IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of S.F. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] K.A. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to S.F., A.T., and K.W. (collectively, “Children”) on the petition of the Department of Child Services (“DCS”). She argues DCS did not present clear and convincing evidence to support termination. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother has two daughters, S.F. (born in 2015)¹ and A.T. (born in 2012),² and one son, K.W. (born in 2019).³ In September 2022, DCS received a report S.F. had been sexually abused by two men, including Mother's boyfriend (“Boyfriend”), who was living in the home. Mother did not believe S.F., refused to engage in a protection plan for Children, and allowed Boyfriend to continue to stay in the house. DCS removed S.F. and A.T. and placed them with a family friend. K.W. remained in the home. On September 21, 2022, DCS filed petitions alleging S.F. and A.T. were Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”).

[3] DCS then received a report that domestic violence had occurred twice between Mother and Boyfriend in front of K.W. During a physical altercation between the couple on October 31, K.W. attempted to pull Boyfriend off Mother. Boyfriend pushed K.W., and Mother shoved K.W. out of a bedroom window to safety. On November 6, law enforcement responded to a second domestic disturbance at the home; Boyfriend was armed, disobeyed officers’ commands, and was arrested. Mother reported Boyfriend had hit her twice in the head with a gun in K.W.’s presence. DCS also learned Mother was abusing alcohol and using illegal drugs. DCS alleged K.W. was a CHINS on December 29 due to domestic violence and illicit drug use in the home. On January 26, 2023, Mother brought K.W. to an initial hearing on the CHINS petition but appeared to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. DCS filed an amended CHINS petition and removed K.W. from Mother's care. At first, DCS placed K.W. in foster care; later that year, he was placed in the same home as his sisters.

[4] The trial court adjudicated Children CHINS on March 27, 2023, after Mother entered a “deny and submit” agreement as to S.F. and A.T. and admitted the allegations as to K.W. The trial court entered a dispositional decree, ordering Mother to, among other things: keep all appointments with service providers; enroll in all programs recommended by the Family Case Manager (“FCM”); not use or consume any illegal controlled substances or alcohol; complete parenting, substance use, and domestic violence assessments and follow all recommendations; submit to random drug screens; and attend all scheduled visits with Children.

[5] Mother's participation in services over the life of the case varied. In early 2023, she regularly attended supervised visits with Children. At a May 2023 case review hearing, she was “partially compliant” with the DCS case plan, having begun many services DCS offered. Ex. Vol. 1 at 48. She did not complete her substance use assessment on April 11 because she attempted to falsify a urine screen and then could not provide a urine sample. DCS referred Mother to Centerstone Recovery Center, an alcohol and drug addiction treatment facility. Mother attended but left the program three days later to go to B.T.’s funeral and never returned. Mother cooperated with DCS but was not making much progress.

[6] Mother's attendance at supervised visits fell off in July. After an August 2023 permanency hearing, the trial court observed Mother “begins many of the programs and does not follow through with completion.” Id. at 52. For example, Mother finished only three of twelve online domestic violence classes. She inconsistently reported for random drug screens, and two of the three she took were positive for illegal drugs. Mother visited S.F. and K.W. once in November.

[7] By the December case review, Mother was noncompliant and had not completed any services offered through DCS, including the parenting assessment, domestic violence classes, and home-based casework. Mother continued to see Boyfriend. When FCM Regan Haines visited Mother's home in December, Mother “had two black eyes, her face was very swollen,” and Mother stated she had been drinking with Boyfriend “when he began to get into a physical altercation with her.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 46. Mother missed forty-nine random drug screens between September 2023 and February 2024. Mother left a second attempt at inpatient rehab in early 2024 and did not finish the program.

[8] On January 16, 2024, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights to Children. The trial court held an initial hearing on February 9. A little over a week later, emergency personnel used Narcan to revive Mother after she was found unresponsive by the road. Mother then attended and completed a month-long inpatient program in March. After leaving treatment, DCS asked her to complete five drug screens; she submitted to only one on May 6, which was negative for illegal drugs.

[9] The trial court held a fact-finding hearing on April 11 and May 20. Mother testified she was attending intensive outpatient therapy and going to alcoholics anonymous (“AA”) or narcotics anonymous (“NA”) meetings once per week. She testified she was trying her best since leaving inpatient treatment, and her attorney asked the trial court for “a little more time ․ to be in a position to take her children and parent them on her own.” Id. at 66.

[10] FCM Haines testified Mother visited with children and participated in therapy during the case but “none of our services were completed.” Id. at 40. Between February 2023 and February 2024, Mother completed at least twenty-two drug screens, sixteen of which were positive for illegal drugs. According to FCM Haines, Mother's service providers “feared for her life” because of “what her levels looked like on her drug screens.” Id. at 39. Many team meetings during the case consisted of providers “begging [Mother] to go into treatment and to stop her drug use” and “stay away from individuals who were abusing her.” Id. At the time of the termination hearing, Mother was still in “some sort of relationship” with Boyfriend and had never completed the domestic violence services. Id. at 49. FCM Haines explained the reasons she recommended termination of Mother's parental rights:

The kids have struggled for a while. They have a lot of trauma. Mom is not equipped ․, at this point, to deal with that trauma or to help the children through that trauma. Mom is not able to provide a safe and stable house and environment for the children, free from drug abuse and domestic violence. Mom is not willing to accept the sexual abuse done to [S.F.]. I don't believe at this time she would be able to keep them safe.

Id. at 52. Children's court appointed special advocate testified Children “need that continued stability” provided in their current placement. Id. at 64.

[11] On August 7, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights.

Standard of Review

[12] In a proceeding to terminate parental rights, the trial court must enter findings of fact that support its conclusions. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(c) (2012). “We confine our review to two steps: whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings, and then whether the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.” In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1170 (Ind. 2016) (quoting In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014)). We must accept as true trial court findings not challenged on appeal. See Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992).

[13] Out of deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will affirm the termination of parental rights unless the trial court's judgment is clearly erroneous. In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019), cert. denied. A termination decision is clearly erroneous “when the court's findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions, or when the legal conclusions do not support the ultimate decision.” Id. We neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. Id. And we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's judgment. Id.

Statutory Requirements for Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship

[14] Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children. Id. This right, however, is not absolute and may be terminated when parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. Id. at 45–46. “The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish parents, but to protect the children.” In re I.B., 933 N.E.2d 1264, 1270 (Ind. 2010) (quoting Egly v. Blackford Cnty. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1234 (Ind. 1992)).

[15] Because parental rights are “an important interest warranting deference and protection, and a termination of that interest is a ‘unique kind of deprivation,’ ” Indiana law sets a high bar to sever the parent-child relationship. In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 916–17 (Ind. 2011) (quoting Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)). To do so, DCS must prove four elements by clear and convincing evidence. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2019);⁴ I.C. § 31-37-14-2 (1997).

[16] Mother does not challenge that DCS proved the first and fourth statutory elements.⁵ Under the second element, DCS is required to prove one of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services[.]

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B). Third, DCS must prove “that termination is in the best interests of the child.” I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(C).

Clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court's termination decision.

[17] Under the second element, the trial court found there is a reasonable probability the conditions that resulted in Children's removal will not be remedied, see I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i), and there is a reasonable probability the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Children, see I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(ii). Yet Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive; therefore, the trial court need only find one of the three requirements of that element has been established. In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1133 (Ind. 2010). Because we find it dispositive here, we review only whether DCS established, by clear and convincing evidence, there is a reasonable probability the conditions that resulted Children's removal will not be remedied. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i).

[18] To make this determination, trial courts engage in a two-step analysis. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013). First, the trial court ascertains what conditions led to Children's placement outside the home, then it determines whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will not be remedied. Id. When making these decisions, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. But the trial court must balance any recent improvements against a parent's habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” Id. The evidence presented by DCS need not rule out all possibilities of change; DCS need only establish there is a reasonable probability the parent's behavior will not change. In re C.C., 153 N.E.3d 340, 348 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

[19] The trial court also found termination was in Children's best interests. When deciding whether termination is in the child's best interest, trial courts “must look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the children.” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. Children's need for permanency is a central concern. Id. “Indeed, ‘children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.’ ” Id. (quoting E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648). And trial courts “need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that the child's physical, mental and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648 (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235).

The evidence supports the findings.

[20] Mother first argues evidence does not support the following trial court findings:⁶

21. Mother did not comply with the Dispositional Order or otherwise show that she could remedy the conditions which resulted in Child's initial or continued removal. ․

22. Succinctly, Mother has taken no substantial steps to address the issues at the root of Child's initial and continued removal.

* * *

26. Based upon Mother's failure to comply with the requirements of the Dispositional Order or to otherwise illustrate the ability to safely and effectively parent Child, there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to Child's removal will not be remedied. Child was removed because Child lacked a safe, sober, and suitable legal caregiver to provide for Child's needs without exposing Child to a substantial risk of neglect or abuse. That continues to be true as of the Termination Hearing, and the evidence clearly and convincingly shows that Mother will not remedy those conditions in a manner that will safely and appropriate [sic] provide for Child's needs.

27. Child has no strong bond or connection to Mother. During the entire life of the CHINS Case, Mother made minimal efforts to be an active part of Child's life or see her on a regular basis. Mother did not visit consistently with Child at any time since DCS removed Child.

28. The lack of bond between Child and Mother is the direct result of Mother's failure to make sufficient efforts in this regard.[7]

29. Mother is not presently able to provide a home that is free from neglect and abuse to Child. Mother's refusal to engage in services and overall unwillingness to fill the parental role in Child's life shows that she is not presently able or willing to provide for Child's reasonable needs. As a result, Child would be at risk of substantial threat – both in terms of physical and mental health – if returned to Mother's care at this time. Mother has not exhibited any ability to provide the safety, stability, and structure Child needs to thrive.

30. In short, there is a reasonable probability that Child's physical, mental, and emotional health would be threatened or damaged by the continuation of Mother's parent-child relationship with Child. This is based on the risk of harm to Child's well-being that would be caused by forcing upon Child any form of relationship with a biological parent who has made minimal efforts to be a safe, loving, and appropriate parent to Child.[8] The witness testifying in this matter emphasized this point to varying degrees in her testimony, and the Court specifically finds her testimony to be strong, reliable, and credible.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 73–75.

[21] According to Mother, the findings can be summed up as follows: “(1) that [Mother] has done nothing to address the reasons for the children's removal; and (2) that [Mother] presently has no potential to be a parent.” Appellant's Br. at 18. It is this characterization Mother disputes, noting she successfully completed a thirty-day inpatient drug treatment program and at the May termination hearing had been sober since February and was attending AA or NA programs once per week. Mother contends her argument is not a request to reweigh evidence, but a claim the trial court erred by finding Mother did not “make any efforts” toward rehabilitation.

[22] The trial court's findings were more nuanced than Mother suggests in her brief. For example, in the termination orders concerning A.T. and K.W. (and S.F. at times), the trial court found Mother had made “no substantial steps” to remedy the conditions leading to Children's removal and “made minimal efforts” to visit with Children and be active in their lives. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 51–52, 73–74, 94–95 (emphasis added). And the record supports these findings. Mother initially visited with Children but stopped attending regularly in mid-2023; several months went by before she visited with Children again. After DCS removed A.T. and S.F., Mother appeared intoxicated at a CHINS hearing for K.W. Mother entered treatment once in 2023, left after three days, and did not return. She had sixteen positive drug tests from February 2023 to February 2024 and missed forty-nine random drug screens in half that time. Service providers were concerned for her life due to the results of her drug screens. She overdosed and had to be revived in February 2024. Although Mother subsequently completed an inpatient treatment program, she was newly sober at the termination hearing and had completed only one of five random drug screens. Although Mother at times attempted to maintain contact with Children and to address her drug and alcohol use problems, these facts support the trial court's characterization of Mother's efforts as minimal overall.

[23] But Mother is correct the trial court found she made “no efforts” toward maintaining a bond with and becoming a safe caregiver for S.F. Id. at 53. DCS removed S.F. from Mother's care after S.F. made credible allegations that two men Mother allowed in the home, including Boyfriend, sexually abused S.F. At the time of the termination hearing, Mother had not completed home-based counseling services or a parenting assessment, never acknowledged the sexual abuse occurred, and was still in some type of relationship with Boyfriend. In this way, the evidence supports the trial court's finding that Mother made no steps toward creating a safe home environment for S.F. or repairing her relationship with S.F. after denying S.F. suffered abuse.⁹

[24] The challenged findings were not clearly erroneous.

The findings support the judgment.

[25] Mother also argues the trial court's focus on her historical failures does not support the trial court's conclusions that (1) there is a reasonable probability the conditions that resulted in Children's removal will not be remedied, and (2) termination is in Children's best interests. Mother points to the finding in which the trial court summarizes Mother's noncompliance with the CHINS dispositional order:

a. Mother failed to maintain regular contact with DCS during the life of the CHINS Case. Despite FCM Haines making contact with Mother and attempting to get Mother to become involved in the CHINS Case and services related to Child, Mother did not communicate with FCM Haines more than a few times and did not finish any service in the CHINS Case.

b. Based on evidence presented, Mother failed to maintain suitable and stable income during the pendency of the CHINS Case, and she was not doing so as of the Termination Hearing.

c. Mother failed to submit to many random drug screens as required by the Dispositional Order, including 48 requested tests between September 2023 and February 2024. During 2023, when Mother did submit to random drug screens, she consistently tested positive for illegal drugs. In March 2024, Mother did complete a 30 day inpatient rehabilitation program. However, following the completion of that program, Mother failed to complete intake for random drug screens at Cordant testing services and failed to appear for all but one drug screen requested by DCS. DCS requested 5 drug screens between March 2024 and the Termination Hearing. Mother came in for one screen, which was negative. She failed to show up to for [sic] her drug screens 4 other times. The Court finds that even following a 30 day inpatient rehabilitation program, Mother was still avoiding drug screens through Cordant as well as screens by DCS. At the time of the Termination Hearing, the Court continues to have grave concerns regarding Mother's use of illegal drugs and lack of compliance with the Dispositional Order.

d. Mother either did not enroll in or failed to successfully complete any of the services required by the Dispositional Order, which included a substance abuse assessment, a parenting assessment, home-based counseling, a psychological evaluation, a domestic violence assessment, and any other services that would have been recommended as a result of these assessments and evaluations.

e. Mother has provided no physical or financial support for Child since Child's removal.

f. Overall, Mother has failed to show compliance with the requirements that Mother have present and consistent ability to provide Child with a safe, secure, and nurturing environment that is free from neglect and abuse.

Id. at 40-42 (order pertaining to S.F.).¹⁰

[26] To support her argument, Mother points to In re C.M., 960 N.E.2d 169 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), aff'd on reh'g, 963 N.E.2d 528 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). In that case, after a father was charged with battering his children, DCS removed them from his care, and the trial court adjudicated them CHINS. Id. at 171. The mother was in jail at the time. Id. After mother's release, she cooperated with DCS and visited consistently with children, so DCS placed them with mother on a trial home visit. Id. A few months later, mother tested positive for oxycodone; another month later, police found marijuana in mother's apartment and arrested mother's boyfriend. Id. at 172. DCS again removed the children and petitioned to terminate mother's parental rights. Id. At the termination hearing, mother testified she was living alone with newborn twins, DCS had not removed them, and she voluntarily enrolled in an intensive outpatient program during which all her drug screens had been negative. Id. The trial court terminated her parental rights. Id.

[27] On appeal, this Court reversed the termination order because the trial court “made no factual determinations with respect to evidence of changed conditions” or whether mother's testimony and evidence was credible. Id. at 174. Observing a trial court “is to judge parental fitness at the time of the termination hearing, while taking into consideration the evidence of changed conditions,” this Court held the trial court's findings were insufficient to establish each element necessary to support the termination decision. Id. at 175 (citing In re J.T., 742 N.E.2d 509, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied).

[28] Unlike in C.M., the trial court here entered factual findings concerning recent conditions, such as Mother's completion of the inpatient rehabilitation program. The trial court also found Mother was “avoiding” drug screens since her inpatient treatment. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 41. And the trial court expressed “grave concerns” about Mother's substance use and noncompliance with the dispositional order. Id. These findings show the trial court balanced Mother's recent efforts to achieve and maintain sobriety against her habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there was a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. This delicate balance was within the trial court's discretion. See E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643 (noting the trial court “has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination”).

[29] Finally, Mother argues DCS presented little evidence to support the termination decision, consisting of only thirty pages of transcript, and focused mainly on her substance use history. Observing substance use disorder is a profound illness and recovery often is a nonlinear process, Mother contends the nine months between the CHINS determination and when the termination petition was filed was insufficient time for her to show she can overcome addiction and DCS should not be permitted to “give up on” her so quickly. Appellant's Br. at 26.

[30] First, the relevant periods for termination of parental rights proceedings are determined by our legislature, and Mother does not argue DCS failed to meet its burden concerning Children's removal from the home, as required by Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(A). Accordingly, we will not disturb the judgment based on an allegation DCS did not provide Mother with sufficient time to demonstrate progress toward reunification.

[31] Moreover, although the transcript of the termination hearing was only thirty pages or so, DCS introduced hundreds of pages of supporting documentation, including records from the CHINS cases and service providers. Those documents show Mother made little progress over the life of this case and demonstrated a general lack of follow-through with services offered to help her address and manage her illness. In addition to Mother's substance use, DCS removed Children because of domestic violence and substantiated allegations of sexual abuse in the home at the hands of Boyfriend. At the termination hearing, FCM Haines testified Mother was still in a relationship with the alleged perpetrator, had not completed domestic violence services, and continued to deny sexual abuse occurred. When making a termination decision, trial courts “must look at the totality of the evidence” and “subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the children.” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. Children's need for permanency is a central concern, and Children need not wait indefinitely for Mother to create a home environment free of drug use, violence, and sexual abuse. Id. In sum, the trial court's findings support the judgment that there was a reasonable probability Mother would not remedy the conditions resulting in Children's removal and termination was in Children's best interests.

Conclusion

[32] The trial court did not clearly err in terminating Mother's parental rights to Children.

[33] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   S.F.’s father, M.F., initially participated with DCS during the underlying Child in Need of Services case but did not appear during the termination proceedings. The trial court terminated his parental rights to S.F., and he is not a party to this appeal.

2.   A.T.’s father, B.T., died in May 2023.

3.   K.W.’s father, D.W., was in jail when DCS filed the petition to terminate, consented to K.W.’s adoption, and is not a party to this appeal.

4.   The legislature amended this statute with an effective date of March 11, 2024. We use the version of the statute in effect at the time DCS filed the petitions to terminate.

5.   First, DCS must prove one of the following is true:(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6) months under a dispositional decree.(ii) A court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6 that reasonable efforts for family preservation or reunification are not required, including a description of the court's finding, the date of the finding, and the manner in which the finding was made.(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of services or a delinquent child.I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(A). Fourth, DCS must prove “there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.” I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(D).

6.   The trial court entered three separate termination orders, one for each child. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 27 (S.F.), 56 (A.T.), 77 (K.W.). The content of each is substantially the same, although the order terminating Mother's parental rights to S.F. refers to both Mother and Father throughout, rather than just Mother. To reduce alterations, we quote from the order terminating Mother's parental rights to A.T., which is nearly identical to the termination order as to K.W. However, in the footnotes, we note the pertinent differences between this order and the trial court's order in S.F.’s case.

7.   In the termination order pertaining to S.F., the trial court found: “The lack of bond between Child and both Mother and Father is the direct result of Mother's and Father's failure to make any efforts in this regard.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 52 (emphasis added).

8.   In the termination order pertaining to S.F., the sentence states: “This is based on the risk of harm to Child's well-being that would be caused by forcing upon Child any form of relationship with biological parents who have made no efforts to be safe, loving, and appropriate parents to Child.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 53 (emphasis added).

9.   In her reply brief, Mother contends the trial court “did not make its decision to terminate [her] rights based upon her alleged failure to remedy issues with sexual or domestic abuse” because it did not reduce to writing any evidence related to that failure. Appellant's Reply Br. at 7. The trial court's order did not lack findings in this regard. Although the findings are more specific about Mother's substance use history, the trial court found Mother failed to comply with the dispositional order by engaging in or completing services designed to remedy the reasons leading to removal, which included sexual abuse, illicit drug use, and domestic violence. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 40–41, 64–66, 85–87. These services included parenting and substance use assessments, home-based counseling, and domestic violence services, among others. Regarding this finding, the trial court found “the testimony of FCM Haines reliable and credible.” Id. at 40, 64, 85. The trial court's findings therefore are sufficient for us to consider Mother's failure to complete services designed to remedy issues with sexual abuse or domestic violence as part of the evidence supporting the trial court's termination decision.

10.   As to this finding, the other orders are nearly identical. See id. at 65-66, 86-87.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Judges Bradford and Pyle concur. Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.