IN RE: J.P. (Minor Child) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] J.L.P. (“Father”) appeals the trial court's adjudication that his minor child, J.P. (“Child”), is a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”).¹ Father raises a single issue for our review, which we restate as whether the trial court's conclusion that the coercive intervention of the court was necessary is clearly erroneous.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Father and K.P. (“Mother”) are the biological parents of Child. In December 2023, Father was incarcerated in the Jackson County Jail and Mother was incarcerated in the Rockville Correctional Facility. Child had been placed in the care of his legal guardian, J.M. (“Guardian”), who lived in Seymour.

[4] That month, Guardian informed the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) that she no longer wished to be Guardian to Child and that she no longer wished to have Child living in her home. DCS thus filed a petition alleging Child to be a CHINS based on the inability of a known adult to provide care for Child. The court authorized DCS to take custody of Child and terminated Guardian's custody.

[5] Father and Mother separately asked the court to have Child placed in the care of a relative, S.R. (“Caregiver”). DCS placed Child with Caregiver during the ensuing proceedings. Thereafter, Mother stipulated that Child was a CHINS. At an ensuing fact-finding hearing, both parents continued to be incarcerated, and DCS thus argued that Child could not be returned to their care. The trial court agreed and, after entering findings of fact and conclusions thereon, adjudicated Child to be a CHINS and continued Child's placement with Caregiver.

[6] This appeal ensued.

Standard of Review

[7] Father challenges the trial court's adjudication of Child as a CHINS. Our standard of review is well settled:

When reviewing a trial court's CHINS determination, we do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. Instead, we consider only the evidence that supports the trial court's decision and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. When a trial court supplements a CHINS judgment with findings of fact and conclusions of law, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. We consider, first, whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, whether the findings support the judgment. We will reverse a CHINS determination only if it was clearly erroneous. A decision is clearly erroneous if the record facts do not support the findings or if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.

Gr. J. v. Ind. Dep't. of Child Servs. (In re D.J.), 68 N.E.3d 574, 577-78 (Ind. 2017) (cleaned up).

[8] In J.B. v. Indiana Department of Child Services (In re S.D.), 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287-88 (Ind. 2014), our Supreme Court explained the three elements required to prove that a child is a CHINS under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1, as alleged in this case:

Not every endangered child is a child in need of services, permitting the State's parens patriae intrusion into the ordinarily private sphere of the family. Rather, a CHINS adjudication under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1 (often called a “CHINS 1,” in reference to the section number) requires three basic elements: that the parent's actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child, that the child's needs are unmet, and (perhaps most critically) that those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion. In full, the statute provides:

A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

I.C. § 31-34-1-1 (2008). That final element guards against unwarranted State interference in family life, reserving that intrusion for families where parents lack the ability to provide for their children, not merely where they encounter difficulty in meeting a child's needs.

(Cleaned up.) Further, the law does not require a court to wait until a tragedy occurs to intervene. In re A.H., 913 N.E.2d 303, 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Rather, a child is a CHINS when he or she is endangered by parental action or inaction. Id. The purpose of a CHINS adjudication is not to punish the parents, but to protect the child. In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 805 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Father's only argument on appeal is that the trial court's determination that Child is a CHINS is clearly erroneous because Child was placed with Caregiver at the request of him and Mother, and, thus, the coercive intervention of the court “was entirely unnecessary.”² Appellant's Br. at 10. Father is incorrect.

[10] With Father and Mother both incarcerated, and with Guardian having had her legal rights over Child terminated, the coercive intervention of the court was necessary to authorize DCS to place Child with Caregiver, regardless of whether Father or Mother had requested that placement. The court's intervention was necessary, for example, to ensure DCS's and Caregiver's home was suitable for Child's placement and to understand the criminal history of those who lived in that home. See I.C. 31-34-4-2. Further, Child's placement with Caregiver separated Child from a sibling, which required the court to determine Child's best interests in that placement. I.C. § 31-34-4-8. And the court appropriately ordered Father to engage in restoration services before Child could be placed with him, which justifies the court's ongoing intervention and supervision.

[11] Accordingly, the trial court's conclusion that the coercive intervention of the court is necessary is not clearly erroneous, and we affirm its determination that Child is a CHINS.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Child's mother does not participate in this appeal.

2.   DCS also argues on appeal that it proved the other statutory requirements for the CHINS adjudication, but, as Father does not challenge those additional requirements on appeal, we need not consider them.

Mathias, Judge.

Foley, J., and Felix, J., concur.