SARFATY v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Gabriel T. Sarfaty appeals his conviction for domestic battery as a level 5 felony. He contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for mistrial. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Sarfaty and S.H. began a romantic relationship in November 2022. S.H. owned a small cleaning company and, on September 14, 2023, Sarfaty was helping her conduct a “moveout clean” for one of her clients. Transcript Volume II at 196. During the cleaning job, S.H. discovered Sarfaty in the bathroom using heroin. After completing the job, S.H. and Sarfaty left in her minivan. As they drove, the couple began arguing when S.H. confronted Sarfaty about his drug use.

[3] S.H. stopped at her mother's house to pick up her four-year-old daughter, M.H. S.H. placed M.H. in her car seat in the third row seat on the passenger side of the van. Sarfaty sat in the passenger seat as S.H. drove onto I-74 near Post Road. The couple continued to argue about Sarfaty's drug use, with Sarfaty becoming angry, yelling at S.H., and calling her “a bitch” and “a liar.” Id. at 204. Sarfaty then hit S.H. in the face. M.H. watched this happening to her mother, “just sitting there quietly just staring.” Id. at 205. Sarfaty twice yanked the steering wheel which caused S.H. to swerve “into the other lane” as they were traveling “around 70 miles an hour.” Id. M.H. “was crying at that point,” and S.H. tried to “kind of defuse the situation” by ceasing to confront Sarfaty about his drug use. Id. at 205-206. S.H. eventually exited the interstate, stopped at a gas station, and asked Sarfaty to “leave.” Id. at 206. Sarfaty ignored S.H.’s pleas.

[4] S.H. subsequently went to the police station to report the incident. She spoke with Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Patrol Officer Katrina Hochstetler, and the case was referred to Detective Joshua Kemmerling. Detective Kemmerling interviewed S.H. by phone. S.H. provided Detective Kemmerling with a photograph via email of the injury she sustained as a result of Sarfaty striking her in the face. The photograph depicted slight bruising on the cheekbone and swelling around S.H.’s eye.

[5] On October 11, 2023, the State charged Sarfaty with domestic battery as a level 5 felony and criminal recklessness as a level 6 felony. The State subsequently alleged that Sarfaty was an habitual offender. Prior to trial, Sarfaty filed a motion in limine, which was granted by the trial court, to prohibit evidence of any “uncharged misconduct or allegations of criminal or other ‘bad’ behavior or evidence prohibited by Rule 404(b) of the Indiana Rules of Evidence.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 116.¹ Defense counsel indicated that, “we want to make sure that we st[eer] clear on the significant criminal history and/or there's other allegations that were made ․ the same week ․ It was a separate report that [S.H.] made.” Id. at 52. The court responded, “Okay, that's fine,” and confirmed with the prosecutor that S.H. had “been prepared” to limit her testimony “to what happened on” September 14, 2023. Id. at 53-55.

[6] A jury trial began on May 1, 2024. The State presented the testimony of Patrol Officer Hochstetler, Detective Kemmerling, M.H., and S.H. During recross-examination of S.H., defense counsel asked, “At some point, did you make a statement to law enforcement that was – that you saved up two or three thousand dollars and [Sarfaty] had saved up like eight hundred dollars?” Id. at 222. S.H. responded, “Not on this case.” Id. Counsel for both parties approached the bench with defense counsel arguing, “On the record of this, she mentioned other cases. So, I think I have to raise that and object to that testimony. I don't think its proper for us to strike it. I know I'm not going to get a mistrial on it, but I'm moving for a mistrial.” Id. at 223-224. The court noted, “I mean I heard it, but – it didn't even register to me ․ but you certainly asked the question.” Id. at 224. The court stated, “But I can certainly admonish the jury if you wish.” Id. Defense counsel declined to ask for an admonishment so as not to draw more attention to the question or answer. Thereafter, the State rested its case. The defense presented no witnesses.

[7] At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Sarfaty guilty of domestic battery as a class A misdemeanor and not guilty of criminal recklessness. The court found, and the parties agreed, that the not guilty verdict on the criminal recklessness count negated the habitual offender enhancement. During the second phase of trial, the trial court found Sarfaty guilty of the enhancing circumstances for domestic battery as a level 5 felony.² Following a sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Sarfaty to four years in the Department of Correction.

Discussion

[8] Sarfaty argues that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion for mistrial after a State's witness, the victim S.H., “volunteered that she had made a statement to law enforcement regarding his involvement in another case.” Appellant's Brief at 7. The State responds that “Sarfaty was not placed in grave peril because S.H.’s vague and isolated statement had no probable persuasive effect on the jury.” Appellee's Brief at 6.

[9] “The granting of a mistrial lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we reverse only when an abuse of discretion is clearly shown.” Davis v. State, 770 N.E.2d 319, 325 (Ind. 2002), reh'g denied. We afford such deference because the trial court evaluates first-hand the relevant facts and circumstances at issue and their impact on the jury and is in the best position to evaluate whether a mistrial is warranted. Weisheit v. State, 26 N.E.3d 3, 15 (Ind. 2015). “The remedy of mistrial is ‘extreme,’ Warren v. State, 757 N.E.2d 995, 998-999 (Ind. 2001), strong medicine that should be prescribed only when ‘no other action can be expected to remedy the situation’ at the trial level, Gambill v. State, 436 N.E.2d 301, 304 (Ind. 1982).” Lucio v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1008, 1010-1011 (Ind. 2009). To prevail on appeal from the denial of a motion for a mistrial, the appellant must demonstrate that he was so prejudiced that he was placed in a position of grave peril. Gill v. State, 730 N.E.2d 709, 712 (Ind. 2000). We determine the gravity of the peril based upon the probable persuasive effect of the jury's decision. Id.

[10] We agree with the State that S.H.’s vague and isolated statement generally referring to the existence of another “case” did not place Sarfaty in a position of grave peril warranting a mistrial. The Indiana Supreme Court has held that “innocent violation of a motion in limine does not automatically warrant a mistrial.” Pittman v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1246, 1255 (Ind. 2008). The court here noted that S.H.’s vague reference was so inconsequential that it “didn't even register” with the court. Transcript Volume II at 224. The court noted that it was defense counsel who asked the question eliciting S.H.’s inadvertent and inapparent reference to a separate criminal matter, and the record reflects that an admonishment was offered, but declined.

[11] Moreover, given the evidence presented against Sarfaty, we think it highly unlikely that S.H.’s response had any significant effect on the jury. S.H. testified that Sarfaty struck her in the face, and M.H. stated that she saw “Daddy punch[ ] mommy in the eye.” Id. at 186. The State further presented photographic evidence of S.H.’s injuries, as well as the testimony of the law enforcement officers who took statements from S.H. identifying Sarfaty as her attacker. Under the circumstances, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. See Pittman, 885 N.E.2d at 1255 (concluding that, given the substantial evidence presented against the defendant, it was highly unlikely that witness's implicit reference to defendant's prior incarceration had any significant effect on the jury).

[12] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Sarfaty's conviction.

[13] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The court granted the motion in limine with the caveat that testimony regarding Sarfaty's alleged drug use on the day of the alleged domestic violence incident in this case would be permitted because such evidence was “intrinsic” to the circumstances surrounding the offense charged. Transcript Volume II at 40.

2.   Sarfaty stipulated to having a prior battery conviction against the same victim, S.H.

Brown, Judge.

May, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.