William Cutter, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] William Cutter pleaded guilty to two counts of child molesting, Class C felonies, based on his acts of molesting his daughter, who has learning disabilities. The trial court sentenced Cutter to the maximum sentence of eight years on each count and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively. On appeal, Cutter claims that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and the character of the offender. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.

Issue

[2] Cutter presents one issue for our review: whether his sixteen-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of Cutter's offenses and his character.

Facts

[3] Cutter is the Father of L.P., who was born in 2003. L.P. has learning disabilities and has an IQ score that puts her in the nineteenth percentile. Even as an adult, L.P. has the mental functioning of an eleven and one-half year-old child.

[4] Starting when L.P. was nine years old, Cutter began molesting her. L.P. stated that Cutter tried to put his finger into her vagina at least three times. Cutter touched L.P. when her younger sister was also in the room with them. Cutter showed L.P. pornography and attempted to put his penis in her mouth. L.P. did not report the sexual abuse earlier because she was scared and blamed herself.

[5] When L.P. was nineteen years old, she reported to a counselor that her father had touched her inappropriately. L.P. stated that this touching started when she was nine years old and stopped four or five years prior, when she would have been fourteen or fifteen years old. When the police interviewed Cutter about these allegations, Cutter claimed that he had twice awoken to find L.P. with her mouth on his penis. Cutter also claimed that he once awoke to find L.P. rubbing her buttocks on his penis but claimed that he had been drunk and may have mistaken L.P. for his wife during these instances.

[6] The State ultimately charged Cutter with: Count I, child molesting, a Class A felony; Count II, child molesting, a Class A felony; Count III, child molesting, a Class C felony; and Count IV, child molesting, a Class C felony. On May 14, 2024, Cutter entered into a plea agreement with the State. Pursuant to this agreement, Cutter agreed to plead guilty to the two Class C felony counts in exchange for the State dismissing the remaining counts. Sentencing was left to the discretion of the trial court. That same day, the trial court accepted the plea agreement and entered judgments of conviction on the two counts of Class C felony child molesting.

[7] The sentencing hearing was held on June 7, 2024. The court found as aggravating: (1) the victim was Cutter's own daughter; (2) the negative effects Cutter's acts had on the victim, including post-traumatic stress disorder; (3) the victim's cognitive disabilities; and (4) the young age of the victim when the abuse began, which was well below the statutory age element required for child molesting.¹ The trial court also noted that Cutter had committed his crimes when his other child was in the room.

[8] The trial court found as mitigating the fact that Cutter pleaded guilty, but it assigned this mitigator little weight because the evidence against Cutter was “very strong,” and because Cutter received a significant benefit in exchange for his plea. Appellant's App. Vol. III p. 71. The trial court also noted that Cutter had no prior convictions, but again it assigned this mitigator little weight because Cutter had molested L.P. over a long period of time. Thus, Cutter had not led a law-abiding life; it simply took a long time for his crimes to come to light. Cutter's other proffered mitigating circumstances, such as undue hardship on Cutter's dependents and Cutter's medical issues were rejected, and the trial court noted that Cutter had been unemployed for several years and Cutter could receive adequate treatment for his medical conditions in prison.

[9] The trial court found that “the aggravators significantly outweighed the mitigators.”² Id. at 72. The trial court also found that the aggravators were “sufficient not only to aggravate the sentences for which the Defendant was convicted, but also for running [the] sentences consecutive to each other.” Id. The court sentenced Cutter to the maximum sentence of eight years on each conviction, to be served consecutively, for an aggregate term of sixteen years. Cutter now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[10] Cutter argues that his sixteen-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and his character. We recently summarized our standard of review on such claims as follows:

The Indiana Constitution authorizes independent appellate review and revision of a trial court's sentencing decision. Our Supreme Court has implemented this authority through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which allows this Court to revise a sentence when it is “inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Our review of a sentence under Appellate Rule 7(B) is not an act of second guessing the trial court's sentence; rather, [o]ur posture on appeal is [ ] deferential to the trial court. We exercise our authority under Appellate Rule 7(B) only in exceptional cases, and its exercise boils down to our collective sense of what is appropriate.

The principal role of appellate review is to attempt to leaven the outliers. The point is not to achieve a perceived correct sentence. Whether a sentence should be deemed inappropriate turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case. Deference to the trial court's sentence should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as [being] accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).

Dean v. State, 222 N.E.3d 976, 989-90 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citations and internal quotations omitted), trans. denied.

[11] Our review under Appellate Rule 7(B) is holistic. Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 127 (Ind. 2024) (citing Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). That is, “[w]e assess a sentence in light of the whole picture before us.” Id. “Allowing a strong showing on one prong to outweigh a weak showing on the other promotes the ideal of ‘similar sentences’ for ‘perpetrators committing the same acts who have the same backgrounds.’ ” Id. (quoting Serino v. State, 798 N.E.2d 852, 854 (Ind. 2003)). Thus, “to the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Id. (citing Connor, 58 N.E.3d at 220).

[12] Here, Cutter was convicted of two counts of child molesting, Class C felonies. The sentencing range for a Class C felony is two to eight years, with an advisory sentence of six years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(a). The trial court sentenced Cutter to the maximum term of eight years on each count and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively.

[13] Our Supreme Court has noted that maximum sentences are generally most appropriate for the worst offenders. Pritcher v. State, 208 N.E.3d 656, 667 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Buchanan v. State, 767 N.E.2d 967, 973 (Ind. 2002); Martin v. State, 179 N.E.3d 1060, 1071 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)).

This is not, however, a guideline to determine whether a worse offender could be imagined. Despite the nature of any particular offense and offender, it will always be possible to identify or hypothesize a significantly more despicable scenario. Although maximum sentences are ordinarily appropriate for the worst offenders, we refer generally to the class of offenses and offenders that warrant the maximum punishment. But such class encompasses a considerable variety of offenses and offenders.

Buchanan, 767 N.E.2d at 973 (quoted in Martin, 179 N.E.3d at 1071).

A. Nature of the Offense

[14] We first consider the nature of Cutter's offenses. “Our analysis of the ‘nature of the offense’ requires us to look at the nature, extent, heinousness, and brutality of the offense.” Dean, 222 N.E.3d at 990 (quoting Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 5 (Ind. 2014)). We should defer to the trial court's sentencing decision unless the defendant presents compelling evidence portraying the nature of his offense in a positive light. Id.

[15] Here, Cutter sexually molested his own disabled daughter over several years. Cutter's sexual abuse of his daughter began when the child was only nine years old. This is a horrific betrayal of his position of trust as a father. As a result of Cutter's actions, L.P. suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, she refers to Cutter as her “ex-father,” and she changed her last name. Tr. Vol. II p. 240. Cutter's actions occurred when L.P.’s younger sister was in the room. Although Cutter claims that he was intoxicated when these incidents occurred, this does not portray his offenses in a more positive light. See Hall v. State, 231 N.E.3d 868, 876 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (noting that defendant was highly intoxicated when committing his offense in concluding that the nature of the offenses did not warrant revision of defendant's sentence), trans. denied; Smith v. State, 929 N.E.2d 255, 260 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (noting defendant's voluntary intoxication on unprescribed medication in concluding that the nature of the offense did not warrant revision of defendant's sentence), trans. denied.

B. Character of the Offender

[16] We next consider Cutter's character. Our analysis of the character of the offender involves a broad consideration of a defendant's qualities, including the defendant's age, criminal history, background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse. Dean, 222 N.E.3d at 990 (citing Harris v. State, 165 N.E.3d 91, 100 (Ind. 2021)). As noted above, Cutter has no prior criminal convictions. But this does not mean that he led a law-abiding life. To the contrary, for years he repeatedly sexually abused his own daughter. Cutter also expressed no remorse about his crimes. During his statement to the police, Cutter attempted to shift the blame to his victim by claiming that he awoke to L.P. touching his penis or rubbing her buttocks on his penis. We see no “substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character,” id., that persuade us that Cutter's sixteen-year sentence is inappropriate.

[17] Accordingly, we cannot say that Cutter's sixteen-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and his character. See Chastain v. State, 165 N.E.3d 589, 601 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (declining to revise defendant's maximum twenty-year sentence for the molestation of his niece because defendant abused his position of trust starting when the child was only eight or nine years old and because victim suffered long-term harm even though defendant had no formal criminal history), trans. denied.

Conclusion

[18] Giving due consideration to the trial court's sentencing decision, and considering both the nature of Cutter's offenses and his character, we cannot say that Cutter's maximum sixteen-year sentence is inappropriate. We, therefore, affirm the trial court's judgment.

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(b) (2007) (“A person who, with a child under fourteen (14) years of age, performs or submits to any fondling or touching, of either the child or the older person, with intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the older person, commits child molesting, a Class C felony”).

2.   “Because the trial court no longer has any obligation to ‘weigh’ aggravating and mitigating factors against each other when imposing a sentence ․ a trial court can not now be said to have abused its discretion in failing to ‘properly weigh’ such factors.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218.

Tavitas, Judge.

Chief Judge Altice and Judge Brown concur. Altice, C.J., and Brown, J., concur.