A.T., Appellant-Respondent v. A.S., Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] A.T. appeals the Porter Circuit Court's order of protection against her. A.T. presents a single issue for our review, namely, whether A.S. presented sufficient evidence to support the order. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On August 21, 2023, A.S., then seventeen years old, was working as a lifeguard at the Shorewood Forest swimming pool in Valparaiso. A.T., an adult woman, was lounging by the pool and swimming that day. At some point, A.S. and the other lifeguards removed umbrellas that had been placed around the pool deck because the wind had picked up and created a dangerous condition. A.T. had been using one of the umbrellas and became “frantic” when she found that it had been removed. Tr. p. 13. A.T. got in A.S.’s face and asked her whether she was on drugs. A.T. yelled at A.S., told her that she did not know how to do her job, and repeatedly accused her of being on drugs. Id. A.S. started crying, and she left to fill out an incident report. A.S. felt scared of A.T.

[3] A few days later, A.T. returned to the pool. A.S. was guarding the deep end of the pool, and A.T. was in the deep end doing water aerobics. Because the deep end is usually reserved for people using a water slide and diving board, and because it was crowded that day, A.S. asked A.T. to move to a lap lane. A.S. told A.T. that she would clear the lane so that she could have it all to herself. But A.T. “freaked out” and “started yelling” at A.S. Id. at 19. A.T. said to A.S., “I know who your dad is.” Id. At some point, A.T.’s mother came over and accosted A.S. Another lifeguard notified the pool manager, who called law enforcement.

[4] A.T.’s sister, S.T., arrived at the pool. And A.T. and her mother told A.S. that S.T. was a lawyer and would take A.S. “to the Supreme Court.” Id. at 20. A.S. was “very” scared, and she “eventually just walked away.” Id. Other patrons stepped in to comfort A.S. A.S. filed another incident report.

[5] A few days later, on August 25, A.S.’s father filed a petition on behalf of A.S. seeking an order of protection against A.T. In the petition, A.S. alleged that A.T. had committed stalking and repeated acts of harassment against her. That same day, the trial court issued an ex parte order of protection. Following a hearing on April 26, 2024, the trial court affirmed the order of protection against A.T. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Initially, we note that A.S. has not filed an appellee's brief. When the appellee fails to file a brief on appeal, we may reverse the trial court's decision if the appellant makes a prima facie showing of reversible error. McGill v. McGill, 801 N.E.2d 1249, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). In this context, prima facie error is defined as “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Orlich v. Orlich, 859 N.E.2d 671, 673 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). This rule was established to make clear that it is not the burden of the court on appeal to rebut apparently valid arguments advanced for reversing the trial court's judgment. See McGill, 801 N.E.2d at 1251.

[7] We also note that A.T. proceeds pro se in this appeal. “It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). “We will not become an advocate for a party, or address arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed to be understood.” Id. at 984.

[8] A.T. contends that A.S. did not present evidence sufficient to support the order of protection. Our standard of review is well settled. When considering the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a decision to issue a protective order, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. A.G. v. P.G., 974 N.E.2d 598, 598 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). We look only to the evidence of probative value and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's judgment. Id.

[9] Indiana Code section 34-26-5-2(b) provides that someone who has been subjected to harassment may file a petition for an order for protection against someone who has committed repeated acts of harassment against the petitioner.¹ Indiana Code section 34-6-2-51.5 defines “harassment”, for purposes of Indiana Code chapter 34-26-5, as conduct directed toward a victim that includes, but is not limited to, repeated or continuing impermissible contact that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress and that actually causes the victim to suffer emotional distress. Our Supreme Court has held that, in the context of stalking, “repeated” harassment means “more than once.” Nicholson v. State, 963 N.E.2d 1096, 1101 (Ind. 2012). We apply that definition here, as well. To obtain an order of protection, the petitioner must establish at least one of the allegations in the petition by a preponderance of the evidence. A.S. v. T.H., 920 N.E.2d 803, 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

[10] Here, A.S. testified that A.T. had verbally accosted her on two separate occasions and that those incidents caused her to feel scared. A.S. testified that A.T.’s attacks were entirely unprovoked. A.S. presented testimony to support the trial court's finding that A.S.’s “emotional distress” in response to A.T.’s attacks was “reasonable[.]” Tr. p. 136; I.C. § 34-6-2-51.5. And the trial court found that A.T.’s “yelling” and “cursing” and “inappropriate conduct” was meant to threaten or intimidate A.S. and supported the order of protection. Id.

[11] A.T.’s arguments on appeal are nothing more than requests that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. The trial court did not err when it issued the order of protection against her.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court found that the evidence was insufficient to support A.S.’s allegation of stalking. Accordingly, we need only address the trial court's finding regarding A.T.’s repeated harassment of A.S.

Mathias, Judge.

Foley, J., and Felix, J., concur.