SMITH v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Jamal Braheim Smith appeals his conviction for criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Smith claims that his conviction must be reversed because the State failed to prove that he “knowingly trespassed the property of IU Methodist Hospital (the Hospital).” Appellant's Brief at 4.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On May 11, 2024, four IU Methodist Public Safety officers (the Officers) were dispatched to the Hospital's emergency room to escort Smith to a behavioral health unit, following his medical discharge. Smith had been on an emergency detention because of his suicidal ideations. When the Officers arrived, they informed Smith that they were going to take him to a secure holding area so he could remove his hospital gown and dress in street clothes.

[4] While in the holding area, Smith told the Officers that he wanted additional medical treatment. In response, the Officers told Smith that because he had been discharged, he would have to return to the emergency room and again check in to the Hospital. The Officers also informed Smith that he had to get dressed and leave the premises, or they would “criminally trespass him.” Transcript Vol. II at 104.

[5] At that point, Smith said that he wanted to make a phone call. A social worker assisted Smith in dialing a call three or four times; however, Smith hung up immediately after the connections were made without talking to anyone. After the Officers again informed Smith of the Hospital's trespass policy, Smith asked if he could call his mother. The Officers assisted Smith in connecting the call, but he refused to speak.

[6] After explaining the trespass policy to Smith a third time, Smith decided that he did not want to check into the Hospital again and told the Officers that he needed a ride home. Smith got dressed while the social worker ordered an Uber. The Officers and Smith then walked outside and waited for the car to arrive. At some point, Smith looked over his shoulder several times and stated that he “really need[ed] to make a phone call.” Transcript Vol. II at 108, 112, 135. In response, the Officers repeatedly told Smith that the Uber was on the way and if he walked into the Hospital again, they would arrest him for trespass. Smith then turned and ran through the Hospital's sliding doors into the emergency room. The Officers followed and arrested Smith.

[7] The State charged Smith with trespass, a Class A misdemeanor. Following a jury trial on July 15, 2024, Smith was found guilty as charged and sentenced to ten days of incarceration, time served.

[8] Smith now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[9] In reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, our standard of review is well-settled. We consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. Id. We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 146-47. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may be reasonably drawn from it to support the verdict. Id. at 147.

[10] In accordance with Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(b)(1), a person who “not having a contractual interest in the property, knowingly or intentionally enters the real property of another person after having been denied entry by the other person or that person's agent ․ commits criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor.” Smith challenges the sufficiency of evidence relating to the mens rea element of the criminal trespass statute, arguing that the State failed to establish that his actions were undertaken “knowingly.”¹ More specifically, while Smith acknowledges that the Officers repeatedly informed him that he would be arrested if he tried to re-enter the Hospital, he claims that he did not “hear” the warnings because he was confused. Appellant's Brief at 10.

[11] Notwithstanding Smith's contention, we note that “knowledge ․ [is a] mental state and absent an admission by the defendant, the [fact finder] must resort to the reasonable inferences from both direct and circumstantial evidence to determine whether the defendant has the requisite knowledge ․ to commit the offense in question.” Stubbers v. State, 190 N.E.3d 424, 432 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. A person acts knowingly if, “when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b). A defendant can defeat the mens rea element of the criminal trespass statute only if he has a “fair and reasonable” belief that he has a right to be on the property of another. A.E.B. v. State, 756 N.E.2d 536, 541 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). And it is for the trier of fact to determine whether the defendant believed that he had a right to be on another's property and whether that belief had a fair and reasonable foundation. Id.

[12] Here, the State presented evidence that the Officers escorted Smith from the Hospital following his medical discharge, ordered an Uber for him because he did not want to check back into the Hospital, and repeatedly warned him that he would be arrested and charged with trespass if he re-entered the emergency room. Smith ignored the Officers’ warnings, stated that he needed to make a phone call, and ran back into the Hospital. This evidence permits an inference that Smith was not confused about what he was being asked to do, i.e., to remain outside and wait for the Uber, and not re-enter the hospital. Smith's contention that he did not “hear” the warnings because he was suffering from a mental health crisis ignores the fact that he had been medically discharged from such a condition two hours prior to the trespass incident. In short, Smith is essentially requesting us to reweigh evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we will not do. See Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146. The evidence was sufficient to support Smith's conviction for trespass.

[13] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The State did not allege that Smith “intentionally” entered the Hospital in violation of I.C. § 35-43-2-2(b)(1).

Altice, Chief Judge.

Vaidik, J. and Scheele, J., concur.