A.B., Appellant-Respondent v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A.B. challenges the order awarding wardship of him to the Department of Correction (“DOC”) for his delinquency adjudication. The only restated issue he raises on appeal is whether the failure to identify him as a dual status child constituted a fundamental error that denied him due process. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] A.B. was born on September 2, 2008. His family has a history of involvement with the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”), including “47 DCS assessments” of his family for child abuse and/or neglect. App. at 15. In 2009, DCS filed a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) petition as to A.B. due to the substance abuse of A.B.’s mother (“Mother”). Mother subsequently completed court-ordered participation in drug court and the CHINS case was closed.

[3] In April 2020, A.B. was adjudicated a delinquent child for a battery-related offense. He was placed in the Youth Care Center but then released to Mother's care. In September 2020, A.B. was again adjudicated a delinquent child for battery, disorderly conduct, and criminal mischief. A.B. was initially placed in the Youth Care Center but then released to Damar for a “diagnostic evaluation.” Id. at 13. After the evaluation was completed, A.B. was placed on probation and released into Mother's care. A.B. successfully completed probation and his case was “closed satisfactorily” on May 29, 2021. Id.

[4] In June 2022, DCS again filed a CHINS petition as to A.B., and the next month the trial court ordered that A.B. was a CHINS under cause number 82D04-2206-JC-977.¹ In August 2022, while the CHINS case was pending, A.B. was adjudicated a delinquent child for possession of a firearm and was placed at the Transitions Academy. The Preliminary Inquiry Report completed for A.B. on August 10 stated, “Child is presently adjudicated to be a Child in Need of Services in Cause No. 82D04-2206-JC-000977,” and “Child was previously adjudicated to be a delinquent child in Cause No. 82D04-2009-JD-001304,” but also stated that “Child has NOT been identified as a dual status child,” and “Child should NOT be referred for an assessment by a Dual Status Assessment Team.” Cause No. 82D04-2208-JD-1148, Report Filed 8/10/22 at 13 (emphasis original).²

[5] In February 2023, A.B.’s placement at Transitions Academy was “no longer found appropriate” due to “a new Battery charge that occurred at Transitions.” App. at 14. In March 2023, A.B. was committed to the DOC. In October 2023, DCS's wardship over A.B. was terminated because A.B. had been made a ward of DOC in March, and the CHINS case was closed. On January 29, 2024, A.B. was released from the DOC and placed on parole.

[6] In June 2024, while A.B. was still on parole, he pointed a firearm at another juvenile's head and threatened to kill him. The State alleged A.B. was a delinquent child for committing an act that would be Level 5 felony intimidation ³ if committed by an adult. The Preliminary Inquiry Report completed on July 9, 2024, stated, “Child is presently adjudicated to be a Child in Need of Services in Cause No. 82D04-2206-JC-000977,” even though that CHINS case had been closed in October 2023. App. at 19. The Report also stated, “Child was previously adjudicated to be a delinquent child in Cause No. 82D04-2009-JD-001304[,]” “Child has NOT been identified as a dual status child[,]” and “Child should NOT be referred for an assessment by a Dual Status Assessment Team.” Id. (emphasis original).

[7] At the July 12 initial hearing, A.B. was represented by counsel and admitted to the intimidation allegation. No one raised the issue of whether A.B. was a dual status child. The court found A.B. to be a delinquent child and set a dispositional hearing. A July 30, 2024, Predispositional Report completed by a juvenile probation officer identified the following multiple “services” that had been provided to A.B. over the years:

Comprehensive Multidisciplinary Psychological/Risk Evaluation at Damar

Prior Detentions

Formal Probation Services

Home-Based Services

CHINS Services

Transitions Academy Residential Placement

Indiana Department of Corrections [sic] Commitment

Youth Villages, served time at YCC on several occasions, benefitted from being too young, probation for a period of 6 months, Intense Intercept Services through Youth Villages, lecture and release, Transitions Academy (found to be no longer suitable), 3/17/2023 - Committed to the Indiana Department of Corrections, and 1/29/2024 - Released from Indiana Department of Corrections and placed on parole[.]

Id. at 46.

[8] At the August 9 dispositional hearing, A.B. appeared with counsel. The probation department recommended that A.B. be placed in the DOC,

due to the serious nature of the offense, the Juvenile admitting to being under the influence of alcohol during this incident, the Juvenile recently being released from the Indiana Department of Corrections [sic] on 1/29/24. He was placed on parole. Parole ended due to this incident. The Juvenile being found not suitable for Transitions Academy and he's exhausted all services through this Court as this is his tenth referral to the Court at only 15 [years of age].

Tr. at 13. The State agreed with that recommendation.

[9] A.B. did not raise the issue of his possible dual status but requested leniency because he had taken responsibility for his actions by admitting to the allegation. A.B.’s counsel noted that A.B. had “probably exhausted all services through this Court,” but nevertheless requested that A.B. be placed somewhere other than the DOC. Id. A.B.’s counsel stated: “I'd like to see a different path for him. I'm not sure what that is, but he is only 15 and I just—I don't know what the answer is, but if the Court has any leniency on that that's what I would ask for.” Id. at 14.

[10] The trial court granted wardship of A.B. to the DOC. In so doing, the court stated, in part:

We have provided you with all of the services that we have available through this Court to teach you a different way to think, a different way to be, a different way to live, and it so far hasn't worked out. And I am left only with the Department of Correction. So we're at a point where basically we've tried the rehabilitative efforts. It's punitive at this point. I mean, I just don't have anything else that we can give to you to try and help you.

Id.

[11] The written dispositional order stated, in part:

That there does not exist any viable options for the care and treatment of said child in the community because previous out-patient (and/or inpatient) services have proven ineffective and there are no facilities available at the present time, which meet the needs of the child.

It is in the best interest of the child and the community that the child receives DOC services because the child has multiple treatment needs, including substance abuse, criminal thinking, educational, and mental health needs that only the DOC can effectively handle simultaneously and the child's criminal and risk-taking behaviors as evidenced by these and/or past delinquent acts could lead to mental or physical injuries to himself.

App. at 48 (emphasis omitted). This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[12] A.B. challenges the juvenile court's dispositional order that he be made a ward of the DOC rather than placement somewhere else. Specifically, he alleges that the court violated his due process rights by failing to recognize him as a dual status child and refer him to a dual status assessment team as required by state law because such an assessment “may have” identified an alternative placement and/or services. Appellant's Br. at 17. However, A.B. did not raise these issues before the trial court. “Where a party fails to alert a trial court to a due process argument, that argument is waived for appeal.” M.H. v. State, 199 N.E.3d 1240, 1245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing Harris v. State, 165 N.E.3d 91, 99 (Ind. 2021)). Moreover, A.B. does not allege that the trial court's error was fundamental, such that we would address the error despite his failure to raise it in the trial court. Therefore, A.B. has waived his due process claim.

[13] Nevertheless, we chose to address whether the trial court committed fundamental error by failing to acknowledge A.B.’s dual status.⁴ “An error is fundamental if it made a fair trial impossible or was a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of due process that presented an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.” Miller v. State, 188 N.E.3d 871, 874 (Ind. 2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

[14] The due process clause is applicable to juvenile proceedings. See, e.g., Harris, 165 N.E.3d at 98 (“Children in the juvenile justice system have many of the same due process rights guaranteed to adults accused of crimes, plus a few extra protections.”). “The standard for determining what due process requires in a particular juvenile delinquency proceeding is fundamental fairness.” J.B. v. State, 205 N.E.3d 244, 250 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The failure to properly follow statutory requirements can lead to a violation of a person's procedural due process rights. See A.P. v. Porter Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 734 N.E.2d 1107, 1112-13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied.

[15] When a child is alleged to be delinquent, an intake officer “shall ․ complete a dual status screening tool on the child,” Ind. Code § 31-37-8-1, “to determine whether [the] child meets the criteria for being a dual status child,” I.C. § 31-41-1-3. Indiana law provides that “a child who is alleged to be or is presently adjudicated” as both a CHINS and a delinquent child is a “dual status child.” I.C. § 31-41-1-2(1). A child is also a dual status child if the child is alleged to be delinquent and was previously adjudicated to be a CHINS but the wardship to DCS has been “terminated.” I.C. § 31-41-1-2(4). In the latter situation, a juvenile court “may refer the child to be assessed by a dual status assessment team,” I.C. § 31-41-2-1 (emphasis added), for an assessment of the child's “(1) status; (2) best interests; (3) need for services; and (4) level of needs, strengths, and risks of the child,” I.C. § 31-41-1-4. In the former situation—i.e., where the child is currently a CHINS—the court “shall be referred to the dual status assessment team” for such an assessment. I.C. § 31-41-2-1 (emphasis added).

[16] Here, although A.B.’s 2024 preliminary and predispositional reports both indicated A.B. had an open CHINS case and was alleged to be delinquent, both reports nevertheless stated that A.B. was not a dual status child, and neither report recommended that A.B. be referred for an assessment by a Dual Status Assessment Team. Those reports were incorrect to the extent they concluded that A.B. had an open CHINS case—his CHINS case had closed in October 2023. However, those reports were also incorrect when they stated that A.B. is not a dual status child—since he previously had been adjudicated to be a CHINS but the wardship to DCS had been terminated, he was a dual status child under Indiana Code Section 31-41-1-2(4). Because A.B. was a dual status child under that subsection, the trial court had discretion whether to order that he be assessed by a Dual Status Assessment Team for a determination of his best interests, need for services, and risks. See I.C. § 31-41-1-2(4); I.C. § 31-41-2-1.

[17] The trial court, however, did not abuse its discretion, much less commit fundamental error, by failing to issue such an order. As all parties and the trial court agreed, A.B. had exhausted all the services the court could order for him other than a wardship to the DOC. Therefore, a dual status assessment was unnecessary and, indeed, would have been futile to the extent A.B. sought services other than DOC placement. Although A.B. contends on appeal that “[o]ther dispositional alternatives, testing, and services may have been available had a dual status assessment team reviewed A.B.’s circumstances,” that is pure speculation and has no support in the record. Appellant's Br. at 17. The trial court's failure to refer A.B. to a Dual Status Assessment Team did not violate his due process rights by denying him “fundamental fairness,” J.B., 205 N.E.3d at 250, or presenting “an undeniable and substantial potential for harm,” Miller, 188 N.E.3d at 874.

Conclusion

[18] The trial court did not commit fundamental error when it failed to refer A.B. to a Dual Status Assessment Team, as such a referral was within the trial court's discretion and would have been futile.

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The relevant court records from A.B.’s CHINS case are not included in the record on appeal. However, we are able to access the court documents in Cause Number 82D04-2206-JC-977 via Indiana's Odyssey Case Management System, and we take judicial notice of those records. See Ind. Evidence Rule 201(b)(5) (“A court may judicially notice a law, which includes ․ records of a court of this state ․”).

2.   Accessed via Odyssey.

3.   Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(a), (b)(2)(A).

4.   As our Supreme Court has held, “where the interests, rights, and privileges of juveniles are involved, appellate courts may search the record and determine issues inherent therein.” A.P. v. Porter Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 734 N.E.2d 1107, 1115 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Hicks v. State, 230 N.E.2d 757, 758 (Ind. 1967)) (addressing an issue despite the juvenile's failure to raise it on appeal), trans. denied.

Bailey, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.