OLIVER v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Odell Oliver appeals his sentence following his convictions for Level 6 felony intimidation and Level 6 felony residential entry. Oliver presents two issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him.

2. Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On February 17, 2023, Brianne Faulkner was home with her children, who were asleep upstairs, when Oliver showed up at her door uninvited. Faulkner and Oliver had, on occasion, been romantically involved, but Faulkner had a court order “banning” Oliver from her home on that date. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 15. When Faulkner opened the door to tell Oliver to leave, he pushed past her and entered the house. Oliver proceeded to “beat [Faulkner] up,” and he refused to leave her house. Id. Faulkner called 9-1-1. The responding officers arrested Oliver, who, while in handcuffs, threatened to blow up Faulkner's house.

[4] The State charged Oliver with Level 6 felony intimidation and Level 6 felony residential entry. In April 2024, Oliver pleaded guilty as charged, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly. At sentencing, Faulkner testified that it was all a “misunderstanding” that had been “blown out of proportion.” Tr. p. 32. Faulkner asked the trial court to give Oliver “no jail time.” Id. In addition, Oliver's pastor, Bishop G. Wesley Bennett, Sr., wrote a letter to the court describing difficulties Oliver had faced in his life due to his mental illness. Bishop Bennett stated further that Oliver's mother, who lives in California, was willing to take him in and support him. Finally, Oliver testified that he would like help for his anger issues, alcohol abuse, and mental health issues.

[5] The trial court found that a single aggravator slightly outweighed a single mitigator and imposed concurrent one-year sentences. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Abuse of Discretion

[6] Oliver first contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him. Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we review such decisions for an abuse of discretion. Hudson v. State, 135 N.E.3d 973, 979 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). “An abuse of discretion will be found where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id. For example, a trial court may abuse its discretion by:

(1) failing to enter a sentencing statement at all; (2) entering a sentencing statement that includes aggravating and mitigating factors that are unsupported by the record; (3) entering a sentencing statement that omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record; or (4) entering a sentencing statement that includes reasons that are improper as a matter of law.

Id. “In cases where the trial court has abused its discretion, we will remand for resentencing only ‘if we cannot say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it properly considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.’ ” Bryant v. State, 959 N.E.2d 315, 322 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind.), clarified on reh'g 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)).

[7] Here, in its sentencing statement, the trial court identified Oliver's criminal history as the sole aggravator. The court found that “[Oliver,] at the age of thirty-seven (37) years[,] has a significant criminal history consisting of twenty-nine (29) Misdemeanor convictions, three (3) Felony convictions, and seven (7) probation revocations. The Court finds this to be a significant aggravating circumstance.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 106. The court identified a single mitigator as follows: “[Oliver] suffers from anxiety and depression for which he takes medication; bi-polar disorder for which he takes medication; and schizophrenia for which he takes medication. [Oliver] also abuses alcohol even while taking such medications. The Court finds this to be a fairly significant mitigating circumstance.” Id. The trial court explicitly rejected seven other mitigators offered by Oliver.

[8] On appeal, Oliver argues that

[t]he facts and circumstances before the trial court ․ included a victim who begged for [Oliver] to have another chance, a mental health system that has largely failed [Oliver] in that he has lived in poverty and been a target for manipulation, and a support system ready to get [Oliver] to a different environment where he might have a better chance at rehabilitation and treatment. Not finding these factors to be mitigating circumstances was an abuse of discretion.

Appellant's Br. at 8. Thus, Oliver contends that the trial court should have identified three of the seven additional mitigators he had proffered at sentencing.

[9] It is well settled that “[a] trial court is not obligated to accept the defendant's argument as to what constitutes a mitigating factor, and a trial court is not required to give the same weight to proffered mitigating factors as does a defendant.” Healey v. State, 969 N.E.2d 607, 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. “A trial court does not err in failing to find a mitigating factor where that claim is highly disputable in nature, weight, or significance.” Id. “An allegation that a trial court abused its discretion by failing to identify or find a mitigating factor requires the defendant on appeal to establish that the mitigating evidence is significant and clearly supported by the record.” Id.

[10] Here, the trial court carefully considered each of Oliver's proffered mitigators and rejected all but one of them. Oliver's arguments on appeal do nothing to convince us that the trial court abused its discretion. Oliver has not met his burden to establish that the mitigating evidence to which he cites is significant and clearly supported by the record. See id. For instance, Faulkner's testimony minimizing the offenses is entirely inconsistent with her statements to law enforcement officers. The trial court identified Oliver's mental illness as a significant mitigator, and, inherent in that finding is an understanding that he faced hardships due to that illness. Finally, Oliver did not present direct evidence that his mother was willing to provide him with support in California.

[11] For all these reasons, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced Oliver to one-year concurrent sentences.

Issue Two: Appellate Rule 7(B)

[12] Oliver argues that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. Under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), we may modify a sentence that we find is “inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Making this determination “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008).

[13] Sentence modification under Rule 7(B), however, is reserved for “a rare and exceptional case.” Livingston v. State, 113 N.E.3d 611, 612 (Ind. 2018) (per curiam). Thus, when conducting this review, we generally defer to the sentence imposed by the trial court, and that deference will prevail unless the defendant demonstrates compelling evidence on appeal that portrays the nature of the offense and his character in a positive light, such as showing a lack of brutality in the offense or showing substantial virtuous character traits. Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[14] Oliver pleaded guilty to two Level 6 felonies. A Level 6 felony conviction carries a fixed term of between six months and two and one-half years, with the advisory sentence being one year. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7. The trial court here imposed the advisory sentence on each count and ordered the sentences to run concurrently.

[15] Oliver argues that his sentence is inappropriate because Faulkner testified that the offenses were “blown out of proportion” and because he has suffered tremendous hardships in his life due to his mental illness. Appellant's Br. at 9. Oliver contends that, rather than finding that the single aggravator outweighed the single mitigator, the trial court should have found that his mental illness outweighed his criminal history.

[16] The weight a trial court gives to aggravating and mitigating factors is not reviewable on appeal. See, e.g., Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind.) (“The relative weight or value assignable to reasons [for imposing a particular sentence] ․ is not subject to review for abuse.”), clarified on reh'g 875 N.E.2d 218 (2007). Oliver's arguments on appeal simply seek to have our Court substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, which is not consistent with our deference to the trial court on sentencing matters. Moreover, Oliver proffers no compelling evidence that portrays the nature of the offenses or his character in a positive light. We therefore affirm his sentence.

[17] Affirmed.

Mathias, Judge.

Foley, J., and Felix, J., concur.