SEWELL v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Kristy Sewell, Kirsten Holland, and Kenosis Sewell (“Kenosis”) lived together and were all involved in a romantic relationship with each other. Sewell became resentful and jealous of the relationship and during an argument, she stabbed Holland 14 times, killing her. Sewell was charged with murder and proceeded to a bench trial. The trial court rejected Sewell's claims of self-defense and sudden heat, found her guilty as charged, and sentenced her to 48 years of incarceration. Sewell now appeals and raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Sewell's murder conviction and rebut her claims of self-defense and sudden heat; and

2. Whether Sewell's sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Between 2004 and 2019, Sewell and Kenosis were in a tumultuous relationship that was plagued with multiple separations and divorces. Each time Kenosis used drugs, Sewell would leave him, occasionally file for divorce, but later return to the relationship.

[4] In April 2018, Kenosis met Kirsten Holland, and the two began a romantic relationship. In July, Sewell separated from Kenosis and moved out of their shared home. That same month, Sewell encountered Kenosis and a noticeably pregnant Holland.

[5] Kenosis moved into an apartment with Holland, and Sewell moved into a house approximately two blocks away. Although Sewell continued her relationship with Kenosis for some time after moving out, she filed for divorce in September 2018. In October, Sewell attempted suicide and was hospitalized. Once Sewell was discharged from the hospital, she moved in with Kenosis, and Kenosis moved Holland in with them to “help” with Sewell. Tr. Vol. III at 34–35. In mid-November, Sewell was hospitalized again for mental health problems.

[6] On November 18, 2018, Holland gave birth. Kenosis acknowledged in a paternity affidavit that he was the child's father, and Sewell knew that Kenosis wanted to raise the child. Because of Holland's drug abuse, however, the child was placed in foster care following her birth.

[7] Sometime in February 2019, Holland entered a drug rehabilitation facility. Sewell and Kenosis's divorce was also finalized that month. Two months later, Sewell and Kenosis remarried and moved into a new residence. Kenosis continued to visit Holland while she was in rehab.

[8] On June 24, Holland contacted Sewell via Facebook Messenger and the two discussed Holland's drug treatment. Holland again messaged Sewell a few days later that she was “ready to leave” rehab and “was gonna see if [she] could stay for a couple weeks [with Sewell and Kenosis] till [she got her] place ․” Ex. Vol. I at 7. Holland and Kenosis planned to have Holland live with Sewell and Kenosis. Holland believed that Sewell would help her and approve of that living arrangement. Kenosis, however, never told Sewell about the plan to move Holland into their residence. On June 26, Sewell and Kenosis drove to Winchester and picked up Holland from rehab. They loaded Holland's belongings into Sewell's vehicle, drove back to the house, and moved Holland's belongings into the living room.

[9] The next morning, Sewell left for work but returned approximately an hour later because she was ill. Kenosis, Sewell, and Holland interacted normally throughout most of the day. At some point, however, Sewell and Kenosis discussed whether she should go to the hospital because she “start[ed] getting paranoid.” Tr. Vol. III at 55. Sewell did not want Holland living with them, and she “wasn't going to let [Holland] stay.” Id. at 139.

[10] Just after midnight on June 28, Kenosis arranged for a ride to go to a hotel and “pick up money.” Tr. Vol. III at 53. After Kenosis left, Sewell decided to have a “woman to woman” conversation with Holland. Id. at 55. At some point during the conversation, Sewell told Holland that things between her and Kenosis were good, that they had remarried, and “I know you love my husband, but you can't have him,” id. at 56. Sewell also told Holland that she was no longer allowed to live with them. Holland responded that Kenosis had told her he loved her; Holland then gave Sewell two choices: Holland could stay with Sewell and Kenosis or she would “just take [Kenosis] with” her when she leaves. Id. at 56, 115. Holland also stated that they would “see ․ who [Kenosis] chooses” when he returned. Id. at 115.

[11] Holland's words made Sewell feel angry, jealous, and resentful because she had helped Holland when she left the rehab facility. Sewell grabbed a knife and stabbed Holland 14 times in vital areas including her eye, chest and abdomen, left arm, and back. The wounds were deep, and it was determined that Sewell had inflicted Holland's injuries with two different knives.

[12] Immediately after the stabbing, Holland ran into the living room, leaving a trail of blood on the walls and floor. Holland died at the front door with a knife in her back. Another knife with hair and blood on it was next to Holland's leg; her DNA was found on the blade and handle.

[13] After the incident, Sewell neither rendered aid to Holland nor called 911. Instead, she walked into the kitchen, washed her hands, and wrapped one of her fingers in a purple washcloth. Sewell then picked up Holland's phone and called Kenosis. Sewell told Kenosis she had been fighting with Holland and that he needed to call 911.

[14] Kenosis returned to the residence with a friend, and they discovered Holland's body blocking the front door. The two then drove to a nearby convenience store. Shortly thereafter, Kenosis called 911 and reported that his “wife is the one who did it.” State's Ex. 7 at 01:06–01:10. When law enforcement officers spoke with Kenosis, he was agitated and frantic, saying that “something bad happened” at the house and his “wife did it.” Tr. Vol. II at 231. Law enforcement officers responded and entered through the back door because Holland's body was blocking the front door.

[15] By the time officers arrived at Sewell's house, Sewell had begun walking toward her mother's residence. During her walk, Sewell tossed Holland's cell phone in some bushes and encountered two women who noticed that Sewell's pants were bloody, she was sweaty, and she had a purple washcloth wrapped around her left hand. Sewell told the women she had been in a “scuffle,” Tr. Vol. II at 174, and hoped that “he doesn't call the police on her,” id. at 169, but she did not say who “he” was. Sewell then borrowed one of the women's cell phones to call her mother. As Sewell was unable to reach her mother, she took a cab to her mother's residence.

[16] Sewell's mother was not home, so Sewell stayed with Hannah Dupree, one of her adult children. Dupree provided Sewell with some pants to wear the next morning, and Sewell retained her bloody pants and socks. Throughout all of this, Sewell did not tell anyone that she had stabbed Holland. Sewell was subsequently arrested, and law enforcement officers collected her bloody clothing. Sewell provided a statement to officers about the events before and after the stabbing, but she did not tell the officers about the stabbing itself and did not claim she stabbed Holland in self-defense.

[17] The State charged Sewell with Holland's murder. At Sewell's bench trial, Sewell testified that Holland attacked her with a knife, so she stabbed Holland in self-defense. Sewell claimed that she only remembered stabbing Holland four times: once each in the left eye, chest, neck, and back; she had no recollection of stabbing Holland more than four times.

[18] The trial court found Sewell guilty as charged. The trial court rejected Sewell's self-defense claim, finding that Sewell's testimony was not believable and that the physical evidence contradicted her claim. The trial court concluded that Sewell was the initial aggressor and stabbed Holland because she was angry that Holland had moved into the home and was romantically involved with Kenosis. The trial court further found that even if Holland had been the initial aggressor, Sewell used unreasonable force by stabbing Holland 14 times, with great force and in vital areas of Holland's body. The trial court also noted that Sewell's actions after the stabbing—that is, not rendering aid to Holland, fleeing, and not telling anyone that she had acted in self-defense—were inconsistent with a claim of self-defense. Finally, the trial court rejected Sewell's claim of sudden heat, concluding that her actions were premeditated.

[19] At the sentencing hearing, the trial court found no aggravating circumstances and the following mitigating circumstances: (1) Sewell's lack of criminal history; (2) the circumstances were unlikely to recur, in part because Sewell “acted under strong provocation as a result of the bizarre circumstances,” Appellant's App Vol. II at 174; (3) Sewell was unlikely to commit another offense; and (4) Sewell's mental health. The trial court determined that the mitigators outweighed the aggravators and sentenced Sewell to 48 years of incarceration. Sewell now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

1. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Rebut Sewell's Self-Defense Claim, Negate Her Sudden Heat Claim, and Support Her Murder Conviction

[20] Sewell challenges the sufficiency of the evidence rebutting her claims of self-defense and sudden heat; she also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her murder conviction. Our Supreme Court has explained our standard of review for sufficiency claims as follows:

Sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims trigger a deferential standard of review in which we “neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the jury.” Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018). A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if “there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015). In conducting that review, we consider only the evidence that supports the jury's determination, not evidence that might undermine it. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024).

Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024).

[21] Our discussion of Sewell's sufficiency claims proceeds in three parts: (a) first, we analyze whether Sewell proved and the State rebutted her claim of self-defense, (b) second, we analyze whether Sewell proved and the State rebutted her claim of sudden heat; and (c) third, we analyze whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Sewell's murder conviction.

a. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Rebut Sewell's Self-Defense Claim

[22] Sewell contends that the State failed to rebut her claim of self-defense. A valid claim of self-defense is legal justification for an otherwise criminal act. Ind. Code § 35-41-3-1; Larkin v. State, 173 N.E.3d 662, 670 (Ind. 2021) (citing Miller v. State, 720 N.E.2d 696, 699 (Ind. 1999)). “Whether a defendant acted in self-defense is generally a question of fact for the jury.” Taylor v. State, 710 N.E.2d 921, 924 (Ind. 1999) (citing Brooks v. State, 683 N.E.2d 574, 577 (Ind. 1997)). “A conviction in spite of a claim of self-defense will be reversed only if no reasonable person could say that the claim was negated by the State beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citing Lilly v. State, 506 N.E.2d 23, 24 (Ind. 1987)).

[23] When a defendant asserts self-defense,

the defendant must prove he was in a place where he had a right to be, “acted without fault,” and reasonably feared or apprehended death or great bodily harm. Miller, 720 N.E.2d at 699–700. The State must then negate at least one element beyond a reasonable doubt “by rebutting the defense directly, by affirmatively showing the defendant did not act in self-defense, or by simply relying upon the sufficiency of its evidence in chief.” Lilly v. State, 506 N.E.2d 23, 24 (Ind. 1987).

Larkin, 173 N.E.3d at 670. When a defendant alleges the State did not sufficiently rebut his self-defense claim, we do not reweigh evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. Miller, 720 N.E.2d at 699. Rather, we “only look to the evidence most favorable to the judgment.” Id. We will affirm the conviction if the evidence and reasonable inference most favorable thereto “constitute substantial evidence of probative value sufficient to support the judgment.” Id.

[24] Sewell contends that the State did not present sufficient evidence to establish that she acted without fault and reasonably feared or apprehended death or great bodily injury. She also claims the State neither presented evidence to “directly contradict” her version of events nor to “disprove ․ that [she] had a reasonable belief that she was in imminent danger and needed to use force to protect herself.” Appellant's Br. at 18. Assuming arguendo that Sewell demonstrated all three elements to claim self-defense, she has not established that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut at least one of those elements.

[25] Sewell's arguments on appeal are essentially a request for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do, see Larkin, 173 N.E.3d at 670 (citing Miller, 720 N.E.2d at 699). For instance, Sewell argues her response was proportionate to the perceived threat. “The amount of force that an individual may use to protect himself must be proportionate to the urgency of the situation. When a person uses more force than is reasonably necessary under the circumstances, the right of self-defense is extinguished.” Hall v. State, 231 N.E.3d 868, 874–75 (Ind. Ct. App. 202) (quoting Pinkston v. State, 821 N.E.2d 830, 842 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)), trans. denied, 238 N.E.3d 639 (Ind. 2024).

[26] Here, even if Holland was the initial aggressor, the evidence established that Sewell grabbed the knife and stabbed Holland in the eye. It is reasonable to infer that this wound would have immobilized and incapacitated Holland, and that any danger to Sewell of an immediate threat of force would have subsided. Sewell, however, stabbed Holland 13 more times with significant force and in vital areas of her body with two different knives. And but for a small cut on a finger, Sewell remained unscathed during the episode, thus establishing what little threat that Holland might have posed. In short, it was no longer objectively reasonable for Sewell to believe that Holland remained a risk of death or serious bodily injury to her after she stabbed her in a vital area of her body. See, e.g., Hood v. State, 877 N.E.2d 492, 497 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (concluding that firing multiple shots undercuts a claim of self-defense), trans. denied.

[27] In sum, and importantly, Sewell's self-defense claim relies on the believability of her testimony. The trial court specifically rejected her testimony and found it to be unbelievable. It was for the factfinder to assess the credibility of the witnesses and to determine the weight of their testimony. See Larkin, 173 N.E.3d at 670 (quoting Miller, 720 N.E.2d at 699). We will not second guess the factfinder's judgment on these matters. See id. (quoting Miller, 720 N.E.2d at 699). Based on the foregoing, we cannot say the State failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut Sewell's claim of self-defense.

b. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Negate Sewell's Sudden Heat Claim

[28] Sewell contends that the State failed to rebut her claim of sudden heat and, therefore, her murder conviction should be reduced to voluntary manslaughter. A person commits murder when the person “knowingly or intentionally kills another human being.” I.C. § 35-42-1-1. A person commits voluntary manslaughter when the person “knowingly or intentionally ․ kills another human being ․ while acting under sudden heat.” Id. § 35-42-1-3(a)(1). Our Supreme Court has described sudden heat as follows:

Sudden heat exists when a defendant is “provoked by anger, rage, resentment, or terror, to a degree sufficient to obscure the reason of an ordinary person, prevent deliberation and premeditation, and render the defendant incapable of cool reflection.” Brantley [v. State], 91 N.E.3d [566,] 572 [(Ind. 2018)] (quoting Isom v. State, 31 N.E.3d 469, 486 (Ind. 2015)). The issue of whether adequate provocation legally exists is an objective—not a subjective—measure. See Stevens v. State, 691 N.E.2d 412, 426 (Ind. 1997); Suprenant v. State, 925 N.E.2d 1280, 1282–83 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Indeed, “[e]vidence of sudden heat may be found in either the State's case or the defendant's.” Brantley, 91 N.E.3d at 572. And because [the factfinder is] in the unique position to assess the veracity of evidence, they must decide whether the evidence contained in the record “constitute[s] sudden heat sufficient to warrant a conviction for voluntary manslaughter.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

Carmack v. State, 200 N.E.3d 452, 459–60 (Ind. 2023) (fourth and sixth alterations in original).

[29] Sudden heat “is a mitigating factor that reduces what otherwise would be murder ․ to voluntary manslaughter.” I.C. § 35-42-1-3(b). In other words, sudden heat is not an affirmative defense, so once it “has been ‘injected’ into the heart of the case, ‘the burden is on the State to negate its existence.’ ” Carmack, 200 N.E.3d at 459 (quoting Bane v. State, 587 N.E.2d 97, 100 (Ind. 1992), reh'g denied). To inject sudden heat into the case, “the defendant must point to some evidence in the record supporting sudden heat.” Id. (citing Watts v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1228, 1234 n.2 (Ind. 2008)). “Because sudden heat functions as an ‘evidentiary predicate,’ it requires the [factfinder] to decide whether the record evidence supports it.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

[30] Sewell argues that she stabbed Holland in sudden heat after “Holland became enraged and physically aggressive” when Sewell informed her that she was no longer permitted to live with Sewell and Kenosis. Appellant's Br. at 19. “Voluntary manslaughter involves an impetus to kill which suddenly overwhelms the actor,” but the “[u]se of insulting or taunting words does not alone provide sufficient provocation for reducing murder to manslaughter.” Hall v. State, 166 N.E.3d 406, 415 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Griffin v. State, 963 N.E.2d 685, 689 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)).

[31] Here, Sewell did not present any evidence of sudden heat at trial. Sewell claims that Holland's threats that she would take Kenosis and leave, causing Sewell to be alone, simply do not constitute sufficient provocation. See Hall, 166 N.E.3d at 415. Sewell did not present any evidence that her reasoning was objectively obscured, in that she was in such a state of rage that she was incapable of cool reflection. Rather, the evidence demonstrated that Sewell was angry, resentful, and jealous that Holland had moved in with her and Kenosis.

[32] Given these circumstances, it was reasonable for the trial court, as the factfinder, to conclude that Sewell had thought about all that had occurred with Holland and Kenosis, had “premeditated” Holland's murder, and executed her plan to kill Holland. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 156. Based on the foregoing, we cannot say the State failed to present sufficient evidence to negate sudden heat.

c. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support Sewell's Conviction for Murder

[33] Sewell argues that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to support her conviction for murder. In order to convict Sewell of murder, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Sewell knowingly or intentionally killed Holland. See I.C. § 35-42-1-1(1).

[34] Sewell specifically contends that the State failed to prove she intended to kill Holland. “A person engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.” Id. § 35-41-2-2(a).

“[K]nowledge and intent are both mental states and, absent an admission by the defendant, the trier of fact must resort to the reasonable inferences from both the direct and circumstantial evidence.” Stokes v. State, 922 N.E.2d 758, 764 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. So given this real-world constraint, a defendant's mens rea may be proven by “circumstantial evidence,”—that is, it may be reasonably “inferred from a defendant's conduct and the natural and usual sequence to which such conduct logically and reasonably points.” Id.

A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1064–65 (Ind. 2024) (alteration omitted).

[35] The physical evidence, Sewell's own testimony, Holland's sexual relationship with Kenosis, the circumstances of Holland moving into the residence without Sewell's knowledge or consent, and Sewell's admitted rage, jealousy, and resentment all belie Sewell's contention that she did not intend to kill Holland.

[36] Sewell testified at trial that she was angry, jealous, and resentful that Holland moved in with her and Kenosis. Sewell further admitted that she was not going to let Holland stay at her house and she did not know about Holland and Kenosis's plan to allow Holland to move in with them. Sewell attacked Holland with two different knives, stabbed her 14 times in vital areas of her body, did not render aid to Holland after the incident, and fled the scene. Based on this record, we cannot say the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support Sewell's murder conviction. See, e.g., Noble v. State, 725 N.E.2d 842, 847 (Ind. 2000) (use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm is sufficient to show the requisite intent to kill); see also Evans v. State, 727 N.E.2d 1072, 1081–82 (Ind. 2000) (observing that the infliction of multiple stab wounds is sufficient to establish an intent to kill).

2. Sewell's Sentence is Not Inappropriate Under Appellate Rule 7(B)

[37] Sewell contends her sentence is inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B) and should be revised. The Indiana Constitution authorizes us to independently review and revise a trial court's sentencing decision. Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 855–56 (Ind. 2024) (citing Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6; Jackson v. State, 145 N.E.3d 783, 784 (Ind. 2020)). That authority is implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), which permits us to revise a sentence if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, we find that the sentence is “inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Id. (quoting Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 159 (Ind. 2019)).

[38] When considering the nature of the offense, we start with the advisory sentence. Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 4 (citing Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007), as amended (July 10, 2007), decision clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)). Here, Sewell was convicted of one count of murder. “A person who commits murder shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between forty-five (45) and sixty-five (65) years, with the advisory sentence being fifty-five (55) years.” I.C. § 35-50-2-3(a) (emphasis added). On her murder conviction, the trial court sentenced Sewell to a mitigated sentence of 48 years executed at the Indiana Department of Correction.

[39] Because the trial court imposed less than the advisory sentence here, Sewell bears “a particularly heavy burden to prove it inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B).” Kincaid v. State, 171 N.E.3d 1036, 1042 (Ind. Ct. App.) (citing Fernbach v. State, 954 N.E.2d 1080, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied), trans. denied, 173 N.E.3d 1028 (Ind. 2021). We first look to the nature of Sewell's offenses and consider, among other things, “whether there is anything more or less egregious about the offense committed by the defendant that makes it different from the ‘typical’ offense accounted for by the legislature when it set the advisory sentence,” T.A.D.W. v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1205, 1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Holloway v. State, 950 N.E.2d 803, 806–07 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)), as amended (May 26, 2023). We also consider whether the offense was “accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality.” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[40] Sewell claims that there should be a “downward departure from the sentence” because the “circumstances surrounding the incident reflect factors that mitigate the gravity of the offense.” Appellant's Br. at 26. However, the evidence established that Sewell stabbed Holland 14 times in a brutal and unforgiving manner. Sewell admitted that she first stabbed Holland in the eye—an act that surely would have immobilized Holland. Sewell then continued stabbing Holland, inflicting deep wounds in her neck and back with two different knives.

[41] In considering the character of the offender, “we engage in a broad consideration of a defendant's qualities,” T.A.D.W., 51 N.E.3d at 1211 (citing Aslinger v. State, 2 N.E.3d 84, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), clarified on other grounds on reh'g), including whether the defendant has “substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character.” Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

[42] Sewell is a licensed nurse, has no prior criminal history, and is the mother of five children. All these factors present Sewell in a positive light, which is likely the reason for the mitigated sentence in the first place. However, we cannot say that Sewell has produced compelling evidence demonstrating that the nature of her offense or her character should result in an even more mitigated sentence than the trial court deemed appropriate. See Lane, 232 N.E.3d 119; Kincaid, 171 N.E.3d at 1042 (citing Fernbach, 954 N.E.2d at 1089). Consequently, Sewell's sentence is not inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B).

Conclusion

[43] In sum, the State presented sufficient evidence to rebut Sewell's claims of self-defense and sudden heat, it presented sufficient evidence to support her conviction for murder, and Sewell's 48-year sentence is not inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B). We therefore affirm Sewell's conviction and sentence.

[44] Affirmed.

Felix, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.