IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of W.M. (Minor Child) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] J.M. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's order terminating her parental rights over her minor child, W.M. (“Child”).¹ Mother raises one issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court clearly erred when it terminated her parental rights. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child was born on May 12, 2018, and Mother adopted him on December 2, 2020. In January 2023, Mother went to the local Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) office and requested assistance because she was homeless, living in her car, and had substance abuse issues. Mother also reported that she struggled with mental health issues. Mother submitted to a drug test, which was positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine. A DCS Family Case Manager (“FCM”) met with Mother, who stated “that she would like DCS to be involved with [Child] to ensure his safety.” Ex. Vol. 1 at 24. She further admitted that she was “actively using” methamphetamine and that she “does not have stable housing[.]” Id. DCS removed Child from Mother's care that same day. Then, on January 6, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child is a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”).

[3] At a fact-finding hearing on DCS's petition, Mother admitted to the allegations, and the Court adjudicated Child a CHINS. Thereafter, the court entered a dispositional decree and ordered Mother to, among other things: complete a diagnostic evaluation, including a clinical interview and assessment; complete a Parent Family Functional Assessment; complete a substance use disorder assessment; participate in home-based case management; participate in individual counseling; complete substance use outpatient treatment; submit to drug screens; and participate in visitation.

[4] Mother partially complied with services. For the time period from August through September 2023, Mother missed five visits, and she was late for three of the four remaining visits. As a result, Mother was discharged from that service. Thereafter, Mother started visitation again through a different provider. Initially, the visits were virtual but progressed to in-person in January 2024. Mother was then able to have an in-home visit in March. But Mother subsequently tested positive for methamphetamine, so visits reverted back to virtual. Mother then continued to miss visits with Child.

[5] Mother also failed to complete a family functional assessment, a substance use disorder assessment, and a clinical interview and assessment. She was “on and off” with her individual counseling appointments and was ultimately discharged for failing to appear. Tr. at 53. Accordingly, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights on April 30.

[6] The court held a fact-finding hearing on DCS's petition on July 24. Mother failed to appear, but she was represented by counsel. At the hearing, various service providers, a representative from DCS, and Child's Court-Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) testified to Mother's lack of compliance with services, the impact that had on Child, Child's behavioral issues, and Child's improvements since being placed in foster care.

[7] Following the hearing, the court entered the following findings of fact and conclusions thereon:

b. One (1) or more of the circumstances described in I.C. 31-35-2-4(d) exist:

i. Specifically, there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal will not be remedied.

ii. A petition alleging a Child in Need of Services was filed on January 6, 2023, after Mother presented to the Tippecanoe County Department of Child Services when she was homeless and admittedly using illegal drugs. DCS Exh. 2.

iii. In an Order on Fact Finding hearing, the court found that Mother admitted she had relapsed, was using methamphetamine within [an] hour before the Fact Finding Hearing and that she remained homeless, living in her car. DCS Exh. 6.

iv. With regard to her living situation, Mother has indicated that she has housing but has not been cooperative with the current DCS FCM in that she has excuses for not being available for a home visit, and contends that although she still lives in Monticello, she sometimes stays in Lafayette. The current FCM cannot confirm that Mother is not yet again homeless. Mother's failure to appear at the fact-finding hearing on this pending TPR petition leaves the Court with no rebuttal to the DCS position that she ․ may well be once again homeless.

v. Mother has exhibited a pattern of relapse. In an order on the Permanency Plan Hearing the Court made the following observations:

[Mother] has partially complied with [the] dispositional orders as follows: Mother continues to be homeless and struggle with substance use, specifically methamphetamine. On April 19, 2023, Mother attended Volunteers of America inpatient treatment and discharged herself the same day. On June 9, 2023, Mother attended Wooded Glen inpatient treatment center and discharged herself on June 15, 2023, against staff advice. On September 29, 2023, Mother admitted herself into Recovery Works and has completed a biopsychosocial assessment and has a mental health and substance use treatment plan. DCS. Exh. p.5

vi. Moreover, the current FCM has not been able to have recent contact with Mother. She missed a drug screen on July 15, 2024, and has missed visits with Child as well. The FCM has tried to contact her, left messages, but had no[ ] response. Mother did have a hair follicle test in May 2024 that was positive for methamphetamine.

vii. It is likely that Mother is again homeless and using illegal drugs. Without Mother's testimony or presence at the hearing to refute or dispute these allegations, the Court finds that there is a reasonable probability that conditions that precipitated Child's removal from the home have not and will not be remedied․

c. Termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best interest of [the] [C]hild in that:

i. Child has never had a stable long-term parent-child relationship.

ii. In December 2020, [Child] was adopted by Mother, his biological aunt.

iii. The adoption was a single parent adoption with consents from the legal father and the biological mother. The parental rights of the biological father had been previously terminated. DCS Exh. 16.

iv. Prior to his current kinship placement through DCS, Child was living with other people due to Mother's homelessness and relapse.

v. Now, in July 2024, Child is before this Court on a petition to terminate the rights of his adoptive Mother.

vi. He is currently in kinship placement with foster parents who have indicated they want to adopt him. Child refers to them as Mom and Dad.

vii. Child has therapeutic services with a counselor from Valley Oak Health who works with him on school issues [and] his aggression with other children.

viii. Child and Mother were having supervised virtual visits through Counseling Partners during August and September 2023. Because of [an] excess of “no show no call” visits, she was terminated from services.

ix. Thereafter, Mother had remote visits supervised by a PAKT.[2]

x. [Child's] visit supervisor reported that Mother was often late for visits, typically close to 15 minutes late. Moreover, she sometimes missed visits without prior notification. This visit supervisor believed these missed visits or the uncertainty of late visits negatively impacted Child and, therefore, implemented a procedure by which Mother was to call 24 hours in advance to confirm that she would visit. (Todd Decker W5).

xi. Child has an individual therapist with Valley Oaks Health to address his defiance, aggression and ability to cope. (Monica Wampler W3).

xii. His therapist believes that his defiance, aggression and inability to cope are the result of past trauma from frequently moving from home to home.

xiii. This therapist has worked with Child for about a year. She believes that Child may not completel[y] understand what a “Mom” is, but now that he has had some stability and consistency, refers to his foster mother as “Mom.”

xiv. Per his therapist, Child needs boundaries, consistency and a permanent caregiver with whom he can bond, build a relationship and form an attachment.

xv. Child's therapist believes he is making progress; that he is calmer during their sessions. Child avoids talking about Mother and quickly changes the subject when he asks about her. He does talk about his foster parents.

xvi. Child also has a school case manager through Valley Oaks Health. Child receives support in the classroom and individually as well. Child and the case manager are working through modeling, prompting and roleplaying. He is making progress in expressing and identifying his emotions and his physical aggression i[s] declining.

xvii. Because Child needs consistency, and assurance that he will be with a family forever, the Court finds that it is in his best interest to terminate the parental rights of Mother who has not been consistent and reliant [sic] in her relationship with him.

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xix. Child's CASA volunteer who has a relationship with the [C]hild and whose role it is to be the [C]hild's voice, believes that termination of Mother's rights and adoption by his current foster parents in his best interest.

d. The DCS has a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Child, which is adoption by his current foster parents.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 8-11. Accordingly, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights over Child. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Mother challenges the trial court's termination of her parental rights over Child. We begin our review of this issue by acknowledging that “[t]he traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Bailey v. Tippecanoe Cnty. Div. of Fam. & Child. (In re M.B.), 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. Schultz v. Porter Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re K.S.), 750 N.E.2d 832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where a child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. Although the right to raise one's own child should not be terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities. Id. at 836.

[9] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS must file a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship. As the Indiana General Assembly has provided:

(c) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

(d) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege the existence of one (1) or more of the following circumstances:

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(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child․

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4. If the court finds that the allegations in the petition are true, “the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a). DCS's “burden of proof in termination of parental rights cases is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’ ” R.Y. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re G.Y.), 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009) (quoting I.C. § 31-37-14-2).

[10] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Peterson v. Marion Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re D.D.), 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover, in deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the court's judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Judy S. v. Noble Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re L.S.), 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.

[11] Here, in terminating Mother's parental rights, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon. When a trial court's judgment contains special findings and conclusions, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences support the trial court's decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208.

[12] Mother does not challenge any of the factual findings made by the trial court. When findings of fact are unchallenged, this Court accepts them as true. L.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re S.S.), 120 N.E.3d 605, 608 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). As such, if the unchallenged findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment, we will affirm. Kitchell v. Franklin, 26 N.E.3d 1050, 1059 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.

[13] On appeal, Mother challenges the court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal will not be remedied, and that the termination of the parent-child relationship is in Child's best interests.³ We address each argument in turn.

Remedy

[14] Mother first challenges the court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal from her care or the reasons for the continued placement outside of her home will not be remedied. To make that determination, the trial court should judge Mother's fitness to care for the Child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. See E.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re E.M.), 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). However, the court must also “evaluate the parent's habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child[ren].” Moore v. Jasper Cnty. Dep't of Child Servs., 894 N.E.2d 218, 226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quotations and citations omitted). Pursuant to this rule, courts have properly considered evidence of a parent's prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment. Id. Moreover, DCS is not required to rule out all possibilities of change; rather, it need establish only that there is a reasonable probability the parent's behavior will not change. Id.

[15] Here, Mother contends that the court erred when it determined that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the reasons for the continued placement outside of Mother's home will not be remedied because she “made substantial progress.” Appellant's Br. at 12. In particular, Mother alleges that the reasons for Child's removal were her “homelessness and drug use,” but that she “subsequently obtained appropriate housing.” Id.

[16] However, contrary to Mother's contention, the court's findings do not suggest that she had remedied her housing situation. Rather, the court found, and Mother does not challenge, that “the current FCM cannot confirm that Mother is not yet again homeless.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 9. Further, Mother's homelessness was not the only reason for Child's removal or the continued placement outside of Mother's home. It was also Mother's admitted use of methamphetamine that caused DCS to remove Child from her home. Furthermore, Mother fails to acknowledge that she continued to test positive for methamphetamine. On DCS's petition, within two months of the prior fact-finding hearing, she had a positive drug test, and subsequently did not submit to testing in July, missing a drug test just two days prior to the hearing.

[17] In addition, Mother has not remediated her drug use and housing situation, nor has she successfully completed any service. She was discharged from her first visitation provider for failing to appear at visits. And while she was initially successful with a second visit facilitator, with visits progressing from virtual to in-home, the visits ultimately regressed back to virtual after Mother tested positive for methamphetamine. Further, Mother failed to complete a family functional assessment, a substance use disorder assessment, and a clinical interview and assessment, and she was ultimately discharged from individual counseling.

[18] Based on the totality of the circumstances, we agree that the court's unchallenged findings support its conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the reasons for his continued placement outside of Mother's care will not likely be remedied. Mother's arguments on appeal are simply requests for this Court to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do.

Best Interests

[19] Mother also challenges the court's conclusion that termination of the parent-child relationship is in Child's best interests. In determining what is in a child's best interests, a court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and consider the totality of the evidence. A.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re A.K.), 924 N.E.2d 212, 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). A parent's historical inability to provide “adequate housing, stability, and supervision,” in addition to the parent's current inability to do so, supports the conclusion that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. Id. at 221.

[20] When making its decision, the court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child. See Stewart v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re J.S.), 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “The court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship.” Id. Moreover, this Court has previously held that recommendations of the family case manager and court-appointed special advocate to terminate parental rights, coupled with evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. Id.

[21] The entirety of Mother's argument on this issue is as follows:

The fact that Mother allegedly cannot provide the perfect home for the child is irrelevant under the best interest standard. Termination of parental rights is designated to be a last resort, available only when all other reasonable efforts have failed. Case law does not require that persons be model parents.

Appellant's Br. at 15-16 (citations omitted). Stated differently, Mother appears to argue that the court erred when it concluded that termination of her parental rights is in Child's best interests based only on Mother's living situation. However, as outlined above, Mother's issues go beyond her housing problems and include continued, un-remediated methamphetamine use.

[22] As the unchallenged findings demonstrate, Mother has not shown that she is capable of being a sober caregiver or otherwise parenting Child. Mother had the opportunity to participate in a multitude of services designed to help her achieve and maintain sobriety, obtain safe and suitable housing, and learn to adequately provide for the care and safety of Child. But Mother did not make any significant progress in any of the services offered.

[23] Child needs permanency. At the time of the termination hearing, Child had been removed from Mother's care for approximately nineteen months. Child's case manager testified that Child had behavioral problems and that he was making progress in therapy but that his behavior would “significantly decline” after visits with Mother. Tr. at 25. And Child's CASA testified that termination of Mother's parental rights would be in Child's best interest. Mother's continued drug use and her refusal to participate in services, coupled with the testimony from Child's case manager and CASA, support the court's determination that termination of Mother's rights is in Child's best interests.

Conclusion

[24] The trial court's unchallenged findings support its conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the reasons for Child's removal or continued placement outside of the home will not be remedied and that termination of the parental rights is in Child's best interests. The trial court did not clearly err when it terminated Mother's parental rights over Child. We therefore affirm the trial court's order.

[25] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother is Child's biological aunt who adopted Child as a single parent, so there is no father.

2.   The record does not indicate what a PAKT is.

3.   Mother also purports to challenge the court's conclusion that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child's well-being. However, the court did not make any such conclusion. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 8-11.

Bailey, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.