Cynthia Crane, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In November 2020, thirty-two-year-old Jennifer Thomas died of a drug overdose. Cynthia Crane and Crane's alleged coconspirator, Curtis Atkinson, supplied Thomas with the illegal drugs. Following a jury trial, Crane was convicted of dealing in a controlled substance resulting in death, a Level 1 felony; conspiracy to commit dealing in a narcotic drug, a Level 5 felony; and conspiracy to commit dealing in methamphetamine, a Level 5 felony. Crane appeals and claims that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence under the exception to the hearsay rules text messages exchanged between Thomas and Atkinson in the days leading up to Thomas’ death; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by denying Crane's motion for a mistrial that was based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct because the State attempted to elicit testimony related to prior-bad-acts evidence under Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b).¹

[2] We conclude that any error in the admission of the text messages was harmless and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Crane's motion for a mistrial. Accordingly, we affirm.

Issues

[3] Crane presents two issues for our review:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence the text messages exchanged between Thomas and Atkinson, Crane's coconspirator, under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rules.

II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Crane's motion for a mistrial, which was based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct that occurred when the State attempted to elicit testimony related to prior-bad-acts evidence under Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b).

Facts

[4] In November 2020, Crane and Atkinson were in a romantic relationship and were staying together in a motel room in Muncie. Crane and Atkinson both used illegal drugs and provided and sold drugs to others. Crane obtained the drugs that she and Atkinson sold, and Atkinson supplied the customers.

[5] In 2020, Crane and Atkinson were friends with Brian Caylor. Caylor had a substance abuse problem and used heroin and methamphetamine. He obtained illegal drugs from Crane and Atkinson, either by buying the drugs from them or by providing them with transportation in exchange for drugs, as neither Crane nor Atkinson owned a car. Caylor would drive Crane and Atkinson to certain locations where Crane “would go in and come back out with the drugs.” Tr. Vol. III p. 110. From time to time, Crane, Atkinson, and Caylor used drugs together in the motel room.

[6] In November 2020, Thomas lived with her two minor children in her parents’ house. Thomas was friends with Caylor, and Thomas relied on Caylor for transportation because Thomas did not own a car. Thomas and Caylor “would hang out” together and used illegal drugs “[e]very time [they] were together[.]” Id. at 85, 88. Thomas purchased drugs from Crane and Atkinson.²

[7] On November 22, 2020, Caylor drove Thomas to Crane's and Atkinson's motel room so that Thomas could purchase drugs. Thomas and Caylor used the drugs—that consisted of “heroin or [f]entanyl”—in the motel room, in Crane's and Atkinson's presence. Tr. Vol. III p. 223. Thomas overdosed and became unresponsive. Atkinson performed CPR on Thomas, and Crane revived Thomas by injecting her with the drug Narcan. It was “a very scary situation” and “the worst overdose” that Crane had “ever dealt with.” Id. at 227. Thomas remained at the motel for a few hours before Caylor drove her to her home.

[8] The next day, November 23, 2020, Thomas sent text messages to Atkinson, apologizing for her overdose and thanking Atkinson and Crane for saving her life. Thomas messaged that she wanted to get “a [little] more” of an unnamed drug from Atkinson because she was going to “need it come tomorrow[.]” State's Ex. 20, Ex. Vol. VI p. 64.

[9] The next morning, November 24, 2020, Thomas and Atkinson exchanged several text messages regarding Thomas obtaining more drugs from Atkinson. Atkinson texted that he and Crane were “almost out” and that he and Crane were waiting for someone to “wake up” so that they could acquire more drugs. Id. at 66. When discussing the purchase price, Atkinson texted that the higher price was “worth it” because the product was “fire” and “hard to find[.]” Id. at 67. “Fire” is a slang term that means “really good stuff[,]” and the term refers to fentanyl or drugs that are very powerful. Tr. Vol. III p. 195.

[10] Caylor drove Thomas to the motel, and Thomas went inside Crane's and Atkinson's room; Caylor remained in the car. It is unclear from the record the exact product that Thomas purchased from Crane and Atkinson that day. In addition to whatever Thomas purchased, Crane gave Thomas methamphetamine—to help her “feel[ ] better”—along with the drug Suboxone. Id. at 231.

[11] Crane did not see Thomas again after November 24, 2020. That night, however, around 9:00 p.m., Atkinson sent a text message to Thomas to check on her wellbeing. Thomas responded around 11:30 p.m., stating that she was “good” and that she was “being super careful” because the product was “way good” and she “[definitely wanted to] be careful[.]” State's Ex. 20, Ex. Vol. VI pp. 75-76.

[12] The next day, November 25, 2020, around 5:00 a.m., Thomas messaged Atkinson, asking if Crane would be willing to “hold onto” a “few more subs” for Thomas until early the next week. Id. at 77. The term “sub” is slang for the drug Suboxone. Tr. Vol. III p. 196. Atkinson told Thomas that Crane had indicated that she would “hold” the Suboxone for Thomas. State's Ex. 20, Ex. Vol. VI p. 77. Thomas replied that she might contact Atkinson in the coming days to obtain a “[little] bit more of the other” unnamed drug that Thomas had previously purchased. Id. Thomas asked Atkinson if he had more of the unnamed drug, and he responded, “Yea[.]” Id. Atkinson then conveyed a message to Thomas from Crane. The message was that, if Thomas needed some “fast”—a slang term for methamphetamine—Thomas could have some at no cost or pay for it on a later date. Id. at 78; Tr. Vol. III p. 197. Thomas replied that she would “[definitely] ․ need some” for the next day. State's Ex. 20, Ex. Vol. VI p. 78.

[13] On the morning of November 26, 2020, Caylor picked up Thomas and drove her to the motel to purchase more drugs. Thomas went inside Crane's and Atkinson's room; Caylor stayed in his car. When Thomas returned to the car, she had what Caylor identified as heroin. Caylor “drove somewhere[,]” and he and Thomas used some of the drug. Tr. Vol. III p. 103.

[14] On November 27, 2020, Thomas spent most of the day in her bedroom and had little contact with her mother. Thomas did not leave the house that day, and no one came to visit with her. Around 6:00 p.m., Thomas’ mother left the house to visit with friends. Before she left, she picked the lock on Thomas’ bedroom door and checked on Thomas. She observed that Thomas was asleep in a chair at her computer desk.

[15] On November 28, 2020, Thomas’ father left the house and headed to work at around 5:30 a.m. He knocked on Thomas’ bedroom door but received no response. He left a note under the door to let Thomas know that he needed her help that day.

[16] Thomas’ father called his wife around 10:00 a.m. and asked her if Thomas was awake. Thomas’ mother knocked on Thomas’ bedroom door but received no response. She picked the lock on the door, entered the bedroom, and found Thomas in her chair but slumped over the computer desk. Thomas was stiff to the touch. Thomas’ mother called 9-1-1.

[17] Police officers and emergency medical personnel responded to the dispatch, and Thomas was pronounced dead. The emergency medical technician who arrived at the scene estimated that, based on his experience, Thomas had been dead between six and twelve hours.

[18] The police found on the computer desk, “[w]ithin reach” of Thomas’ body, a plastic baggie that contained a white, powdery substance; a plastic baggie that contained a green, leafy substance; two syringes; a tin can that contained a “brownish colored powdery substance”; and a plastic baggie that contained a “crystal-like substance.” Tr. Vol. II at 249; Tr. Vol. III p. 73. The police found another syringe lying on the floor near Thomas’ feet. The substances were collected and sent to the Indiana State Police laboratory for testing. The white, powdery substance was found to contain methamphetamine; the crystal-like substance tested positive for methamphetamine; and the brownish powdery substance tested positive for fentanyl.³

[19] Thomas’ blood was tested and found to contain methamphetamine, amphetamine, diazepam, nordiazepam, fentanyl, and norfentanyl. Thomas’ cause of death was determined to be acute mixed drug intoxication.⁴ The methamphetamine and fentanyl were the primary contributors to Thomas’ death.

[20] On December 18, 2020, Christopher Liggett, Eaton Police Department's Deputy Chief, interviewed Crane as part of the investigation of Thomas’ death. During the recorded interview, Crane told Deputy Chief Liggett that she saw Thomas alive on November 24, 2020, and that Crane and Atkinson did not give Thomas any drugs that would cause an overdose. Crane stated that Thomas “did not get that stuff off of us.” State's Ex. 14, 18:00-18:03, Ex. Vol. VII. Crane admitted, however, that she gave Thomas Suboxone and methamphetamine on November 24, 2020. When Deputy Chief Liggett asked Crane if she knew that Atkinson sold methamphetamine and heroin to people, Crane responded, “I do too,” and added that she and Atkinson both sold drugs so that they could have access to the drugs for their own personal use. Id. at 41:57-42:39. Deputy Chief Liggett told Crane that she and Atkinson were both “at fault” for supplying Thomas with the lethal drugs and then asked Crane if she and Atkinson sold heroin to Thomas. Id. at 43:18-43:30. Crane replied, “That would be exactly what it looks like.”⁵ Id.

[21] On February 2, 2021, the State charged Crane with Count I: dealing in a controlled substance resulting in death, a Level 1 felony; Count II: conspiracy to commit dealing in a narcotic drug, a Level 5 felony; and Count III: conspiracy to commit dealing in methamphetamine, a Level 5 felony. Crane's four-day jury trial was held from March 4 through 8, 2024. Caylor, Crane, and Deputy Chief Liggett, among others, testified.⁶

[22] At the trial, Caylor testified that, at times, both Crane and Atkinson were present when he purchased drugs at the motel. Caylor also testified to the different roles that Atkinson and Crane assumed in the drug dealing operation and added that Atkinson and Crane “both, together sold” the drugs and that the operation was a “[t]eam effort.” Tr. Vol. III p. 108. Crane admitted that, between November 22 and 28, 2020, she gave Thomas drugs, including methamphetamine and Suboxone.

[23] During Deputy Chief Liggett's testimony, the State introduced into evidence State's Exhibit 20, which contained the text messages that Thomas exchanged with Atkinson. Thomas’ parents had provided the police with Thomas’ cell phone, and the police were able to extract the text messages. Over Crane's objection, the text messages were admitted into evidence.

[24] At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Crane guilty as charged. On April 12, 2024, the trial court sentenced Crane to thirty years for Count I and three years each for Counts II and III. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively for an aggregate term of thirty-six years imprisonment to be served in the Indiana Department of Correction. Crane now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Any error in admitting into evidence, under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rules, the text messages that Thomas exchanged with Atkinson was harmless.

[25] Crane contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rules the text messages that Thomas exchanged with Atkinson. The State asserts that Crane has waived this argument for our review because she objected to the admission of the evidence on one ground—that she did not know about the communications between Thomas and Atkinson—and raises another ground on appeal—that the text messages were inadmissible hearsay. We do not decide this issue on grounds of waiver. We conclude instead that any error in the admission of the text messages was harmless.⁷

[26] Our standard of review regarding challenges to the admission of evidence at trial is well-settled:

The general admission of evidence at trial is a matter we leave to the discretion of the trial court. We review these determinations for abuse of that discretion and reverse only when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights.

Crabtree v. State, 152 N.E.3d 687, 696 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), trans. denied.

[27] On appeal, Crane argues that the trial court was required to determine that Crane and Atkinson were involved in a conspiracy before admitting the text messages into evidence, and the trial court failed to do so. Crane further argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Crane knew “about any prospective drug deal between [Thomas] and [Atkinson, Crane's] alleged co-conspirator.” Appellant's Br. p. 9.

[28] The Indiana Rules of Evidence define hearsay as “a statement that: (1) is not made by the declarant while testifying at the trial ․ ; and (2) is offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c). Hearsay is generally not admissible into evidence. See Evid. R. 802.

Evidence Rule 801(d), however, specifies that certain statements that would otherwise constitute hearsay are, by rule, not hearsay at all. For example, an opposing party's statement is not hearsay. Evid. R. 801(d)(2). This is so when the opposing party is [her]self making the statement. Evid. R. 801(d)(2)(A). It is also the case when an opposing party's coconspirator is making the statement. Evid. R. 801(d)(2)(E).

M.T.V. v. State, 66 N.E.3d 960, 964 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied.

[29] Importantly, however, to be admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E),

the coconspirator's statement must be made in furtherance of the conspiracy. [T]he coconspirator's “statement does not by itself establish ․ the existence of the conspiracy ․” [Evid. R. 801(d)(2)(E)]. Rather, the State must introduce “independent evidence” of the conspiracy before a coconspirator's statement will be admissible as non-hearsay. Lander v. State, 762 N.E.2d 1208, 1213 (Ind. 2002).

M.T.V., 66 N.E.3d at 964.

[30] We conclude that any error in the admission of the text messages exchanged between Thomas and Atkinson was harmless.

The improper admission of evidence is harmless error when the conviction is supported by such substantial independent evidence of guilt as to satisfy the reviewing court that there is no substantial likelihood that the questioned evidence contributed to the conviction. The erroneous admission of evidence may also be harmless if that evidence is cumulative of other evidence admitted.

Pelissier v. State, 122 N.E.3d 983, 988 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (internal citation and quotation omitted), trans. denied.

[31] Here, our review and consideration of the entire record reveals that by the time the text messages were admitted into evidence—and Deputy Chief Liggett testified in detail regarding the messages—evidence had already been presented that Crane and Atkinson were involved in a drug-dealing operation and that the drugs that they dealt were potentially lethal. Further, the evidence established that Crane was aware of the communications between Thomas and Atkinson. More specifically, evidence was presented that, in November 2020, Crane and Atkinson were staying together in a motel. Crane and Atkinson used and sold illegal drugs; Crane obtained the drugs that she and Atkinson sold, and Atkinson secured the customers, including Thomas. Caylor testified that Crane's and Atkinson's drug dealing operation was a “[t]eam effort.” Tr. Vol. III p. 108. Caylor further testified that he obtained illegal drugs from Crane and Atkinson and that all three had used drugs together in the motel room. Approximately one week prior to Thomas’ death, Thomas had overdosed in Crane's and Atkinson's presence on drugs that Thomas had purchased from them.

[32] Even if the text messages were inadmissible hearsay, significant evidence was presented to the jury, aside from the text messages, with which the jury could properly find Crane guilty of the charged offenses. Thus, admission of the text messages was cumulative of other properly admitted evidence and therefore harmless. See Pelissier, 122 N.E.3d at 988.

II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Crane's motion for a mistrial, which was based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct that occurred when the State attempted to elicit testimony related to prior-bad-acts evidence under Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b).

[33] Crane next argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her motion for a mistrial. We disagree.

[34] During the State's direct examination of Deputy Chief Liggett, the State attempted to admit into evidence an exhibit that contained data found on Crane's cell phone that related to Crane's drug dealing. Defense counsel objected to the evidence and moved for a mistrial, arguing that the evidence of drug dealing found in the data occurred outside of the date range of the charged conduct. The trial court sustained the objection, admonished the jury to disregard all of the testimony concerning the challenged cell phone data, and struck the evidence from the record. The trial court denied Crane's motion for a mistrial.

[35] On appeal, Crane argues that the trial court should have declared a mistrial because, according to Crane, the State “intentionally elicited testimony” from Deputy Chief Liggett regarding the data found on Crane's cell phone. Appellant's Br. at 18. Crane further argues that the “sole purpose” of questioning the deputy chief about the data was to “impermissibly taint” Crane's character and “reinforce the image of Crane as a drug dealer,” in violation of Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b). Id. Rule 404(b) prohibits evidence of “a crime, wrong, or other act ․ to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b)(1). Crane maintains that the trial court's admonishment to the jury was an “insufficient cure.” Appellant's Br. p. 19.

[36] “Whether to grant or deny a motion for a mistrial lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Isom v. State, 31 N.E.3d 469, 480 (Ind. 2015), cert. denied. “We afford great deference to the trial court's decision and review the decision solely for abuse of that discretion.” Id. Our Supreme Court has held that “ ‘[a] mistrial is an extreme remedy that is only justified when other remedial measures are insufficient to rectify the situation.’ ” Id. at 481 (quoting Mickens v. State, 742 N.E.2d 927, 929 (Ind. 2001)).

When determining whether a mistrial is warranted, we consider whether the defendant was placed in a position of grave peril to which he should not have been subjected; the gravity of the peril is determined by the probable persuasive effect on the jury's decision. A timely and accurate admonition is presumed to cure any error in the admission of evidence. Because of that presumption, reversible error will seldom be found if the trial court has admonished the jury to disregard a statement made during the proceedings. When the trial court admonishes the jury, we also presume the jury followed the trial court's admonishment and that the excluded testimony played no part in the jury's deliberation.

Higgason v. State, 210 N.E.3d 868, 882-83 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), trans. denied.

[37] Crane asserts that the State's attempt to admit the cell phone data into evidence constituted prosecutorial misconduct, which was tantamount to the State employing an “evidentiary harpoon” and placed Crane in a position of grave peril of an unfair trial. Appellant's Br. p. 17. An evidentiary harpoon occurs when the prosecution places inadmissible evidence before the jury for the deliberate purpose of prejudicing the jurors against the defendant and her defense. Evans v. State, 643 N.E.2d 877, 879 (Ind. 1994). In certain circumstances, the injection of an evidentiary harpoon may constitute prosecutorial misconduct requiring a mistrial. Roberts v. State, 712 N.E.2d 23, 34 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Jewell v. State, 672 N.E.2d 417, 423 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied), trans denied.

[38] Appellate review of a prosecutorial misconduct claim is a two-step process. First, we consider whether the prosecutor engaged in misconduct. Hand v. State, 863 N.E.2d 386, 393 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). If so, we then consider whether the misconduct placed the defendant in a position of grave peril to which she should not have been subjected. Id. at 394. The gravity of peril is measured by the probable persuasive effect of the misconduct on the jury's verdict rather than the degree of impropriety of the conduct. Cooper v. State, 854 N.E.2d 831, 835 (Ind. 2006). To succeed in proving an evidentiary harpoon, the defendant must demonstrate “1) the prosecution acted deliberately to prejudice the jury and 2) the evidence was inadmissible.” Jewell, 672 N.E.2d at 424. To obtain relief, the defendant must show that the evidentiary harpoon placed her “in a position of grave peril to which [s]he should not have been subjected.” Id.

[39] Here, nothing in the record indicates the State engaged in misconduct—or acted deliberately to prejudice the jury when the State sought to introduce Crane's cell phone data into evidence. Thus, there was no evidentiary harpoon that warranted a mistrial. Furthermore, the trial court sustained Crane's objection to the introduction of the cell phone data, admonished the jury to disregard all of the testimony concerning the cell phone data, and struck the evidence from the record. As our Supreme Court instructed in Isom,

“[o]n appeal, we must presume that the jury obeyed the court's instructions in reaching its verdict.” Tyson v. State, 270 Ind. 458, 386 N.E.2d 1185, 1192 (1979). As we have noted a “clear instruction, together with strong presumptions that juries follow courts’ instructions and that an admonition cures any error, severely undercuts the defendant's position.” Lucio v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1008, 1010-11 (Ind. 2009) (rejecting defense argument of trial court error in denying motion for mistrial where trial court admonished the jury to disregard witness's improper statement).

31 N.E.3d at 481.

[40] We conclude that the State did not engage in prosecutorial misconduct. Therefore, we need not consider whether Crane was placed in a position of grave peril. See Hand, 863 N.E.2d at 394 (noting that appellate review of a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is a two-step process). We hold that the trial court's admonishment was sufficient and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Crane's motion for a mistrial. See, e.g., Higgason, 210 N.E.3d at 884-85 (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion for mistrial where, among other things, trial court provided appropriate admonishment).

Conclusion

[41] We conclude that any error in admitting into evidence, under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rules, the text messages that Thomas exchanged with Atkinson was harmless. We also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Crane's motion for a mistrial that was based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct in the form of an evidentiary harpoon. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[42] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) prohibits evidence of “a crime, wrong, or other act ․ to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b)(1).

2.   Approximately seven years before the events that led to Thomas’ death, Thomas was involved in a car accident. She became addicted to prescription pain medication. She attended three or four rehabilitation clinics but was unsuccessful in achieving sustained sobriety. Thomas eventually began using illegal drugs, including heroin and methamphetamine.

3.   The test result for the green, leafy substance was “inconclusive[.]” Tr. Vol. III p. 145.

4.   At Crane's trial, a forensic pathologist testified that “[a]cute” means that the substance found in the blood is actively present, and “mixed” means that “multiple drugs are present.” Tr. Vol. III p. 23.

5.   At Crane's trial, a police officer provided testimony that, to the “naked eye,” fentanyl can resemble heroin. Tr. Vol. III p. 191.

6.   Atkinson was tried separately and found guilty of aiding, inducing, or causing dealing in a controlled substance resulting in death; conspiracy to commit dealing in a narcotic drug; and conspiracy to commit dealing in methamphetamine. A panel of this Court affirmed his convictions in Atkinson v. State, No. 23ACR-587 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2024) (mem.), trans. denied.

7.   The trial court admitted the text messages over objection, telling defense counsel: “I understand the objection and again, I explained [to counsel] why that objection would be overruled[.]” Tr. Vol. III p. 179. The trial court, however, did not provide further explanation for its ruling. We note that the better practice is for the trial court to state with specificity its reason(s) for admitting evidence over objection.

Tavitas, Judge.

Judges May and DeBoer concur. May, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.