IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of A.M. (Mother) and Yaj.P. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A.M. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to her three children. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother has three children: Yaj.P., born in August 2011, Yav.P., born in February 2013, and J.M., born in January 2017. Yaj.P. and Yav.P.’s father consented to their adoption and does not participate in this appeal. Paternity for J.M. was never established.

[3] In July 2017, the Department of Child Services (DCS) removed the children from Mother's care due to her abuse of cocaine and alcohol and inability to provide them care or supervision. The children were placed with their maternal grandmother (“Grandmother”). On August 1, DCS filed a petition alleging the children were in need of services (CHINS). Two weeks later, Mother was evicted from her home. After Mother admitted to some of the allegations in the CHINS petition, the trial court adjudicated the children to be CHINS. In November, the court issued a dispositional decree ordering Mother to, among other things, refrain from criminal activity, maintain safe and sustainable housing, complete a drug and alcohol assessment and any resulting recommendations, refrain from using drugs or alcohol, and participate in home-based services.

[4] Mother began substance-abuse treatment at Park Center but was unsuccessfully discharged in March 2018 for failing to attend. Later that month, Mother picked up two criminal cases: one for Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass and Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct, and one for Level 5 felony battery with bodily injury to a public-safety officer, Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass, Class B misdemeanor public intoxication, and Class B misdemeanor false informing. Mother's referral for home-based services was canceled due to her incarceration in these cases and overall lack of participation. In the first case, Mother pled guilty to Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass in April and was sentenced to one year of probation. Then in June, Mother pled guilty to all four charges in the second case and was referred to drug court.

[5] In December, Mother was arrested for failing to appear for drug court, and she spent a month in jail. By January 2019, Mother wasn't participating in therapy or parenting classes and had tested positive for alcohol. In June, she tested positive for cocaine, and the drug court ordered her to serve two weekends in jail. Thereafter, Mother was living and participating in substance-abuse treatment at Harriett House, and in December, the CHINS court ordered the children be placed there. But in May 2020, Mother was unsuccessfully discharged from Harriett House after testing positive for alcohol. She was subsequently revoked from drug court and sentenced to three years in the Department of Correction (DOC). DCS placed the children back with Grandmother.

[6] While in the DOC, Mother completed Recovery While Incarcerated. She was released in September 2021 and moved in with her sister but didn't maintain contact with DCS. In October, DCS put in another referral for home-based services, but Mother failed to participate and was eventually unsuccessfully discharged. After moving out of her sister's home, Mother “just ․ stayed place to place.” Tr. p. 37.

[7] In December 2021, Yav.P. was removed from Grandmother's home and placed in foster care “due to some behaviors he was having in the home and at school.” Id. at 68. Yaj.P. and J.M. remained with Grandmother. Yav.P. was returned to Grandmother's home in November 2022, where all three children have since remained.

[8] Meanwhile, in May 2022, Mother was charged with Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) endangering a person and Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent to .15 or more in Marshall County. She pled guilty to the latter charge in September and was sentenced to one year of probation with drug and alcohol monitoring. In November, less than two months later, Mother was charged with another OWI, this time as a Level 6 felony due to her prior conviction. Because of this new charge, Mother's probation was revoked in the Marshall County case. Mother's pattern of criminal activity continued when, in March 2023, she was charged with Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement, Level 6 felony OWI with a prior conviction, and Class B misdemeanor leaving the scene of an accident. That June, Mother pled guilty to the November OWI and to the Level 6 felonies in the March case. In each case, she was sentenced to one-and-a-half years on community corrections, with the sentences to run consecutively. In July, Mother was placed in the Allen County Community Corrections Residential Services program with electronic monitoring.

[9] That November, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights. In January 2024, DCS put in another referral to Park Center for individual counseling. Mother completed an intake assessment in February but didn't participate in the recommended services thereafter.

[10] A termination hearing was held in April. Mother's Allen County Community Corrections case worker testified that Mother had been compliant with drug testing in Residential Services, that all her tests were negative, and that her release date from community corrections was September 10, 2024. Mother admitted that from her release from the DOC in September 2021 to her subsequent incarceration in March 2023, she couldn't find her own housing and was unemployed for about nine months. She testified that she'd been sober for over a year but acknowledged that she'd only maintained her sobriety and successfully completed drug and alcohol programs while she was in custody. Mother explained that she planned to get her own housing after finishing her criminal sentences but hadn't secured anything yet because Residential Services doesn't let residents leave to look for housing until they're within forty-five days of their release date and because she still had time left to serve in her Marshall County case.¹

[11] Family Case Manager (FCM) Barbara Blevins testified that the children are “progressing well” in Grandmother's care and that Grandmother is “providing for them” and “meeting their needs.” Id. at 51, 52. FCM Blevins acknowledged that Grandmother was seventy-seven years old at the time but said she didn't “have any concerns about [Grandmother's] age or health in terms of caring for the[ ] children” because she's cared for them since 2017 and they enjoy being in her home. Id. at 70. FCM Blevins ultimately recommended adoption by Grandmother. Stephen Griebel, the children's guardian ad litem (GAL), also recommended termination and adoption. GAL Griebel testified that he “ha[d] concerns” about Grandmother's age and health, but he was “impressed” that the children listened when Grandmother told them what to do, and several family members had expressed that they would help Grandmother with the children. Id. at 81, 82. Due to time constraints, the court continued the remainder of the hearing to May.

[12] By the time of the May hearing date, Mother was employed, attending weekly AA and NA meetings, in individual therapy at Park Center, and had completed parenting education. At that hearing, Mother's counsel tried to elicit testimony from her about her upbringing with Grandmother and her opinion on whether adoption by Grandmother is in the children's best interests. GAL Griebel objected on relevancy grounds, which the trial court sustained.

[13] In August, the trial court issued an order terminating Mother's parental rights.

[14] Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[15] Mother contends there is insufficient evidence to meet the statutory requirements for termination. When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013). Rather, we consider only the evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom that support the trial court's judgment. Id. When a trial court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we will not set aside the court's findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. Id. To determine whether a judgment terminating parental rights is clearly erroneous, we review whether the evidence supports the trial court's findings and whether the findings support the judgment. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016).

[16] A petition to terminate parental rights must allege, among other things:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2023).² DCS must prove the alleged circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231. If the trial court finds the allegations are true, the court “shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a).

[17] Mother doesn't challenge any of the trial court's findings of fact, so we need only consider whether the findings support the court's conclusions of law. In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 611 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Mother doesn't specify which conclusions she is challenging, but she appears to challenge the court's conclusions that (1) there is a reasonable probability the conditions that resulted in the children's removal and the reasons for placement outside the home will not be remedied, (2) termination is in the best interests of the children, and (3) there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the children. We address each conclusion in turn.

I. The trial court did not err in concluding there is a reasonable probability that Mother will not remedy the conditions that led to the children's removal and continued placement outside the home

[18] In determining whether there is a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in a child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, the trial court engages in a two-step analysis: first, the court identifies what conditions led to the child's placement and retention outside the home, and then it determines whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will not be remedied. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231. This second step requires the court to judge a parent's fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, considering evidence of changed conditions and balancing any recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” Id.

[19] The children were removed from Mother because of her abuse of cocaine and alcohol and inability to provide them care or supervision. Shortly after the children's removal in 2017, Mother was evicted, and since then, she's never had her own housing. Despite participating in substance-abuse treatment at Park Center and Harriett House, Mother continued using drugs and alcohol and was unsuccessfully discharged from both facilities. She also had referrals for individual therapy and home-based services canceled for lack of participation. When Mother picked up two criminal cases in March 2018, just four months after the dispositional decree, she had the opportunity to participate in drug court. Yet she continued testing positive for drugs and alcohol, resulting in revocation from drug court and a fifteen-month stint in the DOC. After her release, she initially moved in with her sister but didn't maintain contact with DCS and eventually “just ․ stayed place to place.” And Mother's prison term did not deter her from committing more crimes—from May 2022 to March 2023, Mother was charged with three OWIs. At the time of the termination hearing, she had four months left on community corrections, but she hadn't secured housing for after her release and still had time left to serve in her Marshall County case. And though Mother testified that she'd been sober for over a year, the trial court found that she “has been unable to maintain her sobriety during her multiple releases” and “question[ed] her ability to remain sober upon her eventual release.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 137. The trial court was within its discretion to give more weight to Mother's habitual drug and alcohol abuse than to her more recent sobriety. See E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643 (“Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.”). The evidence supports the court's conclusion that there is reasonable probability Mother will not remedy the conditions that resulted in the children's removal and continued placement outside the home.

II. The trial court did not err in concluding that termination is in the children's best interests

[20] Deciding whether termination is in a child's best interests is “[p]erhaps the most difficult determination” a trial court must make. In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 49 (Ind. 2019) (quotation omitted), reh'g denied. In making this determination, the trial court must look at the totality of the evidence and subordinate the parent's interests to those of the child. Id. Central among these interests is the child's need for permanency, as “children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.” Id. We have held that the recommendation by both the case manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[21] Here, both FCM Blevins and GAL Griebel recommended termination. And as explained above, Mother has not shown an ability to provide a stable, sober environment for the children. While this evidence alone is sufficient to support the trial court's best-interests conclusion, permanency is a central consideration in determining a child's best interests. The children have been removed from Mother's care since she was sent to the DOC in 2020. And before that, other than the six-month period when they were placed with her at Harriett House, they hadn't lived with Mother since their removal in 2017. By contrast, the children are “progressing well” in the care of Grandmother, who wishes to adopt them.

[22] Mother relies on In re J.M., 908 N.E.2d 191 (Ind. 2009), and Rowlett v. Vanderburgh County Office of Family & Children, 841 N.E.2d 615 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied, but those cases are easily distinguishable. In J.M., the parents were incarcerated for crimes committed before the filing of a CHINS petition, were being released early, and had taken steps to provide permanency for their child upon release. In Rowlett, the father was incarcerated on drug charges shortly after his children were removed three years earlier but was due to be released shortly after the termination hearing and had completed a multitude of services while incarcerated. Unlike the parents in these cases, throughout the CHINS and termination proceedings, Mother repeatedly committed crimes, violated the terms of her probation and drug court, and was in and out of jail and the DOC. Although she only had a few months left on community corrections at the time of the termination hearing, she still had time left to serve in her Marshall County case. And though Mother participated in services while incarcerated and on community corrections, she has not shown an ability to benefit from these services, as evidenced by her three OWIs after her release from the DOC. While we commend Mother's recent progress toward sobriety, the trial court was not required to wait on her any longer. See Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. The evidence supports the court's conclusion that termination is in the children's best interests.

III. DCS established a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the children

[23] Finally, Mother claims there is not a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the children. Pointing to GAL Griebel's concerns about Grandmother's age and health, Mother contends that placement with and adoption by Grandmother “was not in the best interest of the children” and is not a “viable plan.”³ Appellant's Br. pp. 20, 21. But the termination statute's requirement that there be a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child does not amount to a requirement that the trial court find DCS's plan is in the child's best interests. In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied; In re J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), reh'g denied. Rather, where DCS's plan is adoption, “there need not be a guarantee that a suitable adoption will take place, only that DCS will attempt to find a suitable adoptive parent.” A.S., 17 N.E.3d at 1007. “Part of the reason for this is that it is within the authority of the adoption court, not the termination court, to determine whether an adoptive placement is appropriate.” Id.

[24] Here, DCS's plan for the care and treatment of the children is adoption, which the trial court concluded is satisfactory. Mother does not argue that adoption is not a satisfactory plan but instead asserts that Grandmother specifically is not a suitable adoptive placement. But this is merely a request for us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re C.D., 141 N.E.3d 845, 855 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. And in any event, Grandmother's suitability was not at issue before the trial court in the termination proceedings. See A.S., 17 N.E.3d at 1007 (“We need not address whether Aunt is a suitable adoptive parent, because that is within the jurisdiction of the adoption court.”). And we have previously held that adoption is a “satisfactory plan” for the care and treatment of a child under the termination statute. In re B.M., 913 N.E.2d 1283, 1287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). The trial court did not err in determining that DCS's plan of adoption is satisfactory.

[25] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   On August 28, 2024, the Marshall County court ordered Mother to serve 180 days on community corrections.

2.   Section 31-35-2-4 was amended effective March 11, 2024, several months after DCS filed its termination petition in this case. See Pub. L. No. 70-2024, § 4. In ruling on the petition, the trial court applied the pre-amendment version of the statute. Mother does not argue that this was erroneous, so we do the same.

3.   In making this argument, Mother also claims that “her due process rights were violated” because she “was denied any ability to testify about her concerns with regard to the placement, or why she believed it was not in the best interest of the children.” Appellant's Br. p. 21. But Mother did not raise a due-process claim in the trial court, and she does not identify the applicable standard of review or any legal authority supporting this claim as required by Appellate Rule 46(A)(8). Accordingly, she has waived this claim for our review. See In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1173 (Ind. 2016) (“[A] party on appeal may waive a constitutional claim, including a claimed violation of due process rights, by raising it for the first time on appeal.”); In re A.C., 198 N.E.3d 1, 11 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (“Parents do not support these assertions with cogent reasoning and citations to authorities, and therefore these claims are waived.”), reh'g denied, trans. denied.

Vaidik, Judge.

Judges Bailey and DeBoer concur. Bailey, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.