Caleb L. Brown, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Caleb L. Brown claims the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction for Level 5 felony intimidation.¹ We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In late October 2022, Officer James Sosinski ² traveled to 410 Lincolnway, Apartment 1 in LaPorte County to deliver an Order of Possession to Brown. Officer Sosinski arrived and knocked on a door to the apartment building's common area. Because the door was locked and he could not gain access, Officer Sosinski placed the order in Apartment 1's mailbox and returned to his vehicle. As Officer Sosinski started to fill out the return slip, a man—later identified as Brown—started “pounding on the driver's side window.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 121. Officer Sosinski rolled down his window and identified himself. Brown would not tell Officer Sosinski his name and became “very agitated” and “very uncooperative.” Id. at 122. Officer Sosinski told Brown, “I'm not going to play this game with you․ If you are Caleb Brown, you've been served.” Id. at 123. Brown began to yell and scream and “took off running” into traffic, nearly being struck by multiple vehicles. Id. Officer Sosinski then left the area to “de-escalate the situation.” Id.

[3] A few weeks later, Major Patrick Cicero went to Brown's apartment to gauge what personal property Brown had in the apartment and to negotiate more time for Brown to vacate. After knocking on a locked, common-area door for over a minute, Major Cicero noticed a response from a window to his left. Major Cicero announced he was with the sheriff's office, said he was there to speak with Brown, and displayed his badge. Unable to garner any further response, Major Cicero returned to his vehicle and called the property owner to unlock the door to the common area.

[4] As Major Cicero sat in his vehicle, he noticed a white male—later identified as Brown—emerge from the common-area door. Major Cicero exited his vehicle and approached Brown. As the pair stood on a porch outside the door, Major Cicero saw Apartment 1's door was open. Major Cicero then touched Brown's shoulder, asked if he was Brown, and informed Brown he was there for an eviction.

[5] From this point, everything “unravelled [sic] very quickly.” Id. at 140. Brown started yelling he was not being evicted, pushed Major Cicero away from the apartment door, and retreated into his apartment. Before Brown could completely shut the door, however, Major Cicero kept the door ajar by using his body and foot. Major Cicero then announced Brown was under arrest, to which Brown repeatedly responded he was not. At one point, the two men reached a “stalemate” with neither able to open or close the door any further. Id. at 144.

[6] Around this time, Brown grabbed a tire iron from just outside his apartment door. Brown then raised the tire iron “as if he was going to strike [Major Cicero].” Id. at 145. Major Cicero was “very much” in fear and “very much concerned” Brown would hit him with the tire iron. Id. Major Cicero then unholstered his firearm and told Brown to drop the tire iron. After several requests, Brown complied. But the men continued pushing back and forth on the door. At some point, Major Cicero called for backup and sustained an injury to his forehead. Over five minutes into the standoff, Brown managed to completely shut the apartment door. Soon after, additional law enforcement officers arrived and used a metal ram to force open Brown's door. Police took Brown into custody and removed him from the apartment.

[7] The State charged Brown with two Level 5 felonies: intimidation and battery resulting in injury to a public safety official. A jury found Brown guilty of Level 5 felony intimidation but could not reach a verdict on the battery charge. The trial court sentenced Brown to five years with one year suspended.

The State presented sufficient evidence to support Brown's conviction.

[8] Brown raises a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, which warrants a “deferential standard of review in which we ‘neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility[.]’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied). Instead, we respect the fact-finder's exclusive province to weigh conflicting evidence, Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1195 (Ind. 2018), and consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of the trier of fact, Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024). It is “not necessary that the evidence ‘overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’ ” Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 133 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Moore v. State, 652 N.E.2d 53, 55 (Ind. 1995)).

[9] To secure a conviction under Indiana Code Section 35-45-2-1(a)(2), the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a person communicated a threat with the intent that another person be placed in fear of retaliation for a prior lawful act. If a person draws or uses a deadly weapon while communicating the threat, the offense is a Level 5 felony. See I.C. § 35-45-2-1(b)(2)(A). In this context, a “threat” is an “expression, by words or action, of an intention to ․ unlawfully injure the person threatened[.]” I.C. § 35-45-2-1(c)(1). We take an objective view of whether a communication is a threat. See Owens v. State, 659 N.E.2d 466, 474 (Ind. 1995). And a threat is punishable if the speaker intends his communication to put his target in fear for their safety and the communication is likely to actually cause such fear in a reasonable person similarly situated to the target. Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d 946, 964 (Ind. 2014), cert. denied.

[10] Brown contends the evidence was insufficient to show he communicated a threat to Major Cicero, emphasizing he said nothing when he picked up and held the tire iron.³ But a threat can be made by “words or action,” meaning Brown need not have verbalized his threat for it to satisfy the statutory definition. I.C. § 35-45-2-1(c). Whether Brown communicated a threat and intended to place Major Cicero in fear of retaliation for a prior lawful act were questions for the fact-finder to decide. Major Cicero testified he feared Brown would strike him with the tire iron. See Hancz-Barron, 235 N.E.3d at 1244 (noting we do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility when reviewing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim). Such fear was likely to be instilled in a reasonable person in that situation. The State therefore presented sufficient evidence to support the jury's determination that Brown was guilty of Level 5 intimidation.

Conclusion

[11] The State presented sufficient evidence to support Brown's conviction.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(a)(2), (b)(2)(A) (2022).

2.   Officer Sosinski is a former Chief Deputy of the LaPorte County Sheriff's Department. During the events relevant to this case, he was working as a civil process server for the sheriff's department.

3.   In support of his argument, Brown cites Gaddis v. State, a case in which a panel of this Court held “the mere display of a weapon” which the person charged has a constitutional right to carry is insufficient to constitute a threat under the intimidation statute. 680 N.E.2d 860, 862 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). Gaddis involved a traffic dispute during which two drivers in adjoining lanes exchanged indecipherable hand gestures and words, although the windows of both cars were raised, and neither could hear the other. Id. at 860–61. The defendant then took his handgun from his glove box, displayed it at the window without pointing it at the other driver or his car, and placed it on the console. Id. at 861. The other driver then slowed down and the interaction ceased. Id. A panel of this Court determined the defendant's actions were likely foolish but not sufficient to express an intention to unlawfully injure a person or his property. Id. at 862. Our Supreme Court, however, has questioned the result in Gaddis. See Johnson v. State, 743 N.E.2d 755, 756–57 (Ind. 2001) (holding that when “the record shows the existence of words or conduct that are reasonably likely to incite confrontation, coupled with the display of a firearm, we are hard pressed to say that such facts are insufficient to prove that a threat has been communicated within the meaning of the intimidation statute”). In Johnson, the Court affirmed the defendant's intimidation conviction because the defendant introduced a gun into an emotionally charged environment and suggested a willingness to use it. Id. at 757. Even putting the criticism of Gaddis's result aside, we think this case is distinguishable. Most notably, Brown did not “merely display” a weapon. Instead, Brown picked up a tire iron during an emotionally charged back-and-forth. And by the time Brown obtained the tire iron, he and Major Cicero had spent minutes yelling and pushing on the apartment's door. In other words, this record shows an ongoing confrontation paired with the display of a weapon.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Judges Mathias and Brown concur. Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.