IN RE: the Commitment of M.C. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] M.C. was the subject of a temporary civil commitment order sought by the Sandra Eskenazi Mental Health Center (“Eskenazi”). M.C. now appeals, claiming the temporary commitment order was not supported by sufficient evidence. While this appeal was pending, the commitment order expired. M.C. argues that, despite the expiration of the order, his appeal is not moot under the collateral consequences doctrine. Additionally, M.C. argues that the Indiana mootness doctrine, as applied to temporary civil commitment orders, violates the Indiana Constitution. We conclude the appeal is moot, and dismissal is warranted, because M.C. has not satisfied the collateral consequences doctrine or established that the Indiana Constitution requires reaching the merits. We therefore dismiss.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On May 4, 2024, M.C. called an ambulance to transport him from Wheeler Mission, where he was residing, to the hospital for a tooth extraction. After M.C. arrived at the hospital, the attending physician noted that M.C. was “pressured, manic,” and “unable to find shelter.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 13. The attending physician also noted that M.C. “admit[ted] to no sleep[.]” Id. Eskenazi then applied for an emergency commitment on the basis that M.C. was gravely disabled and suffering from a psychiatric disorder.

[3] On May 6, 2024, the probate court granted Eskenazi's application for M.C.’s emergency commitment. In doing so, the trial court indicated that, if Eskenazi timely sought a hearing, the court would regard the request as one for a temporary or permanent commitment order. Two days later, Eskenazi filed a request for a hearing together with a physician's statement and a copy of the application for emergency detention. The trial court regarded the filing as a petition for temporary civil commitment and set a hearing for May 16, 2024.

[4] M.C. testified at the hearing, as did Dr. Ahmed, a psychiatrist at Eskenazi. Dr. Ahmed testified to having been involved in M.C.’s care since his initial meeting on May 6, and every weekday thereafter. Dr. Ahmed's most recent meeting with M.C. was just before the hearing. As to M.C.’s psychiatric history, Dr. Ahmed's knowledge was limited to what M.C. reported. Dr. Ahmed relayed M.C.’s statements that, “in the past[,] a doctor had told him that he had schizophrenia, but he disagreed with that diagnosis, and [M.C.] said that he ha[d] not taken medication for it.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 7–8. Dr. Ahmed testified that M.C. exhibited symptoms consistent with schizophrenia, specifically “disorganized speech and delusions.” Id. at 8. Dr. Ahmed based this diagnosis on his examination of M.C and the history provided by M.C., ultimately agreeing with M.C.’s self-reported schizophrenia diagnosis. Dr. Ahmed added, “[M.C.] reported that he needs to put out a state of emergency regarding something that happened in Grant County, and that he needs to travel to Washington[,] D.C. to go to police headquarters to report this.” Id. M.C. also told Dr. Ahmed that “he is a famous person,” and remarked that Dr. Ahmed was “probably from Grant County” and “probably kn[e]w his father[.]” Id. at 9. M.C. made similar remarks to other staff members. As to M.C.’s ability to provide food and shelter for himself, Dr. Ahmed expressed “concern[ ] that [M.C. was] unable to do that” because M.C. was “so focused” on accomplishing tasks related to his perceived state of emergency, had “no source of income currently,” and it was “unclear to [Dr. Ahmed] how [M.C.] would obtain food moving forward.” Id. at 10. Dr. Ahmed further testified that M.C. “mentioned that he would go to a homeless shelter[,] but ․ it's unknown ․ where [M.C.] intends to do that.” Id. at 10–11.

[5] When Dr. Ahmed spoke with M.C. about his diagnosis and recommended taking medications to help him “function better,” M.C. “disagree[d]” that he was suffering from a mental illness, instead asserting that “[this] situation is real[.]” Id. at 11. Dr. Ahmed explained that M.C. was suffering from delusions such that, when Dr. Ahmed informs M.C. “he has a mental illness, ․ [M.C.] is seeing that as [Dr. Ahmed] saying his situation isn't real.” Id. M.C. believed he did not need medications, and he had not received any medications while under Dr. Ahmed's care. Dr. Ahmed noted that, if M.C. were subject to a temporary commitment order, the treatment plan for M.C. would involve “start[ing] [M.C.] on an anti-psychotic [medication]” with a goal of seeing “a change in [M.C.’s] presentation such that he isn't so focused on needing ․ to travel to Washington[,] D.C. for delusional reasons.” Id. at 11, 12.

[6] When M.C. testified, he mentioned staying at the Wheeler Mission and speaking with a woman about a tooth extraction. At one point, M.C. referred to a “speech broadcast” and recounted that he “filed a state of emergency” after “talking to [a] police chief.” Id. at 22. After M.C. testified, Dr. Ahmed was recalled to the stand. In reference to M.C.’s testimony in the courtroom, Dr. Ahmed was asked whether “there [were] features of ․ either [M.C.’s] speech pattern or the content of his speech that [were] supportive of [his] diagnosis[.]” Id. at 34. Dr. Ahmed explained that M.C.’s “disorganized speech [was] consistent with the diagnosis” and was “what [he] had been seeing all week and ․ continue[d] to see today.” Id.

[7] At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated that Eskenazi proved by clear and convincing evidence that a temporary commitment order was warranted. The trial court entered a written order on May 16, 2024, wherein the court specifically found, by clear and convincing evidence, that M.C. was suffering from schizophrenia and was gravely disabled, rendering him “in need of custody, care[,] and treatment at [Eskenazi]” for “a period of time not expected to exceed ninety (90) days.” Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 9–10. M.C. then pursued the instant appeal, timely filing his Notice of Appeal on June 11, 2024. During the pendency of this appeal, the commitment order expired.

Discussion and Decision

I. Mootness and the Collateral Consequences Doctrine

[8] Because M.C.’s temporary commitment order has expired, we must first address whether the appeal is moot. An appeal is moot when “the controversy at issue has been ended, settled, or otherwise disposed of so that the court can give the parties no effective relief.” E.F. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 188 N.E.3d 464, 466 (Ind. 2022) (per curiam). Our collateral consequences doctrine recognizes that, even if a judicial order has expired, that order may nevertheless continue to impose collateral consequences for the appellant. See generally, e.g., C.P. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 219 N.E.3d 142, 147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). We have applied this doctrine “to hold that appeals are not moot where meaningful relief may still be had by our review of those appeals on their merits.” Id. In J.F. v. St. Vincent Hosp. and Health Care Ctr., Inc., our court concluded that the collateral consequences doctrine is satisfied “only when the appellant demonstrates a particularized collateral consequence flowing from the temporary commitment order.” 222 N.E.3d 1020, 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (emphasis added). For example, in C.P., we identified a particularized collateral consequence—i.e., a live controversy that avoided mootness—where there was evidence that the appellant had been a gunowner and “los[t] ․ his right to lawfully possess a handgun” as a result of the civil commitment order. 219 N.E.3d at 149.

[9] We recognize a split within our court as to whether the fact that a prior commitment order may be used to support a subsequent commitment order satisfies the collateral consequence doctrine. In J.F., the appellant argued that the collateral consequence of the expired commitment order was “an addition to her medical history[,] which would make future involuntary commitment proceedings against her more likely to succeed.” 222 N.E.3d at 1024. Our court concluded that the appellant had “not sufficiently shown a particularized harmful consequence would befall [the appellant] if this Court declined to reach the merits of [the appellant's] appeal” and dismissed the appeal as moot. Id. In contrast, in M.T. v. Community Health Network, 219 N.E.3d 151, 155 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), another panel of this court determined that because the appellant's “history of being committed may contribute to a future serious adverse finding that he again should be committed” the collateral consequence was satisfied and the appeal was not moot.

[10] Here, M.C. presents essentially the same proffered collateral consequence at issue in J.F. and M.T. That is, M.C. argues the case is not moot due to “the possibility that this involuntary commitment will form the basis of any future involuntary treatment.” Appellant's Br. p. 17. M.C. asks us to apply the reasoning in M.T., rather than J.F., and ultimately conclude that a case involving an expired commitment order is not moot due to the potential impact on future commitment cases.

[11] At the outset, we note that “[t]his Court is respectful of the decisions of other panels[,]” but “Indiana does not, however, recognize horizontal stare decisis. Thus, each panel of this Court has coequal authority on an issue and considers any previous decisions by other panels but is not bound by those decisions.” In re J.J., 911 N.E.2d 659, 659 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Here, we follow the approach in J.F., and therefore conclude that, to satisfy the collateral consequences doctrine and avoid dismissal, M.C. must demonstrate a particularized collateral consequence to him individually, rather than the more generalized collateral consequence attributable to the class of persons subject to a commitment order.

[12] Therefore, because M.C. failed to identify a particularized collateral consequence to satisfy the collateral consequences doctrine, we conclude the appeal is moot.¹

II. Indiana Constitution

[13] M.C. next argues that the Indiana Constitution requires our court to address the merits of the appeal, regardless of mootness, arguing: “If the default assumption is that temporary commitments are moot, the average respondent's constitutionally guaranteed right to appeal remains illusory.” Appellant's Br. p. 18. M.C. claims that the application of the mootness doctrine to his temporary commitment order violates both the “absolute right to one appeal” Article 7, Section 6 and the open courts Article 1, Section 12, provisions of the Indiana Constitution. Whether a person has been deprived of a constitutional right is a question of law that we review de novo. Tiplick v. State, 43 N.E.3d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 2015). In arguing “blanket findings of mootness ․ offend the Indiana Constitution,” M.C. cites “Indiana Appellate Rules 9(A)(1), 10(B), [and] 45(B),” which address the procedures for filing a notice of an appeal, the timeline for the assembly of the clerk's record, and the timeline for the appellee to file its brief. Appellant's Br. p. 17. M.C. claims that “[t]his [90-day] timeframe is too abbreviated for any appeal to be decided before the commitment expires.” Id.

[14] Although M.C. claims support in the Indiana Appellate Rules, M.C. fails to reference or even address portions of our Appellate Rules that provide for an expedited appeal. Under Appellate Rule 21(B), a motion for expedited consideration, provides: “[b]y motion of any party, other appeals that involve the constitutionality of any law, the public revenue, public health, or are otherwise of general public concern or for other good cause, may be expedited by order of the court.” M.C. did not seek an expedited appeal under this rule. Moreover, it is worth highlighting that, during the pendency of this appeal, M.C. sought an extension of time to, among other things, file his brief. See Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief at 1–2, Odyssey. Having failed to avail himself of procedures designed to allow for an expedited appeal and having himself sought an extension of time that prolonged the timeline for an opinion in the appeal, we conclude that M.C. has not established that the appellate timeline involved resulted in violations of the cited provisions of the Indiana Constitution. We therefore conclude that the appeal is subject to dismissal.

Conclusion

[15] Because (1) M.C.’s civil commitment order expired and M.C. failed to identify a particularized collateral consequence stemming from the expired order, and (2) M.C. has not established a violation of the Indiana Constitution that would otherwise require reaching the merits of the case, we dismiss the moot appeal.²

[16] Dismissed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Because M.C. only raises the collateral consequences doctrine, we do not consider whether the public interest exception applies to support reaching the merits. See, e.g., T.W. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 121 N.E.3d 1039, 1042 (Ind. 2019) (applying the public interest exception to reach the merits of a moot appeal and discussing whether a court commissioner “lack[ed] authority to enter orders of civil commitment”).

2.   M.C. points out that the Indiana Supreme Court is considering granting transfer in a case that, like his, involves an expired commitment order and appellate argument about the collateral consequences doctrine. See J.F. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 222 N.E.3d 1020 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (holding oral argument regarding transfer on November 19, 2024), trans. pending. M.C. asks that we hold his appeal in abeyance pending the outcome of our Supreme Court's transfer decision. Although we acknowledge M.C.’s request, we ultimately dismiss as moot for the reasons discussed herein. In dismissing as moot, we note that M.C.’s appellate challenge to the merits is limited to whether there was sufficient evidence that he was gravely disabled at the time of the commitment hearing. Had M.C. identified a proper basis to reach the merits—whether under the collateral consequences doctrine, the public interest exception (which M.C. did not raise), or some other grounds—we note that the record discloses no evidentiary defect. Here, Eskenazi established M.C. was gravely disabled in that M.C. was operating in a delusional state, lacked a source of income, and, though generally aware of options for shelter and having previously stayed at Wheeler Mission, insisted he had the urgent responsibility to work with law enforcement and travel to Washington, D.C., to address a perceived state of emergency. See Ind. Code § 12-7-2-96 (defining “grave disability,” a condition that encompasses scenarios where a person's mental illness renders them endangered and unable to provide for their essential human needs).

Foley, Judge.

Judges Bailey and Bradford concur. Bailey, J. and Bradford, J., concur.