SCHMIDT v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Following a jury trial, the La Porte Circuit Court entered judgment of conviction against William H. Schmidt for Level 5 felony intimidation and Level 5 felony criminal recklessness. Schmidt appeals his convictions and argues that the State did not present sufficient evidence to support them.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On April 11, 2021, William Schmidt lived with his then-girlfriend, Nicole Cygan. At some point that day, they left to go to a shooting range. However, the road to get to the range was closed, so they decided to return home.

[4] After they had returned, Cygan's seventeen-year-old daughter, Mia, arrived. Mia refused to eat the dinner that Schmidt had made. Schmidt grew angry over Mia's refusal to eat the dinner, and an argument between them ensued.

[5] Schmidt and Mia's argument moved outside of the house and near Schmidt's car. At one point, Mia asked Schmidt, “are you always this psycho?” Tr. Vol. 3, p. 7. Schmidt responded by retrieving a gun case from his vehicle and throwing it on the ground in front of Mia while saying, “are you scared of me now little girl?” Id. Schmidt also repeatedly told Cygan to call her “boys.” Id. at 30. Cygan understood Schmidt to have meant police officers when he said “boys” because she used to work with police when she was a deputy coroner. Id. at 22. After the confrontation, Mia left the residence.

[6] After she left, Mia called and texted Cygan multiple times and asked Cygan to leave as well. At one point, Cygan told Mia, “if I die, it's because [Schmidt] shot me.” Id. at 32. Concerned for her mother's safety, Mia eventually called 911 and asked for officers to be sent to the house.

[7] Before any officers arrived, and while Schmidt and Cygan were both in the kitchen, Schmidt shot two bullets at one of the windows that faced toward a neighboring house. Id. After shooting through the window, Schmidt punched the remaining glass out of the window frame. Thankfully, both bullets struck the ground outside the window, harming no one.

[8] Four uniformed officers arrived at the house with their lights and sirens turned off, which is common practice when responding to domestic calls. La Porte Police Department Officer Brandon Wilkerson knocked on the door, Cygan exited the house alone, and the two of them spoke briefly. While they spoke, Sergeant Brian Favia was near the street and had a clear view of the front door. Cygan eventually walked away from the door, diagonally from Officer Wilkerson and Sergeant Favia.

[9] Schmidt came out of the front door seconds after Cygan had walked away from Officer Wilkerson. Schmidt was holding a rifle, which he pointed in Sergeant Favia's direction, and shouted, “I'm right here, bro.” Id. at 100. Sergeant Favia took cover behind a pickup truck parked on the street. Officer Wilkerson told Schmidt to drop his weapon. Schmidt complied, and Officer Wilkerson handcuffed him. Schmidt, who was too intoxicated to be placed in jail, was transported to a hospital.

[10] Inside the residence, the officers found broken window glass and blood throughout the kitchen. The window screen for the window was on the ground outside and had two bullet holes in it. The officers also confirmed that there was no damage to the neighboring home.

[11] The State charged Schmidt with Level 5 felony intimidation, and the charging information read as follows:

SCHMIDT did knowingly or intentionally communicate a threat, with the intent that another person be placed in fear that the threat of unlawfully injuring a person or damaging property will be carried out, and said offense was committed while drawing a deadly weapon, to wit: pointed a rifle at Sgt. Favia and [in] the vicinity [of] Nicole Cygan, and said “I'm right here, bro”, causing Favia to take cover behind a truck.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 24. The State also charged Schmidt with Level 5 felony criminal recklessness for shooting a firearm into a place where people are likely to gather and in Cygan's presence. Id.

[12] Schmidt's jury trial commenced on December 11, 2023. Schmidt testified on his own behalf and stated that the gun went off by accident and discharged twice due to a bump-firing mechanism. He also testified that he punched the remaining glass in the window because he was upset with himself for allowing the gun to discharge accidentally.

[13] The jury found Schmidt guilty, and the trial court entered judgment of conviction for Level 5 felony intimidation and Level 5 felony criminal recklessness. The trial court sentenced Schmidt to an aggregate sentence of four years executed in the Department of Correction, which he does not challenge in this appeal.

[14] Schmidt now appeals the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions.

Discussion and Decision

[15] Schmidt contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his convictions for Level 5 felony intimidation and Level 5 felony criminal recklessness. Our standard of review is well settled.

When an appeal raises “a sufficiency of evidence challenge, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses ․” We consider only the probative evidence and the reasonable inferences that support the [judgment]. “We will affirm ‘if the probative evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence could have allowed a reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”

Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1195 (Ind. 2018) (quoting Joslyn v. State, 942 N.E.2d 809, 811 (Ind. 2011)).

[16] We first consider Schmidt's challenge to his intimidation conviction. The State charged Schmidt for threatening Sergeant Favia by “pointing a rifle at [him] [while in] ‘the vicinity’ of Cygan and saying, ‘I'm right here, bro,’ ” and Schmidt did so “with the intent that [Sergeant Favia] be placed in fear of retaliation for a prior lawful act.” Appellee's Br. at 7, 9 (quoting Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 24); see also Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1.

[17] Although Schmidt argues that his statement and display of his weapon were lawful under the Fourth Amendment because the officers covertly entered onto Cygan's property, his argument is more akin to a “Castle Doctrine” argument under Indiana Code section 35-41-3-2.¹ The statute provides, in relevant part, that under certain circumstances a person may be justified in using reasonable force against a public servant. However,

a person is not justified in using force against a public servant if:

(1) the person is committing or is escaping after the commission of a crime;

***

(4) the person reasonably believes the public servant is:

(A) acting lawfully; or

(B) engaged in the lawful execution of the public servant's official duties.

[18] Schmidt's argument that the officers presented a “threat” to which he could lawfully respond with a show of force is simply a request for us to reweigh evidence, which we will not do. First, the State presented evidence that, when responding to domestic disturbances, La Porte Police Department officers do not use sirens or lights when entering a property, especially if doing so could jeopardize the safety of one of the residents.

[19] Second, the State established that the uniformed officers had a legitimate investigatory purpose for being on the property and admitted bodycam footage to show that the officers were on the street and walkways leading up to the house. Schmidt therefore was not justified in using or threatening to use force against the officers because they were responding to a 911 call and were engaged in the lawful execution of their official duties.

[20] Schmidt also argues that his statement, “I'm right here, bro” is insufficient to qualify as a threat because he did not know that the individuals outside of his home were police officers responding to a 911 call. But, while Cygan was on the phone with her daughter, Schmidt told Cygan to “call your boys.” Tr. Vol. 3, p. 30. Cygan understood Schmidt's statement to mean that Cygan should call the police. Id. Schmidt's contention that he did not know that the individuals outside the house were police officers is also a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.

[21] Indeed, whether a statement constitutes a threat is an objective question for the trier of fact to determine. B.B. v. State, 141 N.E.3d 856, 860 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). “Intent is a mental function and, absent a confession, usually must be proved by circumstantial evidence.” Merriweather v. State, 128 N.E.3d 503, 515 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. A defendant's intent may be proven by circumstantial evidence alone, with the fact-finder inferring intent from the facts and circumstances of the case. B.B., 141 N.E.3d at 860. In Brewington v. State, our supreme court held that “ ‘true threats’ under Indiana law depend on two necessary elements: that the speaker intend his communications to put his targets in fear for their safety, and that the communications were likely to actually cause such fear in a reasonable person similarly situated to the target.” 7 N.E.3d 946, 964 (Ind. 2014).

[22] Here, the jury determined Schmidt's statement constituted a threat. Sergeant Favia took cover after he saw Schmidt holding the gun and heard Schmidt say, “I'm right here, bro.” Tr. Vol. 3, p. 100. From that evidence, the jury reasonably concluded that Schmidt intended to intimidate the police by threatening to shoot them. Schmidt's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is another request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.

[23] Turning to Schmidt's criminal recklessness conviction, the State charged Schmidt with “recklessly, knowingly or intentionally perform[ing] an act that creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person ․ by shooting a firearm into a place where people are likely to gather ․ while in a state of intoxication.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 24; see also I.C. 35-42-2-2(b)(2). Schmidt argues that, because the shots were fired into the ground of Cygan's property, “no reasonable juror could conclude that Schmidt shot into the neighbor's home.” Appellant's Br. at 4, 14.

[24] However, the State did not need to prove that Schmidt actually shot into the neighbor's home. Rather, the State needed to prove that he shot “into an inhabited dwelling or other building or place where people are likely to gather.” I.C. 35-42-2-2(b)(2) (emphases added). There is no reasonable question that a “place where people are likely to gather” includes the property surrounding a residence. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 232. Place is defined as “[a] particular part or region of space; a physical locality, a locale; a spot, a location.” Oxford English Dictionary, available at http://www.oed.com. And we agree with the State that the common ordinary meaning of “place” would include a residential yard. For this reason, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to support Schmidt's criminal recklessness conviction.

Conclusion

[25] For all of these reasons, the State presented sufficient evidence to prove that Schmidt committed Level 5 felony intimidation and Level 5 felony criminal recklessness.

[26] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Schmidt also directs our attention to Trimble v. State, which provides that “police entry onto private property and their observations do not violate the Fourth Amendment when the police have a legitimate investigatory purpose for being on the property and limit their entry to places visitors would be expected to go, such as walkways, driveways, and porches.” 842 N.E.2d 798, 802 (Ind. 2006). Schmidt relies on Trimble to argue that the officers’ actions were unlawful because they did not enter Cygan's property conspicuously. See Appellant's Br. at 10. Schmidt's argument in this regard is a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.

Mathias, Judge.

Brown, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.