IN RE: the Adoption of H.A. J.A. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] J.A. (“Father”) appeals the trial court's grant of J.M.’s (“Stepfather”) petition to adopt his daughter, H.A. (“Child”). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child was born in December 2015. T.M. (“Mother”) and Father never married and broke up shortly after Child was born. In January 2017, the Posey County Title IV-D prosecutor petitioned to establish paternity in Father. Later that month, the trial court established paternity in Father and said child support would be established later. See Ex. E, p. 20.

[3] In August 2017, Mother asked for the paternity case to be transferred to Vanderburgh County. The trial court agreed and told Father that he needed to file paperwork there for parenting time. See Tr. p. 20. The case was transferred in September. That month, Mother petitioned for supervised parenting time for Father (based on safety concerns she had) as well as child support. Father was never served, and the case went dormant for nearly three years. In June 2020, the trial court ordered the parties to appear. In May 2021, Mother and Father each appeared pro se, and the court ordered Father to pay $36 per week in child support. Father asked about parenting time, and the court instructed him to file a petition for parenting time. See id. at 21-23, 52, 94. Father didn't do so.

[4] Mother and Stepfather started dating in 2022 and married in May 2023. In October 2023, Stepfather filed a petition to adopt Child along with Mother's consent to the adoption. The petition alleged that Father's consent is not required under Indiana Code section 31-19-9-8 because (1) “Father has physically abandoned the child having failed to exercise his parenting time for approximately four years” and (2) “Father has financially abandoned the child by failing to pay child support.” Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 10, 27. The petition also alleged that adoption is in Child's best interests. The trial court appointed an attorney for Father.

[5] In April 2024, Father filed a pro se petition for parenting time in the paternity case. Two months later, a hearing was held in the adoption case as to whether Father's consent is required and adoption is in Child's best interests. Father testified that he had last seen Child in October 2017—nearly seven years earlier. Father claimed that after his last visit with Child, Mother blocked his phone number and Facebook account and therefore he couldn't contact her about seeing Child. When asked what efforts he had taken to seek parenting time with Child, Father replied, “I can't do nothing when I don't have an address.” Tr. p. 29; see also id. at 62 (Father testifying that he “was not able to make any effort” because he didn't have Mother's contact information). When asked what efforts he had taken to financially support Child after her birth in December 2015 but before the trial court ordered him to pay child support in May 2021, Father responded, “I didn't have a chance to. I mean, I had no address. I had no phone number. She blocked me from everything.” Id. at 31; see also id. at 41 (Father stating that he knew he would have to pay child support once his paternity was established). Upon questioning by the trial court, Father acknowledged that he knew intimate details about Mother's life while claiming that he didn't know where she was. See id. at 56-57.

[6] Father also testified that Mother texted him in July 2021. Father asked to see Child, but Mother responded that there was no court-ordered parenting time, only court-ordered child support. Father told Mother he would see her in court, but he didn't file anything. After the July 2021 text conversation, Father claimed that Mother blocked him again. In total, Father said he tried contacting Mother around fifty times. Father, however, didn't have any proof that his messages to Mother were blocked or not delivered. See id. at 60. Finally, Father acknowledged that he had been convicted of crimes of violence and that he had been charged with crimes against both Mother and his current wife, although the charges against both women were dismissed. See id. at 63-65.

[7] Mother testified to a different version of events. She said that she had the same phone number from October 2017, when Father had last seen Child, until just about two months before the June 2024 hearing, when she switched phone carriers. Mother stated that in that time frame, she had heard from Father only once, in November 2022, when he responded to one of her Facebook posts. See id. at 16. Because she didn't think that any conversation between them would be “healthy,” she blocked Father on Facebook. Id. at 17. However, she remained Facebook friends with Father's wife until Stepfather petitioned to adopt Child. Mother also testified that she “never” blocked Father's phone number. Id. at 18.

[8] Mother also testified that she lived in the same house in New Harmony for “about five years.” See id. at 90. That is, Mother lived there from around 2018 to 2020, briefly moved to Mount Vernon, and then returned there until 2022, when she moved to Evansville. Mother acknowledged that she never “initiate[d]” visits between Father and Child but explained why:

We have never had a healthy relationship. With the ․ allegations of the robbery that took place against me in Posey County, I was honestly concerned for [Child's] safety. There was no ․ proof that my daughter was going to be safe in his care. If he harmed me and everything then yes, I was concerned. And so when my lawyer and the Judge advised him that he would have to file for visitation and everything in Vanderburgh County I followed what the Judge and my lawyer told me to do. And then he never filed for those visitations.

Id. at 93, 94. Mother said that before the adoption petition was filed, she didn't oppose visits between Child and Father; rather, she just wanted them to be supervised based on her safety concerns.

[9] After the hearing, the trial court found that Father's consent is not required and that adoption is in Child's best interests:

The court now finds that [F]ather's consent is not necessary. [F]ather has failed to keep in contact with the child. It was established through testimony that [F]ather was aware of the court system and his ability to have his rights enforced either [sic] without an attorney; he failed to do so. Father failed to support the child until ordered to pay child support by the court. It is in the best interest of the child to be adopted by the petitioner. The child has a loving bond with the petitioner and recognizes him as her father and calls him “Dad”.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 7.¹ The trial court later granted Stepfather's petition to adopt Child and issued an adoption decree.

[10] Father now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[11] Father contends the trial court erred in granting Stepfather's petition to adopt Child. We give “considerable deference” to trial-court decisions in family-law matters “because we recognize that the trial judge is in the best position to judge the facts, determine witness credibility, get a feel for the family dynamics, and get a sense of the parents and their relationship with their children.” In re Adoption of I.B., 163 N.E.3d 270, 274 (Ind. 2021) (quotation omitted). “So, when reviewing an adoption case, we presume that the trial court's decision is correct, and the appellant bears the burden of rebutting this presumption.” Id. (quotation omitted). “And we will not disturb that decision unless the evidence leads to but one conclusion and the trial judge reached an opposite conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted). We will not reweigh evidence or assess witness credibility. Id. Rather, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision. Id.

I. The trial court did not err in finding that Father's consent to the adoption is not required

[12] Father contends the trial court erred in finding that his consent to the adoption is not required. “A natural parent enjoys special protection in any adoption proceeding, and courts strictly construe our adoption statutes to preserve the fundamentally important parent-child relationship.” Id. Generally, a trial court may grant an adoption petition only if both parents consent. See Ind. Code § 31-19-9-1(a)(2). But parental consent may be dispensed with under “carefully enumerated circumstances.” I.B., 163 N.E.3d at 274. Section 31-19-9-8(a) provides consent is not required from:

(2) A parent of a child in the custody of another person if for a period of at least one (1) year the parent:

(A) fails without justifiable cause to communicate significantly with the child when able to do so; or

(B) knowingly fails to provide for the care and support of the child when able to do so as required by law or judicial decree.

The petitioner must prove the parent's consent is unnecessary by clear and convincing evidence. I.B., 163 N.E.3d at 274 (citing I.C. §§ 31-19-10-0.5, - 1.2(a)).

[13] Father argues Stepfather failed to prove that for at least one year he failed without justifiable cause to communicate significantly with Child when able to do so under Section 31-19-9-8(a)(2)(A). Father doesn't dispute that he hasn't seen or visited Child since October 2017. The trial court found as much when it determined that Father “has failed to keep in contact with the child.” Father, however, claims he didn't have the ability to communicate with Child because of Mother's actions. Efforts to hamper or thwart communication between parent and child are relevant in determining the ability to communicate. Rust v. Lawson, 714 N.E.2d 769, 772 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. Although Father testified that Mother blocked him, Mother testified otherwise. That is, Mother testified that she “never” blocked Father's phone number and only blocked his Facebook account in November 2022 after he responded to one of her posts. In addition, Mother said she had the same phone number from October 2017 until shortly before the June 2024 hearing, yet she only heard from Father once. Whether Mother hampered or thwarted communication was a credibility determination for the trial court to make, and the court believed Mother. We will not second guess that determination on appeal. See I.B., 163 N.E.3d at 274.

[14] Father also suggests he had justifiable cause for not seeking parenting time with Child because he didn't know how to navigate the court system as a pro se litigant. The trial court rejected this claim, finding that Father “was aware of the court system and his ability to have his rights enforced” without an attorney but “failed to do so.” Indeed, evidence was presented that the Posey County trial court told Father in 2017 that he needed to pursue parenting time once the case was transferred to Vanderburgh County. In addition, at the child-support hearing in May 2021, the Vanderburgh County trial court told Father, who appeared pro se, that he needed to petition for parenting time. But Father didn't do so until April 2024, about six months after the adoption petition was filed. The court did not err in concluding that Stepfather proved by clear and convincing evidence that for at least one year Father failed without justifiable cause to communicate significantly with Child when able to do so.²

II. The trial court did not err in finding that adoption is in Child's best interests

[15] Father contends the trial court erred in finding that adoption is in the best interests of Child. “[E]ven if a court determines that a natural parent's consent is not required for an adoption, the court must still determine whether adoption is in the child's best interests.” In re Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965, 974 (Ind. 2014) (quotation omitted); see also I.C. § 31-19-11-1(a)(1).

[16] The adoption statute does not provide guidance for which factors to consider when determining the best interests of a child in an adoption proceeding, but we have noted that there are strong similarities between the adoption statute and the termination-of-parental-rights statute in this respect. In re Adoption of M.S., 10 N.E.3d 1272, 1281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). In termination cases, we have held that the trial court is required to look to the totality of the evidence to determine the best interests of a child. Id. Relevant factors include, among others, a parent's historical and current inability to provide a suitable environment for the child and the child's need for permanence and stability. Id.

[17] Here, the record supports the trial court's best-interests finding. Child was born in December 2015, and Father last saw her in October 2017, when she was still one year old. Child was eight at the time of the adoption. Although Father claimed that Mother prevented him from communicating with Child, the trial court rejected his claim. As Mother put it, Father is a “stranger” to Child. Tr. pp. 11, 94. Mother also had safety concerns about Father. Father acknowledged his convictions and that he had been charged with offenses against both Mother and his current wife.

[18] Evidence was also presented that Stepfather has a good bond with Child. As the trial court found, “It is in the best interest of the child to be adopted by the petitioner. The child has a loving bond with the petitioner and recognizes him as her father and calls him ‘Dad’.” Although Father makes several arguments, such as that he is a good dad to another child of his (who was an adult at the time of the hearing) and that Child called Mother's prior boyfriends “Dad” too, these are requests for us to reweigh the evidence, which we won't do. The court did not err in finding that adoption is in Child's best interests.

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court made this ruling in a CCS entry. Father claims the trial court should have issued a “written order” instead because “ ‘a trial court speaks only through its order book.’ ” Appellant's Br. p. 10 (quoting Clark v. Clark, 404 N.E.2d 23, 30 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)). According to Indiana Trial Rule 77(B), however, “The CCS is an official record of the trial court[.]”

2.   Father also argues Stepfather failed to prove that for at least one year he knowingly failed to provide for the care and support of Child when able to do so as required by law or judicial decree under Section 31-19-9-8(a)(2)(B). Because we affirm the trial court's failure-to-communicate finding, we need not reach this alternative ground for dispensing with Father's consent.

Vaidik, Judge.

Judges Bailey and DeBoer concur. Bailey, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.