HAMMOND II v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Franklin Hammond II was charged with attempted rape and criminal confinement. During jury deliberations, a juror had to leave due to an emergency. The trial court replaced the juror, and Hammond was ultimately found guilty of attempted rape. Hammond presents a single issue for our review: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing a juror during deliberations without developing a thorough record.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Hammond and A.T. were “friends with benefits,” Tr. Vol. IV at 6, until A.T. ended the relationship in October 2021. Shortly thereafter, on October 27, Hammond asked A.T. to come to his house so she could pick up some of her clothes. A.T. agreed to go to Hammond's house if they were just going to talk and if he promised “not to try anything.” Ex. Vol. I at 12.

[4] Once A.T. parked in front of Hammond's house, he got into her car and “angrily” told her to park in his driveway. Tr. Vol. III at 193. Then, A.T. looked down and saw that Hammond was holding something that appeared to be a gun. A.T. started crying and pulled the car into the driveway. After A.T. parked the car, Hammond pulled down his pants, started “touching himself,” grabbed A.T. by the hair, placed her head a couple inches above his lap, and told her that she “was going to s**k his d**k.” Id. at 195. A.T. started saying “okay, okay, okay, okay to get [Hammond] to let go of [her] head.” Id. Hammond released A.T., and she turned off her car, got out of the vehicle, started running towards her house, and called her sister for help. The State charged Hammond with attempted rape as a Level 1 felony ¹ and criminal confinement as a Level 3 felony ² .

[5] A jury trial was held, and after four hours of deliberation, the trial court came back on the record and, outside the presence of the jury, indicated, “So I was just told that one of the jurors doesn't--the juror that's wheelchair bound does not have any transportation after 6:30. It's 6:27, so I guess we can sub her out for one of the alternates.” Tr. Vol. IV at 77. After a brief discussion among the attorneys, the trial court continued:

Okay. So we have Mr. Hammond now, and I was explaining to his Counsel and to [the] State, Juror Number 3 has to be released because she has an emergency. As you've seen, she uses a wheelchair. She doesn't have an[y] transportation after 6:30. It's 6:28 now, so I'm going to have to tell her right away. Juror Number 13 was L.H. I was going to release Ms. S. and then bring Juror Number 13 in and instruct her that she is to become a part of the regular jury.

Id. at 78. Hammond objected to Juror 3's removal and stated his basis for the objection as follows: “Basically, I like her as a juror, and she's been picked.” Id. The trial court replaced Juror 3 over Hammond's objection. The jury found Hammond guilty of the lesser included offense of attempted rape as a Level 3 felony and found him not guilty of criminal confinement. Hammond now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

Hammond Failed to Preserve His Structural Error Claim for Our Review

[6] Hammond argues that the trial court erred when it removed Juror 3 after jury deliberations had begun. Our Supreme Court has explained our review under these circumstances as follows:

[W]e apply a heightened standard of review, reversing for an abuse of discretion resulting in the denial of a fair trial. An abuse of discretion in this context arises when the trial court's decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or it misinterprets the law,” Carpenter v. State, 786 N.E.2d 696, 703 (Ind. 2003), or if the decision “was so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant that a fair trial was impossible,” Boatright v. State, 759 N.E.2d 1038, 1042 (Ind. 2001).

Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 650 (Ind. 2018).

[7] Hammond claims that Juror 3's removal amounted to structural error, thus infringing upon his right to an impartial jury. Structural errors are those that “affect ‘the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.’ ” Durden, 99 N.E.3d at 653. Structural errors represent “ ‘a limited class of fundamental constitutional errors that defy analysis by harmless error standards,’ thus requiring automatic reversal without the need to show prejudice.” Id. (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999)). “While the ‘right to an impartial jury is the sort of right that requires automatic reversal when denied,’ the ‘nature, context, and significance of a violation may determine’ otherwise.” Id. at 654–55 (quoting United States v. Harbin, 250 F.3d 532, 548 (7th Cir. 2001)).

[8] The trial court is justified in removing a juror after deliberations have begun “only in the most extreme situations.” Durden, 99 N.E.3d at 654 (quoting Riggs v. State, 809 N.E.2d 322, 327 (Ind. 2004)). The decision to remove a juror at this point “ ‘raises a number of considerations implicating the defendant's right to an impartial jury and a unanimous verdict.” Id. at 650 (quoting Riggs, 809 N.E.2d at 327). Therefore, when a juror is removed after deliberations have started, “the court must demonstrate, through a carefully-developed record, that removal ‘is necessary for the integrity of the process, does not prejudice the deliberations of the rest of the panel, and does not impair the parties[’] right to a trial by jury.’ ” Id. at 654 (alteration in original) (quoting Riggs, 809 N.E.2d at 327–28). Additionally, “[t]he court must ․ (1) avoid questions that affect the juror's judgment, in case he or she continues to serve; and (2) in the event of removal, take steps to minimize any prejudicial impact removal may have had on the remaining jurors.” Id. (citing Riggs, 809 N.E.2d at 329).

[9] “As a general rule, the denial of a defendant's right to an impartial jury requires automatic reversal,” Durden, 99 N.E.3d at 655 (citing Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668 (1987)), but this rule is “subject to exceptions,” id. (quoting Weaver, 582 U.S. at 298). Namely, a defendant is “entitled to automatic reversal” only when “there is an objection at trial and the issue is raised on direct appeal.” Id. (quoting Weaver, 582 U.S. at 299). “If, however, the ‘defendant does not preserve a structural error on direct review,’ then he ‘generally bears the burden’ of showing prejudice.’ ” Id. (quoting Weaver, 582 U.S. at 299).

[10] Here, Hammond argues that the trial court committed structural error by failing to make a thorough record establishing that (1) Juror 3's removal was necessary, and (2) Juror 3's removal did not prejudice the deliberations of the remaining jurors. The State argues that Hammond failed to properly object, waiving his claim for our review. We agree with the State.

[11] “For a party to preserve a claim for review, we generally require that party to object to the trial court's ruling and to state the reasons for that objection.” Bradley v. State, 248 N.E.3d 563, 573 (Ind. 2024) (citing Durden, 99 N.E.3d at 651). Additionally, “to ‘properly preserve an issue for appellate review,’ ․ a defendant ‘must state with reasonable specificity the grounds for his objection while before the trial court.’ ” Id. (quoting Todisco v. State, 965 N.E.2d 753, 756 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)). We have previously held that a party failed to preserve his claim that the trial court did not establish a thorough record justifying a juror's removal during deliberations. Leflore v. State, 823 N.E.2d 1205, 1210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). In Leflore, the defendant objected at trial to a juror's removal during deliberations because that juror was the only African-American member of the jury. Id. On appeal, Leflore argued that the trial court failed to make an adequate record supporting the juror's removal. Id. Because these were not the grounds for his objection at trial, we determined that Leflore waived that issue for appellate review. Id. Similarly, our Supreme Court recently found waiver for an insufficient objection in Bradley v. State. There, Bradley objected at trial on Criminal Rule 4 grounds, arguing that the Criminal Rule 4 deadline had passed; however, there were still eight days left before the Criminal Rule 4 deadline at the time of his objection. Bradley, 248 N.E.3d at 574. Because Bradley did not “demand a trial within the eight days left on the clock,” he “failed to put the trial court on notice of the specific error it was committing.” Id. Our Supreme Court concluded that “because Bradley failed to properly notify the court of its scheduling error ․ he waived his right to discharge.” Id.

[12] Here, Hammond timely objected to the dismissal of Juror 3, but the entire substance of his objection was: “Basically, I like her as a juror, and she's been picked.” Tr. Vol. II at 77. Hammond's objection did not state the grounds he now argues on appeal, failing to give the trial court the opportunity to correct the error and make a thorough record establishing the need for Juror 3's removal. Thus, Hammond's objection was insufficient to preserve the claim he now presents on appeal. See Bradley 248 N.E.3d at 574; Leflore, 823 N.E.2d at 1210. We also note that, on appeal, Hammond argues only that automatic reversal is warranted and does not claim he suffered prejudice from the alleged structural error. We conclude that Hammond failed to preserve his claim of structural error for our review, see Durden, 99 N.E.3d at 655–56, and we affirm the trial court's decision.

[13] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code §§ 35-42-4-1(a)(1); 35-41-5-1.

2.   Id. § 35-42-3-3(a), (b)(3)(A).

Felix, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.