IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of C.M. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] C.M. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to E.S. (“Child”). She raises the following restated issue for our review: whether the trial court's judgment was clearly erroneous. Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother and M.S. (“Father”)¹ are the biological parents of Child, who was born on November 24, 2019, and they lived in Richmond, Indiana during the pertinent timeframe. On April 1, 2020, when Child was approximately four months old, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) became involved with the family after receiving a report that Child was a victim of physical abuse and had sustained life-threatening injuries while in the care of Mother and Father. When Child arrived at the hospital, medical staff discovered that Child had bleeding on the surface of her brain, a broken rib, a lesion on the top part of her right-side humerus bone, and bleeding and hemorrhaging in the retinas of her eyes. The rib injury was at least a week old when Child arrived at the hospital. The most likely reason for Child's injuries was direct trauma, and as to her bone injuries, “[s]omething ha[d] to have been done to her” due to the fact that Child was not yet mobile. Tr. Vol. II p. 22. Child was intubated at the hospital due to difficulty breathing and excessive seizures. Child was later transferred to Riley Children's Hospital in Indianapolis due to the severity of her injuries.

[3] Later, on April 1, the police went to speak with Mother and Father. Father told the police that, in the morning hours of the previous day, Child had stopped breathing for unknown reasons. He stated that he performed CPR on Child and denied harming her but suggested that her two-year-old brother may have done something. Mother told the police that Father had told her about Child not breathing, but Mother did not witness this herself. Mother did notice that Child was not eating, was having tremors, and would cry if she moved a certain way. Neither parent took Child to the hospital on March 31. Child was ultimately taken to the hospital late in the afternoon on April 1 only after Mother called 911 due to an argument with Father. When questioned by the police about the delay in seeking medical care, Mother could not provide a definitive reason, stating only that Father had said no to seeking care. However, she also told the police that Father had not always been present at the house during the timeframe she delayed taking to Child to the hospital, and she acknowledged that she had ample opportunity to take Child to the hospital herself when he was not present.

[4] On April 2, 2020, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child was a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”). On the same date, Child, who was in the hospital, was removed from Mother's care with law enforcement assistance and placed in relative care. On November 23, 2020, the court adjudicated Child as a CHINS after Mother admitted she could not provide necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, or education to Child, was facing criminal charges as a result of Child's injuries and had a no-contact order with Child because of the criminal charges. On December 20, 2020, a dispositional order was issued requiring Mother to participate in certain services while incarcerated and certain other services when she was released from incarceration.

[5] As a result of the criminal charges, Mother was incarcerated from July 12, 2020, until January 5, 2021, at which point she was released from pretrial incarceration. After she was released, Mother consistently engaged in home-based therapy through PEACE Community Services between April 2022 and October 2023. When the no-contact order was lifted, Mother began supervised visitation with Child and visited Child monthly while Child was in placement in Indianapolis. In August 2023, Child was placed with a foster family in Terre Haute, which was approximately one hour farther from Mother's home than Indianapolis, and Child's medical condition restricted her ability to be transported more than thirty minutes so Mother was required to travel to Terre Haute to attend the visits. A referral for supervised parenting time was issued in September 2023, but Mother no longer attended visits with Child, citing the distance as a barrier even though DCS offered transportation to Mother.

[6] On September 18, 2023, Mother pleaded guilty to Level 3 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in serious bodily injury and was sentenced on December 12, 2023, to ten years in the Indiana Department of Correction with two years suspended to probation. Mother was remanded to custody on December 12 with her earliest possible release date being June 16, 2029. Mother appealed her sentence in her criminal case, and her appeal was dismissed with prejudice by this court on September 12, 2024. On March 5, 2024, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights to Child. On May 16, 2024, DCS filed a Motion for a Finding of No Reasonable Efforts, seeking a finding that reasonable efforts to reunify Child with Mother were not required due to Mother's conviction for Level 3 felony neglect of a dependent, and the trial court granted the motion on May 20, 2024, citing Mother's conviction.

[7] On May 30, 2024, the trial court held the termination hearing. At the time of the termination hearing, Child was four years old and had been removed from Mother's care since Child was four months old, and Mother had not seen Child since approximately August 2023. The injuries that Child sustained as an infant resulted in several long-term effects, including being wheelchair-bound, unable to eat without a feeding tube, unable to sit up or stand on her own, and unable to speak beyond babbling, repeating some noises, and laughing. Child also has impaired vision, and it was unknown how much she was actually able to see. At the time of the hearing, Child was receiving a variety of services, including physical and occupational rehabilitation and vision services. Child resided with foster parents who were trained in how to care for her special needs and who were willing to adopt her. Child's court appointed special advocate (“CASA”) testified that, although Mother had been given opportunities to attend Child's different therapies and to learn about Child's conditions and how to care for them, Mother did not do so.

[8] At the time of the hearing, Mother was in a long-term relationship with her boyfriend, with whom she lived before receiving her criminal sentence. Although Child's older brother, H.S., had been removed from Mother's care at the same time as Child, his CHINS case was closed in March 2023, and he was returned to Mother's care. During the pendency of the present case, Mother gave birth to two children and was pregnant at the time of the termination hearing. Mother's boyfriend was the father of those three children, and the three children plus H.S. all lived with the boyfriend in his home.

[9] On May 31, 2024, the trial court issued its order terminating Mother's parental rights to Child. The trial court concluded that Child had been removed from Mother's care for a least six months under a CHINS dispositional order and that Child had been removed from Mother's care and under the supervision of DCS for at least fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months. The trial court also concluded that there was a reasonable probability that continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child's well-being because Child was gravely injured while in the direct control of her parents, where, “[a]t best, Mother knew [Child] had been severely injured and failed to seek medical care for over a full day.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 12. The trial court reasoned that Child's “well-being would be at substantial risk should she be returned to Mother's care—far greater than the ‘reasonable probability of threat’ standard required to sustain the termination of parental rights petition.” Id. (emphasis in original). The trial court also concluded that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests due to Child's extreme medical and physical impairments that have “abated only minimally” over the past four years and because there was no evidence that Mother had the training or ability to care for Child. Id. at 13. Further, the trial court highlighted the fact that Mother would be incarcerated for at least the next five years, by which point Child would be over nine years old. The trial court also concluded that there was a satisfactory plan for Child's care and treatment, which was adoption by the foster family. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[10] While the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of a parent to establish a home and raise their children, the law allows for the termination of parental rights based on a parent's inability or unwillingness to meet parental responsibilities. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005); In re D.P., 994 N.E.2d 1228, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Thus, parental rights are subordinated to the child's interests in determining the appropriate disposition of a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship. In re. J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish the parent but to protect the child. In re D.P., 994 N.E.2d at 1231. Termination of parental rights is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. The trial court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.

[11] As our Supreme Court has observed, “[d]ecisions to terminate parental rights are among the most difficult our trial courts are called upon to make. They are also among the most fact-sensitive—so we review them with great deference to the trial courts ․” E.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 4 N.E.3d 636, 640 (Ind. 2014). In evaluating the trial court's findings and conclusions in an order terminating parental rights, we review only for clear error, and we apply a two-tiered standard of review. In re A.P., 981 N.E.2d 75, 81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “A judgment is clearly erroneous if the findings do not support the trial court's conclusions or the conclusions do not support the judgment.” Id. If the evidence and reasonable inferences support the trial court's decision, we must affirm. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[12] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, the State must allege and prove, among other things:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a [CHINS];

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2).² The State's burden of proof for establishing these allegations is one of clear and convincing evidence. In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Moreover, “if the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a) (emphasis added). Further, because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written such that, to properly effectuate the termination of parental rights, the trial court need only find one of the three requirements of subsection (b)(2)(B) has been established by clear and convincing evidence, we need not address all of the requirements if we find that one has been proven. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B); A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1157 n.6.

[13] Mother does not challenge the trial court's findings of fact, so she has waived any arguments relating to the unchallenged findings, and we therefore accept all of the trial court's findings as true. See In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 610 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (noting this court accepts unchallenged trial court findings as true). Instead, Mother argues that DCS has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal from parental care, and placement outside of Mother's home, will not be remedied. However, the trial court did not enter a conclusion under the subsection (i) of Indiana Code section 31-34-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i) that there was a reasonable probability that Mother would not remedy the reasons for Child's removal or continued placement outside her care, and instead, only made a conclusion under subsection (ii), that there was a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child's well-being. We, therefore, will proceed to determine whether that conclusion was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

[14] Neither actual physical abuse nor a physical threat to a child is required to find that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the child's well-being. In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 811 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. Instead, when determining whether continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the child's well-being, termination is proper when the evidence shows that the emotional and physical development of a child is threatened. C.A. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 15 N.E.3d 85, 94 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). A court need not wait until a child is irreversibly influenced by a deficient lifestyle such that his or her physical, mental, and social growth is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. In re G.F., 135 N.E.3d 654, 661 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). In addition, the court must subordinate the interests of the parent to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding the termination. Id. at 660.

[15] The evidence showed that when Child was four months old, she suffered severe injuries while under the care of Mother and Father. Child initially showed symptoms that something was wrong in the morning hours of March 31, 2020, and neither parent sought medical care for Child until Mother called 911 in the early evening hours of April 1, 2020. When Child arrived at the hospital, she was suffering from bleeding on the surface of her brain, a broken rib, a lesion on the top part of her right-side humerus bone, and bleeding and hemorrhaging in the retinas of her eyes. The most likely reason for Child's injuries was direct trauma, and “[s]omething ha[d] to have been done to her” as Child was not yet mobile. Tr. Vol. II p. 22. As a result of these injuries, Child suffered long-term effects, including being wheelchair-bound, unable to eat without a feeding tube, unable to sit up or stand on her own, visually impaired, and unable to speak beyond babbling, repeating some noises, and laughing. Consequently, Child required a variety of services, including physical and occupational rehabilitation and vision services. As a result of Mother's neglect of Child, Mother was convicted of Level 3 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in serious bodily injury and sentenced to ten years in the Indiana Department of Correction with two years suspended to probation.

[16] Although evidence was presented that Mother complied with many of her court-ordered services and participated in supervised visitation with Child on a monthly basis for a period of time after a no-contact order was lifted, the evidence also revealed that once Child was moved to foster placement in Terre Haute, Mother stopped visiting and did not make efforts to do so based on the distance involved even though DCS offered transportation. Likewise, due to Child's extreme medical and physical impairments, Child does not have the ability to care for herself and will require extensive care by caregivers adequately trained to meet Child's needs. However, there was no evidence that Mother had such training or had made any effort to gain the ability or learn to care for Child. At the time of the termination hearing, Mother had not appreciably improved her ability to safely parent Child as she had not learned how to safely care for Child with her many medical and physical impairments.

[17] Child was removed from Mother's care when she was four months old, and at the time of the termination hearing, Child was four years old. Evidence was presented that Mother will be incarcerated for at least five years from the time of the termination hearing, which would make Child over nine years old when Mother is released. The evidence demonstrated that either Mother's actions or inactions caused Child to suffer severe and long-lasting injuries that will be a part of Child's life indefinitely. In its order, the trial court emphasized that the principal threat to Child's well-being was Mother's neglect of Child while in her care and that Child's well-being would be at substantial risk if she were returned to Mother's care. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 12. Mother's neglect directly harmed Child such that she is in a wheelchair, unable to eat on her own, and cannot speak. In her argument that sufficient evidence was not presented, Mother ignores this crucial evidence, asserting instead that there was a lack of evidence she was provided training for Child's medical needs and that her incarceration was given too much weight. Mother's contentions are essentially requests to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 640. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court's conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the well-being of Child was supported by clear and convincing evidence and was not clearly erroneous.  ³

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father is not a party to this case as he consented to Child's adoption.

2.   Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4 has been amended since DCS filed its termination petition on March 5, 2024. Effective March 11, 2024, subsection (b)(2)(B)(i), (ii), and (iii) has been rewritten as subsection (d)(3), (4), and (5). See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4.

3.   We note that Mother briefly asserts that DCS failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that Child had, on two separate occasions, been adjudicated a CHINS or that termination was in Child's best interests. See Appellant's Br. p. 12. However, we conclude that she has waived these assertions for failure to develop cogent argument or cite to appropriate legal authority. “A party waives an issue where the party fails to develop a cogent argument or provide adequate citation to authority and portions of the record.” N.C. v. Ind. Dept. of Child Servs., 56 N.E.3d 65, 69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

Foley, Judge.

Bailey, J. and Bradford, J., concur.