IN RE: R.S. (Minor Child) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Z.S. (“Father”) appeals the Hancock Superior Court's order adjudicating R.S. (“Child”), his minor child, a Child In Need of Services (“CHINS”). Father raises two issues in this appeal: 1) whether the juvenile court erred when it found that good cause existed to hold the fact-finding hearing beyond the 120-day statutory deadline; and 2) whether the juvenile court's order adjudicating Child a CHINS was supported by the evidence.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Father and D.W. (“Mother”) are married and are the parents of Child, who was born in March 2018. Father has a history of addiction and receives ongoing treatment. Father also has prescriptions for Suboxone and Adderall.

[4] The Department of Child Services (“DCS”) first became involved with the family in June 2023 because Mother and Child were in a single car accident when Mother crashed her vehicle into a telephone pole. Emergency personnel suspected that Mother had overdosed, and, at the hospital, Mother tested positive for opiates, benzodiazepine, and cocaine. During the ensuing investigation, DCS asked Father to voluntarily submit to drug screens, but Father refused to do so. After determining that Mother and Father could benefit from services, DCS offered Mother and Father an informal adjustment, but they refused to participate.

[5] On September 1, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child was a CHINS because Mother continued to test positive for amphetamine, the parents had extensive criminal histories related to drug use and possession, and the parents had refused to participate in an Informal Adjustment. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 41-43. At the initial hearing, Mother and Father denied that Child was a CHINS. Child remained in Mother's and Father's care. After Mother and Father agreed to waive the sixty-day time limit for holding the fact-finding hearing, the juvenile court set the fact-finding hearing for January 4, 2024, which was three days beyond the 120-day statutory deadline. Neither Mother nor Father objected to the court's schedule.

[6] DCS continued to have concerns that Mother and Father were using illegal substances after they had fallen asleep during Child's therapeutic assessment and the provider noted that both parents’ speech was slurred. DCS filed a petition to remove Child from Mother's and Father's care, but the juvenile court determined that the evidence did not support removal. In November, as a result of the June accident that led to DCS's involvement with the family, the State charged Mother with two Level 6 felonies: operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person with a passenger less than eighteen years old and operating a vehicle with a Schedule I or II controlled substance or its metabolite in the blood. The juvenile court granted DCS's request to amend the CHINS petition to include the pending charges.

[7] Mother and Father failed to respond to DCS's discovery requests and failed to sign releases for disclosure of information from their substance abuse treatment providers. Therefore, on January 4, 2024, DCS requested a continuance of the fact-finding hearing, which the court granted without objection, setting the hearing for February 8. Approximately one week before the hearing, DCS requested a second continuance due to the unavailability of essential witnesses and because DCS had not received Mother's or Father's substance abuse treatment records as they had not signed the releases allowing for disclosures. The parents and the Court Appointed Special Advocate objected to that continuance request. The juvenile court granted DCS's request, ordered Mother and Father grant DCS permission to obtain certain records, and reset the fact-finding hearing for April 4.

[8] On March 18, Father was charged with five felonies and two misdemeanors in Madison County, including possession of a controlled substance, unlawful possession of a firearm, and operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Three days later, Father drove his vehicle into a ditch while Child was in the vehicle. As a result of that accident, Father was charged in Hancock County with Level 6 felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person less than 18 years of age and Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent. On March 25, DCS amended the CHINS petition to include Father's new felony charges.

[9] The next day, the juvenile court held a detention hearing, and, after that hearing, Father tested positive for marijuana. The court granted the detention as to Father but not Mother. The court ordered Father's visitation with Child to be supervised.

[10] At the April 4 fact-finding hearing, Mother admitted that Child was a CHINS.¹ Father filed a motion to dismiss the CHINS petition because DCS failed to bring the case to the court for fact-finding within 120-days of filing the petition as required by Indiana Code section 31-34-11-1. The juvenile court denied the motion after finding that good cause existed to hold the hearing beyond the statutory deadline. Specifically, the court cited discovery issues and court congestion in support of its good cause finding.

[11] On April 11, the juvenile court held a hearing on DCS's renewed request to remove Child from Mother. Father tested positive for methamphetamine that day. Because Mother had not complied with the prior order that Father's visitation with Child needed to be supervised, the juvenile court granted DCS's request to remove Child from Mother. The court placed Child with her maternal grandparents.

[12] The fact-finding hearing concluded on April 15. And the juvenile court issued its order adjudicating Child a CHINS on April 25. The juvenile court noted Father's pending criminal charges and that Child was a passenger in Father's vehicle when he was arrested on March 21 for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. The court found that Father tested positive for illegal substances during the CHINS proceedings, and that Father had not adequately addressed his substance abuse issues. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 108. The juvenile court concluded that Child “needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that the Child is not receiving and is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the Court.” Id. Subsequently, the court held the dispositional hearing and issued its dispositional order on May 23.

[13] Father now appeals.

Good Cause for the Delay

[14] First, Father argues that the juvenile court was required to dismiss the CHINS petition because the fact-finding hearing did not conclude until 228 days after the CHINS petition was filed. Indiana Code section 31-34-11-1 provides that a CHINS fact-finding hearing shall be held not more than sixty days after the petition is filed, or, if all parties consent to additional time, not more than 120 days after DCS files the petition. In this case, the parties waived the sixty-day requirement; therefore, pursuant to section 31-34-11-1, the juvenile court was required to hold the fact-finding hearing within the 120-day deadline.

[15] However, that statute conflicts with Indiana Trial Rule 53.5,² which provides in relevant part: “[u]pon motion, trial may be postponed or continued in the discretion of the court, and shall be allowed upon a showing of good cause established by affidavit or other evidence.” In In re M.S., 140 N.E.3d 279 (Ind. 2020), our Supreme Court held that, pursuant to Trial Rule 53.5, a juvenile court can exceed the 120-day deadline imposed by Indiana Code section 31-34-11-1(b) if a party (1) moves for a continuance and (2) shows “good cause” for why a continuance is necessary. Id. at 284. The Court explained its reasoning as follows:

Allowing a “good cause” continuance beyond the 120-day deadline not only provides fairness for the parties involved but also allows the legislature's intent to “prevail[ ] over the strict literal meaning of any word or term.” We have consistently observed the principle that “the purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to protect children, not punish parents.” Accordingly, trial courts are afforded considerable discretion in ruling on motions for continuances, including determining whether the moving parties have shown good cause for requesting a continuance. There are no “mechanical tests” for determining whether a request for a continuance was made for good cause. Rather, the decision to grant or deny a continuance turns on the circumstances present in a particular case ․

Id. at 284-85; see also In re K.W., 178 N.E.3d 1199, 1208 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021).

[16] Here, the juvenile court concluded that there was good cause to set the fact-finding hearing beyond 120 days. The court cited the discovery issues and noted that “it was the parents who ․ did not comply with the discovery requests, which required additional hearings and resettings of the” fact-finding hearing. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 242. The court also explained that “the Court has an abundance of fact-finding hearings right now for some reason in both Circuit and the Superior Court 1, ․ in CHINS matters, ․ and our docket is just very congested right now, and uh, unfortunately, we just have to use ․ the limited time that we have available right now and that's another reason to move outside the hundred and twenty day deadline.” Id.

[17] The fact-finding hearing commenced on April 4, nearly 100 days beyond the 120-day statutory deadline. We agree with Father that this is not an insignificant delay. However, Mother's and Father's refusal to comply with DCS's discovery requests was DCS's reason for requesting a continuance of the fact-finding hearing.³ DCS also asserted that there were essential witnesses that were unavailable for the February 8 fact-finding date. Father complains that the records sought that led to the discovery dispute, i.e., Mother's and Father's prior substance abuse treatment records, were not relevant to proving that the Child was a CHINS. Appellant's Br. at 24. But the CHINS petition alleged that both parents had drug-related criminal histories, and DCS believed that Mother and Father were again struggling with substance abuse. Therefore, we do not agree with Father's claim that the records were irrelevant.

[18] Father also challenges the trial court's finding of court congestion. It is reasonable to infer that the court meant that there were no available dates between February 8, which was the date of the continued fact-finding hearing, and April 4, the date the fact-finding hearing commenced. And Father has not persuaded us that court congestion was not a valid reason to establish good cause in this case. See Matter of K.W., 178 N.E.3d at 1210 (acknowledging that court congestion may establish good cause for granting a motion to continue a CHINS fact-finding hearing).

[19] We conclude that the juvenile court acted within its discretion when it found that good cause existed to hold the fact-finding hearing beyond the 120-day statutory deadline. But Father also argues that the “128 day delay in the fact[-]finding hearing denied Father's due process right to be heard in a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Appellant's Br. at 25. Because CHINS proceedings carry a significant potential to interfere with the rights of parents in the upbringing of their children, due process concerns at all stages of a CHINS proceeding are of paramount concern. Matter of Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d 1201, 1209 (Ind. 2019) (citations omitted).

[20] Father only claims that his due process rights were violated because the “delays required Father and his family to remain under the scrutiny of a pending CHINS petition hanging over their heads ․” Id. at 26. The delay is the only alleged procedural irregularity in the proceedings. But Father's own conduct contributed to the delay. And Father did not file his motion to dismiss until April 4, the date the fact-finding hearing commenced. Father was represented by counsel, he had notice of all proceedings, and he received a fact-finding hearing. For all of these reasons, Father has not demonstrated that his due process rights were violated.

Sufficient Evidence

[21] Father challenges the trial court's adjudication of Child as a CHINS. Our standard of review is well settled:

When reviewing a trial court's CHINS determination, we do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. Instead, we consider only the evidence that supports the trial court's decision and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. When a trial court supplements a CHINS judgment with findings of fact and conclusions of law, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. We consider, first, whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, whether the findings support the judgment. We will reverse a CHINS determination only if it was clearly erroneous. A decision is clearly erroneous if the record facts do not support the findings or if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.

Gr. J. v. Ind. Dep't. of Child Servs. (In re D.J.), 68 N.E.3d 574, 577-78 (Ind. 2017) (cleaned up).

[22] In J.B. v. Indiana Department of Child Services (In re S.D.), 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287-88 (Ind. 2014), our Supreme Court explained the three elements required to prove that a child is a CHINS under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1, as alleged in this case:

Not every endangered child is a child in need of services, permitting the State's parens patriae intrusion into the ordinarily private sphere of the family. Rather, a CHINS adjudication under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1 (often called a “CHINS 1,” in reference to the section number) requires three basic elements: that the parent's actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child, that the child's needs are unmet, and (perhaps most critically) that those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion. In full, the statute provides:

A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

I.C. § 31-34-1-1 (2008). That final element guards against unwarranted State interference in family life, reserving that intrusion for families where parents lack the ability to provide for their children, not merely where they encounter difficulty in meeting a child's needs.

(Cleaned up.) Further, the law does not require a court to wait until a tragedy occurs to intervene. In re A.H., 913 N.E.2d 303, 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Rather, a child is a CHINS when he or she is endangered by parental action or inaction. Id. The purpose of a CHINS adjudication is not to punish the parents, but to protect the child. In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 805 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.

[23] Father argues that the juvenile court's conclusion that Child's needs were unmet or unlikely to be met without State intervention was not supported by the evidence. In support of his argument, Father cites evidence that Child is healthy, attends school, has no behavioral issues, is bonded with her family, and that parents’ home is appropriate.

[24] But that evidence was weighed against the evidence that Father is abusing substances, Father has not been forthcoming about his substance abuse, and he chose to drive his vehicle while under the influence with Child in the car. A law enforcement officer observed Father's erratic driving, including driving left of the center line and failing to stop at a stop sign. And after the officer turned his emergency lights on to initiate the traffic stop, Father drove his car into a ditch. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 37.

[25] DCS presented sufficient evidence that Father's substance abuse threatens Child's safety and well-being. Father failed to voluntarily comply with services offered by DCS and declined to participate in an informal adjustment. Father also refused to acknowledge or address his continuing substance abuse problem. Father's substance abuse has endangered Child's well-being. And Father had pending felony criminal charges in two counties on the date of the fact-finding hearing, which were related to his substance abuse issues. For all of these reasons, we conclude that the juvenile court's conclusion that the coercive intervention of the court was necessary was supported by the evidence.

Conclusion

[26] The trial court did not err when it denied Father's motion to dismiss. And DCS proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Child is a CHINS. Therefore, we affirm the juvenile court's order adjudicating Child a CHINS.

[27] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Trial Rule 53.5 was repealed effective January 1, 2025. Motions to continue are now addressed in Trial Rule 7.

3.   Father argues that, pursuant to Trial Rule 53.5, DCS was required to submit an affidavit as evidence of good cause and its failure to do so requires reversal of the court's order denying his motion to dismiss. See former T.R. 53.5 (“Upon motion, trial may be postponed or continued in the discretion of the court, and shall be allowed upon a showing of good cause established by affidavit or other evidence.”). The juvenile court held a hearing concerning the drug testing and treatment records that DCS wanted to obtain. Father did not dispute the existence of the records but only whether DCS should be allowed to have them. See Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 117-132. For these reasons, we do not agree with Father's claim that the lack of an affidavit warrants reversal of the court's order denying Father's motion to dismiss.

Mathias, Judge.

Brown, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.