IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of H.E. and W.R. (Minor Children) and A.E. (Mother) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A.E. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's involuntary termination of her parental rights to her minor children, H.E. and W.R. (collectively, “Children”).¹ Mother raises one issue, which we restate as whether the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) presented sufficient evidence to support the termination of her parental rights. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother is the biological parent of H.E., born November 6, 2021,² and W.R., born January 1, 2023. At birth, H.E.’s cord tissue tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and THC. When W.R. was born, she tested positive for methamphetamine while Mother tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and THC. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 103. Hospital staff questioned Mother's ability to care for W.R. because in addition to the baby's positive drug screen, the staff heard Mother screaming to “get the baby away from [her],” and noted she would not wake to feed, change, or bond with the baby. Id. at 104. The hospital staff's observations and concerns, as well as W.R.’s “mild tremors” from methamphetamine withdrawal, prompted them to contact DCS. Id.

[3] When a DCS Family Case Manager (“FCM”) confronted Mother about W.R.’s positive drug screen at birth, Mother denied using methamphetamine during her pregnancy but admitted smoking marijuana while pregnant. Id. The next day, Mother admitted to DCS she used methamphetamine until she found out she was pregnant “at approximately 5 months gestation.” Id.

[4] On January 4, 2023, DCS filed a petition alleging W.R. and H.E. were Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”) due to Children's and Mother's positive drug screens, Mother's unwillingness or inability to provide W.R. with effective care, and Mother's ongoing substance abuse. Five days later, the trial court ordered Children be removed from the home and placed in the care of maternal grandparents.

[5] On March 3, 2023, the trial court adjudicated Children to be CHINS. In its March 13, 2023 Dispositional Order, the trial court ordered Mother to follow the standard dispositional requirements, including keeping all appointments with DCS or other service providers, securing and maintaining employment, refraining from using illegal substances or alcohol, completing a substance abuse assessment, completing treatment recommendations, and attending all visits with Children.

[6] DCS referred Mother to Centerstone ³ for a substance abuse assessment and treatment. Mother “no showed” for several appointments with Centerstone but eventually completed her substance abuse assessment on April 27, 2023. Transcript Vol. 2 at 39. Following her assessment, she attended two appointments at Centerstone before being discharged for noncompliance in August 2023. Despite being accepted back into Centerstone's program in early December 2023 and complying for a brief period of time, Mother “no show[ed] for her remaining appointments” and lost contact with the facility. Id.

[7] Mother did not remain drug free as ordered. She tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine on December 6, 2023; December 13, 2023; January 17, 2024; March 26, 2024; and April 10, 2024. Although court-ordered to appear for drug testing, Mother missed eleven drug screens and refused twelve.

[8] Mother was equally unsuccessful in participating in “home-based casework.” Id. at 98. DCS referred Mother to Firefly Children and Family Alliance (“Firefly”) for assistance in parenting, maintaining employment, and improving other life skills. Id. at 99-101. Although she completed an initial assessment and sporadically worked with Firefly for four and a half months, in December 2023 Firefly discharged Mother from their program a second time for “no show[ing]” four times and canceling four times. Id. at 104.

[9] Meanwhile, in October or November 2023, Children were removed from maternal grandparents’ home and placed in foster care due to substance abuse in their home. Beginning around January 2024, Mother began visiting Children in their foster home twice a week. Initially these visits went “very well,” but eventually Mother's visitation with Children stopped and she would not commit to the services offered by DCS. Id. at 59. These two factors caused DCS to reduce Mother's visits to once per week.

[10] DCS filed its Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child Relationship on April 8, 2024. At the fact-finding hearing on June 18, 2024, a DCS FCM and Children's Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) agreed that termination of Mother's parental rights, followed by Children's adoption by their foster family, was in Children's best interests, especially given the fact that Children were “doing great” with their foster family and H.E. was doing “exceptionally well” in speech therapy. Id. at 114-115.

[11] Mother admitted she had not “engaged in any services or activities to help [her] achieve reunification with her children[.]” Id. at 127. Although Mother testified to attending weekly AA meetings, she also stated that she had left an inpatient treatment program arranged by DCS after three days because “[i]t was hard.” Id. at 135. Mother acknowledged that as of the date of the hearing, she was not able to care for Children.

[12] In lieu of termination, Mother proposed Children's grandmother,⁴ P.K., be appointed their guardian in the separately filed guardianship action that was pending during the June 18, 2024 hearing. DCS objected to P.K. becoming Children's guardian due to her “18-year-old criminal history.” Id. at 166.

[13] The trial court terminated Mother's parental rights on June 18, 2024, finding Mother “has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in [Children] being placed in care outside the parents’ home.” See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(2)(B). Although Mother “occasionally participated in supervised visits,” the trial court noted this was the “extent of her parental participation.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 213; Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 182. In its order, the trial court also cited Mother's sporadic participation in services and meetings, her refusal to address her substance abuse, and the fact that Mother was one hour and fifteen minutes late for the termination hearing. Id. Despite DCS's efforts to have Mother participate in “home-based casework, therapy, drug screens, Intensive Outpatient Therapy, supervised visits, [and] inpatient treatment,” Mother did “next to nothing” other than “occasionally participate[ ] in the supervised visits.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 170. Finding termination of the parent-child relationship to be in Children's best interests, with adoption being a satisfactory plan, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights to Children. Mother then filed this appeal.

Discussion and Decision

1. Standard of Review

[14] We agree with Mother that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional rights of parents to establish a home and raise their children. In re K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., Dearborn Cnty. Off., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). After all, “[a] parent's interest in the upbringing of their child is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by the courts.’ ” Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). However, this right is not absolute. Id. A parent's interests must be subordinated to the child's interest when considering a petition to terminate parental rights. Id.; see also In re Matter of Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019) (“[p]arents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute.”), cert denied, 140 S.Ct. 2835 (2020), reh'g denied. “When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” Ma.H. at 45-46.

[15] Here, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law terminating Mother's parental rights. We affirm a trial court's termination of parental rights decision unless it is clearly erroneous. Id. at 45. “We do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's judgment.” Id.

2. Termination of Parental Rights

[16] In order to terminate a parent's rights to his or her child, DCS must prove by clear and convincing evidence the following:

(c) A petition [to terminate the parent-child relationship] must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

(d) A petition [to terminate the parent-child relationship] must allege the existence of one (1) or more of the following circumstances:

․

(2) That:

(A) the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of services or a delinquent child; and

(B) despite the department's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)-(d).⁵

[17] It is well-established that “[a] trial court should judge a parent's fitness as of the time of the termination hearing and take into consideration evidence of changed conditions.” Stone v. Daviess Cnty. Div. of Children & Family Servs., 656 N.E.2d 824, 828 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied. In judging fitness, a trial court may properly consider, among other things, a parent's substance abuse and lack of adequate housing and employment. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. OFC, 798 N.E.2d 185, 199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). The trial court may also consider a parent's failure to respond to services. Lang v. Starke Cnty. OFC, 861 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. “[H]abitual patterns of conduct must be evaluated to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.” Stone, 656 N.E.2d at 828. A trial court “need not wait until the children are irreversibly influenced by their deficient lifestyle such that their physical, mental and social growth is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” Id. “Clear and convincing evidence need not reveal that the continued custody of the parents is wholly inadequate for the child's very survival. Rather, it is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that the child's emotional and physical development are threatened by the respondent parent's custody.” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1230.

A. Reasonable Probability of Remedying Conditions

[18] On January 9, 2023, trial court removed Children from Mother's care because of her noncompliance with court-ordered services and continued substance abuse. At the close of the fact-finding hearing, the trial court concluded a reasonable probability existed that the circumstances which led to the removal of Children and their continued placement outside the home would not be remedied.

[19] The evidence presented reflects that during the time Mother was court-ordered to participate in reunification services and Children were removed from her care, Mother refused drug treatment services, only occasionally participated in supervised visits, and rarely appeared for scheduled services or meetings. Mother twice failed to avail herself of Centerstone's outpatient substance abuse treatment program by “no showing” for her treatment sessions and by being discharged for noncompliance. Inpatient treatment was similarly unsuccessful, with Mother leaving after only three days because “[i]t was hard,” and expressing no desire to retry. Tr. Vol. 2 at 135. Between December 2023 and April 2024, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine five times and failed to appear for or refused numerous drug screens. Mother's refusal to participate in court-ordered treatment programs continued with Firefly. Mother was referred to a home-based caseworker but was terminated from this program after four no shows and four cancellations with the caseworker.

[20] Mother argues that by the time of the termination hearing on June 18, 2024, she had completed two substance abuse assessments and a recovery/life skills program. Although she claimed she was sober, she regularly visited with Children, and she attended weekly AA meetings, Mother admitted she did not complete the services recommended by DCS and that she was over one hour late to the termination hearing due to confusing an upcoming CHINS hearing with the termination hearing. See A.F. v. Marion Cty. Office of Family and Children, 762 N.E.2d 1244, 1252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (“[a] parent's failure to appear for assessments and court hearings reflects ambivalence[.]”), trans. denied.

[21] Mother's alleged sobriety is belied by her habitual pattern of conduct. See In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014) (“[p]arents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.”). Mother claimed to be sober at the June termination hearing, but the trial court had “discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” Id.; see also In re C.S., 190 N.E.3d 434, 439-440 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (finding “it was not improper for the trial court to weigh Mother's years’ long history of drug use more heavily than a few weeks of purported sobriety.”) Mother used methamphetamine while pregnant with each child and her prior history shows over one dozen positive or refused drug tests in the months leading up to the termination hearing, numerous missed outpatient treatment sessions, and an unwillingness to engage in inpatient treatment. The evidence presented here clearly and convincingly shows a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to the Children's removal from Mother's home would not be remedied.

B. Best Interests

[22] Mother argues DCS failed to show that termination was in Children's best interests because she had a “clear bond” with them and “had a plan in place for their care while she continued to work on recovery from her addiction.” Appellee's Br. at 13. To determine what is in the best interests of children, a trial court “must look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the children.” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235. A trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that his or her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id. “When assessing the child's physical, emotional and mental well-being, the trial court may consider a myriad of factors.” Id. “We acknowledge that among those factors contemplated, ‘[p]ermanency is a central consideration in determining the [child's] best interests[.]’ ” Id. (quoting In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1265 (Ind. 2009)). “[R]ecommendation[s] by both the case manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[23] “A parent's historical inability to provide a suitable environment along with the parent's current inability to do so supports finding termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child.” Matter of G.M., 71 N.E.3d 898, 908 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). Here, both the FCM and the CASA testified that Children are thriving in foster care and believed adoption to be in their best interests. Mother admitted that she is not ready to care for Children. Despite having over a year to address her substance abuse, Mother did not. Rather than achieving sobriety, Mother simply quit inpatient treatment because “it was hard.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 135. Nothing in the record indicates that Mother's ability to provide a suitable environment for Children will improve. The trial court did not clearly err when it found that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Children's best interests.

Conclusion

[24] The trial court did not clearly err in terminating Mother's parental rights to Children.

[25] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   J.E. is the biological father of H.E. and J.R. is the biological father of W.R. Although the trial court also terminated each father's parental rights in the same hearing as Mother's, they do not join this appeal. Facts pertaining to the biological fathers will be included insofar as they are relevant to these appellate proceedings.

2.   In 2021, after H.E.’s positive methamphetamine test, DCS investigated Mother and “substantiated neglect and opened an [Informal Adjustment] which was later closed unsuccessfully due to lack of compliance.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 103. Mother “did not comply with the terms of the [Informal Adjustment] or participate satisfactorily in the services offered.” Id. at 104. The record is not clear as to why H.E. was not removed in 2021, or which terms or services Mother did not comply with or participate in.

3.   “Centerstone is a mental health agency [ ] that is contracted with DCS for [ ] services,” including substance abuse treatment. Tr. Vol. 2 at 38.

4.   “The relevant guardianship court records from A.E.’s CHINS case are not included in the record on appeal. However, we are able to access the Rush Circuit Court documents in Cause Numbers 70C01-2404-GU-11 (In Re: the Guardianship of W.R.) and 70C01-2404-GU-12 (In Re: the Guardianship of H.E.), both filed by P.K., via Indiana's Odyssey Case Management System, and we take judicial notice of those records. See Ind. Evidence Rule 201(b)(5) (“A court may judicially notice a law, which includes ․records of a court of this state․”). The guardianship court denied both of P.K.’s petitions since DCS had open cases involving W.R. and H.E. in the CHINS court.

5.   On March 11, 2024, I.C. § 31-35-2-4 was amended to expand the grounds for terminating parental rights to twelve, including (d)(2) quoted above. The trial court appropriately applied the amended version in its June 18, 2024 order. Other changes to the statute do not apply to this appeal.

DeBoer, Judge.

Judges May and Tavitas concur. May, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.