John Moreno, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] John Moreno appeals following his conviction of murder ¹ and adjudication as a habitual offender.² Moreno presents four issues for our review, which we revise and restate as:

1. Whether the State's explanation of the reasonable doubt standard during voir dire constituted prosecutorial misconduct rising to the level of fundamental error?

2. Whether the trial court committed fundamental error when instructing the jury on self-defense?

3. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to negate Moreno's claim of self-defense?

4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion at sentencing by failing to consider Moreno's proffered mitigating factors?

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Donna Hawes sporadically allowed Moreno to spend the night in her apartment in Indianapolis because Moreno did not have a permanent residence. On February 5, 2021, Moreno shot Hawes three times. He then took Hawes's cell phone and car keys and drove away from her apartment in her vehicle. A couple of hours later, Moreno returned to the apartment, loaded two televisions from the apartment into her car, and again drove away.

[3] On February 7, 2021, a neighbor noticed Hawes's apartment door was cracked open, and when the neighbor went to investigate, she found Hawes's dead body lying on the floor. The neighbor called 911, and several Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (“IMPD”) officers and medical personnel arrived on the scene. They discovered a spent shell casing on the living room floor and a TV stand with “an outline in dust where ․ it appeared there should have been a TV.” (Tr. Vol. 5 at 127.) The IMPD also found an empty cell phone case on the floor of Hawes's apartment.

[4] IMPD Detective Charles Benner later obtained surveillance footage from Hawes's apartment complex that showed Moreno leaving the complex on February 5, 2021, driving Hawes's vehicle, returning to the complex, carrying the televisions out of Hawes's apartment, and driving away. IMPD Officer Roberto DeJesus found Hawes's car backed into a parking spot at the Port O’ Call Apartments, and the vehicle was towed so that it could be analyzed by the crime lab. The crime lab found two televisions inside the vehicle, and latent fingerprints found on the televisions matched Moreno's fingerprints.

[5] The IMPD obtained location data regarding Hawes's cellular phone from T-Mobile on February 10, 2021, and detectives went to the apartment complex where the location data indicated the phone was. The detectives saw Moreno leave a four-unit section of one of the apartment buildings. When Moreno saw the detectives outside, he turned around and then entered the entryway of a different four-unit section than the one he had left. When the two detectives approached the entryway, Moreno exited the building and “began walking at a fast pace” away from the officers. (Tr. Vol. 6 at 74.) The officers “began to jog or run after him to try to close the gap and made contact with him.” (Id. at 74-75.) The officers stopped Moreno and began conducting a pat down search, but Moreno pulled away. The officers then “took him to the ground at that point and placed him into handcuffs.” (Id. at 75.) The officers found a handgun on Moreno and ballistics testing later determined it was the handgun that shot the bullets recovered from Hawes's body.

[6] On February 24, 2021, the State filed a criminal information charging Moreno with murder. The State also filed notice of its intention to seek a habitual offender sentence enhancement.³ The trial court held Moreno's first jury trial on November 28, 2022, but that trial ended in a mistrial after the State referenced Moreno's decision to exercise his right to remain silent during its closing argument. The trial court held Moreno's second jury trial on January 23, 2023, but that trial also ended in a mistrial after Moreno interrupted the judge in front of the entire jury panel and asserted the retrial violated his right to be free of double jeopardy.

[7] The trial court then held Moreno's third jury trial on March 6, 2023. During the trial court's voir dire, the court explained both that the defendant was presumed innocent and that the State was required to prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. It questioned the prospective jurors:

THE COURT: Now, as I stated, the State must prove each element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt in order to overcome the presumption of innocence. You will be instructed that under the law of the state, that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the Defendant's guilt. There are very few things in this world that we can know with an absolute certainty, and the law does not require the State to overcome all possible doubt. The law requires that you be firmly convinced of his guilt in order to find him guilty. So if you are firmly convinced, then you may find him guilty. If you are not firmly convinced, then you should find him not guilty.

Do any of you disagree with the principle that the burden of proof is on the State of Indiana?

PROSPECTIVE JURORS: No.

THE COURT: Do any of you disagree that the State must prove the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?

PROSPECTIVE JURORS: No.

(Tr. Vol. 5 at 33.)

[8] The State then conducted its voir dire and presented a PowerPoint to a panel of prospective jurors. The initial PowerPoint slide consisted of a black square and as the State advanced the slides pieces of the black square were removed. The State asked the prospective jurors to “raise your hand when you recognize what this image is.” (Id. at 39.) As the State advanced the slides, an image of the American flag was slowly revealed. Each prospective juror on the panel raised his or her hand before the flag was fully revealed. The State then questioned the prospective jurors about when they raised their hands and asked one prospective juror:

STATE: Now, at that point, after you raised your hand, was it still possible that it could have been something else?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Yes, uh-huh.

STATE: But you made a reasonable inference.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Uh-huh.

(Id. at 40.) Later during voir dire, the State questioned a second panel of prospective jurors:

STATE: Did everybody see the flag example that we did earlier?

PROSPECTIVE JURORS: Yes.

STATE: Now, everybody else kind of had the opportunity to raise their hands when they slowly but surely realized what it was. And you noticed that everybody raised their hands at different times, but everybody ultimately raised their hand before all of the pieces were shown. They were all, at that point, firmly convinced, that is our standard. And that is what we ask for you today, too, when you are assessing the evidence and looking at the reasonable inferences that you can make from the evidence.

(Id. at 66.)

[9] After the parties selected the jury, the trial court delivered preliminary instructions to the jury, including one regarding the State's burden of proof:

The burden is upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant is guilty of the crime charged. It is a strict and heavy burden.

The evidence must overcome any reasonable doubt concerning the Defendant's guilt. But it does not mean that a defendant's guilt must be proved beyond all possible doubt.

A reasonable doubt is a fair, actual, and logical doubt based upon reason and common sense. A reasonable doubt may arise either from the evidence or from a lack of evidence. Reasonable doubt exists when you are not firmly convinced of the Defendant's guilt after you have weighed and considered all of the evidence.

A defendant must not be convicted on suspicion or speculation. It is not enough for the State to show that the Defendant is probably guilty.

On the other hand, there are very few things in this world we know with absolute certainty. The State does not have to overcome every possible doubt.

The State must prove each element of the crime by evidence that firmly convinces each of you and leaves you no reasonable doubt. The proof must be so convincing that you can rely and act upon it in this matter of the highest importance.

If you find that there is a reasonable doubt that the Defendant is guilty of the crime, you must give the Defendant the benefit of that doubt and find the Defendant not guilty of the crime under consideration.

(Id. at 96-97.)

[10] During trial, Moreno testified that he spent the night at Hawes's apartment, and when he woke up on February 5, 2021, Hawes attempted to have sex with him. Moreno stated that when he refused Hawes's advances, she started swinging a baseball bat at him and he shot her three times.

[11] Before the jury retired for deliberation, the trial court again instructed the jury that the State was required to prove each element of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court also instructed the jury regarding self-defense:

Final instruction number 18, it is an issue whether the Defendant acted in self-defense. A person may use reasonable force against another person to protect himself from what the Defendant reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force.

A person is justified in using deadly force and does not have a duty to retreat only if he reasonably believes that the deadly force is necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to himself or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.

However, a person may not use force if he is committing a crime that is directly and immediately connected to the confrontation. In other words, for the Defendant to lose the right of self-defense the jury must find that but for the Defendant's commission of a separate crime, the confrontation resulting in injury to Donna Hawes would not have occurred, or he is escaping after the commission of a crime that is directly and immediately connected to the confrontation, or he provokes a fight with another person with the intent to cause bodily injury to that person, or he has willingly entered into a fight with another person or started the fight unless he withdraws from the fight and communicates to the other person his intent to withdraw and the other person nevertheless continues or threatens to continue the fight.

The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant did not act in self-defense.

(Tr. Vol. 7 at 61.) The jury subsequently returned a verdict finding Moreno guilty of murder. Moreno and the State then entered into an agreement that Moreno would plead guilty to the habitual offender enhancement and the enhancement imposed would be only six years.

[12] The trial court held Moreno's sentencing hearing on March 24, 2023. The State asked the trial court to consider Moreno's criminal history, which consisted of three felony and four misdemeanor convictions, and his repeated violations of probation to be aggravating factors. Moreno asked the trial court to consider as a mitigating factor that he suffered “substantial childhood trauma during his developmental years and was exposed to violence in the household that likely had some impact on [his] psychological and emotional development.” (Id. at 86.) The trial court found aggravating factors in Moreno's criminal history and his being “in absconsion [sic] status from home detention” at the time of the instant offense. (Id. at 91.) The trial court did not mention any mitigating factors in its sentencing statement. The trial court sentenced Moreno to a term of sixty years for his murder conviction and enhanced that sentence by an additional six years because of the habitual offender finding, for a term of sixty-six years.

Discussion and Decision

1. Prosecutorial Misconduct

[13] Moreno contends the State's flag-reveal presentation during voir dire constituted prosecutorial misconduct. Moreno did not object to the State's presentation at trial, and the failure of a defendant to make a contemporaneous objection to alleged prosecutorial misconduct generally precludes the defendant from raising the issue on appeal. Booher v. State, 773 N.E.2d 814, 817 (Ind. 2002). Nonetheless, even if the defendant failed to raise a contemporaneous objection, the defendant's claim of prosecutorial misconduct is not waived if the misconduct was so egregious it rises to the level of fundamental error. Id. “For prosecutorial misconduct to constitute fundamental error, it must make a fair trial impossible or constitute clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process and present an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.” Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

[14] A successful prosecutorial misconduct claim requires the defendant to prove both that there was misconduct by the prosecutor and that the “misconduct, under the circumstances, placed the defendant in a position of grave peril to which he should not have been subjected.” Adcock v. State, 933 N.E.2d 21, 26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. We measure misconduct “by case law and the Rules of Professional Conduct. The gravity of peril is measured by the probable persuasive effect of the misconduct on the jury's decision rather than the degree of impropriety of the conduct.” Craft v. State, 187 N.E.3d 340, 347-48 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted), trans. denied.

[15] Moreno argues the State's flag-reveal presentation “likely left jurors with an impression of reasonable doubt as something less than what our justice system actually requires.” (Appellant's Br. at 16.) He compares the flag-reveal presentation to tactics we warned against in Adcock. During voir dire in Adcock, the State referenced “a twenty-piece jigsaw puzzle that was missing two pieces to highlight the difference between beyond a reasonable doubt and beyond all possible doubt.” 933 N.E.2d at 25 (internal quotation marks omitted). On appeal, Adcock argued the State's use of the jigsaw puzzle analogy to illustrate the beyond a reasonable doubt standard was prosecutorial misconduct and amounted to fundamental error. Id. at 26. We held the analogy did not unduly prejudice Adcock or constitute fundamental error because “Adcock was afforded the opportunity to rebut the prosecutor's analogy and the trial court provided the jury with a detailed instruction that contained the correct definition of reasonable doubt and the State's burden of proof.” Id. at 28. Nonetheless, we also “caution[ed] prosecutors who are tempted to enliven voir dire and/or opening and closing arguments with visual aids or analogies such as the one here, that using such aids to illustrate the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard is dangerous and unwise.” Id. at 28 n.6.

[16] Moreno asserts that “despite this decade-old warning, the State did the ‘dangerous and unwise’ at Moreno's trial.” (Appellant's Br. at 20.) However, like in Adcock, the trial court correctly instructed the jury regarding the State's burden of proof. “ ‘When the jury is properly instructed, we will presume they followed such instructions.’ ” Weisheit v. State, 26 N.E.3d 3, 20 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Duncanson v. State, 509 N.E.2d 182, 186 (Ind. 1987)), reh'g denied, cert. denied, 577 U.S. 1106 (2016). The trial court explained the State's burden of proof in its questioning of the prospective jurors before the State's flag-reveal presentation, and the trial court properly instructed the prospective jurors on the State's burden of proof in its preliminary instructions to the jury. While the trial court did not reread the burden of proof instruction in its final instructions to the jury, it did instruct the jurors to continue to consider the preliminary instructions throughout their deliberations. Moreover, like the defendant in Adcock, Moreno had the opportunity to ask questions about the analogy drawn by the State when he questioned the venire. Thus, like the jigsaw puzzle analogy in Adcock, we cannot say the State's flag-reveal presentation in the instant case constituted fundamental error.⁴

2. Self-Defense Jury Instruction

[17] Second, Moreno asserts the trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding self-defense. We leave instructing the jury to the sound discretion of the trial court, and we generally review the trial court's instructions for an abuse of discretion. Harrison v. State, 32 N.E.3d 240, 251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. “To constitute an abuse of discretion, an instruction that is given to the jury must be erroneous, and the instructions viewed as a whole must misstate the law or otherwise mislead the jury.” Id. However, Moreno did not object to the trial court's jury instruction on self-defense. “A defendant who fails to object to a jury instruction at trial waives any challenge to that instruction on appeal, unless giving the instruction was fundamental error.” Evans v. State, 81 N.E.3d 634, 637 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). Consequently, Moreno's burden on appeal is high.

The fundamental error exception to the waiver rule is an extremely narrow one. To rise to the level of fundamental error, the error must be so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a fair trial impossible. Specifically, the error must constitute a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm must be substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process. When we consider a claim of fundamental error with respect to jury instructions, we look to the jury instructions as a whole to determine if they were adequate.

Munford v. State, 923 N.E.2d 11, 13-14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

[18] Moreno argues the trial court's final jury instruction on self-defense misstated the law because it “included phrases the Indiana Supreme Court has explicitly disavowed because they are likely to lead to erroneous denials of self-defense claims.” (Appellant's Br. at 26-27.) He challenges the portion of the trial court's instruction that stated self-defense does not protect a defendant from using force against another if the defendant “is committing a crime that is directly and immediately connected to the confrontation” or if “but for the Defendant's commission of a separate crime,” the confrontation would not have occurred. (Tr. Vol. 7 at 61.) Moreno notes our Indiana Supreme Court explained in Gammons v. State that instructing the jury “the crime and confrontation must merely be ‘directly and immediately related’ ” risks weakening the causal connection between the crime and the confrontation necessary to preclude a claim of self-defense. 148 N.E.3d 301, 304 (Ind. 2020). Likewise, instructing the jury that “ ‘the evidence must show that but for the defendant committing a crime, the confrontation resulting in injury to the victim would not have occurred’ ” could erroneously “foreclose the defense in an instance where a defendant's crime was tenuously connected with the confrontation[.]” Id. (emphasis in original). “[S]elf-defense is barred only when there is an immediate causal connection between the crime and the confrontation.” Id. at 304-05 (internal quotation marks omitted).

[19] Here, the trial court's self-defense instruction utilized the language our Indiana Supreme Court criticized in Gammons, but that portion of the trial court's instruction was superfluous. An error in a jury instruction does not rise to the level of fundamental error when either the instructions as a whole adequately informed the jury or the error does not relate to a central issue at trial. See Hall v. State, 937 N.E.2d 911, 913 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (“error in an instruction on mens rea does not rise to the level of fundamental error where either the instructions as a whole sufficiently inform the jury of the required mens rea or the defendant's mens rea was not a central issue at trial”). The State did not argue that the contemporaneous crime exception precluded Moreno's claim of self-defense. The only time the exception was mentioned during closing arguments was when Moreno explained that that portion of the self-defense jury instruction was not relevant.

[20] Moreno's testimony was that Hawes allowed him to stay in her apartment, and when he woke up on the day of the incident, she propositioned him for sex and threatened him with a baseball bat. Moreno's explanation of his confrontation with Hawes does not implicate him in any criminal activity at the time. While Moreno testified that he smoked marijuana in Hawes's apartment the night before the confrontation, he also explained that he finished smoking all his marijuana before falling asleep. In addition, while the State presented evidence Moreno stole Hawes's televisions, cellular phone, and car, these acts all occurred after Moreno killed Hawes. We therefore hold the trial court's self-defense jury instruction did not constitute fundamental error because the contemporaneous crime exception was not an issue at trial, and accordingly, the erroneous portion of the instruction pertaining to that exception could not have misled the jury. See, e.g., Winkleman v. State, 22 N.E.3d 844, 851 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (holding jury instruction that omitted element of offense did not constitute fundamental error when that element was clearly established at trial), trans. denied.

3. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[21] Third, Moreno argues the State failed to negate his self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt. Our standard of review for such claims is the same as our standard of review for other sufficiency of the evidence issues. Quinn v. State, 126 N.E.3d 924, 927 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). “We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. We will reverse a conviction only if no reasonable person could say that the State negated the defendant's self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

[22] “Self-defense is a legal justification for an otherwise criminal act.” Stewart v. State, 167 N.E.3d 367, 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. Indiana Code section 35-41-3-2(c) provides: “A person is justified in using reasonable force against any other person to protect the person or a third person from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force.” The use of deadly force is justified “if the person reasonably believes that that force is necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to the person or a third person or the commission of a forcible felony.” Id. A successful self-defense claim requires three elements: (1) the defendant was in a place where the defendant had a right to be; (2) the defendant did not provoke, instigate, or willingly participate in the violence; and (3) the defendant had a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm. Justice v. State, 237 N.E.3d 1154, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), aff'd on rehearing, 245 N.E.3d 670 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied. “[I]t is not the defendant's burden to prove self-defense. Rather, the burden remains on the State to disprove this claim.” Id. at 1159. “The State may meet its burden by rebutting the defense directly—by affirmatively showing the defendant did not act in self-defense—or by simply relying on the sufficiency of its evidence in chief.” Stewart, 167 N.E.3d at 376.

[23] The State asserts Moreno's claim of self-defense “was based entirely on his own testimony,” and “Moreno's jury was simply not required by law to believe him.” (Appellee's Br. at 13.) Moreno testified that he shot Hawes in self-defense, but rather than summoning medical help for her, he took her keys, cellular phone, and vehicle and drove away, only to return hours later to take two televisions from her apartment. As the State notes, “the jury could have easily inferred Moreno's motive for killing Hawes: to steal the items that he actually did steal from her.” (Id. at 21.) Flight can demonstrate consciousness of guilt, Tuggle v. State, 9 N.E.3d 726, 736 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied, and Moreno fled the scene of the shooting and later attempted to evade detectives. The jury could thus have concluded from Moreno's actions in the wake of the shooting that his self-defense explanation at trial was untrue, and therefore, we cannot say the State failed to rebut Moreno's claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Stubbers v. State, 190 N.E.3d 424, 430 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (holding evidence was sufficient to rebut the defendant's defense because the jury was not required to believe the defendant's testimony that he hit and shot dog because he thought doing so was necessary to protect himself from the dog), trans. denied.

4. Sentencing

[24] Fourth, Moreno contends the trial court abused its discretion at sentencing because the trial court did not address Moreno's difficult childhood in its sentencing statement even though Moreno presented it as a potential mitigating factor. We review a trial court's sentencing decision using a well-settled standard of review:

Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court. So long as the sentence is within the statutory range, it is subject to review only for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion will be found where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. A trial court may abuse its discretion in a number of ways, including: (1) failing to enter a sentencing statement at all; (2) entering a sentencing statement that includes aggravating and mitigating factors that are unsupported by the record; (3) entering a sentencing statement that omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record; or (4) entering a sentencing statement that includes reasons that are improper as a matter of law.

Hudson v. State, 135 N.E.3d 973, 979 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (internal citations omitted).

[25] “The trial court is not obligated to accept the defendant's argument as to what constitutes a mitigating factor, and a trial court is not required to give the same weight to proffered mitigating factors as does the defendant.” Lee v. State, 246 N.E.3d 1265, 1270 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). Moreover, “[a]n allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Id. While Moreno reported that his father was an abusive alcoholic, “[o]ur supreme court has ‘consistently held that evidence of a difficult childhood warrants little, if any, mitigating weight.” Patterson v. State, 909 N.E.2d 1058, 1062 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Ritchie v. State, 875 N.E.2d 706, 725 (Ind. 2007), reh'g denied). Consequently, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion when it did not list Moreno's difficult childhood as a mitigating factor in its sentencing statement. See, e.g., Hudson v. State, 135 N.E.3d 973, 979 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not list the defendant's difficult childhood as a mitigating factor at sentencing).

Conclusion

[26] The State's flag-reveal presentation did not constitute fundamental error because the trial court properly instructed the jury regarding the reasonable doubt standard and Moreno had an opportunity to question the prospective jurors after the State's presentation. In addition, while the trial court's jury instruction regarding self-defense misstated the law regarding the contemporaneous crime exception, the misstatement did not rise to the level of fundamental error because the exception was not at issue at Moreno's trial. The State presented sufficient evidence to rebut Moreno's claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it failed to find Moreno's difficult childhood was a mitigating factor at sentencing. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[27] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.

2.   Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8.

3.   The State later amended the criminal information to charge Moreno with Level 5 felony carrying a handgun without a license, Ind. Code § 35-47-2-1, and Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5, but the State subsequently dismissed those charges.

4.   Moreno cites two out-of-state cases, People v. Katzenburger, 178 Cal. App. 4th 1260 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009), rev. denied, and People v. Wilds, 141 A.D.2d 395 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988), to argue “Courts in other jurisdictions have held that presentations like the PowerPoint here violate due process.” (Appellant's Br. at 20.) In Katzenburger, the California Court of Appeals held the prosecutor's use of a PowerPoint presentation showing an incomplete picture of the Statue of Liberty to illustrate the concept of reasonable doubt was improper, but the presentation did not prejudice the defendant because the trial court instructed the jury using the proper definition of reasonable doubt. 178 Cal. App. 4th at 1269. In Wilds, the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division held that the trial court's analogy likening the reasonable doubt standard to being able to tell from an incomplete jigsaw puzzle that the puzzle represented Abraham Lincoln's portrait invalidated the defendant's conviction because it “diminished the People's burden of proof and permitted the conviction of the defendant, based upon a standard less than that of beyond a reasonable doubt.” 141 A.D.2d at 398. Like in Katzenburger and unlike in Wilds, the trial court here correctly instructed the jury regarding the reasonable doubt standard. Thus, our holding aligns with Katzenburger and is distinguishable from Wilds.

May, Judge.

Judges Brown and Pyle concur. Brown, J., and Pyle, J., concur.