IN RE: The Guardianship of: Zavina K. Dils (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Jordan Dils (“Mother”) gave birth to Zavina Dils (“Child”) and left her in the care of Ashlee Reed. The trial court granted permanent guardianship of Child to Reed while Mother exercised parenting time and provided support. Mother filed a petition to terminate the guardianship, which the trial court granted. Reed now appeals and presents a single issue for our review: Whether the trial court clearly erred in granting Mother's petition to terminate the guardianship.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On July 10, 2022, Child was born, and, four days later, Mother left Child with her friend Reed because she was unable to care for Child. On December 13, Reed filed an emergency petition seeking temporary guardianship over Child, which the trial court granted. The following month, after she had filed a subsequent petition, the trial court granted Reed permanent guardianship over Child. The order appointed Reed as guardian, established parenting time for Mother, and ordered Mother to pay support for Child.

[4] After the guardianship was established, both parties filed motions related to contempt and parenting time. The trial court twice set the matters for a hearing, but continuances by each party moved the hearing to September 7, 2023. Before that hearing was able to take place, on August 29, Mother filed a petition to terminate Reed's guardianship.

[5] On August 1, 2024, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on all pending matters. The trial court entered an order on the hearing, issuing findings and conclusions. The trial court found in relevant part as follows:

8. Mother has substantially paid her child support obligation although she has not paid on a weekly basis as ordered.

9. Mother has consistently exercised her parenting time. She has asked for additional parenting time on occasion. [Reed] has granted some of the requests for additional parenting time and denied other requests.

10. The relationship between Mother and [Reed] has deteriorated. It has gone from friendly to hostile, although the Court recognizes that going to Court and having a contested hearing tends to bring out the differences in people.

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12. [Child] is generally in good health although she has allergies and asthma, and had RSV in December [2022].

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17. At the time the Permanent Guardianship was granted, Mother had criminal and substance abuse problems. She successfully completed probation which included substance abuse treatment. She has been sober for four years with the exception of drinking alcohol on one occasion in January 2023. She informed her probation officer and treatment provider that she had consumed alcohol.

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23. Mother has greatly improved her situation in terms of stability since the Permanent Guardianship was established.

24. The Court is concerned that Mother does not fully appreciate the medical needs of [Child] and may expose her to smoke and other noxious odors that will be harmful to her.

Appellant's App. Vol. II at 45–47. The trial court also noted that Mother had been appropriately caring for Child's older brother who was in her custody, which demonstrated that Mother could adequately care for Child. The order terminated Reed's guardianship over Child with Mother's full custody starting on November 15, 2024, finding that a transition period was in the best interests of Child. Reed now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

The Trial Court Did Not Err by Terminating Reed's Permanent Guardianship over Child

[6] Reed argues that the trial court erred in terminating her permanent guardianship over Child. All findings and orders in guardianship proceedings are within the trial court's discretion. Ind. Code § 29-3-2-4(a); see also Guardianship of S.S., 2024 WL 5232812 at *3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). Here, the trial court sua sponte issued findings and conclusions of law, so we review the “issues covered by the findings with a two-tiered standard of review that asks whether the evidence supports the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment.” Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 123 (Ind. 2016) (citing In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014)). We review any issue not covered by the findings “under the general judgment standard,” which means we will affirm “on any legal theory supported by the evidence.” Id. at 123–24 (citing S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287).

[7] Our review is also guided by the following considerations unique to family law cases:

[T]here is a well-established preference in Indiana “for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters.” In re Marriage of Richardson, 622 N.E.2d 178 (Ind. 1993). Appellate courts “are in a poor position to look at a cold transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as it came from the witness stand, did not properly understand the significance of the evidence.” Kirk v. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 2002) (quoting Brickley v. Brickley, 247 Ind. 201, 204, 210 N.E.2d 850, 852 (1965)). “On appeal it is not enough that the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must positively require the conclusion contended for by appellant before there is a basis for reversal.” Id. “Appellate judges are not to reweigh the evidence nor reassess witness credibility, and the evidence should be viewed most favorably to the judgment.” Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011) (citations omitted).

Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 124. Furthermore, we accept as true any findings not challenged on appeal. See R.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)).

[8] Reed argues that Child's interests are best served by maintaining Child's guardianship with her instead of granting custody to Mother. “Indiana law has long recognized that ‘natural parents are entitled to the custody of their minor children, except when they are unsuitable persons to be entrusted with their care, control, and education.’ ” In re Guardianship of B.H., 770 N.E.2d 283, 285 (Ind. 2002) (quoting Gilmore v. Kitson, 165 Ind. 402, 406, 74 N.E. 1083, 1084 (1905)); see also In re A.M.J. 228 N.E.3d 1132, 1140 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). The natural parent “comes to the table with a ‘strong presumption that a child's interests are best served by placement with the natural parent.’ ” K.I. ex rel. J.I. v. J.H. , 903 N.E.2d 453, 460 (Ind. 2009) (quoting B.H., 770 N.E.2d at 287). As is the case here, “when a parent initiates an action to reobtain custody of a child that has been in the custody of another, the burden of proof does not shift to the parent ․ [r]ather, the burden of proof is always on the third party.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting In re Guardianship of J.K., 862 N.E.2d 686, 692 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)). The third party must rebut the presumption in favor of the natural parent by clear and convincing evidence. A.M.J. 228 N.E.3d at 1140 (citing K.I., 903 N.E.2d at 460; B.H., 770 N.E.2d at 287). “The presumption will not be overcome merely because ‘a third party could provide the better things in life for the child.’ ” B.H., 770 N.E.2d at 287 (quoting Hendrickson v. Binkley, 161 Ind. App. 388, 396, 316 N.E.2d 376, 381 (1974)).

[9] Reed claims the evidence shows that she rebutted the presumption in favor of Mother by clear and convincing evidence. Initially, we note that Reed does not challenge any of the trial court's findings, so we accept them as true, see R.M., 203 N.E.3d at 564. Reed claims she rebutted the presumption by providing evidence of Mother's criminal history, past substance abuse, lack of compliance with the court's orders on support, and alleged failure to take Child's health risks seriously. Notwithstanding Reed's contentions, the evidence shows that Mother had successfully completed probation (including court ordered substance abuse treatment), substantially met her child support obligation, quit smoking, prohibited anyone from vaping in her home, and improved her stability since the guardianship was granted. Reed, however, points to the portions of the trial court's order where it recognized that Mother did not comply with technical provisions of the guardianship order and questioned Mother's ability to appreciate Child's medical needs. Even with these concerns in mind, the trial court determined that Reed failed to rebut the presumption in favor of the natural parent. We find that Reed's arguments are nothing more than a request for us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do, see Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 124.

[10] Additionally, Reed argues that she is in a better position to provide financial support, emotional support, and housing for Child. We reiterate that “[t]he presumption will not be overcome merely because ‘a third party could provide the better things in life for the child.’ ” B.H., 770 N.E.2d at 287 (quoting Hendrickson, 161 Ind.App. at 396, 316 N.E.2d at 381). We conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in granting Mother's petition to terminate Reed's guardianship over Child, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[11] Affirmed.

Felix, Judge.

Judges Mathias and Foley concur. Mathias, J., and Foley, J., concur.