Christopher Scott, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Christopher Scott appeals his conviction of Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement.¹ Scott argues the State failed to prove that he committed that crime. Scott had been removed from the same location one day earlier, he failed to listen to police instructions, he pulled his arms away to avoid being handcuffed, and he pulled two officers to the ground in the course of their lawful duties. We therefore hold Scott knowingly and forcibly resisted law enforcement, and we affirm his conviction.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Brianna Reuter was the assistant property manager of Axis Apartments (“Axis”) in downtown Indianapolis. On two occasions in 2023, Reuter found Scott in Axis's private conference room and she called the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (“IMPD”) to remove Scott from the premises. On February 1, 2024, Reuter again found Scott trespassing in Axis's conference room, and she called IMPD. Officer Bradley Harris responded to the call, arrested Scott for trespassing, and told him he was not to return to the property.

[3] On February 2, 2024, Reuter again called IMPD because Scott was trespassing at Axis. IMPD Officers Harris and Ressino ² arrived at the property shortly thereafter. Reuters escorted the officers to the second-floor conference room where Scott was trespassing. Officer Harris recognized Scott and said, “Hey Christopher, you know the deal, man,” and asked Scott to set down his phone. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 27.) Scott responded, “Why?” (State's Exhibit 1 at 06:45.) Officer Harris told Scott that he was illegally trespassing on the property. Officer Harris began to reach for Scott's phone, but Scott refused to relinquish it. Officer Harris then asked Scott to “just relax” and “stand up.” (State's Ex. 1 at 06:50.) Scott, still holding onto his phone, stood up.

[4] To handcuff Scott, Officer Harris took ahold of Scott's wrist and began to put Scott's arm behind his back, but Scott tried to pull his arm away from Officer Harris. Officer Harris and Officer Ressino struggled to place handcuffs on Scott because he was pulling his arms away, so the officers bent Scott face-down over the conference room table in an attempt to handcuff him. Officer Harris was able to secure a handcuff around Scott's right wrist, but Scott continued placing his left arm in front of his body, preventing the officers from securing his left wrist. Officer Harris repeatedly asked Scott to “just relax” and to “just stop” throughout this encounter. (Id. at 07:00-:15.) However, Scott did not comply. As Scott's struggle continued, the three men fell to the ground. While on the ground, Officer Harris told Scott to “stop resisting,” but Scott did not stop attempting to pull his arms away from the officers. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 28.) Eventually, the officers were able to secure Scott's left wrist, and they arrested and transported him to the Marion County Jail.

[5] On February 3, 2024, the State charged Scott with Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement and Class A misdemeanor trespass.³ The trial court conducted a bench trial on June 18, 2024, and found Scott guilty of both resisting law enforcement and trespass. The trial court entered convictions for both crimes, imposed concurrent 180-day sentences, applied four days of time-served credit, and suspended the remaining 176 days to probation.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Scott challenges whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he resisted law enforcement.⁴ In determining the sufficiency of evidence, we apply a well-settled standard of review in which we will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. Shepard v. State, 205 N.E.3d 1051, 1053 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). “ ‘We will affirm a conviction if there is substantial evidence of probative value that would lead a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Id. (quoting Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 263 (Ind. 2020)).

[7] The crime of resisting law enforcement occurs when a person: (1) knowingly or intentionally (2) forcibly (3) resists, obstructs, or interferes (4) with a law enforcement officer (5) who is lawfully engaged in the execution of their duties. Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(b). “[T]he word ‘resist’ means to ‘stand against or to withstand,’ the word ‘obstruct’ means to ‘interpose obstacles or impediments or in any manner prevent,’ and the word ‘interference’ “encompasses actions calculated in any appreciable degree to hamper or impede police officers in the performance of their duties.’ ” Stansberry v. State, 954 N.E.2d 507, 510 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting McCaffrey v. State, 605 N.E.2d 241, 243 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)). Here, Scott argues that his resistance was neither “knowing” nor “forcible.” (Appellant's Br. at 7.)

[8] A person engages in conduct “knowingly” if, when he engaged in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so. Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b). “ ‘[K]nowledge and intent are both mental states and, absent an admission by the defendant, the trier of fact must resort to the reasonable inferences from both the direct and circumstantial evidence.’ ” A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1064 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Stokes v. State, 922 N.E.2d 758, 764 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied). A defendant's mental state therefore may be inferred from his or her “conduct and the natural and usual sequence to which such conduct logically and reasonably points.” Id. at 1065.

[9] The State presented evidence that Scott knew that his presence in Axis was unlawful, but he returned to the property and refused to allow officers to handcuff him for trespass. Scott had trespassed at Axis in the past, and Scott had been arrested at this exact apartment building for trespassing the day prior by Officer Harris. It is patently reasonable to infer that Scott knew he was not allowed to be at Axis. Although Officer Harris did not explicitly say he was arresting Scott, when Officer Harris saw Scott, Officer Harris said, “Hey Christopher, you know the deal.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 26.) It is reasonable to infer Scott knew he was being arrested for trespass because the exact same officer removed and arrested Scott from Axis the day prior.

[10] Moreover, a high probability existed that Scott knew he was resisting an arrest by lawful police officers given his conduct. Officer Harris instructed Scott to “relax,” to “stop,” and to “stop resisting” during their encounter. (State's Ex. 1 at 06:50-07:20.) Scott refused to relinquish his phone to the officers, he repeatedly tried to move his arms in front of his body as the officers attempted to handcuff him, and he even dragged the two arresting officers to the ground because he was being uncooperative. Scott undertook this behavior to prevent himself from being handcuffed and arrested.

[11] Further, the two officers were exercising their lawful duties when they arrived at Axis to arrest Scott for trespass. Scott did not have a right to resist the officers under Indiana law even if he was unaware that his presence at Axis was unlawful. See Woodson v. State, 123 N.E.3d 175, 178 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“The general rule in Indiana is that a private citizen may not use force to resist a peaceful arrest by an individual who he knows, or has reason to know, is a police officer performing his duties, regardless of whether the arrest in question is lawful.”). Officer Harris and the Officer Ressino were both fully uniformed and made no false representations about who they were and why they came to Axis. The officers presented Scott with clear instructions, and Scott reasonably should have known that they were there to arrest him for unlawful trespassing. Because Scott knew that he was unlawfully on Axis property and because Scott reasonably knew that his conduct would prevent police making the arrest, a trier of fact could reasonably determine Scott knowingly resisted law enforcement.⁵

[12] Scott's second challenge to his conviction is whether his resistance was “forcible.” In 2013, the Indiana Supreme Court reiterated the principle that “forcibly” is an essential element of resisting law enforcement. Walker v. State, 998 N.E.2d 724, 726 (Ind. 2013). “Forcibly” modifies the subsequent words “resist,” “obstruct,” and “interfere” within the statute to indicate that the State must show “forcible resistance, obstruction, or interference” to prove an individual resisted law enforcement. Id. While not all non-passive conduct constitutes resistance, conduct need not “rise to the level of mayhem” to be considered resistance. Id. (quoting Graham v. State, 903 N.E.2d 963, 965 (Ind. 2009)). One “forcibly” resists law enforcement when “strong, powerful, violent means are used to evade a law enforcement official's rightful exercise of his or her duties.” Id. at 727. The element “may be satisfied with even a modest exertion of strength, power, or violence.”⁶ Id.

[13] Here, Scott failed to present his hands and relinquish his phone to the Officers when instructed, Scott also immediately began to pull his arms away as the officers tried to move Scott's arms behind his back to handcuff him. This behavior alone is enough to constitute forcible resistance. See, e.g., Shepard v. State, 205 N.E.3d 1051, 1055 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (holding pulling one's arms towards front of body as officers tried to handcuff the defendant constituted active resistance of law enforcement). Nonetheless, the officers had to lean Scott over the conference room table to handcuff him, and even then, the officers were unable to place both of Scott's wrists in handcuffs because he continued to move his arms underneath his body. Scott resisted so forcefully, in fact, that he took both officers to the ground.⁷ If two police officers were taken to the ground by one defiant defendant in the course of a lawful arrest, it is clear that the totality of Scott's conduct meets the definition of “forcibly resisting.” See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 833 N.E.2d 516, 518 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding defendant's conduct – ignoring police instruction, turning and pushing officers away, and “stiffening up” – constituted forcible resistance of law enforcement).

Conclusion

[14] Scott refused to listen to police instructions when being removed from the same location on a second consecutive day, incessantly pulled his arms and wrists away from officers attempting to handcuff him, and physically dragged two police officers to the ground by the strength of his resistance. By doing so, he both “knowingly” and “forcibly” resisted law enforcement for purposes of the statute. We accordingly affirm Scott's conviction of Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement.

[15] Affirmed.

, J., and Scheele, J., concur.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1).

2.   The record does not indicate Officer Ressino's first name.

3.   Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(b)(1).

4.   Appellant does not challenge his conviction of trespass.

5.   Scott also argues his conduct was not “knowingly” but rather “consistent with his disability.” (Appellant's Br. at 10.) Nevertheless, Scott admits that he did not raise this defense at trial or present any evidence regarding it. (Id.) We accordingly may not consider it on appeal. See, e.g., Baker v. State, 403 N.E.2d 1069, 1070 n.1 (Ind. 1980) (declining to address State's assertion of the defense of laches when the State had not asserted it before the trial court), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 882 (1980).

6.   Scott urges us to adopt a narrower, more specific definition of the word “force” to apply to the statute. (Appellant's Br. at 10.) We decline Scott's invitation and instead apply the definition provided by our Indiana Supreme Court in Walker.

7.   This fact distinguishes Scott's circumstances from those in Runnells v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1181 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), which Scott cited in support of his argument. There, the officer took Runnells to the ground in a “bear hug” to compel compliance when Runnells would not obey the officer's commands, id. at 1184, while herein Scott's active resistance was the sole reason he and the officers fell to the ground.

May, Judge.

Judges Weissmann and Scheele concur. Weissmann, J., and Scheele, J., concur.