CASTILLO v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Andrew Castillo was charged with Level 3 felony aggravated battery for stabbing a man during a fight. At trial, Castillo sought to admit a statement he made shortly after the stabbing that he acted in self-defense as an excited utterance. The trial court excluded the statement, and the jury found him guilty.

[2] Castillo now appeals, arguing his statement qualifies as an excited utterance and the exclusion violated his constitutional right to present a defense. But even if the trial court erred in excluding Castillo's statement, and even if the error infringed on his constitutional right to present a defense, we find the error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because other evidence was admitted that Castillo claimed shortly after the stabbing he acted in self-defense. We therefore affirm the trial court.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In October 2021, Maranda Klecz lived with her children in Frankfort. Her boyfriend, Castillo, had moved in about a month earlier. On October 4, Maranda and Castillo invited Jordon Ross, Charissa Catt, and Camela Robey to come over. The night before, Castillo had accused Jordon of “sleeping with” Maranda, and Jordon planned to “hash through” things with Castillo that night so they could maintain their friendship. Tr. Vol. II pp. 143, 146.

[4] Camela picked up Jordon around 6 p.m., and they stopped at a liquor store, where Jordon bought alcohol for the group. On the way to Maranda's house, Jordon made “smart comments” about Castillo, and Camela suspected that “there was going to be problems” that night. Id. at 243.

[5] Over the course of the night, the group drank alcohol and played cards in the garage. Around 1 a.m., Maranda, Charissa, and Camela went to the kitchen to get something to eat, leaving Jordon and Castillo alone in the garage. Jordon asked Castillo why he had made the accusations against him, but Castillo “brushed [him] off.” Id. at 145. When Jordon asked again, Castillo told him to leave. Jordon said it was Maranda's house and she could tell him to leave if she wanted. Castillo responded, “I'm going to stab this motherfu**er,” and “stormed off” into the house. Id. at 146-47. Jordon followed him.

[6] Maranda was cooking at the stove when she saw Castillo enter the kitchen followed by Jordon. They were both “upset” and “arguing.” Id. at 208. Maranda heard Castillo tell Jordon, “Get out of my house or I'm going to stab you.” Id. Castillo then grabbed a steak knife from the knife block and stabbed Jordon in the chest. Castillo tried to stab Jordon again, but Maranda took the knife from him. Jordon then put Castillo in a headlock. After Jordon and Castillo were separated, Castillo started “pacing” in “panic mode” and was “freaking out” and “yelling.” Id. at 216. Maranda observed blood above Castillo's top lip, but she wasn't sure if she saw the blood “during” the stabbing or “prior to” the stabbing. Id. at 217.

[7] During the fight, Charissa had called 911, and the police arrived “[f]airly quickly.” Tr. Vol. III p. 13. When the police arrived, Castillo was “still pacing,” in a “state of panic,” and yelling for them to shoot him. Tr. Vol. II p. 216; Tr. Vol. III p. 19. Frankfort Police Department Officer Dallas Snell spoke to Castillo “moments” after arriving, and Castillo stated, “[Jordon] came at me.” Tr. Vol. III pp. 23, 25. Castillo was arrested, and Jordon was transported to the hospital, where he underwent surgery.

[8] The State charged Castillo with Level 3 felony aggravated battery.¹ At the jury trial, the defense theory was that Castillo acted in self-defense, which he had claimed “from the start.” Tr. Vol. II p. 140. During Officer Snell's cross-examination, defense counsel asked him if Castillo told him whether he “had been struck by anyone,” and Officer Snell answered that Castillo said, “[Jordon] came at me.” Tr. Vol. III p. 25. During Maranda's cross-examination, the following exchange occurred between her and defense counsel:

Q Okay. When the police arrived, did [Castillo] resist the police?

A I would say he was very passionate about not -- about it not being his fault basically.

Q He was saying it was self-defense?

A He was pacing -- he was pacing back and forth. He didn't run from the police or try to fight them or anything. He was just very upset, pacing back and forth.

Q Okay. Was he -- was he saying self-defense or he --

A He was, yes. He was yelling that --

[THE STATE]: Judge, I object. This is statements for the defense's best -- the defense interest and not something that was brought in during direct.

THE COURT: Okay. Response.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I'll withdraw the question and ask it a different way, please.

Tr. Vol. II p. 224. When defense counsel tried to ask the question a different way, the State objected on the same ground, and the trial court sustained the objection. Defense counsel then pivoted to a different question.

[9] Shortly thereafter, defense counsel asked Maranda if Castillo said anything when the police arrived, and the State again objected on the same ground. Defense counsel responded that Castillo's statement that he acted in self-defense was an excited utterance. See id. at 228; Tr. Vol. III p. 3. The trial court, however, brought up Indiana Evidence Rule 801(d)(2), which provides that a statement is not hearsay if it is offered against an opposing party. The court explained that while the State could introduce Castillo's statement under Rule 801(d)(2), Castillo couldn't introduce his own statement. Finding this rule “control[led],” the court found that Castillo's statement was inadmissible and didn't address excited utterances under Indiana Evidence Rule 803(2). Tr. Vol. III p. 5.

[10] Castillo did not testify. The jury was instructed on self-defense, and defense counsel argued during closing arguments that Castillo acted in self-defense, specifically pointing to Officer Snell's testimony that Castillo told him on the scene that Jordon “came at [him].” The jury found Castillo guilty of Level 3 felony aggravated battery, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years, with two years suspended to probation.

[11] Castillo now appeals his conviction.

Discussion and Decision

[12] Castillo contends the trial court erred “by prohibiting [him] from introducing statements made by [him] that he acted in self-defense.” Appellant's Br. p. 9. Castillo argues his statement was admissible as an excited utterance under Indiana Evidence Rule 803(2) and the trial court's exclusion of his statement violated his constitutional right to present a defense. The trial court, however, didn't address Rule 803(2). Instead, it found that Castillo's statement was inadmissible under Rule 801(d)(2), which provides that a statement is not hearsay if it “is offered against an opposing party and ․ was made by the party in an individual or representative capacity.” See also Taylor v. State, 710 N.E.2d 921, 923 n.2 (Ind. 1999) (explaining that Rule 801(d)(2) doesn't allow a party to offer their own statements). Castillo acknowledges that Rule 801(d)(2) doesn't apply and only argues excited utterance.

[13] Hearsay is a statement, not made by the declarant while testifying at trial, “offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c). Hearsay is inadmissible unless it falls under an exception. Evid. R. 802. One such exception is an excited utterance, which is “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.” Evid. R. 803(2). The party seeking admission of hearsay under this exception must show: (1) a startling event; (2) a statement made by the declarant while under the stress of excitement caused by the event; and (3) a relationship between the statement and the event. Jenkins v. State, 725 N.E.2d 66, 68 (Ind. 2000). This “is not a mechanical test” and “turns on whether the statement was inherently reliable because the witness was under the stress of an event and unlikely to make deliberate falsifications.” Id.

[14] Here, Castillo has a fair argument that his statement qualifies as an excited utterance. But whether the exception applies is a fact-sensitive issue that should be determined by the trial court. The problem here is that the trial court never reached the issue because it apparently—and mistakenly—believed that its 801(d)(2) ruling disposed of defense counsel's argument that his statement qualified as an excited utterance under Rule 803(2). But even if the trial court erred in excluding Castillo's statement that he acted in self-defense, and even if the error infringed on his constitutional right to present a defense, we find the error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (finding constitutional errors must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt to be harmless). A constitutional error does not require reversal where “the State can show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” Hall v. State, 36 N.E.3d 459, 468 (Ind. 2015) (quotation omitted), reh'g denied.

[15] Castillo's statement that he acted in self-defense was cumulative of other evidence presented to the jury. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986) (observing that evidentiary errors are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when the evidence is cumulative). That is, Officer Snell testified that when he arrived on the scene, he spoke to Castillo, who said, “[Jordon] came at me.” Maranda also testified that Castillo was “very passionate ․ about it not being his fault.” Because these statements show that Castillo claimed shortly after the stabbing that he acted in self-defense, any other testimony concerning that claim was cumulative and would not have impacted the verdict. We therefore affirm the trial court.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The State also charged Castillo with Level 5 felony battery with a deadly weapon, but the jury hung on this count, and it was dismissed.

Vaidik, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Scheele, J., concur.