COLEMAN v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] James Coleman appeals his conviction for Level 4 felony burglary following a jury trial. He presents two issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court committed fundamental error when it instructed the jury.

2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his burglary conviction.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On November 29, 2022, M.K. parked her SUV outside of her condominium building and began to transport three separate loads of groceries inside. To access her first-floor condo, M.K. entered a foyer through an exterior door to her building, which included three other condos. After she dropped off the first load, she left the door to her unit open “just enough that [she] could swing it open and then kick it open.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 158. On her way back through the foyer to get the other groceries, M.K. saw a man later identified as Coleman standing there. M.K. said “hello,” but she kept moving. Id. When M.K. reentered the foyer with her second load of groceries, Coleman was gone. M.K. “assumed that he [had gone] upstairs to visit some neighbors in the building,” and she entered her condo and shut the door. Id. at 159. M.K. was a “little concerned” about where Coleman had gone, so she checked her bedroom and saw that her dog was asleep on her bed, and she concluded that “everything was ok.” Id.

[4] But when M.K. entered her bathroom, Coleman “jumped out from behind the door and grabbed [her] and threw [her] down on the floor.” Id. at 161. M.K. began yelling and begged Coleman not to hurt her. Coleman then bound M.K.’s hands and feet. M.K. feared for her life and continued to scream. Coleman said to her, “shut the f*** up or I'm going to kill you.” Id. at 162. But M.K. continued to scream. Coleman then inserted an object into M.K.’s rectum that was “very, very painful[.]” Id. M.K. heard a buzzing sound and Coleman inserted “something else” into her rectum that was “very, very painful,” and M.K. stopped screaming. Id. at 163. A short time later, Coleman got up, said “I will be back,” and he left. Id. at 164.

[5] After “quite a period of time,” M.K. got up, freed her hands, and loosened the binding around her feet. Id. She saw a neighbor, Art Boyle, outside her kitchen window, and she “scuffle[d]” outside and tearfully told him what had happened. Id. at 165. Boyle took M.K. back inside her apartment and called 9-1-1. When a responding officer asked M.K. for her identification, she realized that her wallet was gone. She described her wallet as a red “[z]ipper wallet” with a “crocodile finish” and made by Michael Kors. Id. 173. M.K. sought medical treatment at a local hospital, where she was treated for injuries, including torn tissue around her anus. When M.K. got home from the hospital, she saw that her electric toothbrush was missing.

[6] Police investigating the incident found surveillance footage showing a white Volkswagen Jetta that had followed M.K. home from the grocery store. That vehicle was registered to Coleman. Accordingly, officers with the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (“IMPD”) were ordered to keep an eye out for Coleman. On December 2, IMPD Officer Kyle Jones saw Coleman driving the white Jetta in Indianapolis, and he conducted a traffic stop. Officer Jones and his partner arrested Coleman. Officers later found a red wallet in the trunk of Coleman's car, and M.K. identified it as her missing wallet.¹

[7] The State charged Coleman with Level 3 felony rape, Level 4 felony burglary, Level 6 felony intimidation, and Level 6 felony criminal confinement. At his ensuing jury trial, the trial court instructed the jury in relevant part that

The crime of Burglary is defined by law as follows:

A person who breaks and enters the building or structure of another person, with intent to commit a felony or theft in it, commits Burglary, a Level 5 felony. The offense is a Level 4 felony if the building or structure is a dwelling. Before you may convict the Defendant, the State must have proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

1. The Defendant

2. knowingly or intentionally

3. broke and entered

4. the building or structure of M.K.

5. with the intent to commit a theft in it.

Id. at 142-43. The trial court did not define the terms “break” or “broke,” and Coleman did not request any such definition. The jury convicted Coleman on all four charges, including Level 4 felony burglary. The trial court entered judgment and sentenced Coleman to an aggregate term of twenty-four years, with twenty-two years executed to the Department of Correction and two years of home detention. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Jury Instruction

[8] Coleman contends that the trial court erred when it did not sua sponte include a definition of “breaking” in the jury instructions. Appellant's Br. at 9. Coleman concedes that he did not proffer such an instruction or otherwise object, and he alleges fundamental error. Fundamental error is a “daunting” standard. Harris v. State, 76 N.E.3d 137, 140 (Ind. 2017) (quoting Griffith v. State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 956 (Ind. 2016)).

[9] To establish fundamental error, a defendant must “show that the trial court should have raised the issue sua sponte due to a blatant violation of basic and elementary principles, undeniable harm or potential for harm, and prejudice that makes a fair trial impossible.” Id. As relevant here, this Court has held that an alleged error in the omission of a jury instruction does not rise to the level of fundamental error where the issue was not a central issue at trial. See Winkleman v. State, 22 N.E.3d 844, 850 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[10] On appeal, Coleman points out that “the breaking element of burglary requires evidence that some force was used to gain unauthorized entry into the dwelling,” and he directs us to Indiana Criminal Pattern Instruction 14.04450, which provides: “The term ‘breaking’ may include moving a door or window even if unlocked, no matter how slight the force. A breaking does not have to be a fractured or forceful entry, but it may be inferred from the slightest force if used to gain unauthorized entry.” Appellant's Br. at 14 (emphasis added). Coleman maintains that he was prejudiced by the court's failure to include this definitional instruction because “the evidence of force was not overwhelming,” and “[t]he jurors could have convicted Coleman of burglary[ ] even if they did not find that he used any force to gain entry into M.K.’s dwelling.” Id. at 15-16. Thus, he concludes that the omission of the definition of “breaking” made a fair trial impossible and resulted in fundamental error. We cannot agree.

[11] During his trial, Coleman's defense focused on mistaken identity. Simply put, he argued that IMPD officers arrested the wrong man. Coleman does not direct us to any part of the record showing that he disputed whether he had broken and entered into M.K.’s apartment or just entered an already open door, and our review of the transcript reveals no such argument. For the first time on appeal, he argues that, based on M.K.’s testimony that she had left her door only slightly ajar, the jury could have speculated that a gust of air could have caused the door to swing open wide enough for him to enter using no force.

[12] Coleman has not shown that the definition of breaking was a central issue at his trial, and he has not shown fundamental error. See Winkleman, 22 N.E.3d at 850 (holding no fundamental error in omission of element of force or threat of force where neither was a central issue at trial on kidnapping charge).

Issue Two: Sufficiency of the Evidence

[13] Coleman next contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove that he was guilty of Level 4 felony burglary. Our standard of review is well settled.

When an appeal raises “a sufficiency of evidence challenge, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses ․” We consider only the probative evidence and the reasonable inferences that support the [judgment]. “We will affirm ‘if the probative evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence could have allowed a reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”

Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1195 (Ind. 2018) (quoting Joslyn v. State, 942 N.E.2d 809, 811 (Ind. 2011)).

[14] Indiana Code section 35-43-2-1 provides in relevant part that a person who breaks and enters the dwelling of another person, with intent to commit a felony or theft in it, commits burglary, a Level 4 felony. Using even the slightest force to gain unauthorized entry satisfies the breaking element of the crime. Davis v. State, 770 N.E.2d 319, 322 (Ind. 2002). For example, opening an unlocked door or pushing a door that is slightly ajar constitutes a breaking. Id.

[15] Coleman's sole contention on appeal is that the State did not present sufficient evidence to prove that he used any force to enter M.K.’s condo. He argues that, “[w]ith the door being left ajar, it could have easily swung open, so that a person could enter the condominium without touching or moving the door in any way.” Appellant's Br. at 12. But there was no evidence that the door had swung open to permit Coleman to enter M.K.’s condo without first pushing the door open enough for him to gain entry.

[16] The only evidence regarding the width of the opening in the door was M.K.’s testimony that she had left it open “just enough that you could swing it open and then kick it open.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 158. In other words, M.K.’s testimony was that someone had to either kick it open or manually swing it open to gain entry. And that evidence is sufficient to show that Coleman broke and entered M.K.’s condo. Coleman's argument on appeal is merely a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.

[17] For all these reasons, we affirm Coleman's Level 4 felony burglary conviction.²

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The wallet was not made by Michael Kors, but by Kate Spade. Coleman made much of that discrepancy during trial.

2.   Coleman does not appeal any of his other convictions or his sentence.

Mathias, Judge.

Foley, J., and Felix, J., concur.