Carl J. Griffith, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Carl Griffith appeals the trial court's revocation of 540 days of his previously suspended 1,093-day sentence after finding Griffith violated probation. Griffith argues the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed that sanction. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On March 4, 2022, police stopped the vehicle Griffith was driving for a traffic infraction. During that stop, a K9 alerted to Griffith's vehicle and a police search uncovered a corner-cut bag containing methamphetamine in his vehicle. On March 7, 2022, in case number 16D01-2203-F5-000249 (hereinafter “F5-249”), the State charged Griffith with Level 5 felony possession of methamphetamine.¹ On December 29, 2022, Griffith entered a consolidated plea agreement wherein he agreed to plead guilty to possession of methamphetamine under F5-249 and to a charge of Class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana ² under case number 16D01-2212-CM 1126. On April 17, 2023, the trial court entered convictions of both charges, sentenced Griffith to 1,095 days, applied two days of time-served credit, suspended the remaining 1,093 days to probation, and imposed a fine of $1.00 for the possession of marijuana conviction. The order of probation, as relevant here, required Griffith to refrain from committing “any criminal act or violating any traffic law” and required Griffith to not “possess or consume any illegal controlled substances, alcohol, ․ or any substance containing THC[.]” (Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 81.) The order further required Griffith to obtain written permission from his probation officer or the sentencing court in order to leave the state supervising his probation. (Id. at 82).

[3] Griffith's probation was transferred to the State of Michigan where he lived with his mother. He would regularly travel to Indiana to visit his two daughters. At the start of his probation, Griffith's probation officer gave him verbal permission to leave Michigan to visit with his daughters without requesting permission each time. In early 2024, a new probation officer was assigned to supervise Griffith. On February 28, 2024, before Griffith met his new probation officer, he drove to Indiana to visit his daughters. During the trip, police in Decatur County, Indiana, stopped Griffith for a traffic infraction. The officers searched his vehicle and found an edible marijuana gummy. The State then charged Griffith with possession of marijuana in case number 16D01-2402-CM-191 (hereinafter CM-191).

[4] On March 22, 2024, in F5-249, the State filed a petition to revoke Griffith's probation. The State alleged that Griffith had left the state without written permission from his probation officer and that Griffith had been charged with a new crime. On July 11, 2024, the trial court held a fact-finding hearing on the petition for revocation of probation, during which Griffith admitted that he violated probation and that he had been charged with possession of marijuana.

[5] In CM-191, on August 8, 2024, Griffith plead guilty to the new charge of possession of marijuana. The trial court ordered Griffith to pay several fees as his sentence.

[6] On August 29, 2024, in F5-249, the trial court held a probation-violation dispositional hearing, in which the court addressed both alleged violations of probation. The trial court noted that Griffith's original probation officer in Michigan gave Griffith verbal permission to travel to Indiana for visitation with his children but that Griffith recently was assigned to a new probation officer. The trial court found “there's good explanation for [the violation,]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 23), and primarily focused on Griffith's new criminal drug conviction as the reason for revocation.

[7] In imposing a sanction, the court considered Griffith's substance abuse history and attempted rehabilitation, the testimony of Griffith's mother, Griffith's criminal history and prior probation revocations, as well as the impact that incarceration would have on Griffith's mother and young children. The trial court revoked 540 days of Griffith's original sentence, ordered Griffith to serve that time in the Department of Correction (“IDOC”), and vacated the remaining 553 days of Griffith's suspended sentence.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Griffith argues the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to serve 540 days of his previously suspended 1,093-day sentence. “Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). We afford trial judges great discretion in their dealings with probationers so that judges feel more inclined to offer probation to future defendants. Id. Thus, we will not overturn a sanction unless there has been an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Id. “An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Id.

[9] “Probation revocation is a two-step process, wherein the trial court first makes a factual determination as to whether the probationer violated the terms of his probation.” Killebrew v. State, 165 N.E.3d 578, 582 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. If the trial court finds a violation, it may impose any of the following sanctions:

(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions.

(2) Extend the person's probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original probationary period.

(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h).

[10] Griffith argues the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve 540 days of his previously suspended 1,093-day sentence “in light of Griffith's ready admission [to the violation] and substantial efforts to lead a law abiding and drug free life.” (Appellant's Br. at 11.) “ ‘[A] probationer who admits the allegations against him must still be given an opportunity to offer mitigating evidence suggesting that the violation does not warrant revocation.’ ” Ripps v. State, 968 N.E.2d 323, 326 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 634, 640 (Ind. 2008)). While two violations are at issue herein, the finding of a single violation is sufficient for probation revocation. Killebrew, 165 N.E.3d at 582.

[11] We acknowledge Griffith's failure to obtain written permission from his probation officer to travel to Indiana does not represent a serious violation of his terms of probation. As the trial court pointed out: “The one violation of leaving without permission, there's good explanation for that. Although typically a violation of the rules, [it is] understandable how that happened.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 23.) However, Griffith's conditions of probation specifically stated that he was not permitted to possess or consume any illegal controlled substance or any “substance containing THC.” (Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 81-2.) Further, possession of marijuana is a crime in the State of Indiana,³ and Griffith's terms of probation dictated that he may not commit a new criminal offense. At the time of the dispositional hearing, Griffth had already accepted a plea agreement and had been convicted of the new marijuana charge, which proves the violation.⁴

[12] Moreover, Griffith was aware that he was on probation while living with his mother in Michigan. Griffith's mother testified at the dispositional hearing that the gummy found by police “might have been [hers].” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 21.) She further testified that she and Griffith share a vehicle, and that “he might have even known [the gummy] was in there.” (Id.) However, whether or not the gummy belonged to Griffith's mother is irrelevant because Griffith knew he was not to possess or consume marijuana on probation, but he traveled to Indiana with marijuana in his car. Despite marijuana's legality in Michigan, his probation condition prohibited his possession of marijuana in all states. Griffith knew if he was found with marijuana in any state it could affect his probation status, but he did not take adequate steps to ensure his compliance. Instead, he lived with his mother while knowing about her marijuana usage.

[13] In addition to the convictions for which he was serving probation, Griffith has prior misdemeanor and felony convictions for various drug related crimes, including marijuana, methamphetamine, and cocaine. Griffith's criminal history demonstrates that he has a long history of substance abuse, which he has failed to adequately address. Moreover, Griffith was granted probation at least twice in the past and his probation was revoked at least once due to violation of the terms. Despite these circumstances, the trial court only ordered Griffith to serve half of his remaining sentence. Griffith's history of unsuccessful completion of probation coupled together with his history of ongoing substance abuse supports the trial court's sanction and demonstrates that the court's decision was not against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. See, e.g., Overstreet v. State, 136 N.E.3d 260, 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking probation when defendant admitted drug use, had an extensive criminal history involving substance abuse, and had been given opportunities to address his substance issues in the past, but failed to cease drug use).

Conclusion

[14] The trial court's revocation of Griffith's probation and imposition of a 540-day sanction in IDOC was reasonable in light of Griffith's prior criminal history, his knowledge of the conditions of his probation, his decision to live with an active marijuana user despite those conditions, and his commission of a new drug-related crime. The trial court did not abuse its discretion, and we accordingly affirm.

[15] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(b)(2).

2.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11.

3.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11.

4.   Griffith argues that he presented clean drug screens after the State's filing for revocation of probation and that he passed a drug screen the day of his dispositional hearing. (Appellant's Br. at 12.) However, the record is devoid of evidence demonstrating the results of any drug screens by Griffith.

May, Judge.

Judges Weissmann and Scheele concur. Weissmann, J., and Scheele, J., concur.