Terence J. Richey, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Following a jury trial, Terence Richey was convicted of domestic battery resulting in serious bodily injury, a Level 5 felony. Richey appeals and claims that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction. We disagree and affirm.

Issue

[2] Richey presents one issue: whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction.

Facts

[3] In May 2023, M.M. met Richey online, and the two began a romantic and sexual relationship. On May 27, 2023, M.M. invited Richey to a cookout at her house. Richey agreed to attend and to cook. M.M. picked Richey up from the inpatient treatment center for veterans where he lived. Back at M.M.’s house, the two drank beer and tequila. Later in the afternoon, Richey was on the phone when M.M. asked him about the food. Richey took offense to this and told M.M. that she was being rude.

[4] Several minutes later, M.M. came back into the house and said that she would put the food on the grill. This infuriated Richey, who called M.M. a “bitch” and stated that she did not know how to cook. Tr. Vol. II p. 119. The two began to argue, and Richey, who was taller than M.M., “hover[ed]” over M.M. Id. M.M., who suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder, felt threatened and told Richey several times to “get out of my bubble,” apparently referring to her personal space. Id. Feeling cornered, M.M. pushed Richey so she could leave. Richey then pushed her to the floor. M.M. momentarily blacked out but realized that she was lying on the floor as Richey punched her in the face. After Richey stopped hitting her, M.M. asked Richey to leave, and he did. M.M. then went outside and told her father what had happened; she also called 911. M.M. suffered from a broken nose and had a gash on her head resulting from hitting her head on the door as she fell.

[5] Officer Brandon Bryant of the Fort Wayne Police Department arrived on the scene and observed M.M. “clearly with a deformed nose” and holding the back of her head. Id. at 134. M.M. told Officer Bryant what had happened. Officer Bryant took photos of M.M.’s injuries, which were later admitted at trial. M.M. described her pain as being a “15” on a scale of one to ten. Id. at 166. Eight staples were required to close the gash on M.M.’s head, and her nose had to be rebroken to be set. She ultimately missed two months of work due to her injuries.

[6] On June 2, 2023, the State charged Richey with domestic battery resulting in moderate bodily injury, a Level 6 felony. The State amended the charge on October 26, 2023, to add a count of domestic battery resulting in serious bodily injury, a Level 5 felony. A jury trial was held in June 2024. The jury found Richey guilty of the Level 5 felony but not guilty of the Level 6 felony. On July 15, 2024, the trial court sentenced Richey to three years of incarceration. Richey now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Richey claims that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims warrant a deferential standard of review in which we “neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the jury.” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018)). “A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Id. (quoting Brantley, 91 N.E.3d at 570). “In conducting this review, we consider only the evidence that supports the jury's determination, not evidence that might undermine it.” Id. (citing Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024)). We affirm the conviction “ ‘unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. “It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.’ ” Sutton v. State, 167 N.E.3d 800, 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007)).

[8] To convict Richey of domestic battery resulting in serious bodily injury, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Richey knowingly or intentionally touched M.M., who was a family or household member, in a rude insolent or angry manner which resulted in serious bodily injury. Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1), (c)(1). “An individual is a ‘family or household member’ of another person if the individual: ․ (2) is dating or has dated the other person; or (3) is or was engaged in a sexual relationship with the other person.” Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-128(a). And “serious bodily injury” means “bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes: (1) serious permanent disfigurement; (2) unconsciousness; (3) extreme pain; (4) permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ; or (5) loss of a fetus.” Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-292.

[9] On appeal, Richey does not dispute that M.M. was injured, nor does he dispute the severity of her injuries. Instead, he argues that there was insufficient proof that he caused M.M.’s injuries. In so doing, he claims that there was no other witness to corroborate M.M.’s version of the events; he also notes that M.M. was admittedly drinking on the day at issue and speculates that she could have fallen and caused her own injuries. He also refers to his version of events. These arguments, however, are merely a request that we consider evidence that is not favorable to the jury's verdict, reweigh the evidence, and judge M.M.’s credibility as a witness, none of which we may do on appeal. See Stubbers, 190 N.E.3d at 429.

[10] The evidence favorable to the jury's verdict shows that M.M. and Richey were in a sexual relationship, and, during an argument, Richey pushed M.M. down and repeatedly punched her in the face. This resulted in M.M. hitting her head on the door, causing a large gash that required eight staples to close. Richey's punches also broke M.M.’s nose, and M.M. was in severe pain. This evidence is sufficient to support Richey's conviction for domestic battery resulting in serious bodily injury. See Dausch v. State, 616 N.E.2d 13, 16 (Ind. 1993) (finding sufficient evidence of serious bodily injury where victim suffered from a broken nose and bruising and required stitches to close her wounds); McFadden v. State, 25 N.E.3d 1271, 1275 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (finding sufficient evidence of serious bodily injury where defendant had several injuries, including a broken nose, which caused extreme pain).

[11] Richey also argues that M.M.’s testimony was incredibly dubious and, therefore, not worthy of credit. We have explained that:

[a]pplication of the incredibly dubiosity doctrine requires that there be: “1) a sole testifying witness; 2) testimony that is inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion; and 3) a complete absence of circumstantial evidence.” Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 756 (Ind. 2015). “[W]hile incredible dubiosity provides a standard that is ‘not impossible’ to meet, it is a ‘difficult standard to meet, [and] one that requires great ambiguity and inconsistency in the evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting Edwards v. State, 753 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. 2001)). “ ‘The testimony must be so convoluted and/or contrary to human experience that no reasonable person could believe it.’ ” Id. (quoting Edwards, 753 N.E.2d at 622).

Wilburn v. State, 177 N.E.3d 805, 815-16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021).

[12] The incredible dubiosity rule is inapplicable here for several reasons. First, there was not a sole testifying witness. In addition to the testimony of M.M., the State presented testimony from the responding police officer and emergency medical technician, the physician's assistant who treated M.M., and the detective who investigated the crime. Still, Richey argues that the State presented only one witness who testified regarding the battery—M.M. herself. We note, however, that Officer Bryant testified that, only minutes after the attack, M.M. told him that Richey “pushed her two times in the face before pushing her to the ground causing her to hit her hand [sic] and then after that he stood over her punching her more times in the face and nose area, breaking her nose at that time[.]” Tr. Vol. II p 135. M.M.’s out-of-court statement to Officer Bryant was admitted without objection,¹ and could be considered as substantive evidence. See Humphrey v. State, 73 N.E.3d 677, 684 (Ind. 2017) (noting that “ ‘[o]therwise inadmissible hearsay evidence may be considered for substantive purposes and is sufficient to establish a material fact at issue when the hearsay evidence is admitted without a timely objection at trial’ ”) (quoting Banks v. State, 567 N.E.2d 1126, 1129 (Ind. 1991)).

[13] Nor was there any complete lack of circumstantial evidence here. M.M. suffered from serious injuries, and Richey was seen a short time after the event with stains on his t-shirt that appeared to be blood. Ex. Vol., State's Ex. 10. Lastly, M.M.’s testimony was not convoluted or contradictory, nor did it run counter to human experience. To the contrary, M.M.’s testimony described a sadly familiar incidence of domestic violence. In short, there is nothing incredibly dubious about M.M.’s testimony.

Conclusion

[14] Richey's claim that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction is merely a request that we reweigh the evidence. Moreover, the incredible dubiosity rule does not apply here. We, therefore, conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to support Richey's conviction for domestic battery resulting in serious bodily injury, a Level 5 felony, and we affirm Richey's conviction.

[15] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Even if Richey had objected, M.M.’s statements to Officer Bryant were made while she was still under the distress caused by Richey's attack and would, therefore, have likely been admissible under the “excited utterance” exception to the hearsay rule. See Boatner v. State, 934 N.E.2d 184, 187 (2010) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting into evidence victim's out-of-court statement to police officer that defendant pushed her down and hit her because victim approached the officer “disoriented, crying, without shoes, and almost ran to [the officer] in her attempt to find help”).

Tavitas, Judge.

Chief Judge Altice and Judge Brown concur. Altice, C.J., and Brown, J., concur.