VALENTI v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Brian K. Valenti appeals his convictions for disorderly conduct as a class B misdemeanor and resisting law enforcement as a class A misdemeanor. He asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss pursuant to Ind. Criminal Rule 4(C) and that his 180-day sentence for direct contempt is unreasonable. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On September 5, 2022, the Hartford City Fire Department was dispatched to Valenti's residence regarding an open fire burning in the backyard. The fire department requested assistance from law enforcement, and Hartford City Police Lieutenant Daniel Johnson, and Officers Corbin Garrett and Craig Jarvis responded. The officers entered Valenti's backyard and Lieutenant Johnson spoke with him. During the interaction, Valenti began yelling, cursing, and making “unreasonable noise” in the direction of a group of people who were outside several houses to the east. Transcript Volume II at 20. When Valenti continued to “make loud noise,” even after being warned three times to “stop yelling,” Officer Jarvis “attempted to restrain him.” Id. at 21. Valenti “began pulling away from Officer Jarvis and Officer Garrett” so Lieutenant Johnson “placed [his] hands on the back of [Valenti's] head in order to help pull him to the ground.” Id. Officers arrested Valenti, and he was released on bond later that day.

[3] On September 14, 2023, the State charged Valenti with disorderly conduct as a class B misdemeanor and resisting law enforcement as a class A misdemeanor. Valenti entered an appearance pro se. On June 3, 2024, Valenti demanded a trial by jury. During the pretrial conference, Valenti maintained that he wished to represent himself during trial and the court scheduled a jury trial for August 7, 2024. On July 1, 2024, Valenti filed a motion to dismiss the charges pursuant to Ind. Criminal Rule 4(C) arguing that more than a year had elapsed between his arrest and the filing of charges. The court denied the motion on July 11, 2024.

[4] The court held the scheduled jury trial on August 7, 2024. The jury found Valenti guilty as charged. The court held a sentencing hearing immediately following the verdict. During the hearing, Valenti repeatedly yelled, argued, and interrupted both the court and the prosecutor. At one point the court cautioned him, “Mr. Valenti, we have all been very patient with you this afternoon. The patience is growing thin. Very thin. On my behalf at the very least.” Id. at 72. The court stated that it was imposing a 365-day sentence for the class A misdemeanor and a concurrent 180-day sentence for the class B misdemeanor.

[5] After the court advised Valenti that he would be taken into custody, the record indicates that Valenti ran toward the bench and the police officers who were present in the courtroom, before ultimately being taken to the ground by the officers. As a result of that behavior, the court entered an order finding Valenti in direct criminal contempt, concluding that he “did aggressively approach law enforcement” and that such “defiance” was “in disrespect of the Court's authority” and “a disturbance of the Court's business.” Id. at 74. In its written contempt order, the Court noted that Valenti

stood from his chair running toward the bench, stopped and challenged those officers near him to take him into custody whereby the respondent indicated that it was his intention to fight the officers rather than to be peacefully taken into custody in compliance with the judgment of the Court. The defendant clearly took a posture of aggression against the officers approaching and brandished closed fists as the officers approached.

Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 93. The court imposed a 180-day sentence for the contempt to be served consecutively with his sentence in the criminal case.

Discussion

A. Motion to Dismiss

[6] Valenti first contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss pursuant to Ind. Criminal Rule 4(C). We generally review a trial court's ruling on such a motion for an abuse of discretion. Battering v. State, 150 N.E.3d 597, 600 (Ind. 2020), reh'g denied.

[7] Ind. Criminal Rule 4(C) provides:¹

No person can be held on recognizance or otherwise to answer a criminal charge for a period in aggregate exceeding one year from the date the criminal charge against such defendant is filed, or from the date of the arrest on such charge, whichever is later. Delays caused by a defendant, congestion of the court calendar, or an emergency are excluded from the time period. If a defendant is held beyond the time limit of this section and moves for dismissal, the criminal charge against the defendant must be dismissed.

[8] Valenti filed his motion to dismiss based on the time period between his arrest on September 5, 2022, and the filing of charges on September 14, 2023, asserting that his Criminal Rule 4(C) rights were violated because the State failed to bring “charges within (1) year” of his arrest. Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 39. However, the period between his arrest and the filing of charges is not the pertinent time period. As provided above, Criminal Rule 4(C) “places an affirmative duty on the State to bring a defendant to trial within one year of being charged or arrested” whichever is later. See Cook v. State, 810 N.E.2d 1064, 1065 (Ind. 2004). Valenti was arrested in September 2022 and charged in September 2023, so one year from the later of those two dates would be September 2024. The court held Valenti's trial in August 2024. Accordingly, Criminal Rule 4(C) was not implicated and we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss.

[9] To the extent that Valenti makes additional arguments on appeal regarding the motion to dismiss that he did not raise below, those claims are waived. It is well established that a party may not object on one ground at trial and raise a different ground on appeal. Ko v. State, 243 N.E.3d 1153, 1160 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied.

B. Reasonable Sentence

[10] Valenti asks this Court “to consider whether his sentence of 180 days for contempt, which will require him to serve the same amount of time for contempt as was imposed for his convictions from his jury trial was unreasonable and inappropriate.” Appellant's Brief at 20. We note that sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Grogg v. State, 156 N.E.3d 744, 750-751 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id. at 751.

[11] “The contempt power encompasses a broad and varied group of actions.” Bellamy v. State, 952 N.E.2d 263, 266 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Hopping v. State, 637 N.E.2d 1294, 1298 (Ind. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1017, 115 S. Ct. 578 (1994)), trans. denied. Citations for criminal contempt are meant to be punitive. Id. Indeed, a criminal contempt sanction is punitive in nature because its purpose is to vindicate the authority of the court, and it benefits the State rather than the aggrieved party. Jones v. State, 847 N.E.2d 190, 199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. In addition, a punishment for criminal contempt is meant “to act as a deterrent for [the defendant] and all others who might harbor the thought of defying an order of [the court].” In re Perrello, 260 Ind. 26, 30, 291 N.E.2d 698, 701 (1973).

[12] Direct contempt, as in this case, involves actions occurring near the court, interfering with the business of the court, of which the judge has personal knowledge. Bellamy, 952 N.E.2d at 266. “The power of Indiana courts to summarily punish for direct criminal contempt, while specified by statute, rests upon the common law. It is inherent in the courts.” Hopping, 637 N.E.2d at 1296 (citing McIntire v. State, 248 Ind. 142, 144-145, 223 N.E.2d 347, 348-349 (1967)). “It is essential for a court to be able ‘[t]o protect itself against gross violations of decency and decorum ․’ as it pursues justice.” Id. (quoting Brown v. Brown, 4 Ind. 627 (1853)).

[13] Punishment for contempt is generally a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Gerber v. State, 167 N.E.3d 792, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. The court's power to punish contempt is limited only by reasonableness. Id.² “However, a trial court may impose a maximum sentence of six months ‘for criminal contempt [ ] without guilt or innocence being determined by a jury.’ ” Id. (quoting Holly v. State, 681 N.E.2d 1176, 1177 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)).

[14] The record indicates that Valenti was combative during trial and yelled at the trial court during sentencing. After the court pronounced his sentence, which included an order that he be taken into custody, Valenti stood, ran toward the bench, and physically and aggressively challenged the law enforcement officers present. The officers had to resort to force to stop him, and he continued to resist while being taken into custody. These actions were gross violations of decency and decorum which interfered with the business of the court. We cannot say that the 180-day sentence was unreasonable under the circumstances.

[15] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Criminal Rule 4 was amended effective January 1, 2024, which was after Valenti was charged but before he moved for discharge. The parties do not claim that the amendments should affect our analysis, so we cite the current version of the rule.

2.   In Jones, this Court observed: “Because there is no longer a statute setting out the punishment for contempt, it is unclear whether Appellate Rule 7(B) should apply in reviewing contempt sentences.” 847 N.E.2d at 202. Although Valenti mentions Jones, he makes no argument that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense or character of the offender as would be his burden, so we decline to review his sentence pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B).

Brown, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Tavitas, J., concur.