FIELDS v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Tony E. Fields (“Fields”) appeals the denial of his Trial Rule 60(B)(8) motion, which sought to set aside the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Consolidating the issues, we address whether the post-conviction court erred in declining to set aside its judgment because, contrary to a mandatory Post-Conviction Rule, the court denied Fields's request to refer his petition to the State Public Defender (“the State PD”). Adhering to State v. Collier, 61 N.E.3d 265, 268 (Ind. 2016), we reverse and remand with instructions to grant the Trial Rule 60(B)(8) motion and set aside the judgment denying post-conviction relief.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Fields was convicted of murder in 2007, and this court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. Fields v. State, No. 49A04-0709-CR-509, 2008 WL 2221982 (Ind. Ct. App. May 30, 2008). It is undisputed that, at times pertinent to the instant appeal, Fields has remained incarcerated in the Indiana Department of Correction. On January 11, 2023, Fields filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, raising claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and appellate counsel. In the petition, Fields noted that, on two prior occasions, he had petitioned for post-conviction relief and the petitions were withdrawn upon his motion.¹ In his January 2023 petition, Fields asked the post-conviction court to appoint the State PD. On January 13, 2023, the post-conviction court issued an order declining to refer the petition to the State PD, stating that the “State PD ha[d] previously investigated and withdrawn representation” in connection with Fields's prior post-conviction petitions. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 43. The post-conviction court also separately issued an “Order on Proceeding in Forma Pauperis” wherein it stated that, because the State PD “ha[d] previously filed [a] Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance and Certification pursuant to [Post-Conviction] Rule 1(9)(c), the [c]ourt [was] advis[ing] [Fields] he must now proceed pro se or hire private counsel.” Id. at 45 (emphasis removed).

[3] In August 2023, the post-conviction court held a hearing on Fields's petition for post-conviction relief. Fields represented himself and did not present evidence, noting that he had no witnesses. See Tr. Vol. 2 p. 3. On August 15, 2023, the post-conviction court denied the petition. Fields then belatedly filed a Notice of Appeal. Due to the belated Notice of Appeal, on March 8, 2024, this court dismissed the appeal with prejudice. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 30–31.

[4] On March 27, 2024, Fields filed a Trial Rule 60(B)(8) motion to set aside the judgment denying his petition. Fields argued that grounds existed to set aside the judgment because he “requested the assistance of the [State PD] in his petition and the [c]ourt failed to provide [him] with th[at] assistance,” leaving Fields “not at fault for his inability to prosecute the petition himself or effectively appeal the erroneous denial of same.” Id. at 9. On April 1, 2024, the post-conviction court denied the motion without explanation. Fields now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Fields brings this pro se appeal challenging the denial of his Trial Rule 60(B)(8) motion, which sought to set aside the judgment denying his petition for post-conviction relief. Before turning to the merits, we begin by noting that a pro se litigant is afforded no inherent leniency and is held to the same standards as a trained attorney. Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 249, 266 (Ind. 2014).

[6] Trial Rule 60(B)(8) is a catchall provision that allows a court to grant relief from a judgment for “any reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment” other than those stated elsewhere in Trial Rule 60(B). Under this rule, the movant generally must “demonstrate some extraordinary or exceptional circumstances justifying equitable relief” from the judgment. Collier, 61 N.E.3d at 268. Moreover, to obtain relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(8), the movant must file the motion “within a reasonable time” and “must allege a meritorious claim or defense.” Ind. Trial Rule 60(B). In general, “a meritorious claim or defense is ‘one that would lead to a different result if the case were tried on the merits.’ ” Collier, 61 N.E.3d at 268 (quoting Butler v. State, 933 N.E.2d 33, 36 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)). A movant may also satisfy this requirement by “showing that the judgment was ‘unfairly procured.’ ” Outback Steakhouse of Fla., Inc. v. Markley, 856 N.E.2d 65, 73 (Ind. 2006) (quoting Schultz v. Butcher, 24 F.3d 626, 631 (4th Cir. 1994)). We review the denial of a Trial Rule 60(B) motion for an abuse of the court's discretion, which occurs when the ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Collier, 61 N.E.3d at 268.

[7] Fields directs us to Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(2), which states: “If the court finds the indigent petitioner is incarcerated in the Indiana Department of Correction, and has requested representation, it shall order a copy of the petition sent to [the State PD's] office.” Fields asserts that, under this rule, the post-conviction court should have referred his petition to the State PD. Fields also directs us to Collier, where a petitioner for post-conviction relief successfully obtained relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(8). Collier, 61 N.E.3d at 270. There, the petitioner moved to set aside the judgment on the basis that the post-conviction court violated Post-Conviction Rule 1(2) by failing to refer the post-conviction petition to the State PD. Id. at 268. The post-conviction court granted the Trial Rule 60(B)(8) motion, and the State appealed. Id. After this court reversed on the basis that the petitioner failed to file the Trial Rule 60(B)(8) motion within a reasonable time, the Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer and determined that the post-conviction court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside the judgment due to the court's failure to appoint the State PD as required by Post-Conviction Rule 1(2). Id. at 269. Notably, in Collier, the post-conviction petition at issue was filed years after (1) the petitioner previously filed for post-conviction relief, (2) the court appointed the State PD, and (3) the prior petition was “withdrawn without prejudice ․ after [the petitioner's] motion to file a belated appeal was denied and [the State PD] withdrew as counsel.” Id. at 266.

[8] In Collier, our Supreme Court referred to the requirements of Trial Rule 60(B)(8) and determined that the “failure to refer [the] case to [the State PD] [was] an error that cannot be attributed to [the petitioner] and [was] one that justifie[d] extraordinary relief.” Id. at 269. As for the requirement that a Trial Rule 60(B)(8) motion allege a meritorious claim or defense, our Supreme Court discussed the claims referenced in the current post-conviction petition before identifying a “[m]ore fundamental[ ]” way in which the petitioner satisfied the requirement: “[I]f [the petitioner's] motion for relief from judgment is granted, the result for [the petitioner] is certainly different—he would have an opportunity to present his claim with the assistance of counsel and have [the petition] decided on the merits instead of having it summarily dismissed.” Id. at 270.

[9] Fields argues that, under Collier, the post-conviction court should have granted his Trial Rule 60(B)(8) motion. The State argues that Collier is distinguishable because, in that case, it was the post-conviction court that “first found that the second ․ petition should have been referred and that the failure to refer was an extraordinary circumstance justifying relief.” Appellee's Br. p. 10. The State also argues that the post-conviction court, “in both that case and here, is in the best position to see whether a succeeding petition is truly a new ․ petition requiring referral or simply a rehashing of what had already been referred.” Id. At the same time, the State acknowledges that “[t]he present record”—which does not contain Fields's first two petitions—“does not allow for any comparison” of the claims asserted. Id. The State goes on to argue that “even if entirely-repetitive petitions must be forwarded [to the State PD], Collier is still distinguishable because that petitioner, unlike the present one, also made the required showing of a meritorious claim ․ in his request for relief from judgment.” Id. According to the State, Fields failed to allege a meritorious claim or defense, and therefore failed to show entitlement to relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(8) because, in moving to set aside the judgment, Fields focused on the post-conviction court's failure to refer his petition to the State PD without discussing the merits of Fields's underlying petition for post-conviction relief.

[10] As to the requirements of Trial Rule 60(B)(8), in the instant case, Fields sought relief from judgment within weeks of the dismissal of his appeal—well within the reasonable time required by the rule. Moreover, we disagree that Fields failed to allege a meritorious claim or defense. Post-Conviction Rule 1(2) contains procedural safeguards mandating that whenever a person is indigent, is incarcerated in the Indiana Department of Correction, and has requested representation, the court “shall order a copy of the petition sent to [the State PD's] office.” At that point, the State PD has discretion to represent the person. See Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(9)(a). In this case, the post-conviction court followed these procedures in connection with Fields's prior petitions that were later withdrawn, but it did not do so in connection with the instant petition.

[11] On appeal, the State suggests that the post-conviction court should have the authority to bypass referral procedures when (1) a person previously petitioned for post-conviction relief, (2) the State PD declined to exercise its discretion to represent the person, and (3) the petition was ultimately withdrawn. Indeed, the State argues that the post-conviction court is well-suited to filter out repetitious petitions. But Post-Conviction Rule 1(2) does not function as the State suggests; rather, it imposes a mandatory duty to refer the petition to the State PD, granting the State PD—not the court—discretion to assess the petition's merits. Moreover, there is no indication that the post-conviction court reviewed or compared Fields's prior petitions with the current petition. Instead, the court viewed the State PD's previous decisions to withdraw representation as eliminating the obligation to refer the current petition.

[12] In Collier, our Supreme Court reasoned that the petitioner alleged a meritorious claim or defense under Trial Rule 60(B)(8) because, “[i]f [the petitioner's] motion for relief from judgment is granted, the result for [the petitioner] is certainly different—he would have an opportunity to present his claim with the assistance of counsel and have [the petition] decided on the merits instead of having it summarily dismissed.” 61 N.E.3d at 270. Here, too, the result for Fields would have been different if the post-conviction court referred the petition as required. That is, Fields would have had the opportunity to have the State PD review his petition. Moreover, in light of the State PD's broad discretion to represent convicted persons under Post-Conviction Rule 1(9), just because the State PD withdrew its representation in connection with a prior petition filed in 2014, it does not necessarily follow that the State PD would again withdraw representation in connection with a petition filed roughly nine years later. Further, the way the judgment was obtained implicates Markley, where our Supreme Court stated that a movant alleges a meritorious defense by “showing that the judgment was ‘unfairly procured.’ ” 856 N.E.2d at 81 (quoting Schultz, 24 F.3d at 631). We therefore conclude that Fields alleged a meritorious claim or defense in satisfaction of Trial Rule 60(B)(8).

[13] At one point, the State argues that, because Fields failed to timely file a Notice of Appeal in connection with the underlying judgment, Fields should be precluded from obtaining relief under Trial Rule 60(B). We disagree. The procedural difficulties Fields encountered in attempting to perfect his appeal—difficulties counsel might have helped navigate—illustrate why Post-Conviction Rule 1(2)’s mandatory referral requirement is important. Moreover, when a judgment is flawed due to this type of procedural defect, the timing or existence of an appeal becomes secondary to remedying the underlying error. See Collier, 61 N.E.3d at 268 (focusing on the fundamental nature of the failure to refer the petition rather than any subsequent procedural step). Ultimately, just as Fields could have chosen not to appeal at all, we conclude that Fields's unsuccessful attempt to appeal did not bar him from later seeking relief from the judgment.

[14] For the foregoing reasons, we conclude it was clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances to deny the Trial Rule 60(B)(8) motion. We therefore reverse and remand with instructions to grant the motion and set aside the judgment denying Fields's petition for post-conviction relief.

[15] Reversed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Odyssey system reflects that both prior petitions were filed in cause number 49G02-0612-PC-233297. The first petition was filed on April 12, 2010, and withdrawn without prejudice on March 15, 2012. The second petition was filed on August 12, 2014, and withdrawn without prejudice on February 6, 2015.

Foley, Judge.

Bailey, J. and Bradford, J., concur.