IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of I.C. (Minor Child); (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] H.C. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's termination of her parental rights to I.C. (“Child”). Mother argues that: (1) several of the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous; (2) the trial court clearly erred by determining that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal were unlikely to be remedied; and (3) the trial court clearly erred by determining that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.

Issues

[2] Mother raises three issues on appeal, which we restate as:

I. Whether the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous.

II. Whether the trial court clearly erred by determining that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal were unlikely to be remedied.

III. Whether the trial court clearly erred by determining that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests.

Facts

[3] Mother and R.C. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) are the biological parents of Child, born in April 2012. Parents are also the parents of three older children—T.K., born in 2004; Ad.C., born in 2007; and As.C., born in 2008 (collectively, “the Older Children”). T.K. and his girlfriend (“Girlfriend”) are the biological parents of J.M. (“Grandchild”), born in January 2020. In 2020, Parents, Child, the Older Children, Girlfriend, and Grandchild lived together in Parents’ home.¹

[4] The Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) first became involved with the family when a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) case was opened in February 2017, and Child was removed from Parents’ care ten months later. The case was closed in March 2019.

[5] In February 2020, DCS again became involved with the family. DCS received a report concerning Grandchild's wellbeing, based on allegations of T.K.’s and Girlfriend's alleged drug use and the poor conditions of Parents’ home. The home “needed [to be] cleaned[,]” and dirty clothes and dishes were “everywhere.” Tr. Vol. II p. 59. DCS family case manager (“FCM”) Kara Cox went to the home to investigate the report and encountered T.K., Girlfriend, Grandchild, As.C., and Child, even though it was a school day. Parents were not home at the time. Grandchild's clothing was wet from milk and smelled of marijuana; T.K. and Girlfriend appeared to be impaired; and T.K. had a bag of marijuana in his possession. FCM Cox screened T.K. and Girlfriend for illegal substances.

[6] During the screenings, Parents returned home and began behaving in a “[v]ery erratic” manner and “talking very fast[.]” Id. Parents asked FCM Cox to leave, and they refused to submit to a drug screen. Father, who was on probation at the time, submitted to a drug screen later that day. He tested positive for methamphetamine and marijuana. DCS did not remove Child from Parents’ care at that time. Instead, FCM Cox established a safety plan with Parents that consisted of Child, the Older Children, and Girlfriend spending the weekend at a relative's home.

[7] On March 6, 2020, FCM Cox returned to Parents’ home and observed that the conditions of the home had improved but that the home still “needed to be in better condition.” Id. at 60. When the FCM asked Mother if she would submit to a drug screen, Mother admitted that she was using marijuana “occasionally.” Id.

[8] On March 9, 2020, DCS received a new report alleging that Parents were using drugs; Parents’ home was in a poor condition—with dirty dishes and food on the floor; and one of the Older Children was not in school. When FCM Cox visited the home the following day, she found Child and the Older Children still at home and late for school. Mother submitted to a drug screen that day and tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine.

[9] On March 25, 2020, DCS filed a petition alleging Child to be a CHINS based upon DCS's involvement with the family in March 2020; the children's inconsistent school attendance; the drug use in the home; and the home's unacceptable condition. Child was not removed from Parents’ care at that time. DCS believed that Child could safely remain in the home while services were offered to Parents.

[10] On July 17, 2020, Child was adjudicated a CHINS after Mother admitted to substance abuse in the home, which created a lack of supervision. Approximately two weeks later, Child was removed from Parents’ care because Parents continued to use drugs; Parents failed to maintain the home in an acceptable condition; and T.K. and Ad.C. tested positive for marijuana. Child was placed in relative care and then moved to foster care. Child never returned to Parents’ care.

[11] On August 18, 2020, the CHINS court entered a dispositional decree. Mother was ordered to, among other things: refrain from all criminal activity; maintain contact with DCS; enroll and participate in the programs recommended by DCS; obtain and arrange to complete required assessments; keep all appointments with service providers; maintain suitable safe, and stable housing; keep the family home in a manner structurally sound, sanitary, clean, free from clutter, and safe for Child; secure and maintain a stable source of income; obey the law; submit to random drug screens; refrain from committing acts of domestic violence; attend all visitations with Child and comply with all visitation rules; provide Child with a safe, secure, and nurturing environment that is free from abuse and neglect; and complete services to address issues such as substance abuse, employment, budgeting, parenting, and home conditions.

[12] In the fall of 2020, Mother was arrested and charged with domestic battery, sexual misconduct with a minor, and resisting law enforcement. The charges stemmed from an incident involving Ad.C. Ad.C. had returned to Mother's home to obtain some of his clothing and discovered Mother in her bedroom with a minor male. Mother and Ad.C. argued; then Mother pushed and hit Ad.C. Mother eventually pleaded guilty to sexual misconduct with a minor, and the State dismissed the other charges. Mother was sentenced to six years with eighteen months executed at the Indiana Department of Correction, eighteen months on home detention, and the balance of the time suspended to probation. Mother remained incarcerated from September 2020 until midNovember 2021. Mother was also required to register as a sex offender.

[13] Before Mother's incarceration, she “would go through periods of compliance and non-compliance” with the services that DCS offered her, and she continued to test positive for marijuana and methamphetamine. Id. at 171. Mother met periodically with her home-based caseworker, attended visitation with Child, and completed a substance abuse assessment, but she did not follow the recommendations from the assessment. While Mother was incarcerated, she was able to participate in some substance abuse programs; however, most DCS services were unavailable due to the Covid-19 pandemic, when access to jails and prisons was limited.

[14] Mother was released from incarceration in mid-November 2021 and was placed first on home detention and then on probation. FCM Joni Garrett—who had been assigned to Mother's case in April 2021—put services in place for Mother that included home-based casework, drug screens, and visitation with Child.

[15] After Mother's release from incarceration, she struggled to find a place to live. Her sex offender status prevented her from returning to her own home because it was located near a daycare facility. Mother moved in with her parents, who lived in a two-bedroom mobile home. The home was “very crowded” and not large enough to accommodate Child, as other family members lived there. Tr. Vol. III p. 26. Mother slept on the floor in the living room. The bathroom floor had a hole in it that had been repaired with cardboard and duct tape.

[16] Hannah Harvey, a family consultant with Lifeline Youth & Family Services, worked with Mother, in Mother's home, on parenting skills; budgeting; and maintaining employment, stable housing, and sobriety. Mother was initially engaged in her services, and she and Harvey worked well together. Harvey observed, however, that helping Mother secure housing was “hard” because Mother was on probation and could not leave the county. Tr. Vol. II p. 135. Another challenge to securing housing was Mother's employment history. Mother would leave one job for a higher-paying job, which resulted in periods of unemployment and fluctuations in Mother's income. Mother was never able to find suitable housing.

[17] Mother did experience periods of sobriety; however, she was never able to achieve sustained sobriety. When Harvey went on maternity leave between October and December 2022, Mother relapsed and began using methamphetamine. Harvey returned to work and resumed her home-based casework with Mother; however, Harvey stopped working with Mother in May 2023, when Mother became “nonresponsive” to Harvey's attempts to communicate with Mother. Id. at 137.

[18] DCS referred Mother to two different facilities for services to address her substance abuse issues—RainTree Consulting and Hamilton Center. “[O]verall[,]” Mother did not comply with the services. Id. at 200. At RainTree Consulting, Mother met with her therapist but would not express her feelings or respond to her therapist's questions. The therapist closed Mother's referral. Mother participated in therapy at Hamilton Center from March through May 2023. Mother, however, told her therapist at Hamilton Center that she did not want to stop using drugs; she did not think her substance abuse was a problem; and she did not want to discuss the matter.

[19] In 2023, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine and failed to properly register as a sex offender. Her probation was revoked, and she was incarcerated from September 2023 until January 2024. After her release, Mother returned to her parents’ overcrowded, “cluttered” mobile home. Tr. Vol. III p. 26. Mother was able to obtain full-time employment at a fast-food restaurant.

[20] When Mother was not incarcerated, she attended the DCS supervised visitations with Child “pretty regularly.” Tr. Vol. II p. 76. Although Mother missed some of the visits, she was found to have substantially complied with the visitation requirement. Visitation with Child became difficult for Mother after her release from incarceration in January 2024. By that time, Child had been moved to a pre-adoptive foster home that was located four hours away from Mother's parents’ mobile home, and Mother did not own a car. Mother has not seen Child since she was released from incarceration in January 2024.

[21] During the CHINS case, and after Child was removed from Mother's care, Child had various placements. Child initially was placed in relative care; however, in May 2021, Child was removed from the placement due to a lack of supervision in the home. Ad.C.—who had been placed in the same home—overdosed on methamphetamine while in the relative's care. Shortly thereafter, Child was placed in foster care, and she remained with the foster family for approximately six months. In December 2021, DCS moved Child to another foster family where she remained until November 2023. DCS removed Child from the second foster home after Child began to withdraw emotionally from the family. Child was then placed in a pre-adoptive foster home.

[22] On May 31, 2023, DCS filed its petition to terminate Mother's parental rights. The fact-finding hearing on the termination petition was held on April 24 and 26, 2024. Mother and Father both appeared at the hearing in person and by counsel. Neither parent testified.

[23] At the hearing, FCM Garrett testified that since the CHINS case was opened in March 2020, Mother had been incarcerated for a total of nineteen months. FCM Garrett further testified that, when Mother was not incarcerated, she was provided with services, including therapy and home-based casework, and that Mother had been assigned four different home-based case workers. When asked why Mother had been assigned so many home-based case workers, the FCM testified that “[s]ome [of the case workers] canceled due to [Mother's] non-compliance” with the services. Id. at 197. The FCM testified that Mother went “back and forth” between being “not ․ fully engaged in services” and then becoming “reengaged.” Id. at 199. She explained that Mother had been “very inconsistent with services and compliance with services” and that Mother had a “habit of non-compliance and instability.” Id. at 221.

[24] FCM Garrett testified that she did not believe that Mother would remedy the reasons for Child's removal from Mother's care. The FCM further testified that Child “deserve[d] to have permanency.” Id. FCM Garrett told the trial court that DCS's plan for Child's care and treatment was termination of parental rights with adoption by Child's foster parents.

[25] FCM Garrett and Child's court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”) Jeanne Hall both testified that termination of Mother's parental rights and adoption by Child's foster family is in the best interests of Child. CASA Hall testified that there was no indication that Mother's home conditions had improved. When the CASA was asked if she had “ever recommended” that Child be returned to Mother's care, she answered, “No ․ because of [Mother's] ․ non-consistent sobriety, non-consistent employment[,]” and lack of adequate housing. Tr. Vol. III p. 29.

[26] On May 23, 2024, the trial court entered its extensive findings of fact, conclusions thereon, and order terminating Mother's parental rights. The trial court concluded, among other things, that there is a reasonable probability the conditions leading to Child's removal will not be remedied and that termination is in Child's best interests. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[27] The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional rights of parents to establish a home and raise their children. In re K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). “[A] parent's interest in the upbringing of [his or her] child is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by th[e] [c]ourt[s].’ ” Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000)). We recognize that parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the child's best interests when determining the proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights. Id.; see also In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019) (“Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute.”). “When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45-46.

[28] Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8(c), the trial court “shall enter findings of fact that support the entry of the conclusions required by subsections (a) and (b)” when granting a petition to terminate parental rights.² Here, the trial court did enter findings of fact and conclusions thereon in granting DCS's petition to terminate Mother's parental rights. We affirm a trial court's termination of parental rights decision unless it is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45. A termination of parental rights decision is clearly erroneous when the trial court's findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions, or when the legal conclusions do not support the ultimate decision. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's judgment. Id.

[29] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS is required to allege and prove, among other things:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6) months under a dispositional decree;

* * * * *

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) [and] that termination is in the best interests of the child ․

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2).³ DCS need establish only one of the requirements of subsection (b)(2)(B) before the trial court may terminate parental rights. Id.

[30] DCS “is required to prove that termination is appropriate by a showing of clear and convincing evidence.” In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 (Ind. 2016) (citing In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Ind. 2009)). If the trial court finds that the allegations in the termination petition are true, it “shall” terminate the parent-child relationship and enter findings supporting its conclusions. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8. Finally, we note that because Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, we need only conclude that DCS has met its burden as to one of the three elements. In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[31] Mother challenges five of the trial court's seventy-five findings and the sufficiency of the evidence DCS presented to satisfy the elements of Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4, inclusive of subsections (B) (remediation of conditions) and (C) (best interests of Child). We conclude that the challenged findings are not clearly erroneous and DCS presented sufficient evidence to establish the requisite statutory elements for termination of Mother's parental rights as to the remediation of conditions and the best interests of Child. Accordingly, the trial court's termination of Mother's parental rights to Child is not clearly erroneous.

I. The trial court's findings are not clearly erroneous.

[32] Mother contends that five of the trial court's seventy-five findings are clearly erroneous. Specifically, Mother challenges findings 21, 22, 23, 35, and 40. Findings 21, 22, 23, and 35 are closely related and read as follows:

21. In December 2022, Mother's home-based case worker at the time went on leave.

22. Shortly thereafter, Mother began to periodically use methamphetamine. Mother admitted this to the FCM and providers after the fact. She would screen positive in March 2023.

23. During this time of relapse, Mother's compliance with services also began to fall off, as she became more difficult to communicate with to schedule services, was not as engaged in her services, and did not communicate as frequently with DCS. She also began screening positive during this time.

* * * * *

35. While Mother did maintain an extended period of sobriety in 2022, the Court has great concern that she relapsed once her Home Base Case Worker went on leave and there was a temporary gap in services. It appears to the Court that Mother will not be able to maintain her sobriety without either significant involvement of providers or a drastic change in her situation.

Appealed Order pp. 8-10 (internal citations omitted). Finding 40 states:

40. First, and most importantly, poverty is not an excuse for ongoing substance abuse, especially when the State through DCS is providing services to address it at no cost to the parents. Both Mother and Father had access to resources and services through DCS․ Mother did take advantage of the services that were offered, but Mother relapsed fairly quickly when there was a gap in her services.

Id. at 10.

[33] Mother argues that there was no evidence presented to show that she had “any positive [drug] screens or relapsed” between October and December 2022, when Harvey, Mother's home-based caseworker, was on maternity leave. Appellant's Br. p. 17. Mother further argues that she did not test positive for illegal substances until March 2023, “over a year after her caseworker went on maternity leave” and that the positive screen “appear[ed] to be an isolated slip-up, and not a full[-]blown relapse.” Id. Mother maintains that, while there was “some evidence” that her compliance with her services decreased when Harvey went on maternity leave, the decrease in compliance was the “result of Mother's work schedule.” Id. at 18.

[34] At the termination hearing, Harvey testified that she was on maternity leave between October and December 2022. She further testified that Mother “admitted” that she began to relapse “once [Harvey] went on maternity leave.” Tr. Vol. II. p. 145. Harvey answered in the affirmative when she was asked if Mother told Harvey that Mother's relapse “had been going on for months[.]” Id. FCM Garrett testified that Mother tested positive for amphetamines in March 2023.

[35] Regarding Mother's participation in her services, Harvey testified that Mother was initially engaged in her services, and she and Harvey worked well together. Harvey further testified, however, that she stopped working with Mother because Mother became “nonresponsive” to Harvey's communication attempts. Id. at 137.

[36] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the evidence presented at the termination hearing supports the challenged findings. Mother's arguments to the contrary are merely requests that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45. Accordingly, the trial court's findings 21, 22, 23, 35, and 40 are not clearly erroneous.

II. The trial court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal will not be remedied is not clearly erroneous.

[37] Mother next argues that DCS failed to prove that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal would be remedied. As to the likelihood of remediation of conditions, “[w]e engage in a two-step analysis[.]” V.A., 51 N.E.3d at 1145. “First, we must ascertain what conditions led to [Child's] placement and retention in foster care. Second, we determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). In the first step, we consider not only the initial reasons for removal, but also the reasons for continued placement outside the home. In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). In the second step, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014).

[38] However, the court must also “consider a parent's habitual pattern of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231. “The trial court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that the child's physical, mental and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” Id. at 1235 (citation omitted). In evaluating the parent's habitual patterns of conduct, the court may disregard efforts made shortly before the termination hearing and weigh the history of the parent's prior conduct more heavily. Id. at 1234. And DCS is not required to rule out all possibilities of change; rather, it need establish only that there is a reasonable probability the parent's behavior will not change. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Habitual conduct may include parents’ prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and a lack of adequate housing and employment. Id.

[39] Here, Child was initially removed from Mother's care due to Mother's ongoing drug use, her failure to maintain the home in an acceptable condition, and T.K. and Ad.C. testing positive for marijuana. Child never returned to Mother's care.

[40] Mother completed a substance abuse assessment, but she did not follow the recommendations from the assessment. While Mother did attempt to participate in some of the services recommended to her—and she should be commended for her initial engagement in her services, her visitations with Child, and her attempts to achieve sustained sobriety—Mother ultimately relapsed and stopped communicating with her home-based caseworker. FCM Garrett testified that, overall, Mother was “very inconsistent with services [,]” and she had a “habit of non-compliance and instability.” Tr. Vol. II p. 221.

[41] In the four years since the CHINS case was opened, Mother spent nineteen months in jail. Mother's offenses included sexual misconduct with a minor and a probation violation for, among other things, testing positive for methamphetamine. Mother was never able to achieve sustained sobriety. Approximately one year after her release from her first incarceration, Mother relapsed. She tested positive for methamphetamine three times in 2023, which resulted in Mother violating her probation and returning to jail.

[42] Mother also was never able to secure adequate housing for herself and Child due to her sex offender status, her gaps in employment, and her fluctuating income. The home where Mother was living at the time that the termination hearing took place was overcrowded and cluttered and—by Mother's admission—not safe for Child. Given that Mother continues to struggle with her drug use and with obtaining steady employment and adequate housing, the trial court's finding of no reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal from Mother will be remedied is not clearly erroneous.⁴

III. The trial court's conclusion that termination of Mother's parental rights is in Child's best interests is not clearly erroneous.

[43] Mother also argues that DCS failed to prove that termination of the parent-child relationship was in Child's best interests. In making such a determination, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1158. “A parent's historical inability to provide adequate housing, stability and supervision coupled with a current inability to provide the same will support a finding that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.” In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 221 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Castro v. State Off. of Fam. & Child., 842 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied), trans. dismissed. “Additionally, a child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child, and the testimony of the service providers may support a finding that termination is in the child's best interests.” Id. at 224. Such evidence, “in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1158-59.

[44] Here, the evidence established that Child was removed from Mother's care in the summer of 2020, and has been in her pre-adoptive foster home since late 2023. In the four years since the CHINS proceedings commenced, Mother has not been able to rectify the issues that resulted in Child's removal. Mother has been unable to achieve sustained sobriety or secure adequate housing for herself and Child.

[45] Additionally, FCM Garrett testified that DCS had “seen enough” of Mother's “pattern” of inconsistent participation in her services and her “habit of noncompliance and instability.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 221-22. She told the trial court that Child “deserve[d] to have permanency.” Id. at 221. FCM Garrett and CASA Hall both testified that Child is doing well in her pre-adoptive foster home. The FCM and CASA also testified that they believe that termination of Mother's parental rights is in Child's best interests. And as we have already discussed, there is evidence that the conditions resulting in Child's removal will not likely be remedied. Thus, the totality of the evidence is such that the trial court did not clearly err in concluding that termination of Mother's parental rights is in Child's best interests.

Conclusion

[46] The trial court's termination of Mother's parental rights to Child is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm.

[47] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father, Ad.C., and As.C. do not participate in this appeal. T.K., Girlfriend, and Grandchild are not parties to this appeal. Thus, we largely limit our recitation of the facts to those pertinent to the termination of Mother's parental rights to Child.

2.   Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8, governing termination of a parent-child relationship involving a delinquent child or CHINS, provides as follows:(a) Except as provided in section 4.5(d) of this chapter, if the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.(b) If the court does not find that the allegations in the petition are true, the court shall dismiss the petition.

3.   This statute was amended effective March 11, 2024. DCS filed its petition in 2023, under the prior version of the statute.

4.   Mother also argues that DCS failed to prove that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of Child. Because Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, we need only address whether the trial court erred in concluding that there exists a reasonable probability that Mother will not remedy the conditions that resulted in Child's removal.

Tavitas, Judge.

Judges May and DeBoer concur. May, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.