IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: K.S. (Minor Child) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] The Department of Child Services (“DCS”) became involved with then-three-year-old K.S. (“Child”) in July of 2022, after receiving reports that Child was living in a dog kennel with N.G. (“Mother”) and that Mother was using methamphetamine. DCS filed a petition alleging that Child was a child in need of services (“CHINS”) in August of 2022. The CHINS petition was subsequently amended to include C.R. (“Father”). Child was adjudicated to be a CHINS and placed in foster care. Mother and Father (collectively, “Parents”) were ordered to complete certain services, which both failed to do. On September 20, 2023, DCS petitioned to terminate Parents’ parental rights to Child.

[2] During a two-day evidentiary hearing, the DCS family case manager (“FCM”) and Child's court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”) both testified that termination of Parents’ parental rights, followed by adoption by foster parents, was in Child's best interests. On August 13, 2024, the juvenile court issued an order terminating Father's parental rights.¹ Father challenges the juvenile court's order, arguing that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the termination of his parental rights. Concluding otherwise, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Child was born on December 12, 2018. In July of 2022, DCS received reports that Child and Mother were living in a dog kennel, Child was sleeping in an alley, and that Mother and her then-boyfriend, who is a convicted sex offender, were using methamphetamine. On August 8, 2022, DCS petitioned the juvenile court to adjudicate Child as a CHINS. Child was removed from Mother's care and placed with foster parents, with whom he has lived through the pendency of the CHINS and subsequent termination proceedings. Mother admitted that Child was a CHINS.

[4] In September of 2022, DCS amended the CHINS petition to include Father. Father was not granted any visitation with Child, however, due to a no-contact order that had been issued with respect to Child in a separate criminal matter. From the onset of the CHINS proceedings, Father has displayed severe anger-management issues. As it related to Father, Child was adjudicated to be a CHINS on November 3, 2022. Afterwards, Father was ordered to maintain suitable, safe, and stable housing; secure and maintain a legal source of income; obey the law; complete a parenting assessment and any recommended services; submit to a substance-abuse evaluation, follow all reasonable recommendations, and submit to random drug screens; complete a psychological evaluation and complete any recommended services; meet all of Child's medical and mental health needs; and participate in fatherhood-engagement services as recommended by DCS.

[5] While Father provided Child with “occasional gifts and sundry offerings of support” and had cared for Child for a nine-day period prior to the initiation of the underlying CHINS proceedings, Father had not generally provided adequate financial or parental support for Child. Appellant's App. Vol. p. 117. Father did not obey the law and was frequently incarcerated. Due in part, but not completely, to his frequent incarceration, Father did not complete the services ordered by the juvenile court following the CHINS adjudication.

[6] On September 20, 2023, DCS petitioned to terminate Father's parental rights. The juvenile court conducted a two-day evidentiary hearing on July 17 and 26, 2024. During this hearing, DCS presented evidence, including testimony from the three FCMs who had attempted to help Father make progress towards reunification: FCM Jake Campbell, FCM Julie Evans, and FCM Ashley Doan. For his part, Father testified and presented evidence which he claimed showed that he had begun to make progress towards reunification.

[7] As of July of 2024, Child had been placed with foster parents for approximately two years. Foster parents were meeting all of Child's basic needs and had expressed a willingness to adopt Child. Child was bonded with foster parents. FCM Doan opined that removing Child from foster parents’ care and placing him “with somebody else [․] he barely knows could be detrimental to his mental health.” Tr. Vol. I p. 169.

[8] FCM Doan indicated that she had no reason to believe that Father would remedy the circumstances leading to Child's removal from his care “in a timely manner[.]” Tr. Vol. I p. 166. FCM Doan indicated that “permanency is very important in a child's life and it is not fair to ask a [five-year-old] to hold off on having a stable ․ family” in order to possibly reunify with someone who had not shown progress towards reunification. Tr. Vol. I p. 167. FCM Doan expressed concerns with Father's refusal to participate in services prior to his most recent incarceration. FCM Doan expressed further concerns with the fact that Father had been incarcerated multiple times during the pendency of the underlying CHINS and termination proceedings and noted that it had never been recommended that Child be placed with Father for a trial home visit. FCM Doan further indicated that she was familiar with maternal grandmother, Barbara Cochran, but that to her knowledge, Cochran had never visited with Child.

[9] FCM Doan testified that in determining what is in a child's best interests she considers permanency, the child's need for a stable home free from abuse and neglect, and financial stability. FCM Doan opined that termination of Father's parental rights, followed by adoption by foster parents, was in Child's best interests. Likewise, CASA Abigail Jones opined that termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best interests.

[10] At the conclusion of the evidence, the juvenile court took the matter under advisement. On August 13, 2024, the juvenile court issued an order terminating Father's parental rights to Child. The juvenile court made numerous factual findings outlining Father's severe anger issues, lack of relationship with Child, failure to provide for Child's care, frequent incarceration, substantial criminal history, and admitted drug use. The juvenile court also noted Child's need for stability and the testimony of FCM Doan and CASA Jones that termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best interests.

[11] The juvenile court further rejected Cochran's petition for a guardianship, which had been filed on July 24, 2024, noting Cochran's prior concern for whether she would be able to adequately care for Child and the fact that Cochran did not have sufficient income to meet her basic living expenses. Specifically, the juvenile court concluded that “[t]he prospect of removing [Child] from [foster parents] and placing him in a home where there are insufficient means to financially support the current occupants is a non-starter for the court.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 152.

Discussion and Decision

[12] “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). Although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Parental rights, therefore, are not absolute and must be subordinated to the best interests of the child. Id. Termination of parental rights is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. The juvenile court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.

[13] In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, we will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Involuntary Term. of Parental Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only consider the evidence that supports the juvenile court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. Where, as here, the juvenile court includes findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its order terminating parental rights, our standard of review is two-tiered. Id. First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, whether the findings support the legal conclusions. Id.

[14] In deference to the juvenile court's unique position to assess the evidence, we set aside the juvenile court's findings and judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it.” Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the legal conclusions made by the juvenile court are not supported by its findings of fact, or the conclusions do not support the judgment. Id.

[15] Father contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the termination of his parental rights to Child. DCS was required to prove the following:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6) months under a dispositional decree.․

(iii) The child has been removed from the parent ․ for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months ․ as a result of the child being alleged to be a [CHINS]․

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a [CHINS];

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2).² Father argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove subsection (B).

[16] It is well-settled that because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, the juvenile court need only find that one of the conditions listed therein has been met. See In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. Therefore, where the juvenile court determines that one of the conditions has been proven and there is sufficient evidence in the record supporting the juvenile court's determination, it is not necessary for DCS to prove, or for the juvenile court to find, the other conditions listed in Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B). See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 882.

[17] When determining whether a reasonable probability exists that the conditions justifying a child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In so doing, the trial court may consider the parent's response to the services offered through [DCS]. A pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with those providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions, support a finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will change. Additionally, [DCS] was not required to rule out all possibilities of change; rather, it needed to establish only that there is a reasonable probability that the parent's behavior will not change.

In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 18–19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted), trans. denied.

A. The Challenged Findings

[18] The juvenile court made numerous findings to support its conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal from Father's care would not be remedied. Father challenges some, but not all of these findings.³ Specifically, Father challenges finding numbers forty-four, forty-five, fifty-nine, sixty-six, and seventy-eight.

[19] Finding number forty-four reads

Father, in 2020, filed a petition to establish his paternity of [Child] during one (1) of his many periods of incarceration (see 41C01-2008-JP-000154). Father offered no explanation for why he waited until he was incarcerated to file the petition. The matter was ultimately dismissed because Father failed to appear at the March 29, 2021 hearing on the matter.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 121. In challenging this finding, Father does not point to any alleged inaccuracy but merely asserts that he had not received notice of the hearing. Even assuming that this assertion were true, it does not change the fact that the matter was dismissed due to Father's “failure to appear and prosecute the matter.” Ex. Vol. V p. 149. The juvenile court's finding provided no explanation for why Father had failed to appear at the hearing, noting only that the paternity action had been dismissed because Father had failed to appear. The challenged finding is supported by the record.

[20] Finding number forty-five reads

The evidence supports the finding that Father has been largely absent and unavailable during the five (5) years [Child] has been alive. Because of Father's criminal lifestyle and his failure to meaningfully and consistently act as a parent during those times when he was not incarcerated, [Child] does not view Father as his parent. In point of fact, [Child] does not wish to communicate with Father. The reasons for this will be explicated infra., but can be understood, in part, by reviewing the court's “Order Suspending Biological Father's Parenting Time” issued under the CHINS matter on June 6, 2024. Said order is incorporated herein, in full.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 121. In challenging this finding, Father points to his own self-serving testimony as well as Cochran's testimony in an effort to prove that he had not been largely absent from Child's life. As it relates to Father's testimony, the juvenile court, acting as the trier-of-fact, was not obligated to believe Father's self-serving testimony. See Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004) (“As a general rule, factfinders are not required to believe a witness's testimony even when it is uncontradicted.”). Neither was the juvenile court obligated to believe Cochran's testimony. See id. The evidence, as well as other unchallenged findings, supports the juvenile court's finding that Father has been largely absent from Child's life. Father's challenge to this finding amounts to an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

[21] Finding number fifty-nine reads

Mr. Campbell took the threat seriously and requested to be removed from the case in June 2023. His request was honored and Julie Evans was assigned as the new family case manager. [The court pauses here to note that this case has utilized a total of three (3) family case managers, Jake Campbell, Julie Evans, and Ashley Doan. Mr. Campbell and Ms. Evans have combined experience with DCS of over twenty (20) years and bring a wealth of institutional knowledge and understanding to each case on which they serve. This court is very familiar with the work of Jake Campbell and has consistently found him to be one of the most competent and able family case managers working in the Johnson County Local Office. The court notes its familiarity with Mr. Campbell's work in order to provide context to the threats made by Father to harm him. Put simply, nobody deserves to be spoken to in this manner, but this court's unqualified conviction in the unflagging kindness, patience, and compassion exhibited by Jake Campell makes the threat all the more disquieting.]

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 124. In challenging this finding, Father does not deny that he had made threatening statements to FCM Campbell but claims that the finding is incomplete. Father acknowledges that FCM Campbell had testified that he had requested to be removed from the case due to Father's threats but argues that a secondary reason for FCM Campbell's removal had also existed, i.e., FCM Campbell had been promoted and could not maintain his then-current caseload. While there may have been a secondary reason for removing FCM Campbell from the case, it does not change the fact that FCM Campbell had in fact requested to be removed from the case due to Father's threats. Father's challenge again amounts to a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

[22] Father also asserts that “the fact that there were three FCM's [sic] throughout the case likely served to disadvantage Father and DCS was not entirely without fault.” Appellant's Br. p. 32. Father, however, fails to establish how he was disadvantaged by having to work with three different FCMs during the pendency of the case. The evidence demonstrates that each of the FCMs attempted to work with Father to help him improve his situation and parenting skills. Father met these attempts with threats and indifference. To the extent that one can even argue that Father has been disadvantaged during the pendency of this matter, the record supports the reasonable inference that any disadvantage has been the result of Father's actions, not the result of having the opportunity to work with three different FCMs.

[23] Finding number sixty-six reads “Julie Evans undertook significant efforts to implement virtual parenting time between Father and [Child] once this transfer took place. These efforts were commenced at this time because the restrictions in place at the Reception Diagnostic Center were vacated once Father reached the Plainfield Correctional Facility.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 126. In challenging this finding, Father acknowledges that FCM Evans took some efforts to implement virtual parenting time. However, he appears to take issue with the juvenile's classification of FCM Evans's efforts as significant. The substance of the juvenile court's finding is that FCM Evans made repeated efforts, over the course of six weeks, to establish virtual parenting time and kept with those efforts until she was able to successfully implement Father's virtual parenting time with Child. Father's challenge to this finding effectively amounts to an impermissible request to reweigh the evidence. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

[24] Finding number seventy-eight reads “[i]mportantly, Father was receiving services through each of these programs at the time his virtual parenting time commenced with [Child] in late December 2023.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 131. The reference to “these programs” refers to unchallenged finding number seventy-seven, in which the juvenile court found that Father had been participating in “(i) Recovery While Incarcerated [(“RWI”)] (an intensive substance[-]abuse treatment program); (ii) an anger management curriculum; and (iii) the ‘You, Yes You’ program that offers a fatherhood curriculum and group therapy sessions.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 130. Father argues that the record does not support the statement that he had begun receiving these services prior to the commencement of his virtual parenting time.

[25] Father's virtual parenting time commenced on December 27, 2023. Father testified that he started the RWI program on December 21, 2023, and acknowledged that “[a]nger management is a required elective” of the RWI program. Tr. Vol. I p. 98. Father's own testimony establishes that he had started the RWI program before the commencement of his virtual parenting time and, given that anger management was a required component of his RWI program, it is reasonable to infer that he had begun anger-management services at or near the time that he began the RWI program. As for the “You, Yes You” program, Father testified that he had begun the program on January 4, 2024, i.e., approximately one week after his virtual visitation commenced. While the record does not support the juvenile court's finding that Father had started this program before his visitation had commenced, we cannot see, and Father has not established, how he was prejudiced by this erroneous statement. The record reveals that Father began a number of services, including those discussed above, after being transferred to a DOC facility that allowed for such services. To the extent that the juvenile court erred in making its finding regarding the commencement dates of these services, said error does not warrant reversal and was harmless given the juvenile court's numerous unchallenged findings.

B. The Findings Support the Juvenile Court's Termination Order

[26] Notwithstanding the challenged findings, the unchallenged findings, which, again, we accept as true, Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d at 626, support the juvenile court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal and the reasons for Child's continued placement outside of Father's care will not be remedied. At the time of Child's removal from Mother's care, Child did not have safe or stable housing as Child had been living with Mother in a dog kennel and Mother and her then-boyfriend, who is a convicted sex offender, had been using methamphetamine. Father's paternity had not been established at this time, despite the fact that “Father had openly expressed his belief that he was” Child's biological father “for at least two (2) years” prior. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 117. Further, while Child had, at one point, been placed in Father's care for a period of roughly nine days and Father had provided Child with “occasional gifts and sundry offerings of support[,]” Father had failed to take on “a role that could be called that of a parent.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 117.

[27] Father was denied the opportunity to exercise visitation with Child beginning in September of 2022, “based upon the fact that there were active criminal warrants for his arrest and there was a no-contact order issued in a separate criminal matter prohibiting contact between Father and [Child.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 113. While the no-contact order was eventually rescinded and Father was granted virtual visitation rights, Child has expressed that he no longer wishes to visit with or communicate with Father. Father has a substantial criminal history, which has resulted in him being incarcerated for a large portion of Child's life. Father also acknowledged that he had used illicit drugs for most of his adult life.

[28] The juvenile court also cited multiple examples of Father's “hair trigger temper[,]” with the court noting both events witnessed by the court itself ⁴ and others testified to by witnesses. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 113. Father has been offered services throughout the pendency of this matter but, as the juvenile court noted, “[t]he efficacy of” the services offered “was blunted by Father's emotional volatility.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 123. Father has threatened his attorneys, FCM Campbell, and other service providers. Father has referred to FCM Evans as “a liar; angrily told her she was not competent to perform her job; and forcefully accused her of intentionally interfering with his virtual parent time sessions.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 127. Father admitted during the evidentiary hearing that even after receiving anger-management services, he had referred to numerous service providers as “a piece of sh[**.]” Tr. Vol. I p. 98.

[29] The juvenile court noted that Father's threatening behavior “occurred before, during, and after completing” anger-management services. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 147. The juvenile court further noted that “Father's anger and hostility continue to impede his ability to participate in services” and evidence “something significantly more baleful than a misplaced love of his son.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 128. The juvenile court reiterated its prior conclusion that Father's anger issues left it with “grave concerns about Father's capacity to parent” Child. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 128.

[30] Father has also failed to abide by the juvenile court's dispositional order as he has failed to establish a safe, stable, and secure housing situation for Child. Father has only expressed a willingness to engage in services while incarcerated and has refused to participate upon his release. Further, despite being offered services while incarcerated, Father has failed to demonstrate that the services he engaged in resulted in a lasting, positive change to his behavior. Father also failed to take advice from service providers. Father's statements during virtual visitation with Child also evidenced a failure to “grasp even a basic understanding of the delicacy of [Child's] situation and how complicated” visitation was for Child. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 133.

[31] Further, while Father argues that the juvenile court's conclusion does “not account for [his] attempts to improve himself[,]” we note that the juvenile court's order reveals that it considered Father's claimed improved circumstances but found that Father's habitual patterns of conduct supported the inference that his allegedly improved circumstances were unlikely to be permanent. Appellant's Br. p. 33. Habitual conduct may include a parent's prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. The juvenile court may also consider the services offered to the parent by DCS and the parent's response to those services as evidence of whether conditions will be remedied. Id.

[32] Considering Father's claimed improvements against his habitual patterns of conduct, the juvenile court concluded as follows:

The facts in evidence point unerringly to far greater weight being placed on Father's prior history and far less on his recent programming efforts in the [DOC]. Father's criminal record is horrendous ․ and his response to services in the [DOC] is negligible. It is this court's conclusion that Father's recent engagement in services through the [DOC] is far too little far too late.․

The evidence placed before this court puts Father, in this court's opinion, squarely in the firmament of truly dangerous people. The court does not make this statement lightly. Many of the men and women who pass before this court in the context of a CHINS or termination proceeding are deeply flawed, often for reasons largely outside their control. These men and women are often not up to the task of parenting their children, but few are actually malevolent. Father is dangerous. He is cruel. It will require sustained effort over a very long period of time to correct the many personality defects noted in this order. Father's efforts are in their infancy. If past is prologue, and this court suspects it is here, Father will return to a criminal lifestyle soon after he is released from the [DOC]. The court does not wish this for Father, in fact, the opposite is true. But the body and weight of the evidence leads directly to this conclusion. This court cannot envisage placing this five (5) year old boy, or any child for that matter, in Father's custody. To do so would place the child in grave and immediate peril.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 148–49.

[33] The juvenile court, acting as the trier-of-fact, was in the best position to weigh the evidence of Father's habitual patterns together with his claimed progress. See Tharp v. State, 942 N.E.2d 814, 816 (Ind. 2011) (providing that the trier-of-fact is best positioned to judge the credibility of the witnesses, is free to discredit testimony, and weigh conflicting evidence). In doing so, the juvenile court gave more weight to Father's habitual conduct than to his recent improvements. This was within the juvenile court's discretion. See In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014).

[34] The juvenile court's unchallenged findings support the conclusion that it is not reasonably probable that the conditions resulting in Child's removal from Father's care would be remedied. As such, we need not address Father's assertion that the juvenile court's conclusion that continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child was unsupported by the evidence. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 882. Father's challenge to the juvenile court's order terminating his parental rights to Child essentially amounts to nothing more than an invitation for this court to reweigh the evidence, which, again, we will not do.⁵ See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

[35] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The juvenile court also terminated Mother's parental rights. Mother does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Although Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4 has been amended, effective March 11, 2024, those provisions do not apply to this case.

3.   We accept the unchallenged factual findings as true. See Moriarty v. Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d 616, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (providing that unchallenged findings must be accepted as true), trans. denied.

4.   One particular outburst at a prior attorney left the juvenile court “gobsmacked” by Father's conduct and inability to control himself. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 114.

5.   We note that to the extent that Father relies upon the Indiana Supreme Court's decision in K.E. v. Indiana Department of Child Services, 39 N.E.3d 641 (Ind. 2015), K.E. is easily distinguishable from this case. In K.E., the Indiana Supreme Court reiterated that incarceration alone “is an insufficient basis for terminating parental rights.” 39 N.E.3d at 643. In its order terminating Father's parental rights, the juvenile court expressly distinguished K.E., and its extensive findings make it clear that the juvenile court did not rely on Father's incarceration alone in finding that there was not a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to Child's removal from Father's care would be remedied.

Bradford, Judge.

Judges Pyle and Kenworthy concur. Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.