GRIFFIN v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Leetravis Griffin appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief following his convictions for felony murder, robbery, and burglary. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Our opinion in Griffin's direct appeal sets forth the following facts:

On the night of December 27, 2012, Tyler Jordan, Autumn Jordan, and Christine Jordan gathered at the home of Kent and Sandra Price (“the home”), who are relatives of the Jordans. Also present at the home was Kent's daughter, Klarisa, and a few of her friends.

At approximately 9:30 p.m., Tyler made his way from the home's second-floor bedroom to the home's first floor kitchen, located at the rear of the home. While there, Tyler heard a knock on the back door, which entered into the kitchen. When Tyler pulled back the door's curtains to see outside, Walter Neely forced open the door and entered the home. Neely grabbed a knife from the kitchen butcher block and cut Tyler's hands before pushing him to the floor. Four other men, including Griffin, then entered the home wearing ski or surgical masks.

After the men entered, one of the men climbed on top of Tyler, placed his hand over Tyler's mouth, and instructed him “to shut up, to be quiet.” While some of the other men went upstairs, this man, armed with a revolver, took Tyler to the basement. Tyler blacked out for a time soon thereafter and, while he could not specifically recall, he subsequently reported that he believed his attacker had knocked him unconscious.

When Tyler regained consciousness, he “didn't look up” but heard the man searching the basement. The man noticed that Tyler was awake and asked Tyler whether he or his uncle knew the codes to the Prices’ safes. The man then went upstairs, but, before doing so, he pointed his gun at Tyler, cocked it, and commanded him, “[D]on't move or I'll kill you.” Tyler could hear screaming and stomping emanating from the home's upper levels.

Thereafter, at least two men—Neely and the man with the gun—“busted through the door” to a second-floor bedroom where everyone but Klarisa and her friends had gathered. The two men stormed into the room. Kent was knocked down, and Christine, who jumped onto Neely, was “slung” to the ground. Neely swung at both Kent and Christine with the knife. The second man pointed the gun at Christine, threatened her life, and ordered her to the bathroom. He also threatened to kill Sandra.

The men demanded money, jewelry, guns, and the home's safes, and they ransacked the bedroom. Meanwhile, a third intruder, also armed with a knife, made his way to the third-floor bedroom where Klarisa and her friends were located. The man searched the room for valuables, taking several items, but did not locate Klarisa or her friends, who hid when they heard the commotion below.

At some point, Klarisa and her friends were able to call 9-1-1. Christine had also managed to call 9-1-1. Officers with the South Bend Police Department responded to the calls and surrounded the home. As the intruders attempted to flee the home, the police apprehended them. Griffin was among those apprehended, and he was still inside the house when the police ordered him out. Griffin, accompanied by another intruder, exited through the home's rear entrance. When officers arrested him, Griffin wore black clothes and a surgical mask but was unarmed.

When the officers entered the home, they discovered Kent and Sandra had sustained serious injuries from knife wounds from Neely's attack. Sandra subsequently died from her injuries, which included a wound to her neck. The officers also found several items of property collected at the rear door of the home and a black duffel bag full of the Prices’ property in the dining room.

Officers transported Griffin to the South Bend Police Department. En route, without being prompted or questioned, Griffin repeatedly expressed that he knew he had acted wrongfully and stated that “he messed up, he messed up, he even drug his brothers into this.” While awaiting formal questioning at the station, Griffin talked to himself, and he expressed his belief that no confession would be needed because he and his confederates had been caught, would tell the same story, and he would go to prison.

Griffin v. State, 16 N.E.3d 997, 1001-02 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citations and footnotes omitted).

[3] The State charged Griffin with felony murder, robbery, and burglary. The case proceeded to a jury trial. The State moved to admit autopsy photos that depicted the knife wounds to Sandra's face and neck. Griffin objected on the basis that the photos were gruesome and showed medically altered wounds. The trial court admitted the photos over Griffin's objection.

[4] During jury instructions, the court learned that a juror—Juror Dempsey—was ill. When questioned, Juror Dempsey said the illness was “due to food allergies” rather than something contagious and that he wanted to remain on the jury. Sept. 12, 2013 Tr. p. 41. Shortly after the jury began its deliberations, however, Juror Dempsey reported that he couldn't continue. He was excused from the jury and replaced by an alternate.

[5] Later in deliberations, another juror—Juror Vohs—reported that she had a “concern” about Juror Dempsey becoming ill. Id. at 46. Juror Vohs was questioned and explained that Juror Dempsey had a gluten allergy, that another juror had brought cookies and said there was a gluten-free one for Juror Dempsey, that she later heard Juror Dempsey say “whoever did this was not cool,” and that hearing this made her worried that the other juror wanted Juror Dempsey to get sick so he would be excused from the jury. Id. at 46-47. Juror Vohs said she didn't know if Juror Dempsey knew who brought the cookies, didn't know if he directed his comment at anyone in particular, and didn't know if anyone else had heard his comment. Griffin's attorney said he was concerned about the possibility that someone wanted Juror Dempsey off the jury because he was the only African-American and “might be sympathetic to [Griffin].” Id. at 50. However, when the court brought up the prospect of questioning other jurors, Griffin's attorney said, “It's one of those kind of things where the surgery might inflict more damage because we are down to twelve.” Id. at 51. Griffin's attorney then requested that Juror Vohs be asked if she could be fair and impartial given her concern. She said she could be, and she was instructed not to discuss the issue with the other jurors. Griffin's attorney didn't object to the makeup of the jury or move for a mistrial, and deliberations continued. The jury found Griffin guilty as charged, and the court sentenced him to 115 years in prison.

[6] Griffin appealed, and his attorney argued, among other things, that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the autopsy photos into evidence. However, the appellate argument was different than the objection made at trial. Whereas trial counsel argued that the photos were unfairly prejudicial because of their gruesome nature and because the wounds depicted had been altered by the pathologist, appellate counsel argued that the photos were unfairly prejudicial because Neely, not Griffin, inflicted the wounds, and the photos were not probative of Griffin's liability as an accomplice. We found that argument waived because it hadn't been made to the trial court. Griffin, 16 N.E.3d at 1005-06. However, we continued:

Waiver notwithstanding, Griffin misstates the law. The [Bruno v. State, 774 N.E.2d 880 (Ind. 2002)] factors provide a starting point for determining an accomplice relationship, but Bruno is not the end of the inquiry. The State still had the burden of proving every element of the offenses charged, including felony murder, beyond a reasonable doubt. Stewart v. State, 945 N.E.2d 1277, 1290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. The photographs assisted the State in meeting that burden. They assisted the testimony of the pathologist, Dr. Prahlow, in explaining Sandra's cause of death. Moreover, Dr. Prahlow explained that he and other doctors, not Griffin, were responsible for those alterations. In such instances, Indiana courts have repeatedly upheld the admission of autopsy photographs. See, e.g., Swingley v. State, 739 N.E.2d 132, 133-34 (Ind. 2000) (discussing Fentress v. State, 702 N.E.2d 721, 722 (Ind. 1998)); Jackson v. State, 973 N.E.2d 1123, 1127-28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.

Id. at 1006. We also rejected Griffin's other arguments and affirmed his convictions.

[7] A year later, Griffin petitioned for post-conviction relief. At his request, the post-conviction court appointed the State Public Defender's Office to represent him. After consulting with Griffin and investigating the case, the State Public Defender's Office moved to withdraw under Post-Conviction Rule 1(9)(c). The post-conviction court granted the motion, and Griffin opted to proceed pro se. As relevant here, Griffin claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object or move for a mistrial in relation to Juror Dempsey's illness and that his appellate counsel was ineffective for raising a challenge to the autopsy photos that hadn't been preserved for appeal. The court held an evidentiary hearing, and Griffin's trial counsel and appellate counsel both testified. At the end of the hearing, the court asked Griffin if he had any other evidence to present and specifically asked if he wanted to subpoena Juror Dempsey and Juror Vohs. Griffin said no. After the hearing, the post-conviction court denied Griffin's petition.

[8] Griffin, still acting pro se, now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. The post-conviction court didn't err by failing to appoint another attorney to represent Griffin after the State Public Defender's Office withdrew

[9] Griffin first argues that the post-conviction court “abused its discretion” by failing to appoint another attorney to represent him after the State Public Defender's Office withdrew from the case. Appellant's Br. p. 16. Griffin doesn't point to anything in the record showing that he asked the court to appoint another attorney, but it wouldn't have mattered. There is no constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, Graves v. State, 823 N.E.2d 1193, 1196 (Ind. 2005), and the only appointed counsel contemplated by the Indiana Rules of Post-Conviction Remedies is the State Public Defender's Office, see Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(2). The rules also explicitly permit the State Public Defender's Office to withdraw after consulting with the petitioner and conducting an appropriate investigation. Id. at 1(9)(c). When that happens, the petitioner has only three options: (1) drop the petition; (2) find their own attorney; or (3) proceed pro se. See id. at 1(9). The post-conviction court didn't err by failing to appoint another attorney for Griffin.

II. The post-conviction court didn't err by denying Griffin's petition for post-conviction relief

[10] Griffin also contends the post-conviction court erred by denying his petition for post-conviction relief. A defendant who petitions for post-conviction relief must establish the grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Hollowell v. State, 19 N.E.3d 263, 268-69 (Ind. 2014). If the post-conviction court denies relief, and the petitioner appeals, the petitioner must show that the evidence leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction court. Id. at 269.

[11] Griffin argues that both his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. When evaluating a defendant's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, we apply the well-established two-part test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Bobadilla v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1272, 1280 (Ind. 2019). The defendant must prove (1) counsel rendered deficient performance, meaning counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as gauged by prevailing professional norms, and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defendant, i.e., but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. “Failure to satisfy either prong will cause the claim to fail.” Conley v. State, 183 N.E.3d 276, 283 (Ind. 2022) (quotation omitted), reh'g denied.

A. Trial Counsel

[12] Griffin argues the post-conviction court should have found that his trial counsel was ineffective in his handling of Juror Dempsey's removal from the jury. Citing Juror Vohs's stated concern that another juror might have intentionally made Juror Dempsey sick, Griffin argues that his trial counsel should have objected to the removal of Juror Dempsey, objected to “the assembly of the jury for possible juror misconduct,” or moved for a mistrial based on juror misconduct. Appellant's Br. pp. 17-24. But when a post-conviction petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel based on failure to object or failure to move for a mistrial, the petitioner must show that the objection would have had merit or that a mistrial was warranted. Pruitt v. State, 903 N.E.2d 899, 928 (Ind. 2009) (objection), reh'g denied; Bouye v. State, 699 N.E.2d 620, 623-24 (Ind. 1998) (mistrial). Here, Griffin has given us no reason to think that the trial court would have agreed with an objection or mistrial motion that was based solely on Juror Vohs's mere concern about what might have happened.

[13] In the alternative, Griffin argues that his trial counsel should have at least “sought to investigate the issue.” Appellant's Br. p. 24. It is of course possible that an investigation would have revealed that another juror intentionally made Juror Dempsey sick. And if another juror did, in fact, purposely sicken Juror Dempsey, Griffin would have a strong basis for post-conviction relief. But when a post-conviction petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel based on failure to investigate, the petitioner must go “beyond the trial record to show what an investigation, if undertaken, would have produced.” Reeves v. State, 174 N.E.3d 1134, 1141 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. Here, Griffin didn't present any evidence that an investigation would have uncovered juror misconduct. Instead, he relied entirely on Juror Vohs's speculation that there might have been juror misconduct. And when the post-conviction court asked Griffin if he wanted to subpoena Juror Dempsey or Juror Vohs, he declined. Because Griffin didn't show what an investigation would have produced, he couldn't show that he was prejudiced by the failure to investigate.

[14] The post-conviction court didn't err by rejecting Griffin's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

B. Appellate Counsel

[15] Griffin argues the post-conviction court should have found that his appellate counsel was ineffective for challenging the admission of the autopsy photos on a ground that had not been raised at trial: the photos were unfairly prejudicial because Neely, not Griffin, inflicted the wounds, and the photos were not probative of whether Griffin acted as Neely's accomplice. Though Griffin doesn't say so, presumably he believes appellate counsel should have renewed the argument made by trial counsel: the photos were unfairly prejudicial because of their gruesome nature and because the wounds depicted had been altered by the pathologist. But Griffin offers no explanation for why that argument would have fared any better, and our previous opinion made clear why it wouldn't have—autopsy photos are routinely admitted in murder cases, and the pathologist acknowledged to the jury that the wounds had been medically altered. Griffin, 16 N.E.3d at 1006. Griffin doesn't address that part of our opinion. Therefore, he hasn't shown that the post-conviction court erred by rejecting his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

[16] Affirmed.

Vaidik, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Scheele, J., concur.