Adriana Hernandez-Jarquin, Appellant-Petitioner v. Rigoberto Nievez-Salazar, Appellee-Respondent (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Adriana Hernandez-Jarquin sued Rigoberto Nievez-Salazar for unjust enrichment after their nearly twenty-year relationship ended. The trial court entered a judgment dividing the parties’ joint property and ordering Adriana to make an equalization payment to Rigoberto and pay his attorney fees. Adriana appeals, raising several issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as: (1) was the trial court's order valuing and distributing joint property clearly erroneous, and (2) was the trial court's attorney fee order clearly erroneous? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Adriana and Rigoberto met in Mexico and began cohabiting there in 2003. In 2004, they moved to the United States and resided together in Indiana until mid-2020. They never married but had four children together and accumulated real property, vehicles, and financial accounts. Both parties worked outside the home—Rigoberto worked day shift for fifteen years at the same job; Adriana worked second shift for six or seven years with one employer and then worked four ten-hour days when she changed jobs. They used joint funds to purchase old houses, and both worked in their free time to fix them up to be rental income properties. Their hope was to eventually make enough money from their investment properties so that Adriana could stay at home full-time with the children.

[3] The parties separated in July 2020. At that time, they jointly owned six properties in Indiana and five properties in Mexico.¹ In particular, they had two properties in Mexico that would be points of contention during this litigation: 1) a property known as the Oaxaca home, and (2) a property known as the San Juan lots. Ultimately, they could not agree on a division of their joint property, and in September 2020, Adriana filed a complaint against Rigoberto for unjust enrichment, seeking half the value of the assets acquired during their period of cohabitation.

[4] Also in September, the parties initiated actions to establish paternity of their children. Many of the trial court pleadings bear both the MI cause number associated with this unjust enrichment case and the paternity cause numbers, and some hearings addressed issues related to both. Issues of custody, support, and parenting time for the children were resolved with an agreed order in March 2021. Most of the proceedings between then and the final hearing in September 2023 were related to this case.

[5] After the parties separated, Rigoberto was charged with domestic battery against Adriana. Rigoberto lost his job because he was jailed for a month while awaiting trial. Adriana testified against Rigoberto at his trial; a jury found him not guilty. Rigoberto had not found full-time work at the time of the final hearing.

[6] In December 2021, after Rigoberto's acquittal, he deposed Adriana in this case. Of note, Adriana did not disclose the Oaxaca home when asked about the properties she and Rigoberto owned in Mexico. Also, Adriana testified she had not contacted an immigration attorney about obtaining a U-visa.² U-visas are residency visas for victims of violent crime and human trafficking. Matter of Moreno, 222 N.E.3d 948, 949 (Ind. 2023). But in fact, she had spoken with an attorney. When confronted with evidence of her consultation with an attorney, Adriana refused—on advice of counsel—to answer further questions. Rigoberto's counsel certified several questions. When the reporter tendered a copy of the deposition transcript to Adriana for her review and signature, she did not sign and return it. After Rigoberto filed a motion to compel related to the deposition,³ Adriana completed an errata sheet to change her deposition answers about consulting an attorney from “No” to “Yes.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 48. She also moved to suppress the deposition and/or enter a protective order against answering the certified questions. A hearing had previously been set for November 8, 2022, to address Adriana's unjust enrichment claim and outstanding child support issues. The trial court held the hearing as scheduled, but rather than addressing property division, it addressed whether the deposition would be allowed into evidence.⁴ As the trial court explained later, Adriana objected to introduction of the deposition because it “contains contradictory statements, thereby allowing [Rigoberto] to impeach her testimony with prior inconsistent statements.” Id. at 55.

[7] Two days after that hearing, Rigoberto filed a motion for attorney fees, alleging:

Throughout the course of the paternity and miscellaneous proceedings, Adriana ․ has exhibited conduct which has driven the litigation related costs upward. [Adriana's] conduct has included, but not been limited, to offering up perjurious testimony to the Court and during depositions. [Adriana's] conduct has involved false allegations made to law enforcement authorities alleging wrongdoing on the part of Rigoberto ․, all of which [w]as done to frustrate his purpose in the paternity and property division matters[.]

Id. at 49. Citing Indiana Code Section 31-15-10-1 and an income discrepancy between the parties, Rigoberto asked the court to order Adriana to pay “all or a portion of” Rigoberto's attorney fees. Id.

[8] The trial court issued an order on December 15 in which it found Adriana's reason for objecting to the deposition “is not a reason why the deposition should be excluded ․; indeed, it is exactly why it is admissible.” Id. at 55. The property division issues were set for final hearing on February 2, 2023.

[9] But the final hearing was not held on that date. Instead, the trial court heard the parties’ arguments about another discovery dispute. By this point, Adriana had acknowledged the existence of the Oaxaca home, but was unwilling to share information about it, claiming Rigoberto had no interest in the property and had made no contributions to its improvement since she purchased it with her sisters in 2003. See Ex. Vol. 2 at 146. Rigoberto sought an order for Adriana to cooperate and facilitate access to the Oaxaca property so he could get an appraisal. Rigoberto acknowledged Adriana should have access to the San Juan lots so she could do the same there. The court, observing it had no jurisdiction over third persons in Mexico who could allow access to these properties, simply reminded the parties, “All I can say is obstruction is not availing anyone. Whatever is going to happen is going to happen and everyone finding ways to drag their feet about just doing whatever needs to be done isn't going to help anybody when I have to make this decision.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 121.

[10] Three months later, the parties were back in court with the same dispute. Appraisals had still not been done. The court observed, “[T]here is no way for me to determine the answer to the question that was asked [in Adriana's claim] unless someone gives me some numbers. And I am never going to get a number from either one of these parties․ That is exactly why somebody else is going to get into this and give me a number.” Id. at 130–31. The court ordered an appraiser be appointed to appraise the properties.

[11] Finally, on September 19, 2023, the parties appeared for the final hearing. Adriana asked for “half of all the assets” because “we worked together during all those years.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 12. Rigoberto acknowledged he and Adriana had “both invested in all of the properties.” Id. at 110. The parties largely agreed on the extent and values of their joint real property, but they disagreed about the Oaxaca home and the San Juan lots.⁵ The following evidence was presented as to those two properties:

Oaxaca home

[12] In 2003, Adriana and her two sisters purchased the land on which the Oaxaca home now sits. By agreement of the sisters, the property was titled in Maxima's name. Adriana and Rigoberto used their joint funds to buy out the sisters’ interests in 2009, although the title remained in Maxima's name.⁶ In 2011, Rigoberto and Adriana began sending money to construct a home on the lot. Adriana estimated they spent $35,000 to build the house.

[13] Adriana introduced into evidence what she identified as three appraisals of the property, written in Spanish. In August 2015, the property was appraised at 811,650.00 pesos. Ex. Vol. 1 at 17. Adriana said this equaled approximately $40,550. See id. at 6; Tr. Vol. 2 at 17. A January 2021 appraisal valued the property at slightly more. The 2015 and 2021 appraisals have the same pictures attached. A May 2022 appraisal valued the property at 1,625,175 pesos.⁷ The pictures attached to that appraisal show improvements to the home. Adriana testified she used the 2015 appraisal in her proposed distribution “[b]ecause Rigoberto didn't want to invest in that property. He didn't want to spend any money uh, to fix the house. And the house was abandoned.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 17. After Adriana and Rigoberto stopped sharing money, Adriana decided to invest in the property herself and fix up the house: “I fixed ․ everything in the inside. And also, the outside of the house.” Id. at 21. Adriana testified “all of the improvement[s] in [the] Oaxaca house are only a result of [her] investing money out of [her] pocket.” Id. at 25. She introduced eighteen receipts for wire transfers she claimed she made beginning in April 2020 and continuing through 2022 “to paint the house.” Id. at 24. The transfers totaled $35,681.00. The receipts show Adriana did not make all the transfers; her sisters and the husband of one of her sisters also sent money. Maxima was not the recipient of all the transfers.

[14] Rigoberto testified he originally wanted to invest in a commercial business, but he and Adriana jointly invested in purchasing the land and constructing the Oaxaca home for them to live in when they moved back to Mexico. Rigoberto designed the house and was involved with “all of the construction of the home[.]” Id. at 132. He acknowledged some improvements had been made after its original construction but said “most of the expense ․ was the structure of the home.” Id. at 133. The home is thirty minutes from the airport and on the edge of the capital city of Oaxaca, where there are “big universities, ․ big businesses.” Id. at 101. The home has electricity, drainage, and filtered water, and is in an area where there is public lighting and an ongoing project to pave the streets. The home “has a lot of value because it's four (4) bedrooms, each bedroom has their own bathroom.” Id. at 102. There is a commercial space on the ground floor that could house a local business like a restaurant or boutique. Due in part to the discovery disputes mentioned above and lack of cooperation in Mexico, Rigoberto obtained an appraisal of the Oaxaca home just a few days before trial. His appraisal valued the home at 3,850,798 pesos, or $225,496. Rigoberto believed this was “the real value of the home.” Id. at 101.

San Juan lots

[15] Rigoberto testified he and Adriana purchased the San Juan lots in 2019 for approximately $70,000. Rigoberto thought that was “a little expensive” but said, “since that's ․ where I came from, I wanted to have something there.” Id. at 104–05. He described the lots:

[I]t's just the piece of land it doesn't have anything․ [T]here's no public lighting, there's no electricity, there's no constructions, there's no filtered water. There's a third street to get there. It's a place where it's very distance from the city of Oaxaca. In that town there is no big business. Not even a gas station.

Id. at 103–04. The parties did not invest anything but the original purchase price in the lots. Rigoberto's appraisal valued the lots at $76,125. He believed that was a fair value for the lots, “especially where they're located.” Id. at 106.

[16] Adriana testified buying the San Juan lots was “Rigoberto's idea. He said that it was a big piece of land where he's from. And that ․ we should buy it.” Id. at 30. Adriana said the land cost them approximately $60,000. She introduced documents written in Spanish she identified as a receipt showing she and Rigoberto were the purchasers and a deed to the lots dated February 2022 showing they were titled to Rigoberto and his brother. Rigoberto testified “it doesn't matter who they are named under,” Adriana “has the right to be interested in” the San Juan lots. Id. at 121. Adriana had the lots appraised in June 2023. Her appraisal valued the lots at 1,840,000 pesos, or approximately $115,000.

[17] During the hearing, Rigoberto renewed his request for Adriana to pay his attorney fees, explaining:

She didn't want to cooperate, she didn't want the house in Oaxaca appraised, the hearings kept getting backed up and backed up, until the very last day we were able to obtain an appraisal. Because she didn't want to recognize the real value of the home. This is, that was one of the biggest issues and that's why our hearing got continued.

Id. at 127–28.

[18] The trial court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law on November 17, 2023. The court made the following findings: the parties lived together from sometime in 2003 through July 2020, and had four children together; in 2021, Rigoberto was charged with domestic battery against Adriana but was acquitted by a jury; Adriana has maintained employment but Rigoberto lost his job due to the criminal charges; both parties continue to maintain the rental properties they own in Indiana; and while together, they also acquired several properties in Mexico. The court noted the exhibits related to the disputed properties in Mexico “consist of unverifiable triple hearsay from another country” and that the court “is left to resolve the matter with nothing more than the parties’ testimony[.] This is almost entirely a matter of ‘he said/she said,’ the resolution of which depends on the Court's assessment of credibility[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 68. The court stated Adriana's testimony “was only consistent in its inconsistency” and he did not find it credible. Id.

The Court has already addressed the issues with the early depositions in this Cause. [Adriana's] various stories about her sister's interest or involvement with the [Oaxaca home] are disingenuous, her descriptions and valuations of the properties defy logic, and she was consistently nonresponsive at best and obstructive at worst on the witness stand ․ It is perhaps unintentionally instructive to the Court that one would file a claim against another party, and then repeatedly, over a period of years, obstruct any and all efforts to collect any information the Court might use to support the claim[.]

Id. at 69.

[19] The court concluded Adriana “has given the Court virtually nothing it can apply to the three-prong test [for unjust enrichment], and therefore cannot say that she has met her burden to prove her claim.” Id. The court adopted Rigoberto's proposed division of joint assets, valuing the Oaxaca home at $225,496; the San Juan lots at $76,125; and dividing the joint estate equally.⁸ The trial court also granted Rigoberto's motion for attorney fees “for the reasons stated above.” Id. Because Adriana was awarded properties worth more than those awarded to Rigoberto, the trial court ordered Adriana to pay Rigoberto $56,492, “which includes $9,329.90 in attorney's fees.” Id. at 70.

Standard of Review

[20] Adriana requested findings of fact and conclusions thereon under Trial Rule 52(A), which provides: “Upon ․ the written request of any party filed with the court prior to the admission of evidence, the court ․ shall find the facts specially and state its conclusions thereon.” On appeal, we determine first whether the evidence supports the findings and second, whether the findings support the judgment. Turner v. Freed, 792 N.E.2d 947, 949 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). We “shall not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). Findings are clearly erroneous where the record lacks any facts or reasonable inferences from the evidence to support them. Bandini v. Bandini, 935 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). The judgment is clearly erroneous when it is unsupported by the findings of fact and conclusions entered on the findings. Id.

[21] “Particular deference is given to the judgment where the proceeding sounds in equity.” Stoll v. Grimm, 681 N.E.2d 749, 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). And although this is not a family law case in the strict sense, it involves the splitting of a family arrangement, and trial courts are also afforded “a great deal of deference in family law matters.” D.C. v. J.A.C., 977 N.E.2d 951, 957 (Ind. 2012). “[W]here a trial court has made special findings pursuant to a party's request ․, the reviewing court may affirm the judgment on any legal theory supported by the findings.” Mitchell v. Mitchell, 695 N.E.2d 920, 923 (Ind. 1998).

The trial court's order valuing and distributing the parties’ joint property is not clearly erroneous.

[22] Adriana argues the following findings are clearly erroneous: (1) she did not meet her burden of proving her unjust enrichment claim; (2) the resolution of the case depends on the court's credibility assessment; and (3) the value of the Oaxaca home is $225,496. Adriana also argues the trial court's determination and division of the joint property is not supported by its findings.

[23] A person “who cohabitates with another without subsequent marriage is entitled to relief upon a showing of an express contract or a viable equitable theory such as an implied contract or unjust enrichment.” Bright v. Kuel, 650 N.E.2d 311, 315 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). This equitable relief is based on the parties’ expectation of shared ownership of property acquired during the cohabitation. See Neibert v. Perdomo, 54 N.E.3d 1046, 1052 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). To succeed on an unjust enrichment claim, the plaintiff must prove three elements:

(1) he rendered a measurable benefit to the defendant at the defendant's express or implied request; (2) he expected payment from the defendant; and (3) allowing the defendant to retain the benefit without restitution would be unjust.

Id. at 1051 (internal citation omitted). The aggrieved party “need not establish an expectation of monetary payment for the services rendered.” Id. at 1052 (emphasis omitted).

[24] With respect to the trial court's finding that Adriana did not prove her unjust enrichment claim, we agree with Adriana this finding is clearly erroneous. If she did not prove her unjust enrichment claim, there was no basis on which to award her anything. “However, we may reverse a trial court's judgment only if its findings constitute prejudicial error. A finding of fact is not prejudicial to a party unless it directly supports a conclusion of law adverse to him.” Riehle v. Moore, 601 N.E.2d 365, 369 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted), trans. denied. The vehicle for getting this dispute into court was an unjust enrichment claim.⁹ But the question here is not whether Adriana proved she rendered a measurable benefit to Rigoberto under such circumstances that Rigoberto's retention of the benefit without payment would be unjust—Rigoberto expressly testified they both invested time and money in accumulating and maintaining various assets by mutual agreement and agreed Adriana was entitled to her share of those assets. Rather, the essence of this case is the extent, value, and division of the joint property—and, despite its finding, the trial court did determine, value, and divide the joint property. So this erroneous finding was not prejudicial to Adriana, and it does not constitute reversible error.

[25] Next, Adriana claims the trial court “oversimplified this as a ‘he said, she said’ single choice between two stories.” Appellant's Br. at 13. Adriana points to “an abundance of agreement between the parties, based on reliable evidence, that is, appraisals․ [T]hose values are not contrasting stories as the trial court suggested.” Id. at 22. Indeed, the parties agreed about the extent of the joint real estate assets and most of their values. But the primary issue before the trial court was the value of the Oaxaca home and the San Juan lots, numbers on which they could not agree. Adriana offered an appraisal for the Oaxaca home from five years before the parties separated and explained why she believed that number was its true value; Rigoberto offered a different appraisal from three years after they separated and gave his explanation for that value. The same is true of the San Juan lots. The parties presented conflicting evidence on the primary matter at issue. It was Adriana's burden to prove her case and the trial court's function as the finder of fact to determine which witness testimony to credit and resolve the conflict in the evidence. See Smith v. Dermatology Assocs. of Fort Wayne, P.C., 977 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). The trial court did not accept Adriana's valuation, finding her to have no credibility and her “various stories” about the Oaxaca home to be disingenuous. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 69. As a reviewing court, we will not second-guess the trial court's credibility determination. See, e.g., Simpson v. City of Madison, 213 N.E.3d 530, 543 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (holding appellant's contention about conflicting evidence was “nothing more than a request for us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do”).

[26] Relatedly, Adriana claims the trial court's valuation of the Oaxaca home erroneously included her personal investment in the home after the parties’ separation rather than the value created through their joint efforts. She points to the pictures included in the 2015 and 2021 appraisals as showing construction in “an arrested state” as opposed to the pictures in the 2022 appraisal showing physical improvements.¹⁰ Appellant's Br. at 26. But again, the trial court did not credit Adriana's testimony the improvements were solely a result of her investment, and we defer to the court's determination.

[27] Adriana also contends the trial court's determination and division of the property is clearly erroneous because the findings “do not contain all the facts necessary to recovery by Rigoberto.” Appellant's Br. at 24. The purpose of special findings is to provide the parties and reviewing courts with the theory on which the case was decided. Balicki v. Balicki, 837 N.E.2d 532, 536 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. “A court on review must determine whether the specific findings are adequate to support the trial court's decision. The findings are adequate if they disclose a valid basis under the issues to support the result reached in the judgment.” Matter of Est. of Kroslack, 570 N.E.2d 117, 121 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (internal citations omitted).

[28] Adriana notes the trial court's spreadsheet identifying, valuing, and dividing assets does not include certain “additional assets.” Appellant's Br. at 24. These assets include the parties’ retirement accounts, their individual bank accounts, and a work trailer. She cites Erb v. Erb, in which this Court found the trial court's findings were insufficient because they did not contain all facts necessary to show how the trial court arrived at its net marital estate figure. 815 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (stating the Court was unable to arrive at the trial court's total using the trial court's findings). The Erb Court noted, “In dissolution proceedings in cases involving marital estates with considerable assets and debts, the trial court's careful calculation of the net marital estate in its findings of fact and conclusions of law facilitates our review on appeal.” Id. at 1030.

[29] In citing Erb and making this argument, it appears Adriana seeks property rights equivalent to those conferred by Indiana's marital dissolution statutes. But here, the trial court was not dividing a marital estate based on the “one-pot” theory. See Dierckman v. Dierckman, 225 N.E.3d 185, 195 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (describing the one-pot method for calculating and distributing marital property, “whereby all property is included in the marital pot and subject to division”), trans. denied. Further, there is no statutory presumption of an equal division here as there would be for a dissolution of marriage. Instead, the trial court was determining and valuing the assets obtained through the parties’ joint efforts and dividing them based on principles of restitution. See Lash v. Kreigh, 202 N.E.3d 1098, 1103 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (“[I]n an unjust-enrichment case, the inquiry focuses on the benefit realized and retained by the defendant[.]”) (quoting 66 Am. Jur. 2d Restitution and Implied Contracts § 35). Every asset the parties owned, jointly or individually, did not have to be accounted for, valued, and divided to mathematical precision. See Turner, 792 N.E.2d at 950–51 (affirming trial court's order that ex-boyfriend pay ex-girlfriend $18,000 upon finding ex-boyfriend would be unjustly enriched if ex-girlfriend were awarded no part of the $108,000 in assets accumulated during their cohabitation). The trial court just had to assure neither party was unjustly enriched by the result.

[30] The trial court made findings as to the length and nature of the parties’ cohabitation, their efforts to accumulate property, their relative work situations, and Adriana's credibility. The court explicitly adopted the list Rigoberto submitted as representing the assets to which the parties jointly contributed, and in doing so, accepted Rigoberto's valuations of the disputed Mexico properties. The trial court's findings are sufficient for us to review the basis for the trial court's judgment, and they support the trial court's valuation and division of the assets comprising the joint property. Deferring to the court's equitable judgment, we conclude the order is not clearly erroneous.

The trial court's order for Adriana to pay Rigoberto's attorney fees is not clearly erroneous.

[31] Adriana also argues the trial court's award of attorney fees to Rigoberto is clearly erroneous because there is no finding or authority to support the trial court's award.

[32] The trial court's order states the division of assets “includes an award of fees to [Rigoberto], which the Court grants for the reasons stated above.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 69. The trial court did not identify the authority under which it awarded fees.

[33] Shortly after the hearing at which the trial court last heard issues related to the paternity cases, Rigoberto filed a motion for attorney fees, citing Indiana Code Section 31-15-10-1 as authority for the award. The trial court did not act on the motion at that time. Section 31-15-10-1(a) is a provision allowing the court to periodically order a party in a dissolution case to pay a reasonable amount to the other party for attorney fees and other costs. As we have noted above, this is not a dissolution proceeding. This provision therefore does not apply. In his brief, Rigoberto cites Indiana Code Section 31-14-18-2—the provision allowing an award of costs and attorney fees in a paternity action—as authority supporting the award. See Appellee's Br. at 28. But this provision also does not apply, as the award was made in the unjust enrichment case for “legal services rendered in this matter” and not the paternity cases. Ex. Vol. 2 at 116 (Rigoberto's attorney's fee affidavit and invoice referencing only the unjust enrichment cause number); see also Turner, 792 N.E.2d at 951 (holding trial court erred in ordering boyfriend to pay the cost of a business appraisal requested by girlfriend because even though the parties also had a paternity action pending, the girlfriend “did not use the business appraisal in her child support calculations” or “for any purpose other than to arrive at the amount of her recovery for ․ unjust enrichment”).

[34] That said, Rigoberto's motion alleged Adriana had engaged in conduct intended to frustrate the litigation in the paternity and property division cases. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 49. When Rigoberto renewed his motion at the final hearing, he alleged Adriana had refused to cooperate in gathering the information needed to decide the property division she sought from the court, prolonging the litigation. These allegations sound in bad faith. Indiana Code Section 34-52-1-1(b) states that in any civil action, the court “may award attorney's fees ․ if the court finds that either party: ․ litigated the action in bad faith.”¹¹ “Bad faith, for the purpose of an award of attorney fees, implies the conscious doing of a wrong because of a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.” Neu v. Gibson, 968 N.E.2d 262, 279 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. The conduct must be “vexatious and oppressive in the extreme.” Id. (citation omitted); see also BioConvergence, LLC v. Menefee, 103 N.E.3d 1141, 1162 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (“Bad faith is demonstrated where the party presenting the claim is affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will.”), trans. denied. The trial court's order includes findings regarding Adriana's “disingenuous,” “nonresponsive,” and “obstructive” behavior and references the issues arising from her deposition. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 69. For these reasons, there is both a statutory basis for an attorney fee award and findings that contain a viable theory supporting the award.¹² As we can affirm the judgment on any theory supported by the findings, we conclude the trial court's order on attorney fees is not clearly erroneous.

Conclusion

[35] The trial court order valuing and dividing the parties’ joint property is not clearly erroneous, nor is the trial court's award of attorney fees to Rigoberto.

[36] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Rigoberto and Adriana had not returned to Mexico since moving to Indiana, so neither party had seen their Mexico properties in person. Adriana's sister Maxima resided in Mexico and assisted Rigoberto and Adriana with some of their Mexico properties.

2.   Apparently, Adriana said the same when she was asked about this at Rigoberto's criminal trial. We do not have the transcript of that trial and cannot independently verify Adriana's testimony, although during cross-examination by Rigoberto's attorney at a hearing in this case, Adriana answered “[y]es” when asked if “the information that you provided in that courtroom was entirely false[.]” Tr. Vol. 3 at 34.

3.   Adriana included her response to Rigoberto's motion to compel in her appendix, but did not include the motion to compel itself.

4.   The child support issues were also heard at this time and decided in the trial court's subsequent order.

5.   A comparison of Adriana's Exhibit 1 listing the values she assigned to the eleven properties with Rigoberto's Exhibit F listing the values he assigned shows they agree as to the value of nine properties. Compare Ex. Vol. 1 at 6, with Ex. Vol. 2 at 178. Although they disagreed about the value of the Oaxaca home and the San Juan lots, they agreed Adriana should be awarded the Oaxaca home and Rigoberto should be awarded the San Juan lots.

6.   Rigoberto and Adriana “were on the same page that [the Oaxaca home] would be under [Maxima's] name.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 107.

7.   No conversion into a United States dollar amount was given, but this is roughly twice the value in pesos as the 2015 appraisal.

8.   The division also included each party's vehicle and the value of a joint bank account when they separated.

9.   This is not a typical claim for unjust enrichment in a cohabitation context given the joint assets were held in both parties’ names and there was no evidence Rigoberto was unfairly retaining them without payment. See Neibert, 54 N.E.3d at 1053 (holding ex-boyfriend rendered a measurable benefit in performing work on ex-girlfriend's properties and she would be unjustly enriched by retaining that benefit without restitution when they separated); Turner, 792 N.E.2d at 950–51 (holding ex-boyfriend would be unjustly enriched if ex-girlfriend “were awarded no part of the value of the assets [he] acquired in his name alone during their cohabitation” when he accepted the benefit of ex-girlfriend's domestic services, and those services contributed to his ability to acquire assets). Throughout these proceedings, both parties showed an intention to share in the assets accumulated through their joint efforts but needed the court's intervention to determine the extent and value of those assets, not to coerce restitution.

10.   As noted above, the pictures attached to the 2015 and 2021 appraisals are identical, not in the sense that they show the property in the same state, but in the sense that the 2021 appraisal used the pictures taken in 2015. Accordingly, the 2021 pictures do not necessarily show the state of the property at that time.

11.   Rigoberto cites this section in his brief, although it was not cited to the trial court. See Appellee's Br. at 28.

12.   We also note a court has inherent equitable authority to grant attorney fees even where not specifically allowed by statute, agreement, or stipulation. Est. of Kroslack, 570 N.E.2d at 121 (“[A] court may in its inherent equitable power, determine that an award of attorney's fees is appropriate under the circumstances of a particular case after a determination that a party has acted in bad-faith and such conduct is calculatedly oppressive, obdurate, or obstreperous.”).

Kenworthy, Judge.

Judges Felix and DeBoer concur. Felix, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.