Cameron Michael Reine, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A jury found Cameron Reine (“Reine”) guilty of Level 6 felony theft ¹ for stealing clothes from Walmart. At trial, a Walmart security investigator testified that Reine was put on Walmart's trespass list because of “prior opportunities we've had at Walmart.” Tr. at 63. After defense counsel objected and the State withdrew its question, the trial court instructed the jury to “[d]isregard the last question.” Id. Reine now appeals his conviction, arguing that this sequence of events placed him in grave peril and the trial court committed fundamental error by failing to sua sponte declare a mistrial. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On April 2, 2024, Reine and Misty Turner (“Turner”), drew the attention of Craig Young (“Investigator Young”), an asset protection investigator at Walmart. Investigator Young observed them walk to a self-checkout station in the store where Turner bundled two separate rolls of clothing containing three items each but scanned only one item of clothing in each roll. Reine “helped guide” the rolls of clothing into a grocery bag. Tr. at 57. Surveillance cameras captured clear footage of this scheme from multiple angles.

[3] After Reine paid for the scanned items, Investigator Young stopped the pair to check their receipt and verified that there were articles of clothing in their shopping bags that had not been paid for. Reine initially denied stealing the items, but “eventually admitted to the theft.” Id. at 62. Investigator Young gave Reine and Turner written notices prohibiting them from returning to the store. Both signed the notices and provided their dates of birth at which time Investigator Young reported the incident to law enforcement.

[4] On April 4, 2024, the State charged Reine with Theft as a Level 6 felony due to his prior conviction for theft. A jury trial was held on June 27, 2024. In its preliminary instructions, the trial court advised the jurors that “the Court may rule that certain questions may not be answered,” and instructed the jurors that they “must not concern [themselves] with the reasons for the rulings,” and that their “verdict should be based only on the evidence admitted.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 50.

[5] During the State's examination of Investigator Young, the following exchange occurred regarding the notice Reine signed prohibiting him from returning to the store:

STATE: Part of the procedure when people are suspected of thievery from Walmart, are they put on a trespass list?

INVESTIGATOR YOUNG: Not initially, no.

STATE: Is that an option?

INVESTIGATOR YOUNG: Yes, it is.

STATE: Was that done in this case?

INVESTIGATOR YOUNG: Yes, it was.

STATE: Why did you do that?

INVESTIGATOR YOUNG: Due to other opportunities that we've had at Walmart.

[6] Tr. at 62-63. At this point, defense counsel objected and argued during a sidebar that the line of questioning was “getting really close to talking about prior bad acts.” Id. at 63. The State explained that the purpose of the question was to identify Reine because the notice contained his signature and date of birth, but it agreed to withdraw the question. Without defense counsel requesting an instruction or admonishment, the trial court instructed the jury to “[d]isregard the last question. The prosecutor has withdrawn it.” Id. The questioning continued and Investigator Young testified that he witnessed Reine write his signature and date of birth on the notice.²

[7] The jury found Reine guilty of Class A misdemeanor theft. Outside the presence of the jury, Reine admitted he had a prior theft conviction and waived his right to a jury trial on the enhancement to theft as a Level 6 felony. On July 1, 2024, the trial court sentenced Reine to 547 days executed to be served on home detention.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Reine acknowledges he did not move for a mistrial. Nonetheless, he argues he was placed in grave peril after Investigator Young provided highly prejudicial testimony alluding to his prior misconduct, and the trial court committed fundamental error by failing to sua sponte declare a mistrial.

[9] “Mistrial is an extreme remedy in a criminal case which should be granted only when nothing else can rectify a situation.” Schlomer v. State, 580 N.E.2d 950, 955 (Ind. 1991). “[T]he trial court is in the best position to gauge the surrounding circumstances of the event and its impact on the jury.” Id. “The overriding concern is whether the defendant ‘was so prejudiced that he was placed in a position of grave peril.’ ” Lucio v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1008, 1010 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Gill v. State, 730 N.E.2d 709, 712 (Ind. 2000) (“The gravity of peril is measured by the probable persuasive effect on the jury's decision.”)). Thus, a trial court's decision to grant or deny a request for a mistrial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1283 (Ind. 2014). However, when the defendant fails to move for mistrial, he waives the issue on appeal unless he can show fundamental error. Id. at 1281. Fundamental error is an “extremely narrow” exception to waiver that occurs when the error makes “a fair trial impossible or constitutes clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process presenting an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.” Cooper v. State, 854 N.E.2d 831, 835 (Ind. 2006) (cleaned up).

[10] Initially, Reine argues that Investigator Young's testimony about “other opportunities” referred to Reine's “other thefts in Walmart,” which was inadmissible character evidence under Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b). Tr. at 63; Appellant's Br. at 10. Rule 404(b) “serves to safeguard the presumption of innocence in favor of criminal defendants” and “prevents the jury from indulging in the ‘forbidden inference’ that a criminal defendant's ‘prior wrongful conduct suggests present guilt.’ ” Fairbanks v. State, 119 N.E.3d 564, 568 (Ind. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S.Ct. 198 (Oct. 7, 2019) (quoting Byers v. State, 709 N.E.2d 1024, 1026-27 (Ind. 1999)). Accordingly, Rule 404(b)(1) provides that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” However, such evidence “may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Rule 404(b)(2). Rule 404(b) is also subject to Rule 403's balancing test. Thus, when assessing the admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b), the trial court must: (1) “determine that the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the charged act;” and (2) determine whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Laird v. State, 103 N.E.3d 1171, 1177 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied.

[11] Reine claims that Investigator Young's testimony at issue is “the very type of evidence that Rule 404(b) was designed to exclude” and compares the testimony at issue to the evidence admitted in Rhodes v. State, 771 N.E.2d 1246 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. Appellant's Br. at 11 (emphasis in original). In Rhodes, the defendant was tried and found guilty of OWI charges and this Court found that the State's “case in chief seemed to be a focused inquiry” into Rhodes's prior misconduct, including “inquiries into Rhodes's driving convictions, alcohol problems, and history of domestic violence to questions concerning the legitimacy of Rhodes and Ralston's child[.]” Id. at 1256. We held that this “flood of irrelevant and prejudicial” character evidence constituted fundamental error and mandated reversal of Rhodes's convictions. Id. at 1256-57.

[12] Unlike Rhodes, it is speculative that Investigator Young's testimony invoked Reine's prior bad acts. Investigator Young testified that people suspected of theft are not initially put on a trespass list but that it is an option that was utilized in this case. When asked why, Investigator Young responded, “[d]ue to other prior opportunities that we've had at Walmart.” Tr. at 63. Subsequently, following the attorneys’ sidebar with the trial court and the court's limiting instruction, Investigator Young explained that Reine and Turner wrote their identifying information on the trespass notices. Lacking any context, this testimony was vague, and the jury may not necessarily have understood “other opportunities” to mean that Reine had been suspected of stealing from the store on prior occasions. Id. It also left open the possibility that Reine had been placed on the trespass list for a first offense. We conclude that Investigator Young's vague testimony was not impermissible character evidence.

[13] However, assuming arguendo that Investigator Young's testimony implicated Rule 404(b)(1),³ Reine's next argument is that the trial court's limiting instruction for the jury to “[d]isregard the last question[,] [t]he prosecutor has withdrawn it[,]” was “woefully insufficient.” Tr. at 63; Appellant's Br. at 12. A trial court's decision not to grant a mistrial is “seldom found” to be reversible error “when the trial court has admonished the jury to disregard a statement made during the proceedings.” Lehman v. State, 777 N.E.2d 69, 72 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).

[14] In Lehman, Lehman was charged with multiple counts of child molesting and the trial court's motion in limine ruling prohibited the introduction of his other alleged sexual offenses. Id. at 71. Before testifying, the investigating officer was advised of the motion in limine; however, when asked what other investigation he did in the case, the officer responded that the investigation had broadened to include nine other victims. Id. Lehman's counsel moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied, and the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the officer's answer. Id. Applying an abuse of discretion standard, we reversed Lehman's conviction, reasoning that the trial court “made no observations regarding the effect” this “prejudicial and inflammatory” comment may have had on the jury, and that the trial court's admonishment for the jury to disregard the officer's response had not cured the defect under the circumstances. Id. at 73.

[15] Here, unlike Lehman, Investigator Young's testimony did not allege that Reine had committed any specific past misconduct. Any prejudice arising from Investigator Young's “other opportunities” comment was minimal compared to the officer's “inflammatory” reference to “nine other victims” in Lehman. Tr. at 63; Lehman, 777 N.E.2d at 73. Additionally, following the disputed testimony, Reine did not request a mistrial or even a limiting instruction. Given the trial court's instruction to “[d]isregard the question[,] [t]he prosecutor has withdrawn it[,]” and its prior instructions that “the Court may rule that certain questions may not be answered,” that the jurors “must not concern [themselves] with the reasons for the rulings,” and that their “verdict should be based only on the evidence admitted”—we are satisfied that the trial court's admonishment sufficiently cured any minor defect in the evidence at issue. Tr. at 63; Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 50; see also Perry v. State, 78 N.E.3d 1, 12 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (“When the jury is properly instructed, we will presume they follow such instructions.”).

[16] Finally, even if Investigator Young's testimony ran afoul of Rule 404(b) and the trial court's limiting instruction was deficient, Investigator Young's testimony did not place Reine in grave peril nor did the trial court's decision not to order a mistrial constitute fundamental error. The evidence against Reine was overwhelming, which “minimiz[es] the danger that the jury found him guilty based on” Investigator Young's vague reference to placing Reine on a trespass list “[d]ue to other opportunities ․ at Walmart.” Taylor v. State, 86 N.E.3d 157, 162 (Ind. 2017), reh'g denied, cert. denied, 586 U.S. 1034 (2018); Tr. at 63. There was eyewitness testimony and footage from multiple surveillance cameras that clearly depicted Reine and Turner's theft scheme. Their receipt also confirmed that they were leaving the store with items they had not paid for. This overwhelming evidence “militates against fundamental error” and shows that Reine was not “so prejudiced that he was placed in a position of grave peril” by Investigator Young's vague testimony. Taylor, 86 N.E.3d at 162; Lucio, 907 N.E.2d at 1010.

Conclusion

[17] The trial court did not err by declining to sua sponte order a mistrial in this case.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a)(1)(C) (enhancing Class A misdemeanor theft to a Level 6 felony if the person has a prior unrelated conviction for theft, conversion, robbery, or burglary).

2.   Later, outside the presence of the jury, the State confirmed that Reine and Turner were in fact suspected of stealing from this Walmart on two recent occasions and sought to admit this evidence. After hearing argument on the issue, the trial court ultimately concluded that the prior instances were not admissible.The State argues that Reine cannot claim that fundamental error occurred here because his specific objection “was synonymous with a claim of no objection to the testimony so far” and was merely “an objection to where the conversation was going.” Appellee's Br. at 10; see also Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 679 (Ind. 2013) (finding the fundamental error doctrine inapplicable “upon an express declaration of ‘no objection’ ” because the doctrine “presupposes the trial judge erred in performing some duty that the law had charged the judge with performing sua sponte”). However, we are not persuaded that fundamental error is unavailable for Reine to argue because he did make an objection, which prompted the State to withdraw its question, and the defense was later successful in keeping out Reine's previous suspicious activities at Walmart.

3.   While the State argues that Investigator Young's testimony was not subject to Rule 404(b), the State does not argue that the testimony served a non-propensity purpose if it did implicate Rule 404(b).

DeBoer, Judge.

Judges May and Tavitas concur. May, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.