2023 are attached as Exhibit C.Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 17. Exhibit A contains a message from an analyst at the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation stating that Baker “was registered as sexual,” “[t]hose offenders are required to register for 10 years past the expiration of their sentence,” “[a]fter that time, they are eligible for termination if they apply,” “[a]t this time, [Baker] does not have an end date because he has not applied,” and “[i]t appears he would be eligible to apply sometime in 2022 just on a cursory look.” Id. at 19-20.

4.   The State cites 34 U.S.C.A. § 20913 (“A sex offender shall register, and keep the registration current, in each jurisdiction where the offender resides[.]”), points to 34 U.S.C § 20911(3) and claims that “Baker is classified as a ‘Tier II Sex Offender’ because his sex offense was punishable by imprisonment for more than one year and he engaged in enticement,” and points to 34 U.S.C.A. § 20915 (“The full registration period is ․ 25 years, if the offender is a tier II sex offender[.]”), and asserts that “Tier II offenders such as Baker are required to register for 25 years.” Appellant's Brief at 10.

5.   The State cites Ky. Rev. Stat. § 17.520, which provides in part: “(3) All other registrants are required to register for twenty (20) years following discharge from confinement or twenty (20) years following the maximum discharge date on probation, shock probation, conditional discharge, parole, or other form of early release, whichever period is greater.”

6.   The State argues, “[b]y what information exists in the record, it appears [that Baker's] Tennessee registration requirement appears to be at least 10 years, at which point he remains on the registry until he petitions to be removed, and that request is granted,” “[i]f that is the case, his registration requirement in Indiana will continue until his Tennessee requirement is removed under Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-19(f),” and “[t]his is the source of Baker's current Indiana registration requirement, which does not have an end date.” Appellant's Brief at 13.

7.   Ind. Code § 11-8-8-19(f) became effective July 1, 2007, before Baker committed the offense and was sentenced. See Pub. Law No. 216-2007, § 27 (eff. Jul 1, 2007).

8.   The Indiana Supreme Court held oral argument on the petition to transfer in Peters v. Quakenbush on February 12, 2025, and transfer is pending at the date of this opinion.

9.   While the dissent finds that “[t]he most sensible interpretation of this provision is that it only applies when ․ a person has been convicted of an offense in a jurisdiction other than Indiana ․ ,” we observe that the plain language of Ind. Code § 11-8-8-19(f) does not include any such limitation.

10.   I note that Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-4 defines “register” as “to report in person to a local law enforcement authority and provide the information required under section 8 of this chapter.” Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-8 contains numerous requirements that are surely not followed in every jurisdiction that imposes a registration requirement. This definition of “register,” thus, only appears to apply when the person is required to register in Indiana, whether due to an in-state or out-of-state conviction.

11.   In Peters, 243 N.E.3d at 1150 n.2, the majority disagreed with Marroquin on the application of Ammons. The Peters Court reasoned that, “if the other-jurisdiction statute did not apply at all [in Ammons], the Ammons Court would have so said and avoided reaching Ammons's constitutional ex post facto claim” under the doctrine of “judicial restraint.” (quoting Jones v. Jones, 832 N.E.2d 1057, 1059 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that, under the doctrine of judicial restraint, the court “must refrain from deciding constitutional questions unless no non-constitutional grounds present themselves for resolving the case under consideration”)). I disagree with this reasoning in Peters. The textual interpretation of Section 11-8-8-19(f) was simply not addressed in Ammons, and I cannot glean a binding textual holding from that case based on mere inference. Transfer is currently pending in Peters.

Brown, Judge.

Chief Judge Altice concurs. Judge Tavitas dissents with separate opinion. Altice, C.J., concurs. Tavitas, J., dissents with separate opinion.