II v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In this belated appeal, William McCasland, II contends that the trial court lost jurisdiction to sentence him because he was not promptly sentenced after pleading guilty. Accordingly, he challenges the trial court's denial of his motion for discharge.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] On June 11, 2019, McCasland pleaded guilty to one count of Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine. The negotiated plea agreement provided for the dismissal of the seven remaining counts, as well as felony drug charges under a separate case, Cause No. 36C01-1612-F4-33 (Cause F4-33). The agreement further provided for a sentence of sixteen years, with six executed in the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC) and ten suspended with three years of probation. This sentence was to be served consecutive to his ten-year sentence under Cause No. 36C01-1603-F2-9 (Cause F2-9), which he was in the process of serving.¹ The trial court took the plea under advisement and scheduled sentencing for July 11, 2019. On McCasland's motion, the sentencing hearing was later moved up to June 27, 2019.

[4] Two days before the scheduled sentencing hearing, McCasland's counsel filed a motion to withdraw appearance, alleging that there had been a breakdown in communication with his client. The trial court granted the motion to withdraw and scheduled a pretrial conference (PTC) for July 3, 2019.

[5] On July 2, 2019, new counsel, Brian Chastain (Attorney Chastain), filed an appearance on behalf of McCasland. Attorney Chastain also filed a motion to continue the PTC scheduled for the next day. The trial court granted McCasland's request for a continuance and reset the PTC for July 31, 2019.

[6] On August 2, 2019, the trial court issued a pretrial order after the PTC. In addition to setting another PTC for September 16, 2019, the court noted:

Defendant has already entered a guilty plea. Subsequent to the guilty plea but prior to sentencing Jeremy Braunstein withdrew as defense counsel and Brian Chastain entered. Mr. Chastain needs more time to discuss with the defendant [ ] the next step in the case. Parties request a PTC/Status Hearing in approximately two weeks.

Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 183 (emphasis supplied). Although a PTC was held on September 16, the record does not indicate what was discussed at that hearing or why another hearing was not scheduled.

[7] On July 24, 2020, McCasland filed a motion for a hearing to withdraw his guilty plea. The State filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion, detailing the lengthy procedural history of the case and the State's efforts to come to a final disposition during that time. Regarding the time after Attorney Chastain came on the case, the memorandum provided in part:

13) That the files on [this case and Cause F4-33] were larger than average files for the type of offenses that the defendant was charged with, so the State recognized that [Attorney] Chastain needed sufficient time to familiarize himself with the cases in order to effectively represent the Defendant at the Sentencing Hearing in these Causes.

14) [Since the guilty plea was entered,] the Undersigned, Chief Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Mark Hollingsworth [(DPA Hollingsworth)], has made numerous inquiries of [Attorney] Chastain as to when he would be ready to resolve the Defendant's cases.

15) [DPA Hollingsworth] has not only personally spoken to [Attorney] Chastain frequently about the status of Defendant's cases but has also emailed and text corresponded with [him] about the Defendant's cases in an effort to determine a final resolution of these cases ․.

16) [DPA Hollingsworth] references the contact ․ to show that the [he] and [Attorney] Chastain did not forget or fail to have discussions about the Defendant's cases during this time period since the Defendant's guilty plea.

17) That any delay caused in the final disposition ․ was not caused by [DPA Hollingsworth] on behalf of the State, but the delay was caused by a change in attorneys representing the defendant post-guilty plea․.

Id. at 191.

[8] On August 7, 2020, McCasland sent correspondence to Attorney Chastain, which McCasland also filed, pro se, with the trial court. McCasland urged Attorney Chastain to not “under any circumstances” withdraw his guilty plea, as McCasland believed the trial court had lost jurisdiction to sentence him. Id. at 195.

[9] The trial court set a hearing for September 23, 2020. Prior to the hearing, McCasland, by counsel, filed a motion to withdraw plea agreement, in which he set forth several claims, including that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him due to the passage of time since his June 2019 plea.

[10] At the hearing, McCasland testified that he was currently serving a sentence on an unrelated case and that his current release date in that case was in 2024, though he expected some time cuts. McCasland acknowledged that after pleading guilty in this case, his attorney withdrew and he was then appointed a new attorney, Attorney Chastain, who required additional time to review the files and fairly represent McCasland.

[11] The State presented documents into evidence showing earlier communications from DPA Hollingsworth to Attorney Chastain inquiring about moving the case along. Further, DPA Hollingsworth represented “as an officer of the Court” that “most of the time” he had in person conversations with Attorney Chastain about the case. Transcript at 31. Thereafter, Attorney Chastain acknowledged that “it did take some time to review” the case files and that he “wouldn't be comfortable proceeding with a sentencing [until] review[ing] those documents, at least some due diligence put into it.” Id. at 35. Attorney Chastain, however, noted McCasland's position that he should have been sentenced within thirty days of entering his guilty plea.

[12] At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that there was good cause for the delay in sentencing. Accordingly, the trial court denied McCasland's motion to withdraw his plea and scheduled sentencing for October 21, 2020. After multiple additional delays occasioned by the defense, the sentencing hearing was held on April 28, 2021. McCasland was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement. He now appeals.

Discussion & Decision

[13] McCasland contends that he is entitled to discharge because “the delay in imposition of sentence was without excuse or justification and the trial court lost jurisdiction.” Appellant's Brief at 9. While he acknowledges that much of the twenty-two-month delay between his guilty plea and sentencing was attributable to him, McCasland argues that the delay between September 16, 2019, and July 24, 2020, was “purely the result of undue delay at the hands of the trial court.” Id. at 13. And he claims that the delay would have continued indefinitely had he not sought discharge.

[14] It has long been established that:

the availability of discharge for a person found guilty of a criminal offense but not promptly sentenced is limited to circumstances where the record discloses a deliberate attempt upon the part of the court to withhold sentence or where the facts disclose a delay in the imposition of sentence without excuse or justification for such a period of time as to offend basic notions of fundamental fairness if the court were to then impose sentence.

Taylor v. State, 358 N.E.2d 167, 172 (Ind. 1976) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

[15] McCasland's argument that the delay between September 16, 2019, and July 24, 2020, was without excuse or justification is belied by the record. While the CCS is silent regarding the delay during this period, the State presented evidence and argument at the September 2020 hearing that shows that DPA Hollingsworth maintained contact with Attorney Chastain throughout and repeatedly inquired about when the defense would be ready to proceed. Indeed, without disputing DPA Hollingsworth's representations at the hearing, Attorney Chastain acknowledged that upon his appointment he needed time to come up to speed on McCasland's cases, which involved relatively voluminous files.

[16] Even if some of the delay was not justified, McCasland has not established prejudice. During the entire time that he awaited sentencing in this case, McCasland was in the DOC serving a ten-year sentence in another case, Cause F2-9. And the negotiated plea agreement provided for a fixed sentence to be served consecutive to the sentence in Cause F2-9. Accordingly, this is not a case where McCasland was “a free man unable to live his life, plan for his future, or otherwise find repose due to the looming threat of incarceration.” Minnick v. State, 965 N.E.2d 124, 129 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (observing that the rationale for requiring prompt sentencing is that a citizen is entitled to live without a Damocles sword dangling over his head and holding that the rationale had no application where the defendant spent the entire period of delay incarcerated on another conviction), trans. denied; see also Beliles v. State, 663 N.E.2d 1168, 1173 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (“[T]he ‘sword’ which hung over Beliles’ head while he was in prison properly serving his sentence consisted of the chance that the error in the sentencing order would be corrected depriving him of the windfall of a shorter executed sentence than the one he had bargained for under his plea agreement. As discussed above, Beliles has not shown prejudice beyond frustrated expectations.”).

[17] In sum, the circumstances of the delayed sentencing here do not offend basic notions of fundamental fairness. The trial court properly determined that McCasland was not entitled to discharge.

[18] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   McCasland was sentenced under Cause F2-9 on August 9, 2017, to ten years in the DOC, fully executed.

Altice, Chief Judge.

Judges Vaidik and Scheele concur. Vaidik, J. and Scheele, J., concur.