Ja'Ron Hedrick, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Ja'Ron Hedrick appeals his convictions for two counts of rape, as Level 3 felonies.¹ We affirm.

Issues

[2] Hedrick raises the following two issues for our review:

1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his convictions.

2. Whether his convictions violate the prohibition against double jeopardy.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Hedrick and K.J. met when K.J. was a freshman in high school and Hedrick was a sophomore, and the two dated for “a week.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 106. Thereafter, K.J. “stopped speaking” to Hedrick until they “start[ed] a friendship again” during K.J.’s junior year of high school. Id. at 38-39. In the summer of 2022, when K.J. was seventeen years old, K.J. and Hedrick were friends, but the two had not “hung out.” Id. at 39. But, in June, the two made plans to hang out together on June 25.

[4] In the “early morning” that day, K.J. left her house and took an Uber to Hedrick's house. Id. at 41. After she arrived, K.J., Hedrick, and his brother sat around a table and played music and talked. They then started playing games and drinking from a bottle of Bombay gin that was “a little more than halfway full.” Id. at 46. The three individuals drank all morning, then cooked and ate food, and went outside. K.J. felt “intoxicated.” Id. at 45. By midafternoon, the bottle of gin was empty, with K.J. and Hedrick having consumed the majority and Hedrick's brother having only taken “a couple of shots.” Id. at 46. At that point, the three went to the grocery store and acquired two bottles of Bacardi rum. They then returned to the house.

[5] Once they were back at the house, the three again went outside. They were “hanging out, rolling around in the grass, just kind of being silly,” and they continued drinking. Id. at 47. Within roughly an hour, K.J. and Hedrick had consumed one and one-half bottles of the rum. They also smoked marijuana at some point during the day.

[6] The next thing K.J. remembered, she was in the bathroom inside the house, sitting on the toilet and vomiting. K.J. did not “remember actually walking back inside.” Id. at 48. K.J. vomited on the wall and on her clothes. Hedrick then came into the bathroom and started recording videos of K.J., including videos asking K.J. if she felt comfortable with him removing her clothes. Hedrick asked if he could kiss K.J., but K.J. did not respond. K.J. was “[e]xtremely intoxicated” and unable “to form words and sentences” or stand up. Id. at 51. At some point, K.J. became aware that her shirt and bra had been removed and that Hedrick was holding her bra, but she did not remember if she had taken them off or if Hedrick had.

[7] Hedrick then helped K.J. leave the bathroom and walk up the stairs to a bedroom. Hedrick had to help K.J. because she “couldn't walk.” Id. at 52. At that point, K.J. was “in and out of consciousness.” Id. at 54. K.J. next remembered “being in a bed” wearing shorts and underwear but no shirt or bra. Id. at 52. She then remembered Hedrick using his fingers to touch the inside and outside of her vagina. K.J. “couldn't speak” and “couldn't move” because of her intoxication. Id. at 54. At some point, Hedrick asked K.J. if it “felt good,” and K.J. responded: “huh-uh,” which meant “no” to her. Id. at 55. She “didn't want to be touched” and that was “the only sound [she] could get out because of how intoxicated” she was. Id. K.J. does not remember how the touching stopped.

[8] K.J. continued to be “in and out of it,” and she next remembered Hedrick behind her in the bed, and she felt his penis inside her vagina. Id. at 56. K.J. did not want this, but she did not say anything to Hedrick because she “couldn't.” Id. at 57. She also “couldn't move” due to being “so intoxicated.” Id. She does not remember how the penetration ended. K.J. then remembered trying to get up but “couldn't.” Id. at 58.

[9] At some point later, K.J. “came to” and was able to get out of bed. Id. She was “confused” and still felt intoxicated. Id. She found her shorts and underwear by the bed, but did not remember how they got there. She went downstairs, retrieved her shirt and bra, and got dressed. At approximately 7:00 p.m., K.J. texted her girlfriend, Harmony Bacon, to pick her up. When Bacon arrived, K.J. was crying, confused, and “still drunk.” Id. at 62. K.J. disclosed to Bacon that she “had been raped.” Id. at 102. Bacon then informed K.J.’s mother, who took K.J. to the hospital in the early morning hours the next day.

[10] The State charged Hedrick with two counts of rape, as Level 3 felonies. Following a bench trial at which K.J., Bacon, and K.J.’s mother testified, the court found Hedrick guilty of both counts and entered judgment of conviction accordingly. The court then sentenced Hedrick to concurrent sentences of four years on each count. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Sufficiency of the Evidence

[11] Hedrick first asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his convictions. Our standard of review on a claim of insufficient evidence is well settled:

For a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we look only at the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We do not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence. Id. We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017).

[12] Here, the State charged Hedrick with two counts of rape, as Level 3 felonies. To show that he committed the offenses, the State was required to prove that he knowingly or intentionally had sexual intercourse with K.J. or knowingly or intentionally caused K.J. to perform or submit to other sexual conduct when K.J. was unaware that the sexual intercourse or other conduct was occurring. Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1(a)(2). The State charged Hedrick in Count 1 based on its allegation that Hedrick had knowingly or intentionally had sexual intercourse with K.J. while she was unaware that the sexual intercourse was occurring, and the State charged Hedrick in Count 2 based on its allegation that he had caused K.J. to submit to other sexual conduct while she was unaware that the other sexual conduct was occurring. See Appellant's App. Vol. at 30. Other sexual conduct is defined as an act involving the sex organ of one person and the mouth or anus of another person or the penetration of the sex organ or anus of a person by an object. I.C. § 35-31.5-2-221.5.

[13] On appeal, Hedrick does not dispute that he engaged in sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct with K.J. Rather, he contends that the State failed to prove that K.J. was unaware that the sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct was occurring. This Court has previously stated that

the term “unaware” had not been defined by the legislature for the purposes of Indiana Code Section 35-42-4-1(a)(2). Therefore, we adopted a dictionary definition of the term—“not aware: lacking knowledge or acquaintance; unconscious”—and held that the victim must be “ ‘unaware’ that the sexual act is occurring” for a defendant to be guilty of rape pursuant to the statute.

Filice v. State, 886 N.E.2d 24, 32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (internal citations omitted).

[14] Here, Hedrick contends that K.J. was “neither asleep nor unconscious when the sexual conduct occurred” and that she “acknowledged that she was aware of acts that form the basis of these charges.” Appellant's Br. at 13. He also asserts that K.J. was “able to testify in detail about where she was in the bed, where [Hedrick] was, the start of the touching, him asking her if it was okay, if it felt good, her response, and the intercourse.” Id. Hedrick maintains that, because K.J. “was able to understand what was happening as it occurred and form memories of the events,” she “was not ‘unaware’ ” of the sexual conduct. Id. at 21.

[15] Our Court has previously considered whether a victim was “unaware” for the purposes of the rape statute. In Glover v. State, this Court held that the State presented sufficient evidence to show that a victim was unaware that sexual conduct was occurring where the evidence showed that the victim was “so intoxicated at the time she was taken to the bedroom that she could not stand unassisted,” she was “barely mumbling” and “incoherent,” and she was later determined to be “unconscious due to severe intoxication.” 760 N.E.2d 1120, 1125 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. In Nolan v. State, this Court held that the victim was unaware because she was “half awake and half asleep” when Nolan initiated the sexual conduct. 863 N.E.2d 398, 403 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. Then, in Filice, this Court held that, despite not being fully unconscious, the victim was unaware of the sexual conduct because she was under the influence of Rohypnol and was “so impaired” that she was “verbally unresponsive” and was “kind of limp.” 886 N.E.2d at 36. And, recently, this Court held that there was sufficient evidence to show that a victim was unaware even though she “remembered portions of the intercourse” because she was “inebriated and ‘passed out’ ” when the intercourse began. Steury v. State, 243 N.E.3d 1108, 1120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied.²

[16] Here, the evidence most favorable to the trial court's judgment demonstrates that K.J. consumed copious amounts of alcohol in a relatively short time while at Hedrick's house. Indeed, she and Hedrick together drank more than one-half of a bottle of gin by mid-afternoon, and then the two proceeded to drink another one and one-half bottles of rum. In addition, K.J. had also smoked marijuana. K.J. drank to the point of becoming “[e]xtremely intoxicated,” and she was unable to form words or sentences or stand up. Tr. at 51. Hedrick had to help K.J. up the stairs because she “couldn't walk.” Id. She was then “in and out of consciousness” and “couldn't speak” and “couldn't move” because of her intoxication. Id. at 54.

[17] In other words, the State's evidence demonstrated that K.J. was vomiting, unable to speak, unable to walk or stand, and was in and out of consciousness due to her extreme intoxication. And the evidence demonstrates that Hedrick was aware of her condition, as he held her hair back while she vomited, asked her about removing her vomit-covered clothes, and had to help her walk up the stairs. While K.J. may remember some of the moments, the evidence most favorable to the court's judgment supports a reasonable inference that K.J. was intoxicated to the point of not being aware of the sexual conduct or intercourse as they were occurring. As such, we hold that the State presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder could infer that K.J. was unaware of the sexual acts.

Issue Two: Double Jeopardy

[18] Hedrick next contends that his two convictions for rape violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. Our Supreme Court has recognized that substantive double jeopardy claims arise in two principal contexts: (1) when a single criminal act or transaction violates a single statute but results in multiple injuries/victims, and (2) when a single criminal act or transaction violates multiple statutes with common elements and harms one or more victims. Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227, 247 (Ind. 2020); Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 263 (Ind. 2020). The Court's decision in Wadle addressed the latter scenario, and its decision in Powell addressed the former scenario. See Stone v. State, 226 N.E.3d 829, 832 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied. “In either circumstance, the dispositive question is one of statutory intent.” Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 247.

[19] Hedrick was charged with and convicted of two counts of rape under Indiana Code Section 35-42-4-1-(a)(2), which provides:

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), a person who knowingly or intentionally has sexual intercourse with another person or knowingly or intentionally causes another person to perform or submit to other sexual conduct (as defined in IC 35-31.5-2-221.5) when:

* * *

(2) the other person is unaware that the sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct (as defined in IC 35-31.5-2-221.5) is occurring․

commits rape, a Level 3 felony.

One of the charges against Hedrick was based on sexual intercourse while the other was based on other sexual conduct.

[20] We first note that the parties disagree as to which test should apply. The State contends that we should apply the test outlined in Powell because Hedrick's “convictions fall under a single statute.” Appellee's Br. at 21. However, this Court has recently stated that

several cases have made clear that the legislature's decision to delineate separate crimes in one statute rather than multiple statutes should not control which double jeopardy test applies. See Stone, 226 N.E.3d at 832-33; Carranza v. State, 184 N.E.3d 712, 716 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022); Koziski v. State, 172 N.E.3d 338, 342 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. In the rape context, we recently held that the Wadle test applied where the convictions were based on separate criminal acts —forcible sexual intercourse and forcible other sexual conduct—set out in the rape statute. Stone, 226 N.E.3d at 833. And we have done the same in child molest cases where multiple convictions were based on separate provisions of the same statute. Carranza, 184 N.E.3d at 716 (applying Wadle where child molesting convictions—one for other sexual conduct and the other for fondling or touching— were “based on separate subsections of the primary charging statute”); Koziski, 172 N.E.3d at 342 (applying Wadle where child molesting convictions—one for licking victim's vagina and the other for digital penetration of her vagina—were based on two different statutorily defined types of other sexual conduct). Accordingly, where, as here, multiple convictions “fall under separate statutory provisions, each defining a separate crime, the Wadle ‘multiple statutes’ test is a better fit than the Powell ‘single statute’ test.” Koziski, 172 N.E.3d at 342.

Thompson v. State, 246 N.E.3d 1251, 1254-55 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). Because Hedrick's charges were based on separate criminal acts—one for sexual intercourse and one for other sexual conduct—we agree with Hedrick that the Wadle test applies.

[21] Wadle requires a multi-step analysis. We first look to the statutory language of the offenses to determine whether the language clearly permits multiple punishments, either expressly or by implication. A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1066 (Ind. 2024). If multiple punishments are not clearly permitted, we turn to the included-offense statute, Indiana Code Section 35-31.5-2-168, to determine whether either offense is included (inherently or factually) in the other. A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1067. If neither is included in the other, “the analysis ends—full stop” as there is no violation of double jeopardy. Id. Otherwise, we move to the third step and “probe the underlying facts—as presented in the charging instrument and adduced at trial—to determine whether [the] defendant's actions were ‘so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.’ ” Id. at 1071 (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249).

[22] Here, because the rape statute does not clearly permit multiple punishments, we turn to step two under the Wadle test and apply the included-offense statute to determine whether either offense is factually or inherently included in the other. The included-offense statute provides:

“Included offense” means an offense that:

(1) is established by proof of the same material elements or less than all the material elements required to establish the commission of the offense charged;

(2) consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or

(3) differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious harm or risk of harm to the same person, property, or public interest, or a lesser kind of culpability, is required to establish its commission.

I.C. § 35-31.5-2-168. Subsections (2) and (3) are not applicable here, where Hedrick was convicted of two counts of Level 3 felony rape, neither of which involved an attempt or a less serious harm/lesser culpability. We therefore focus our analysis on subsection (1).

[23] The rape statute sets out different types of rape, each with one or more mutually exclusive material elements, thus criminalizing different conduct. In particular, the statute criminalizes sexual intercourse, which is defined as “an act that includes any penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ,” and it criminalizes other sexual conduct, which as relevant here is defined as an act involving “the penetration of the sex organ or anus of a person by an object.” I.C. §§ 35-31.5-2-302; 35-31.5-2-221.5.

[24] This Court has held that “sexual intercourse and other sexual conduct are mutually exclusive material elements of rape,” and convictions under both do not violate double jeopardy because neither rape conviction is included in the other. Stone 226 N.E.3d at 834; see also Thompson, 246 N.E.3d at 1256 (holding that multiple convictions under the rape statute for various forms of forcible rape did not violate the double jeopardy principles because each act was for a separate and distinct crime.). Similarly, in Koziski, we upheld two convictions for child molesting that were based on distinct statutory provisions defining other sexual conduct, explaining: “Neither form of ‘other sexual conduct’ – an act involving ‘a sex organ of one (1) person and the mouth or anus of another person’ and an act involving ‘the penetration of the sex organ or anus of a person by an object’ – is established by proof of the other.” 172 N.E.3d at 343.

[25] Hedrick was convicted of one count for each of the distinct, statutorily defined criminal acts, neither of which is established by proof of the same material element or less than all of the material elements required to establish the other. Indeed, Hedrick was convicted of one count of rape based on his sexual intercourse with K.J. when he inserted his penis into her vagina, and he was convicted on the other count of rape based on his other sexual conduct of inserting his fingers into her vagina. As neither offense is inherently or factually included in the other, our analysis ends “full stop.” A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1067. Hedrick's two convictions were for separate and distinct crimes and, as such, there is no double jeopardy violation.

Conclusion

[26] The State presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that K.J. was “unaware” of the sexual conduct as it was occurring. And because Hedrick's convictions were based on separate acts, they do not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. We therefore affirm Hedrick's convictions.

[27] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1(a)(1).

2.   Further, in dicta, our Supreme Court has previously suggested that a defendant charged under a different subsection of the rape statute for raping a woman who was extremely intoxicated but not unconscious could have, alternatively, been charged under the second subsection of that statute because of her “illness and intoxication.” Bryant v. State, 644 N.E.2d 859, 860 n.1 (Ind. 1994).

Bailey, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and DeBoer concur. Vaidik, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.