Shannon Brady, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Shannon Brady refused to leave a Walmart store the day after Walmart staff notified him that he had been previously banned from Walmart. Brady was charged with and convicted of criminal trespass. Brady appeals and presents a single issue for our review: Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In 2018, Brady pled guilty to committing theft at a Walmart store in Evansville, Indiana. Due to this incident, Brady was banned from Walmart stores “[i]ndefinitely.” Tr. Vol. II at 16. On August 13, 2023, Brady was caught shoplifting at a different Walmart store, and he was later convicted of theft on December 11. Nine days later, on December 20, Brady returned to the Evansville Walmart store. Craig Young, an asset protection officer for Walmart who was working on the day Brady was banned back in 2018, recognized Brady as someone who had been banned because he was caught stealing from Walmart. Young approached Brady and asked him to leave, telling Brady that he had been banned from visiting Walmart stores. Brady initially “blew up” about being asked to leave, Tr. Vol. II at 8, but he left once Officer Reed of the Evansville Police Department arrived and notified him that he had to leave. Not long after this initial confrontation, Brady came back into the Walmart store and started talking to Young and Officer Reed. Brady eventually left “[a]fter repeatedly being told to leave.” Id. at 20.

[4] Undaunted, the following morning, Brady returned to the Walmart store. Young contacted law enforcement. Officer Reed responded and asked Brady to leave the store, but Brady refused. “After telling [Brady] repeatedly” that he had to leave Walmart, Tr. Vol. II at 20, and what the consequences would be for not leaving, Officer Reed cited Brady for trespass. The State charged Brady with criminal trespass as a Class A misdemeanor, and the trial court found him guilty as charged. Brady now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support Brady's Criminal Trespass Conviction

[5] Brady argues that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to support his conviction for criminal trespass as a Class A misdemeanor. Our standard of review is:

Sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims trigger a deferential standard of review in which we “neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the jury.” Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018). A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if “there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015). In conducting that review, we consider only the evidence that supports the jury's determination, not evidence that might undermine it. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024).

Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024).

[6] To convict Brady of criminal trespass as a Class A misdemeanor under Indiana Code section 35-43-2-2(b)(1), the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, without having a contractual interest in the property, he “knowingly or intentionally refus[ed] to leave the real property of another person after having been asked to leave by the other person or that person's agent.” A conviction for criminal trespass can be supported by circumstantial evidence alone. Kifer v. State, 137 N.E.3d 990, 992 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 133 (Ind. 2016)). In contesting the sufficiency of the evidence, Brady specifically argues only that the State failed to prove that he did not have a contractual interest in Walmart.

[7] “In proving the lack of a contractual interest, the State need not ‘disprove every conceivable contractual interest’ that a defendant might have obtained in the real property at issue.” Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 143 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Fleck v. State, 508 N.E.2d 539, 541 (Ind. 1987)). The State can prove this element by showing that (1) the defendant was neither an employee nor owner of the business he was trespassed from and (2) the individual who trespassed him had the authority to ask customers to leave. Id.

[8] Here, Young told Brady that he had been banned from entering the Walmart store, and Brady returned to the store the following day. Regarding Brady's contractual interest in Walmart, at trial, the State asked Young whether Brady was employed by Walmart or had any interest in the property, and Young replied “And [sic] employee for Walmart? I'm unaware of that.” Tr. Vol. II at 11. Brady seems to argue that Young was required to answer, “no.” Appellant's Brief at 10. Brady claims this testimony was the only evidence related to Brady's contractual interest and it fails to show that he did not have a contractual interest in the property. We disagree. Taken all together, (1) Young's testimony, a 25-year employee who was unaware of Brady being employed at Walmart, (2) the evidence of Brady being indefinitely banned from Walmart stores in 2018, (3) his conviction for theft at a Walmart store days before the present offense, and (4) the fact that Brady had been trespassed from the Walmart store the previous day, the evidence supports the reasonable inference that Brady did not have a contractual interest in Walmart. Thus, the State presented sufficient evidence to convict Brady, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[9] Affirmed.

Felix, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Foley, J., concur.