K.H., Appellant-Respondent v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] K.H., a juvenile delinquent, repeatedly violated the terms of his probation by committing new offenses, possessing and testing positive for illegal substances, and absconding from the secured facilities at which he was placed. After the juvenile court's attempts to place K.H. in less restrictive placement failed to yield better behavior from K.H., it awarded wardship of K.H. to the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”). K.H. now appeals and presents three issues for our review that we revise and restate as the following two issues:

1. Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion by awarding wardship of K.H. to the DOC, and

2. Whether a prior dispositional order entered in this case was erroneous.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] K.H. was born on June 17, 2009. In early 2022, the State filed a delinquency petition alleging K.H. had committed theft.¹ Less than two weeks later, the State filed a second delinquency petition alleging K.H. had committed theft and criminal mischief.² K.H. was adjudicated a delinquent pursuant to the first petition and the second petition was dismissed pursuant to an agreement. K.H. was placed on probation. In mid-2022, while still on probation, the State filed a delinquency petition alleging K.H. had committed criminal trespass.³ K.H. was adjudicated a delinquent pursuant to this petition and placed on probation. In late 2022, a truancy petition was filed alleging K.H. had missed “excessive days of school.”⁴ Appellant's App. Vol. II at 32.

[4] In early 2023, while still on probation, K.H. committed criminal trespass; the case was “closed” without any apparent official action after K.H. spent 13 days in detention.⁵ Appellant's App. Vol. II at 32. In mid-2023, K.H. again committed criminal trespass, but no delinquency petition was filed. In early September 2023, while still on probation, the State filed a delinquency petition alleging K.H. had committed unlawful possession or use of a legend drug, possession of marijuana, and dangerous possession of a firearm.⁶ On September 14, he was released and agreed to adhere to certain conditions pending adjudication.

[5] Two weeks later, on September 28, 2023, while still on probation and subject to the conditions of release for his most recent delinquency petition, the State filed a delinquency petition (the “September 28 Petition”) alleging K.H. had committed burglary and theft three days earlier.⁷ K.H. admitted to the allegations in the September 28 Petition and to violating his probation. The juvenile court entered a dispositional order (the “First Dispositional Order”) that placed K.H. at Gibault Children's Services, a secure facility, until he completed the Child and Adolescent Residential Environment (“CARE”) program. Pursuant to the order, once K.H. completed the CARE program and was released from Gibault, he would then be placed on six months of supervised probation. The order also stated that if K.H. “fails to complete the CARE Program or complete Probation [he] will be placed at [DOC] for an indeterminate stay.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 44.

[6] On January 5, 2024, the State filed a petition seeking modification of the First Dispositional Decree, alleging that K.H. had not been following the rules at Gibault. In particular, the State alleged that K.H. had (1) initiated a fight in a classroom; (2) possessed a vape and refused a drug screen, which he later took and (3) tested positive for nicotine; (4) attempted to leave the facility; (5) possessed a vape charger; (6) ripped open his mattress and hid food, juice boxes, and a “poke tattoo gun” therein; and (7) defaced walls by writing cuss words and making other large marks. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 92. The juvenile court, by a different judge, declined to modify the First Dispositional Order and K.H.’s placement.

[7] On May 1, the State filed another petition seeking modification of the First Dispositional Decree, alleging that K.H. continued to violate the rules at Gibault. The State alleged that in late April, K.H. had (1) tested positive for THC and nicotine after a home visit, (2) hid a peer in his room during a “crisis incident,” and (3) jumped in a pond and refused to get out; the State further alleged that on May 1, K.H. “went AWOL.” Appellant's App. Vol. III at 35. The juvenile court issued a writ of attachment for K.H., and he was detained less than two days later.

[8] On May 20, the State amended its petition to modify the First Dispositional Decree, adding a new allegation that a delinquency petition had been filed on May 3 ⁸ alleging that while K.H. was absent from Gibault and before being detained, he had committed theft and criminal mischief. After a hearing on the State's amended petition to modify K.H.’s placement, at which K.H. admitted to the allegations in the amended petition and to fighting in detention, the juvenile court awarded wardship of K.H. to DOC. This appeal ensued.⁹

Discussion and Decision

1. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Awarding Wardship of K.H. to the DOC

[9] K.H. challenges the juvenile court's decision to award wardship of him to DOC. “Juvenile courts enjoy wide latitude and significant flexibility in their dealings with juveniles.” B.K. v. State, 235 N.E.3d 142, 145 (Ind. 2024) (citing In re M.T., 928 N.E.2d 266, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)). The disposition of a delinquent is guided by the following relevant statutory considerations: the safety of the community, the best interests of the juvenile, the least restrictive alternative, family autonomy and life, freedom of the juvenile, and the freedom and participation of the juvenile's parent, guardian, or custodian. Ind. Code § 31-37-18-6. We review a juvenile court's disposition decision for an abuse of discretion. G.W. v. State, 231 N.E.3d 184, 188 (Ind. 2024) (citing K.S. v. State, 114 N.E.3d 849, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)). “A court abuses its discretion by misinterpreting the law or ‘if its decision clearly contravenes the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.’ ” Id. (quoting T.D. v. State, 219 N.E.3d 719, 724 (Ind. 2023)). “In determining whether a juvenile court has abused its discretion, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility.” A.F. v. State, 247 N.E.3d 841, 843 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (citing Q.H. v. State, 216 N.E.3d 1197, 1200 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023)), trans. not sought. Notably, “commitment to the DOC ‘should be treated as a last resort,’ ” G.W., 231 N.E.3d at 190 (quoting C.H. v. State, 201 N.E.3d 202, 205 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022)), but “that option may be appropriate when ‘consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child,’ ” id. (quoting I.C. § 31-37-18-6).

[10] First, K.H. argues that despite his “history of adjudications, there is no evidence in the record that he served as a danger to the community or that this placement considered his best interests.” Appellant's Br. at 10. This argument is a request for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do, see A.F., 247 N.E.3d at 843 (citing Q.H., 216 N.E.3d at 1200). For example, K.H. contends that the offenses for which he was adjudicated a delinquent were not “of a violent nature” and that the probation department had identified a potential placement for him at a children's home that “would be able to accept K.H. within two (2) or three (3) months.” Appellant's Br. at 11. Given K.H.’s history of delinquency—which was elevating in severity (e.g., thefts and trespass in early 2022 to possession of a firearm and burglary in late 2023)—and demonstrated inability to comply with the rules of probation and the rules of a secured facility, we cannot say the juvenile court abused its discretion when it determined that committing K.H. to DOC was appropriate in this case.

[11] Second, K.H. argues that the juvenile court's decision to commit him to DOC was based on a presumptive disposition. Pursuant to the First Dispositional Order, K.H. was required to serve a suspended commitment:

The Court now awards wardship of the juvenile to the Indiana Department of Correction for housing in a correctional facility for children or any community-based correctional facility for children. This commitment is suspended on the condition that the juvenile must comply with the rules of probation attached to this Order

Appellant's App. Vol. II at 44 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the First Dispositional Order informed K.H. that he would be placed at DOC if he failed to complete the CARE program or if he violated the terms of his probation.

[12] K.H. claims the suspended commitment provisions of the First Dispositional Order “improperly influenced the juvenile court when it was tasked with handling his modification,” Appellant's Br. at 14, and “placed constraints and influence upon the Judge handling his modification,” id. at 15. Presumptive dispositions “run[ ] counter to the court's duty to make an individualized determination in each case.” E.L. v. State, 783 N.E.2d 360, 367 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).

[13] Importantly, two different judges presided over this case: the judge who entered the First Dispositional Order, and the judge who ruled on both of the State's petitions to modify K.H.’s placement. Contrary to K.H.’s contention that the suspended commitment provision “improperly influenced” and “constrain[ed]” the second judge in ruling on the State's modification petitions, the second judge refused to enforce the suspended commitment provision when he declined to modify K.H.’s placement based on the State's first modification petition. Moreover, at the hearing on the State's second modification petition, the second judge stated, “I don't think that the [First Dispositional Order] binds further Order, although it does express at least the opinion of the prior Judge that the options were running out at least at that time about where to go.” Tr. Vol. II at 23. Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that the juvenile court failed to make an individualized determination when it awarded wardship of K.H. to DOC.

2. K.H. Forfeited His Claim Regarding the First Dispositional Order and Has Not Shown Extraordinarily Compelling Reasons Exist to Reinstate His Right to Appeal that Order

[14] K.H. argues the First Dispositional Order was unconstitutional because it required him to obtain a haircut. On November 8, 2023, the first judge to preside over this case held a hearing at which K.H. admitted to the allegations in the September 28 Petition and the parties set forth their general agreement regarding disposition. During that hearing, the juvenile court ordered K.H. to obtain a haircut before going to Gibault. At no point during the November 8 hearing did K.H. object to the haircut requirement, and his counsel explicitly stated, “We'll accept those terms, Judge.” Tr. Vol. II at 5. K.H. also did not appeal the First Dispositional Order.

[15] Now, K.H. contends the haircut requirement violated his rights Article 1, Section 9 of the Indiana Constitution. Although K.H. “acknowledge[s]” that he did not timely raise this claim, Appellant's Br. at 13, he does not explain why we should address it now. Generally, “a party loses his or her right to appeal for failing to file timely a Notice of Appeal.” In re Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965, 971 (Ind. 2014). When a party seeks to file a belated appeal that is not governed by Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 2—as is the case here—a court must determine “whether there are extraordinarily compelling reasons why this forfeited right should be restored.” Id. at 971.

[16] K.H. does not contend that there are extraordinarily compelling reasons to restore his right to appeal the First Dispositional Decree. Instead, K.H. states only that “he believes that [his constitutional claim is] appropriate for the Court to address and consistent with the Court's historical actions.” Appellant's Br. at 13. Without cogent argument as to why we should restore his right to appeal the First Dispositional Decree, we cannot address the merits of his claim.¹⁰ See Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Guardiola v. State, 375 N.E.2d 1105, 1107 (Ind. 1978)) (holding we will not address the merits of a claim if the party's failure to comply with the Indiana Appellate Rules is “sufficiently substantial to impede our consideration of the issue raised”); Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring cogent reasoning); Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)) (“We will not step in the shoes of the advocate and fashion arguments on his behalf ․”).

Conclusion

[17] In sum, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by awarding wardship of K.H. to DOC, K.H. has not shown that the juvenile court presumed that K.H. should be placed at DOC, and K.H. has not demonstrated extraordinarily compelling reasons to reinstate his right to appeal the First Dispositional Order. We therefore affirm the juvenile court on all issues raised.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Cause 88C01-2201-JD-000004.

2.   Cause 88C01-2201-JD-000015.

3.   Cause 88D01-2208-JD-000148.

4.   Cause 88D01-2212-JS-000251.

5.   Cause 88D01-2302-JD-000012.

6.   Cause 88D01-2309-JD-000128.

7.   Cause 88D01-2309-JD-000136.

8.   Cause 88D01-2405-JD-000047. This delinquency petition was later dismissed.

9.   K.H. fails to support with record citations all the statements of fact in his Statement of Case, as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(5). Because this noncompliance with Appellate Rule 46 does not substantially impede our review of K.H.’s claims, we choose to address their merits. See Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015).

10.   Based on this conclusion, we need not address the State's argument that K.H.’s constitutional claim is moot without exception.

Felix, Judge.

Judges Mathias and Foley concur. Mathias, J., and Foley, J., concur.